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The English Aristocracy at War, 1272-1314 
In the closing decades of the thirteenth century, the king of England, Edward I, 
embarked upon a series of wars in Wales, France and Scotland that placed 
unprecedented demands on the community of the realm. Although the Crown's war 
aims varied depending on whether the campaigns were being fought within the British 
Isles or on the continent, one factor remained constant: the need to recruit hundreds and 
sometimes thousands of soldiers on an almost annual basis from among the landholding 
elites. It is the aim of this thesis to assess how the gentry and nobility responded to these 
demands; how they discharged their military obligations; and what their service patterns 
and military experiences can tell us about the strengths and weaknesses of the armies 
that were put into the field. 
By using an innovative methodological approach established in recent decades 
by historians such as Philip Morgan, Andrew Ayton and Anne Curry, the thesis seeks to 
gain insights into the characteristics of the military community in its entirety. The 
individual soldier forms the main focus of enquiry throughout much of the discussion; 
and the frequency with which he gave military service, his connections to other 
members of the military elite, and, in the case of the king's chief commanders, the 
leadership duties that he performed, are each considered in detail. Nevertheless, the 
experiences of medieval combatants are best understood in the context of the local 
communities from which they were recruited and the retinues in which they served. 
Consequently, an attempt is also made to reassess the subject of military organisation 
under the first two Edwards by examining the composition and structure of these armies 
from the perspective of the soldiers and small units that comprised them. 
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Introduction 
War, conquest and overreaching ambition provide the connecting thread to the history 
of the British Isles between 1272 and the battle of Bannockburn. Therefore, it is no 
surprise to find that those decades have been well served by generations of military 
historians. J. E. Morris' history of The Welsh Wars of Edward I, published for the first 
time over a century ago and since reprinted for a modern readership, set new standards 
of scholarship and source analysis when it was written and has remained the seminal 
book on the subject to this day. ' More recently, work by Michael Prestwich on the 
financing and organisation of the wars of Edward I has placed the military 
developments of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries into their political, 
logistical and administrative contexts. 2 With these two historians as the main standard- 
bearers, supported by the works of various others on subjects such as military obligation 
and garrison service, 3 it is evident, to quote the words of a scholar of a slightly earlier 
period, that `the organisation of military service in the later thirteenth century. . . 
has 
received a lot of attention'. 4 The appeal of the wars of Edward I and his son to the 
historian lies not only in the scale of the campaigns that were launched, but also in the 
extensive trail of documents that they left in their wake. Consequently, a great deal is 
now known about the sizes of the armies that were put into the field; the conduct of the 
campaigns; the means by which armies were supplied with money and food; and the 
impact of the wars on English society. In contrast, the role of the aristocracy in its 
widest sense and their contribution to the war effort are less perfectly understood. Over 
the last twenty years or so, studies on genteel military service have become an 
established feature of historical writing on the later Middle Ages. They have contributed 
significantly to our understanding of the dynamics of regional military communities, 
and of the composition of armies raised at various stages of the Hundred Years War. 5 In 
1 J. E. Morris, The Welsh Wars of Edward I (Oxford, 1901); reprinted with new introduction by M. 
Prestwich and R. F. Walker (Stroud, 1996). 
2 M. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance under Edward I (London, 1972). 
3 E. g. M. R. Powicke, Military Obligation in Medieval England: A Study in Liberty and Duty (Oxford, 
1962), chapters 6-8; F. J. Watson, Under the Hammer: Edward I and Scotland, 1286-1306 (East Linton, 
1998). 
° J. S. Critchley, `Summonses to Military Service early in the Reign of Henry III', EHR, lxxxvi (1971), 79. 
5 E. g. P. Morgan, War and Society in Medieval Cheshire, 1277-1403 (Manchester, 1987); A. Ayton, 
Knights and Warhorses: Military Service and the English Aristocracy under Edward III (Woodbridge, 
1994); A. King, `War, Politics and Landed Society in Northumberland, c. 1296-c. 1408', University of 
Durham D. Phil. thesis, 2001; A. R. Bell, War and the Soldier in the Fourteenth Century (Woodbridge, 
2004); A. Ayton, `The English Army at Crecy', The Battle of Crecy, 1346, A. Ayton and P. Preston 
(Woodbridge, 2005), 159-251; A. Curry, Agincourt: A New History (Stroud, 2005). 
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this respect, the hosts of Edward I and Edward II have been less well served: much 
remains to be discovered about the ancestors of the men who later fought so 
courageously on the battlefields of France. The aim of this study is to redress this 
imbalance, and to place alongside the traditional images of the wars of conquest. the 
majestic castles of Caernarfon, Conwy, Harlech and Beaumaris, that of the genteel 
warrior whose deeds with sword in hand made such grandiose building schemes 
possible. 
The personalities of the kings who governed England during these turbulent 
years could not have been more different. Edward I, we have been assured by his 
biographer, `was a formidable king; his reign, with both its successes and its 
disappointments, a great one'. 6 Upon returning from crusade for his coronation in 1274, 
Edward quickly put behind him the mischievous tendencies of his youth and embarked 
upon his duties with relish. The crowning glory of his reign, the conquest of Wales, was 
completed and then consolidated by 1295. Furthermore, just two years before his death, 
in 1307, it seemed that the northern kingdom of Scotland, too, had been brought under 
his imperial sway. Two factors, however, determined that Edward's dream of uniting 
Britain under one ruler would not be realised. The rebellion in 1306 of Robert Bruce, 
who was enthroned at Scone in March of that year, ensured the failure of the political 
`settlement' of 1305 to bring about a lasting peace. 7 To compound this problem, the 
death (after a lingering illness) of Edward the following year brought to the throne his 
son, Edward of Caernarfon, a man universally judged to have been unfit to rule. Unlike 
his father, Edward II would prove to be 'a procrastinator; someone who shunned 
unpleasant duties whether administrative, political or military'. 8 This new king was no 
idler: he launched himself into campaigns north of the border with only slightly less 
frequency than his father had done. Yet, within a few years of assuming the regalia of 
kingship, he had divided the realm and surrendered the initiative in the north to the 
Scots. At Bannockburn in 1314, on the approach to Stirling castle where a strong 
Scottish army had gathered to prevent the relief of that besieged fortress, all was lost 
within two bloody days of battle. Whilst the English continued to wage war with the 
Scots for many years to come, the strong kingship of Robert Bruce. combined with the 
political instability south of the border and the outbreak of war with France in 1337, 
meant that there would be no unification of the two crowns under one king. For the 
6 M. Prestwich, Edward I (London. 1988). 567. 
7 Cf. Anglo-Scottish Relations 11 --1-1328: Some Selected Documents, ed. E. L. G. Stones (Oxford, 1965). 
-11 no. -33. 8 R. M. Haines. King Edward H. Edward of Caernarfon, His Life, His Reign, and Its Aftermath, 1 
1330 (Montreal. 200' ), 333. 
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remainder of the Middle Ages, the energies of the kings of England would be 
consumed, primarily, on the continent. 
The wars with Wales and Scotland, along with the campaigns that were 
conducted against Philip IV of France over the disputed territory of Gascony between 
1294 and 1298, took place against a shifting social, political and economic background. 
Despite this, and whoever happened to be governing the country at any particular 
moment in time, one factor remained constant: the need of the kings of England to 
ensure a constant supply of manpower from the manors and vills that dotted the realm 
so as to pursue their ambitious and unsparing military objectives. From the mid-1290s, 
when expeditions were launched with great regularity and sometimes against more than 
one rival at the same time, this need was felt with added urgency. Between 1294, when 
war broke out in Wales and France almost simultaneously, and 1314, hardly a year 
passed unless the landholders and sub-tenants of the shires were called upon to man the 
king's armies. These wars were much more than petty disputes between rival kings and 
their immediate entourages. On the contrary, they saw the weight of the landholding 
communities of the competing realms pressed into the struggle on an unprecedented 
scale. As such, there is a real need to know more about how the aristocracy responded to 
these pressures and how, as individuals and as members of families, communities, and 
localities, they met and discharged their military obligations. Who were these men? 
How often did they serve in the king's armies? What were their relationships with other 
warriors who fought in the royal hosts? Indeed, how might we use our knowledge of 
these individuals and their careers to enhance our understanding of the forces that were 
put into the field? This study seeks to answer these questions through an analysis of the 
records for military service that were created and preserved during the course of these 
wars, and which name a large proportion of the combatants. 
No account of the wars of conquest would be complete without a thorough 
examination of the role played by the landholding elites and their families. Despite the 
debate currently being waged as to the relative contributions of cavalry and infantry 
forces to the conduct of medieval warfare when viewed over the longue duree, 9 there 
can be no denying that noble and genteel warriors were the soldiers of choice within 
medieval English armies. Aristocratic leadership in war, however defined, was one of 
the constant factors throughout the Middle Ages and beyond. Matthew Strickland's 
observation on the Anglo-Norman era, when the aristocracy was `defined first and 
9 Cf. B. S. Bachrach, `Medieval Military Historiography', Companion to Historiography, ed. M. Bentley 
(London, 1997), 203-20. 
4 
foremost by its military function', may be applied equally well to the Angevin, 
Plantagenet, Lancastrian and Yorkist epochs of English history. 1° The rise of contract 
armies during the course of the fourteenth century did not alter the superior role 
occupied by the social elite, and there is undoubtedly a great deal of truth in the 
assertion that `for better or worse, aristocratic leadership carried potent associations 
with sheer force, on or off the field of battle'. 11 Over the years, a number of 
explanations have been put forward as to why the aristocracy were so dominant within 
the sphere of medieval warfare. The most common explanation is that the fall of the 
Roman Empire created a vacuum of public authority which `left governance, such as it 
was, to rural warrior chieftains and their followers'. This `class' of men then went on to 
dominate society's resources, as well as the way that it used those resources to conduct 
warfare. 12 Consequently, `under the aristocratic-feudal model, civilian and military 
elites were socially and functionally integrated', and `a narrow base of recruitment for 
both elites and a relatively monolithic power structure provided the civilian elite with a 
comprehensive basis for political control of the military'. 13 The dual nature of this 
dominance was well expressed during the reigns of Edward I and his son when the 
`peerage', the leading landholders who received individual summonses to attend 
parliament, were also the men who commanded the largest retinues when the king's 
armies were gathered. 
At the closing decades of the thirteenth century, the aristocracy retained their 
position as the natural military and political leaders of English society. Around the same 
time, the social elite was undergoing a process of diversification and stratification which 
led gradually to the emergence of a new rank of men among the lower rungs of the 
aristocracy, known to history as the gentry. Whether or not the gentry had fully formed 
by the reign of Edward I, or even by the end of it, remains open to question: Peter Coss 
has recently argued that the gentry did not exist as a distinct social order until later in 
the fourteenth century. Even use of the term `proto-gentry', he has suggested, may be 
unwise for the period around 1300.14 Despite Coss' caution on this point, there is some 
room for flexibility. David Crouch, for one, has employed `gentry' as a term of 
10 M. Strickland, ed. Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military 
Organization and Warfare (Woodbridge, 1992), ix. 
" J. Powis, Aristocracy (Oxford, 1984), 44. 
12 S. Morillo, `The "Age of Cavalry" Revisited', The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: Essays on 
Medieval Military and Naval History, ed. D. J. Kagay and L. J. A. Villalon (Woodbridge, 1999), 53. 
13 M. Janowitz, `Military Organization', Handbook of Military Institutions, ed. R. W. Little (Beverley 
Hills, CA, 1971), 24. 
14 P. Coss, The Origins of the English Gentry (Cambridge, 2003), 161-4. 
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convenience to denote the lesser knights of the twelfth century. 15 However we choose to 
describe them, whether `gentry', `knightly class' or whatever, the point of greatest 
importance from a military perspective is that these `middling' men were being 
recruited in increasing numbers during the reign of Edward I to serve in the king's 
armies. The wars of Edward I and his son, in Wales between 1277 and 1295, on the 
continent from 1294 to 1298, and in Scotland from 1296 to Bannockburn and beyond, 
placed new and intense demands on the landholders of England and their families. In 
such circumstances, it was not enough to rely on the leading nobles, bannerets and 
knights alone. Instead, the Crown came to call increasingly heavily upon the services of 
the `county' knights and sergeants, estate-holders of relatively modest wealth and status 
and their often landless relatives. During the reign of Edward I, soldiering once again 
became a viable career option for men of gentle blood, including those at the lower end 
of the scale. 16 Whether all of these individuals, squires, sergeants and all, should strictly 
be described as members of the aristocracy during this period is open to debate. What is 
clear is that when the armies of Edward I and his son were raised, such men-at-arms 
served under the leading earls and bannerets in the retinues of the social elite. In 
contrast, their participation in the wars of Henry III's reign would appear to have been 
minimal, with relatively few opportunities available for military adventure. Owing to 
the great scale of the wars of Edward I and, just as importantly, the greater 
administrative capacity of the English state which produced and preserved the records 
relating to military service, the late thirteenth century opens up new possibilities to the 
military historian. Moreover, it does so at a time when English armies still bore many of 
the imprints of those of an earlier period, such as the traditional feudal levy and the 
recruitment of large numbers of mounted warriors not serving for Crown pay. 
That administrative records survive in abundance from Edward I's reign is 
important, for it is only from then onwards that a detailed investigation into the 
composition of the military community can be carried out. Any glance through the 
catalogues listing the military records of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries reveals a 
notable difference in the scale of documentary survival between the reigns of Henry III 
and his successor. Edward's expeditions, which grew in intensity and regularity as the 
reign progressed, were managed and administered by the king's household officials 
whose lengthy accounts enable us to trace the contours of genteel military service in 
some detail. The greater administrative efficiency of these years facilitated an increase 
15 D. Crouch, The Image ofAristocracy in Britain, 1000-1300 (London, 1992), 27. 
16 M. J. Bennett, `Careerism in Late Medieval England', People, Politics and Community in the Later 
Middle Ages, ed. J. Rosenthal and C. Richmond (Gloucester, 1987), 21. 
6 
in the scale of war, which in turn led to further progress in government. '7 Indeed, `the 
English royal administrative system was, at the end of the thirteenth century, 
precociously developed by contemporary European standards'. 18 The penetrative nature 
of the Edwardian government, analysed by M. T. Clanchy in his celebrated study From 
Memory to Written Record, enabled contemporary royal officials to keep track of 
individuals down to the village level. 19 More importantly for our purposes, it enables us, 
more than for previous reigns, to trace warriors of less elevated social origins, albeit 
from among the landed elites. This enquiry therefore seeks to trace the military careers 
not only of men like Simon de Montacute, a leading banneret from Somerset whose 
years of active service match almost exactly with the period under investigation, but 
also of more obscure individuals drawn from the ranks of thousands of lesser knights 
and sergeants. 20 This means soldiers like the Cornish knight Roland de Coykin, a 
regular companion of Elias d'Aubeny during the later Welsh and early Scottish wars-, 21 
the Yorkshireman Richard de Thurston, a frequent follower of Henry de Percy; 22 and 
the altogether more obscure sergeant Luke de Hercy, who served in the garrisons of 
north Wales in 1295 before being drawn from Worcestershire for service in Flanders 
two years later. 23 Individuals such as these formed the backbone of the expeditionary 
forces and garrisons of Edward I and Edward II, and it is therefore only right that they 
should be allowed their place in the history of these wars. 
Reconstruction of the careers of so many soldiers depends upon the successful 
linkage of thousands of names to the men-at-arms who bore them. Fortunately, the size 
of the landholding pool within Edwardian England was not so great as to preclude a 
certain familiarity with most of these men, particularly those who held knightly rank. In 
all probability there were not many more than a thousand knights within England by the 
time that Edward II came to the throne. Nevertheless, in attempting to trace the service 
records of individuals who lived 700 years ago, one inevitably encounters a number of 
source-based and methodological difficulties along the way. Not least of these is the 
tendency of many retinue leaders and their men-at-arms to give service during these 
I' R. Frame, The Political Development of the British Isles 1100-1400 (Oxford, 1990), 144. 
18 M. Keen, England in the Later Middle Ages, 2°d edition (London, 2003), 2. 
19 M. T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307 (London, 1979), 31-2. 
20 Montacute appears to have begun his military service in the first Welsh war when he proffered his 
feudal service as a sergeant (PW, i, 208) and went on to serve as a knight in Wales in 1282 (E 101/4/1, m. 
1), Gascony in 1294 and 1297 (RG, iii, 110,350), and Scotland in 1298 (C 67/13, m. 6), 1300 (E 
101/8/23, m. 6), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10), 1307 (CCW, 259) and 1310 (E 101/374/5, f. 77r). He died in 
1316. 
21 C 67/10, m. 7; C 67/11, m. 6; C 67/13, m. 2; PDS, 218. A man of that name had also been with Philip 
Daubeny in west Wales during the war of 1282-3; C 47/2/4, m. 10. 
22 C 67/10, m. 6; Rotuli Scotiae, i, 32,42; C 67/15, m. 7. 
23 E 101/5/18, m. 1; BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 73v. 
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years without Crown pay. This means that unless they took out letters of protection or 
attorney, or received respites of debts, pleas or fines, they do not appear in the military 
sources. The incompleteness of the records for military service therefore poses a greater 
problem during these four decades than for later reigns when all men-at-arms received 
Crown pay. Even if the personnel of the armies could be recovered in their entirety, 
there would still be limits to what nominal record linkage could tell us about the genteel 
soldiers within Edwardian hosts. As Nigel Saul has noted, `the details of office-holding 
and military service that can be gleaned in relative abundance from the public records 
tell us much about their public careers but little about their private lives'. 24 Put another 
way, `the very many people whom the historian encounters in his researches are, as a 
rule, knowable by their externals only - age, sex, habitation, occupation. We have a 
massive collection of passport descriptions without even passport photographs'. 25 
Nevertheless, whilst the motives that drove members of the gentry to war are usually 
difficult to discern, the many letters and petitions that have survived from this period 
sometimes shed light on the private concerns of Edwardian men-at-arms and their 
attitudes towards war. A letter from Richard de Baskerville to the king's council in the 
spring of 1298, for example, shows that he wished to be respited from military service 
in that year because of his financial difficulties and the problems that he faced in finding 
men to go with him to Scotland. 26 Baskerville had fought in Wales under the earl of 
Hereford just three years previously and later took out a letter of protection for the 
Scottish campaign of 1301.27 His concerns in 1298 would, therefore, appear to have 
been genuine. It is likely that there were many more men like him who were willing to 
serve in the king's armies, but who simply could not afford to do so. 
Perhaps a greater problem than the lack of service data on some men-at-arms is 
that posed by the recurrence, within the military sources, of a small number of very 
popular forenames. As P. M. Stell discovered in his analysis of the forenames used by 
landholders in Yorkshire during the reign of Edward I, almost half the men of the 
county possessed one of the four most favoured names of William, John, Robert and 
Thomas. 28 A similar phenomenon has been observed by Richard Gorski in his study of 
24 N. Saul, `A "Rising" Lord and a "Declining" Esquire: Sir Thomas de Berkeley III and Geoffrey 
Gascelyn of Sheldon', BIHR, lxi (1988), 345. 
25 G. R. Elton, England, 1200-1640 (London, 1969), 243. 
26 SC 1/26, no. 74. 
27 C 67/10, m. 3; C 67/14, m. 6. 
28 P. M. Stell, `Forenames in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century Yorkshire: A Study Based on a 
Biographical Database Generated by Computer', Medieval Prosopography, xx (1999), 118-21. 
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local administrative personnel in fourteenth-century England. 29 This can lead to major 
identification problems in those instances when a common forename is twinned with a 
common surname, as in the case of John de Neville. At least three men of that name 
appear in the military sources between 1277 and 1314: a John de Neville of Snarford, a 
John de Neville of Stoke, and a John de Neville of Grimsthorpe. This is without the 
various additional instances when men of that name are listed in the military records but 
are not accorded any place of habitat. 3° Other, similar examples abound. Gorski's 
conclusion, that `if the historian's aim is to produce valid conclusions based on the most 
accurate set of data possible, then the priority must be to minimise these errors rather 
than to seek in vain for a panacea for their complete elimination', sounds like shrewd 
advice. 31 Whilst bearing in mind the need for caution, the favourable survival of horse 
inventories, pay accounts and related documents from the reigns of Edward I and his 
son, combined with the additional reference works (albeit sometimes flawed) of men 
like Sir Francis Palgrave, Charles Moor and Gerard Brault, provide an ideal opportunity 
for further investigation. 32 The scope and composition of English landholding society in 
this era are now reasonably well defined, at least for those wealthy and important 
enough to possess a coat of arms. Even lesser men, when viewed in the context of the 
retinues in which they served and the counties from which they were summoned, can 
usually be identified with some precision. 
It is, in fact, one of the aims of this study to show that prosopography can tell us 
much more than the lengths of soldiers' careers and the spheres of war in which they 
fought, valid as those fields of research are. Nominal record linkage also sheds much 
light on the composition of the retinues and of the armies at large. That medieval armies 
were very different from modern armies is hardly to be denied, but one unfortunate 
consequence of this distinction is that characterisations of these earlier forces have 
generally been far from favourable. Michael Wolfe recently referred to medieval armies 
as `notoriously motley agglomerations of knightly vassals, hired mercenaries, militia 
auxiliaries, and all manner of irregular contingents often hastily thrown together for a 
29 R. Gorski, `A Methodological Holy Grail: Nominal Record Linkage in a Medieval Context', Medieval 
Prosopography, xvii (1996), 158. 
30 A John de Neville of Snarford was retained as a man-at-arms from Lincolnshire in 1297 (C 47/2/16, m. 
6), a John de Neville of Stoke served in Scotland in 1310 (C 71/3, m. 3), and a John de Neville of 
Grimsthorpe was distrained to knighthood in Lincolnshire in 1312, having previously been summoned to 
Berwick in 1301 (PW, i, 356; C 47/1/7, m. 15). 
3' Gorski, `Methodological Holy Grail', 165. 
32 Parliamentary Writs and Writs of Military Summons, ed. F. Palgrave, 2 vols in 4 parts (London, 1827- 
34); Knights of Edward I, ed. C. Moor, 5 vols, Harleian Society, lxxx-lxxxiv (1929-32); Aspilogia III. 
Rolls of Arms, Edward 1 (1272-1307), ed. G. J. Brault, 2 vols (Woodbridge, 1997). 
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season" s campaigns' . 
33 As they were not standing armies, Edwardian hosts and other 
forces of the later Middle Ages are generally believed to have been inferior to those of a 
later epoch. However, the work of J. F. Verbruggen and others should long ago have 
rendered such myths about the poor quality of medieval armies redundant. 34 The key to 
understanding these hosts, including those raised by Edward I and his son, lies in the 
observation that `military organisation reflects the social structure and political and 
cultural values of each particular environment'. 35 In other words, the organisational 
cohesion within medieval armies was provided by the small groups and units that 
combined at the muster; that is, the retinues brought to war by their military leaders and 
normally consisting of their friends, relatives, tenants and landed neighbours. Studies on 
the forces raised by the Italian city-states during the thirteenth century and on French 
armies during the early stages of the Hundred Years War have indicated that such socio- 
military units held the key to the organisation of armies in those parts or Europe. 36 it 
remains to be seen how far local recruitment networks and small-group structures 
obtained within the armies of the first two Edwards, and what effect they had on the 
way that these forces functioned when on campaign. What is certain is that a fuller 
understanding of these hosts cannot be arrived at until we first know more about the 
soldiers who served in them. 
M. Wolfe, `New Perspectives on Medieval Siege Warfare: An Introduction', The Medieval City' under 
Siege, ed. I. A. Corfis and M. Wolfe (Woodbridge. 1995), 12. 
34 J. F. Verbruggen, The Art of H aifare in H'estern Europe during the Middle Ages: From the Eighth 
Centuii' to 1340,2nd edition (Woodbridge, 1997). 
35 Janowitz, 'Military Organization', 13. 
36 J. Heers, Family Clans in the .1 fiddle Ages: A Study of Political and Social Structures in Urban Areas 
(Oxford, 1977), 169-70, P. Contamine, 'Batailles. Bannieres, Compagnies: Aspects de l'Organisation 
Militaire Francaise Pendant la Premiere Partie de la Guerre de Cent Ans', Les Cahiers i'ernonnais (1964), 
24-5. 
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1 
Mobilisation 
In medieval England, the beginning of a new reign often furnished the occasion for a 
shift in the direction and fortunes of the realm; and the events following upon the death 
of King Henry III in 1272 were certainly a case in point. The accession of Henry's son, 
Edward I, sparked an era of conflict, both within the British Isles and in France, on a 
scale that had never previously been witnessed during the Middle Ages. For T. F. Tout, 
writing shortly after the defeat of Kaiser Wilhelm II's armies in the Great European 
War, the parallel with the increased military demands of his own day seemed striking. 
`The magnitude of the military efforts of Edward I', he observed, `as far transcended 
those of his predecessors as the war which has laid low German imperialism 
transcended the Napoleonic wars, or the Napoleonic wars the war of the Spanish 
Succession'. ' The comparison seems all the more appropriate when we consider that 
both the Great War and the Napoleonic wars necessitated the extension of the obligation 
to military service to new social groups and classes. By stretching his manpower 
reserves to their limit through his wars in Wales, France and Scotland, Edward ensured 
that the landholding elites of late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century England were 
engaged in the martial calling to an extent that could not have been foreseen during the 
reign of his father. The demands placed on the gentry and nobility were particularly 
great from the mid- i 290s when the confiscation of Gascony by Philip IV, together with 
the deterioration of relations with the Scots, posed new threats to the Edwardian polity. 
During these years the capacity of the medieval kingdoms to wage war reached new 
heights, leading to a rapid increase in the number of men regularly engaged in military 
activities. 2 Contemporaries were well aware of the new departure that these campaigns 
marked in the military affairs of the realm. Above all, however, it was the steadfastness 
of Edward I in the face of such adversity that aroused their admiration. 3 No prince, it 
was noted, had encountered so much trouble and strife as had `sire Edward' during his 
1 T. F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of Mediaeval England, The Wardrobe, the Chamber 
and the Small Seals, 6 vols (Manchester, 1920-33), ii, 143. 
`' R. W. Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 
1988), 389. 
3 Bury St. Edmunds, 133. 
time on the throne, and for many writers the king simultaneously personified the war 
effort and was the moving figure behind its most pivotal events. 4 
The tendency of medieval commentators to view warfare as the preserve of the 
Crown is understandable given the hierarchical bent of that society. Nevertheless. 
Edward could not have succeeded in the conquest of Wales. or in the near-conquest of 
Scotland, had he not been supported by a willing and bellicose aristocracy. His success, 
therefore, lay not only in his castle-building projects in Wales, or his victory in battle at 
Falkirk, but in his ability to engage the energy and enthusiasm of the social elite for his 
ambitious campaigns. Edward's achievements in this respect have not been overlooked 
in the historiography of the reign. It has been customary when discussing his wars to 
draw contrasts with the far more modest ambitions that had characterised the fifty-six 
year rule of his father, Henry III. During that long period only twenty years were 
affected by war, including six spells of war on the continent, five in Wales, and two on 
the Scottish border. 5 Still more indicative of the reduction in military activity during the 
middle third of the century was the absence of any royal expeditions against an external 
enemy between 1257 and the first Welsh war twenty years later. If it had not been for 
the Barons' Wars of 1264-5, or the Lord Edward's crusade to the Holy Land from 1270- 
2, the landholders of medieval England would not have taken up arms for nearly twenty 
years. Furthermore, the number of knights involved in the civil war does not appear to 
have been great. 6 The most formidable army that Henry was able to raise during his 
reign was for the Breton expedition of 1230 when he had put some 548 knights into the 
field. Subsequently, his reign-witnessed a gradual demilitarisation among the gentry and 
nobility. 7 For Michael Prestwich, the peace agreement with Louis IX in 1259 marked an 
important stage in the retreat of the Crown from its military commitments; the changing 
of the seal at that time was particularly significant. `Whereas the king had been depicted 
on the old one bearing a sword, on the new he carried a sceptre'. 8 
It was not only the infrequency of Henry's wars, but also their unimpressive 
scale, which meant that Edward had much work to do when he came to the throne. The 
forces that Henry managed to muster, both overseas and within Britain, do not seem to 
have been particularly large. One reason for this was that whilst Edward sought to 
' Langtoft, 229. 
5 P. Contamine, I1"ar in the . 
Middle Ages (Oxford, 1984), 65. 
6 Cf. P. Coss, The Knight in Medieval England. 1000-1400 (Stroud, 1993), 70. 
R. F. Walker, The Anglo-Welsh Wars, 1217-1267', University of Oxford D. Phil. thesis, 1954,48. On 
the decline in the number of knights, see N. Denholm-Young. `Feudal Society in the Thirteenth Century: 
The Knights', Collected Papers of'd'. Denhohn-Young (Cardiff. 1969), 84-5. 
8 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 14. 
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conquer new territories. Welsh campaigns under his father were more often punitive, or 
attempts to establish secure footholds by constructing yet more castles'. 9 Distinctions 
between the armies of the mid- and late thirteenth centuries should not be exaggerated. 
for Henry sometimes put into the field forces which seem to have equalled in number 
those for Edward's more modest campaigns. 10 On the other hand, it is generally agreed 
that Henry failed to draw on as wide a cross section of English landholding society for 
his wars as did his son. Whilst the household force of Henry III was strong, he does not 
appear to have exploited the military potential that lay dormant in the shires to any great 
extent. In his perceptive study of the formation of the gentry, Philip Morgan saw the 
reign of Henry III as a time when the lesser landholders occupied their time primarily in 
non-military pursuits. `There was simply not enough actual experience of arms to create 
a class of soldier careerists such as that which fuelled the gentry in the fourteenth 
century' . 
'" For Andrew Ayton, `that experience was to be gained during the reign of 
Edward I, whose wars in Wales, France and Scotland provided plentiful opportunities 
for a real military role'. 12 Looking back from the reign of Edward III, it is evident that 
the years between 1272 and 1327 represented the stage of adolescent immaturity for the 
gentry as a military order. By the time of the French wars of Edward I's grandson, the 
seeds sown during the 1280s and 1290s, when the Crown attempted to mobilise the 
gentry on a grand scale for the first time, had begun to bear fruit. Yet when Edward I 
came to the throne in 1272, he could not have known that the glories of Falkirk, Crecy 
and Poitiers lay ahead. Unlike his grandson and the Black Prince, Edward was not able 
to draw upon a broad range of military experience among his leading subjects. J. E. 
Morris was undoubtedly right when he suggested that Edward `was teaching the art of 
war to poor material'. 13 Indeed the relative scarcity of experienced warriors in the 
armies of his early years meant that Edward was forced to act with promethean 
ingenuity, forging a military community out of a realm of estate dwellers. 
To do this, Edward acted with thoroughness and innovation, extending and 
adding to the recruitment methods that had been established by his father. The main 
developments in military obligation during his reign have been considered by Michael 
9 J. S. Critchley, `Military Organisation in England, 1154-1254', University of Nottingham D. Phil. thesis, 
1968,173. 
10 For some comparisons, see Walker, The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 510. 
" P. Morgan, `Making the English Gentry', Thirteenth Century England f'. ed. P. R. Coss and S. D. Lloyd 
(\\ oodbridge, 1995), 26. 
12 A. Aston, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred and the Edwardian Military Revolution', The Age of Edward III, ed. 
J. S. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001), 112. 
13 Morris, li'elsh liars, 30. 
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Powicke and can be broken down into three stages. 14 During his early years on the 
throne, Edward continued with the policy of distraint to knighthood: the process by 
which landholders of specified landed wealth were forced to become knights, or pay 
fines for respites or exemptions. Twenty-six such writs were issued during the reign of 
Henry III, the first in 1224. Those of the later part of that king's rule were possibly sent 
out with financial rather than military aims in mind. 15 Under Edward I, however, 
distraint to knighthood seems to have been employed primarily as a way of increasing 
the pool of military reserves within England. Three national writs of distraint were 
issued during the first half of Edward's reign, in 1278,1285 and 1292. Later, around the 
time of Bannockburn, these writs were reintroduced, with Edward II ordering the 
distraint of the forty- and fifty-librate holders in 1312 and 1316. The Crown's need for 
greater manpower reserves was particularly urgent during the years of emergency from 
the mid-1290s. At that stage, Edward I deviated from the policies of his father and 
began to seek more innovative methods of recruitment. In 1295,1300 and 1301 he 
summoned forty-librate holders throughout the counties of England, whether they were 
knights or not. For the expedition to Flanders in 1297, he took this a step further by 
lowering the income bracket to include all men with twenty pounds of landed wealth a 
year. Finally, in his later years, Edward returned to his earlier preoccupation with 
knighthood. He invited all men who wished to receive arma militaria to London in 
1306 to be knighted alongside his son, then adopted a similar measure later the same 
year with plans for a mass knighting ceremony at Carlisle. 
Although the general outline of Edward's mobilisation policies is well known, 
the aristocratic response to these measures remains a more shadowy subject. It is far 
from clear whether Edward was able, as a result of his efforts, to draw on the assistance 
of men who had not previously taken up arms. The records for military service that may 
cast some light on this are, for the most part, bulky, unpublished and incomplete. 16 Yet 
these sources, mainly letters of protection; horse inventories; proffer rolls of feudal 
service; and pay rolls; have survived in sufficient quantity to enable the reconstruction 
of a large proportion of the mounted warriors who served in the king's armies. Only by 
using these sources, in conjunction with the records for distraint to knighthood and the 
14 Powicke, Military Obligation, chapter 6; idem, `The General Obligation to Cavalry Service under 
Edward I', Speculum, xxviii (1953), 814-33. 
15 On the distraint orders of Henry III's reign, see Powicke, Military Obligation, chapter 4; idem, 
`Distraint of Knighthood and Military Obligation under Henry III', Speculum, xxv (1950), 457-70; S. L. 
Waugh, `Reluctant Knights and Jurors: Respites, Exemptions, and Public Obligations in the Reign of 
Henry III', Speculum, lviii (1983), 937-86. 
16 Cf. Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 138-9. 
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summons lists mentioned above, is it possible to analyse the process of mobilisation 
among the aristocracy in any detail. 
When considering the development of military obligation under Edward I, 
Powicke concluded that the king's favoured force would probably have consisted of `a 
class of effective knightly cavalry'. 17 During his lifetime, the king gained a reputation 
for his commitment to the knightly cause. In the Commendatio Lamentabilis, written 
shortly after his death in 1307, Edward was described as the flower of the world of 
chivalry, and praised as a ruler who had augmented the glory of knighthood. 18 His 
martial reputation spread far and wide. Foreign lords sometimes wrote to the king, 
expressing a desire to be knighted at his court, or to serve alongside him on crusade. 19 In 
Edwardian England, knighthood occupied an elevated position within an increasingly 
status-orientated society. Edward sought to cultivate this social snobbery to suit his own 
ends. For many men, indeed, knightly arms remained something to aspire to, despite the 
growing costs incumbent upon the rank. 20 By 1302, a slight blow to a knight or noble 
was considered by legal theorists to be `as bad as a wound given to one of the rabble', 
which shows that knighthood was held alongside nobility as a status of the highest 
prestige. 21 Ladies from the noble classes were discouraged from marrying anyone who 
had not assumed the title `dominus'. 22 Furthermore, Piers Gaveston's desperate situation 
before his execution in 1312 must have presented a sorry sight when set against the 
privileges that he had once enjoyed as a member of the knightly elite. 23 Above all, 
knighthood retained its primary function as a military rank. For Peter Coss, `the ultimate 
raison d 'etre of the chivalric knights was to fight. The consequences of the ideology 
that underpinned their privileged station in the world were inescapable'. 24 
Some historians have suggested that distraint to knighthood might have been 
intended to augment the number of knights available for work in the shires, or to serve 
on juries, rather than for waging war. For David Crouch, `it may well be that the 
administrative and not the military problems posed by lack of knights was what 
17 Powicke, `The General Obligation to Cavalry Service', 816. 
18 `Commendatio Lamentabilis in Transitu Magni Regis Edwardi', Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I 
and Edward II, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxvi (London, 1882-3), ii, 16. 
19 Cf. Foedera, I, ii, 523,529,793. 
20 Coss, Knight in Medieval England, 70-1. 
21 Year Books of the Reign of King Edward the First, Years =and and XUU, ed. A. J. Horwood, Rolls Ser., 
xxxi (London, 1863), 108. 
22 Chronica et Annales, 416. 
23 Vita Edwardi Secundi, ed. W. R. Childs (Oxford, 2005), 45. 
24 Coss, Knight in Medieval England, 111. 
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eventually concerned the king more than anything else'. 25 However, a recent study on 
the fourteenth-century sheriff has shown that the connection between distraint and 
administrative service was by no means clear-cut. In fact, the ideal of knighthood as 
represented by contemporaries was invariably that of the miles strenuus, or the knight at 
war. 26 Barbour regarded Giles de Argentein as the third best knight of his time not as a 
consequence of any work that he may have done in the shires, but because he had 
fought valiantly against the Saracens. 27 In contrast, the bad or unworthy knight was he 
who failed to draw his sword, as revealed by the indictment by one chronicler of the 
knights who failed to assist the earl of Gloucester when he fell at Bannockburn. 28 The 
martial superiority of the knightly order is suggested by their entitlement to double the 
pay of ordinary men-at-arms; but also, more subtly, by the distinction made between 
them and other soldiers in the references to war mortalities in the chronicles. Thomas 
Wykes noted that around 160 knights were killed at the battle of Evesham in 1265, 
along with numerous others who had not yet been girded with the belt of knighthood. 29 
Chroniclers tended to name the knights who had been slain or captured in combat, 
whereas they simply numbered the other men-at-arms. The London annalist recorded 
the names of thirty-seven knights slain on the English side at Bannockburn. As for the 
others, we are told merely that the greater part managed to flee before being killed. 30 
This concern to record the deaths of knights, rather than sergeants or others of inferior 
status, implies an important military distinction between the two. It would seem that 
knights continued to be sought for their value during times of war, whatever additional 
tasks they may have fulfilled in peacetime. 
The only way to test this theory is to turn to the military sources where it is 
possible to trace individual responses to the distraint process. If writs of distraint were 
issued with the aim of widening the military reserve, one would expect men who had 
been forced to become knights to appear in the pay and related records shortly after 
assuming that honour. Responses to the writ of 1278 are not as easy to trace as those for 
later in the reign, for warfare during the 1270s and 1280s was intermittent compared 
with the crisis years from the mid-1290s. Of those who were distrained in that year, an 
appreciable number can nonetheless be traced in the records for the second Welsh war 
25 Crouch, Image of Aristocracy, 146. For an alternative view, see N. Saul, Knights and Esquires: The 
Gloucestershire Gentry in the Fourteenth Century (Oxford, 1981), 47. 
26 R. Gorski, The Fourteenth-Century Sheriff: English Local Administration in the Late Middle Ages 
(Woodbridge, 2003), 100. 
27 John Barbour, The Bruce, ed. A. A. M. Duncan (Edinburgh, 1997), 497. 
28 Vita Edwardi Secundi, 93. 
29 Wykes, 173. 
30 Ann. Lond., 231. 
16 
of 1282-3. The names of around 400 of these men have survived in the sheriffs' returns 
from ten counties, and a minimum of sixty of these served in the war against Llywelyn. 
This is a significant figure given that many soldiers did not receive Crown pay during 
the Welsh wars and cannot therefore be found on the horse inventories and pay rolls. 
Furthermore, if we extrapolate from these figures, in the country as a whole, it is likely 
that several hundred of the men distrained in 1278 participated as cavalrymen within 
four years of taking up knightly arms. Taking the sixty in our sample, a few, such as 
Laurence de Preston, Robert de Somerville, William de Say and Robert Luterel, had 
served as servientes in the war of 1277 and now returned as knightly combatants. 31 
Even allowing for the incompleteness of the records for the first Welsh war, the larger 
part would appear to have been fighting for the first time in 1282. It is not possible to 
know how many of these had taken up knightly arms during the intervening period, as 
the service of a large number is indicated by enrolled letters of protection, which do not 
state the soldiers' ranks. Even so, of those who appear on the horse inventory, proffer 
roll and pay roll, the majority were returned as knights. Whilst four of the men 
distrained in 1278 fought as sergeants, 32 around twenty had received the honour of 
knighthood. It is likely that most of those with letters of protection also held knightly 
rank. 33 Of these new knights, several, such as William Grimbaud, Hugh de Broke, 
William de Audley and Laurence de St. Michael, served either as retinue leaders or co- 
knights of the leaders within the army, 34 whilst a group of others, including Richard de 
Horseley, Humphrey de Cael, Richard de Harcourt and Richard Fouke, registered their 
service with the marshal at the feudal muster. 35 It should also be noted that many of the 
men distrained in 1278, but who do not appear to have served in the second Welsh war, 
can nevertheless be traced as knights on later campaigns. 
Few sheriffs' returns have survived relating to the distraint order of 1285 when, 
owing to the good service given during 1282-3, the obligation to knighthood was 
relaxed to those possessing a hundred pounds of landed wealth per annum. The efforts 
of Edward and his father meant that the number of landholders who fell within that 
wealth bracket and had not received knighthood was in any case very small: only one 
31 Preston (PW, i, 204; C 47/1/2, m. 4; E 101/4/1, m. 2); Somerville (PW, i, 203; ibid, 216,230); Say (PW, 
i, 209; C 47/1/2, m. 21; PW, i, 232); Luterel (PW, i, 203; C 47/1/2, m. 5i; E 101/4/1, m. 1). 
32 Roger le Breton (C 47/1/2, m. 5i; PW, i, 230); William Maletake (C 47/1/2, m. 5ii; C 47/2/7, m. 10); 
Robert de Burgherssh (PW, i, 216; C 47/2/7, m. 7); Roger de Conyers (PW, i, 216; E 101/4/1, m. 8). 
33 On protections, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 162. 
34 Grimbaud (C 47/l/2, m. 4; C 47/2/7, m. 1); Broke (C 47/l/2, m. 21; E 101/4/1, m. 3); Audley (C 
47/1/2, m. 7; C 47/2/6, m. 5; C 47/2/7, m. 7); St. Michael (PW, i, 218; C 47/2/7, m. 4). 
35 Horseley (PW, i, 216,229); Cael (C 47/1/2, m. 2; PW, i, 228); Harcourt (C 47/1/2, m. 8; PW, i, 234); 
Fouke (C 47/1/2, m. 10; PW, i, 229). 
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man was returned from Lancashire, and four from the larger county of Yorkshire. 36 In 
response to the writs issued to the forty-librate holders seven years later, we have the 
names of thirty distrained men in the county of Lincolnshire, along with two individuals 
from Lancashire. 37 We are unfortunate that the returns for other counties have not 
survived; yet, because this order was issued just two years prior to the outbreak of war 
in France, and four before the start of the war in Scotland, it is possible to evaluate the 
responses of these forty-librate holders in some detail. The writ of 1292 would appear to 
have been enforced with some success. A list of men-at-arms retained in the king's 
service from Lincolnshire in 1297 shows that a third of those distrained five years 
previously had become knights by that date. 38 Not one was returned among the esquires, 
so the remainder were probably already engaged in Flanders or Scotland at that time. 
Inquests carried out into the enforcement of the order reveal that in some counties, Kent, 
Middlesex and Rutland, all those who possessed forty pounds in landed wealth had 
received knighthood by the deadline. 39 In other counties, it was seldom the case that 
more than one or two individuals had failed to comply. Powicke suggested, given the 
dating of the writ, that the order of 1292 was probably issued with financial rather than 
military aims in mind. 40 That might have been the case, but the evidence of the military 
records shows that many of those distrained in 1292 were drafted into the war effort 
during the final years of the reign. Peter de Dutton, knighted on the deadline in Cheshire 
in 1292, obtained a letter of protection with Reginald de Grey in the Welsh war of 1294- 
5,41 whilst Philip de Chauncy, William Fraunk of Grimsby and Peter de Gipthorp were 
just several of those distrained to knighthood in Lincolnshire who served during the 
crisis years of 1294-1298.42 William Dacre, one of the two men returned by the sheriff 
of Lancashire, was the leader of a large contingent of footmen going from that county to 
Scotland in 1298.43 Furthermore, some of those who had not received knighthood by the 
deadline had done so and were fighting in Edward's wars within a few years. 44 
36 C 47/1/2, mm. 14d, 20d. Seven men were returned from Wiltshire; E 198/3/3, m. 2. 
37 C 47/l/3, mm. 2,4. 
38 C 47/2/16, m. 6. Roger de Huntingfeld, William Caus, Robert de Brakenbergh, Baldwin Pygot, William 
de Funtaynes, William de Diseney, Robert de Hakebech, Peter de Gipthorp, William le Breton and Ralph 
de Wellewyk had all probably assumed knighthood in response to the writ of 1292. 
39 E 198/3/5, mm. lOd, 12,22. 
40 Powicke, Military Obligation, 109. 
41 C 67/10, m. 3. He was with William le Botiller of Warrington as a sergeant in 1282; C 47/2/7, m. 7. 
42 Chauncy (RG, iii, 120,126,325,352); Fraunk (C 67/11, m. 3); Gipthorp (C 67/11, m. 4). All three 
were distrained at C 47/1/3, M. 2. 
43 E 101/6/30, m. 1 iv. [The membranes on some of the rolls are imperfectly or imprecisely numbered, so 
Roman numerals have been employed to assist the reader in locating the references. In this instance the 
data can be found on the fourth of the membranes incorporated under membrane `1']. 
44 John de Clivedon had not taken up knighthood by the deadline in Somerset and Dorset (E 198/3/5, m. 
1) but was summoned to Wales as a knight in 1294 and had a letter of protection for Gascony in the same 
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The connection between distraint to knighthood and military service continued 
during the early years of the reign of Edward II. However, the writs of 1312 and 1316 
would not appear to have been as effective as those issued during his father's time on 
the throne. The sheriffs' returns for 1312 contain around 350 names from twenty-eight 
counties, whilst those for 1316 give some 260 names from thirty-three counties. The 
unpopularity of the new king, and his inability to engage the martial instincts of his 
subjects as his father had done, may account for the return of around seventy-two of the 
men distrained in 1312 four years later. 45 Whatever the reasons for this reluctance to 
assume knightly arms, quite a few of those distrained to knighthood followed the 
military calling much as their predecessors had done during the previous reign. It is not 
always possible, owing to the nature of the sources, to know whether or not these men 
had received knighthood prior to embarking on their military careers, but in a few 
instances the pressure that was brought to bear on them probably had the desired effect. 
Henry de Cokefeld, who was distrained in Suffolk in 1312, fought under Payn de 
Tibetot at Bannockburn two years later before leading a retinue to the siege of Berwick 
in 1319.46 Several other men distrained in that county in 1312 followed Cokefeld by 
serving in the king's army for the first time two years later, including John de Tendring, 
John de St. Philibert and Bartholomew de Avylers. 47 The latter was with the earl of 
Norfolk in 1322 and on the Weardale campaign five years later. In between times, he 
accompanied the king's other half-brother, the earl of Kent, to Gascony during the War 
of St. Sardos. 48 Among the distrainees who later saw service in Scotland or France there 
were some, such as Aymer Pauncefot, who did so whilst retaining the rank of 
sergeant. 49 A few others, like Patrick de Curwen of Westmorland, had joined the king's 
armies prior to receiving that honour. 5° Clearly, there was no precise correlation 
between the assumption of knightly arms and service in the king's armies. Even so, the 
frequent issuing of distraint orders does seem to have encouraged some individuals who 
had never previously been on campaign to embark on military service. 
Whilst soldiering provided just one of a number of possible outlets for men of 
gentle blood anxious to make their mark in aristocratic society, it was the form of 
year (PW, i, 265; RG, iii, 119). For a similar example, see Roger de Thornton (E 198/3/5, m. 17d; RG, iii, 
177; C 81/1740, m. 69). 
as C 47/1/7; C 47/1/8. 
46 C 47/1/7, m. 33; C 71/6, m. 5; E 101/378/4, f. 26r. 
47 C 47/1/7, m. 33. For their service at Bannockburn; C 71/6, mm. 1,5. 
48 1322 (CPR, 1321-24,187); 1324-5 (E 101/35/2, m. 7); 1327 (C 71/11, m. 5). 
49 C 47/l/8, m. 9d; C 71/10, m. 3, C 81/1733, m. 97. The protection warrant describes him as a sergeant 
and almost certainly relates to the campaign of 1319. 
so C 47/1/7, m. 17; 1298 (C 67/13, m. 6d); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. ld); 1307 (E 101/612/21, m. li); and 
as a knight in 1314 (E 101/14/15, m. 5). 
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service most likely to win the respect of their peers and the king. Distraint to knighthood 
enabled Edward I and his son to augment their armies with new recruits through a direct 
appeal to the sense of honour that prevailed among the landholding elites. The 
importance of knighthood to the Crown's recruitment efforts is further demonstrated by 
the link between campaigning and the mass knighting ceremonies of these years. Simon 
de Montfort created a number of new knights prior to the battle of Lewes in 1264 in an 
attempt to encourage his followers before the royalist onslaught. 51 In like manner, the 
earl Warenne is reported to have conferred knighthood on some of his soldiers on the 
morning of the battle of Stirling Bridge in 1297, many of whom fell together that day. 52 
The most famous mass knighting ceremony of the reign of Edward I was that which 
took place on 22 May 1306, on the occasion of the knighting of Edward of Caernarfon 
at Westminster. 53 Several chroniclers noted at the time that the king's aim in offering 
arma militaria to young men who wished to be knighted alongside his son was to 
strengthen his army for Scotland in that year. 54 This is supported by the appearance with 
letters of protection on the Scottish roll of 129 of the 297 men who had been knighted. 
Around sixty-three of these joined the companies of leading magnates; of the remainder, 
most obtained protections with either the prince or the king. Many of these letters of 
protection and attorney were enrolled within just four or five days of the main event. 55 
This, combined with the fact that many of these new knights went on to be summoned 
for military service on a regular basis during the early years of the reign of Edward II, 
highlights the success of the knighting ceremony as a recruitment initiative. Although 
the ceremony scheduled for Carlisle at the beginning of the following year has not 
received as much attention from historians, it is evident, from the location specified for 
the conferment of knighthood, that the measure was again intended as a way of 
obtaining more soldiers for the king's army. 56 This was to be no modest occasion: the 
issue rolls show that a sum of £1,480 15s 10d had been set aside for the purpose of 
equipping the new knights. 57 Unfortunately, Edward's illness disrupted his plans in that 
year, and the lack of comment in the chronicles suggests that nothing came of this 
proposed sequel. 
51 The Chronicle of William de Rishanger of the Barons' Wars, ed. J. O. Halliwell, Camden Society 1st 
ser., xv (1840), 31. 
52 Guisborough, 300. 
53 Cf. Ann. Lond., 146. For the list of men knighted, see E101/362/20, printed in C. Bullock-Davies, 
Menestrellorum Multitudo: Minstrels at a Royal Feast (Cardiff, 1978), appendix. 
54 E. g. Flores Historiarum, iii, 131; Guisborough, 367-8. 
ss E. g. Fulk Fitz Waryn junior's protection was enrolled on 25 May (C 67/16, m. 11), and Robert le 
Constable's on 24 May (C 67/16, m. 12). 
56 CCR, 1302-07,520. 
57 E 403/134, m. 4. 
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It may seem strange, given Edward I's apparent preference for knightly cavalry 
forces, that between 1292 and 1306 the idea of enforcing or encouraging more men to 
become knights was abandoned. In truth, the distinction between distraint to knighthood 
and the summonses to the twenty- and forty-librate holders, in 1295,1297,1300 and 
1301, which made no mention of knighthood, was more apparent than real. Distraint to 
knighthood was based on the same kind of economic criteria as these later writs, and by 
1295 Edward had reason to assume that the great majority of those summoned directly 
from the shires would be knights. Returns made in the spring of 1295 show that among 
the men with forty pounds of landed wealth in Wiltshire, twelve were knights whilst 
only six were sergeants. In Oxfordshire, the ratio for the same year was thirty-eight 
knights to thirteen men who had not received knighthood, whilst in Berkshire there were 
twenty-eight knights as against just eight men of inferior rank. 58 It is at this point that 
Edward's attempts to tap the military potential of the country gentry becomes most 
apparent; but, as we have seen, the writs of distraint had already been quite successful in 
energising that order of men during the first half of the reign. The sources for the armies 
that campaigned in Wales and Gascony in 1295 are far from complete, but of the 204 
names that were returned for Wiltshire, Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire, Berkshire and 
Oxfordshire some forty-five can be traced in the hosts for that year. 59 Of these, perhaps 
three-quarters served in direct response to the order of 10 February. Fortunately, the 
sources for the royal expeditions of 1297,1300 and 1301 are more extensive. Michael 
Powicke noted that for the Flanders campaign of 1297-8, some 713 names were 
returned from thirteen counties. Fifty-two of these men received letters of protection as 
a direct result of the summons to the twenty-pounders, not including the paid company 
leaders. Extrapolating from this, Powicke arrived at a figure of around 150 soldiers from 
all counties who were added to the army by these means. 60 His calculations did not 
include the returns for Buckinghamshire, Bedfordshire, Essex and Hertfordshire, which 
bring the total up to 872 names from seventeen counties. A little over a hundred of these 
men took out letters of protection or attorney, or had an appraised horse. 61 That most of 
the twenty-pounders who were summoned did not follow the king to Flanders is clear 
enough, but even if only fifty men were added to the army in this way the innovation 
might have been deemed worthwhile. Of the thousand or so men returned in 1300 from 
twenty-three counties, some 255 can be traced in the military records, not including 
58 E 198/3/6,8. 
59 For the returns: ibid; E 198/3/7. 
60 Powicke, Military Obligation, 111-2. 
61 The additional returns can be found at C 47/l/5, mm. 1 ii, 2ii. Some of these 111 men were also 
included in the summons to the magnates. 
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forty described in the sheriffs' returns as going to Scotland but for whom no further 
details survive. There were also a further fifty individuals who made proffers at the 
feudal muster in their capacity as tenants-in-chief. Finally, for the ambitious expedition 
of the following year when two armies were launched, at least 133 of the 856 
individuals who received a summons appear to have served. 62 
That the records for the well-documented army that besieged Caerlaverock 
castle in 1300 reveal the names of more than a quarter of the forty-pounders summoned 
in that year, whereas the figures for the other expeditions are less impressive, shows just 
how cautious we must be when assessing the effectiveness of these writs. The tendency 
to underestimate the success of the Crown's recruitment policies is exacerbated not only 
by patchy source survival, but also by the invisibility of many soldiers who did not 
receive wages or serve as part of their feudal obligations. Furthermore, the Crown was 
sometimes willing to accept substitutes in place of the men who were summoned and it 
is therefore likely that a few of those who did not serve in person sent sons and brothers 
instead. 63 Taking these factors into account, it is probable that on average at least a 
quarter, and in some cases more than a half, of the men summoned according to 
economic criteria took part in the royal campaigns, representing a mobilisation effort of 
some magnitude. What the king desired most of all was the enlistment of individuals 
and families who had never previously seen active service. In this he would appear to 
have been at least partly successful. Around twenty of the forty-pounders summoned in 
1300 can be found in the service records for the first time in that year. Included among 
these were middling knights and sergeants like Richard de Hywysh, Roger de Kerdeston 
and John de Farlington, 64 as well as young members of well-established families such as 
Robert de Ufford, whose father had died a couple of years previously, and John 
Mauleverer. 65 The more fragmented evidence for the twenty-pounders who went to 
Flanders three years earlier indicates that on that occasion, too, quite a few of those 
conscripted were virgin warriors. Edmund de la Hyde, who took out a letter of 
protection with John de Drokensford, seems to have been taking part in the king's wars 
62 For the records consulted, see: Flanders 1297-8 - wardrobe book (BL, Add. MS 7965), inventories (E 
101/6/19,28,37) and protections (C 67/12); Scotland 1300 - wardrobe book (Liber Quotidianus), 
inventory (E 101/8/23), protections (C 67/14) and proffer roll (PDS, 209-231); and Scotland 1301 - 
wardrobe book (BL, Add. MS 7966a), inventories (E 10 1/9/23,4) and protections (C 67/14). 
63 E. g. Simon de Ormesby (CCR, 1296-1302,37). In 1297 Ralph Perot was summoned from Essex (C 
47/1/5, m. 2ii), but his son Simon might have served in his place (E 101/6/37, m. 6i). 
64 Hywysh, (E 101/8/23, m. 6); Kerdeston (C 67/14, m. 9); Farlington (E 101/8/23, m. 6). For the 
summonses, see C 47/1/6, m. 65; PW, i, 334; PW, i, 339. 
65 Ufford (E 101/9/24, m. 2; E 101/612/11, m. 2; C 67/16, m. 7) and Mauleverer (C 67/14, m. 2; C 67/15 
m. 1; C 67/16, m. 10) went on to serve in 1301,1303-4 and 1306, as well as in other years. See C 67/14, 
mm. 11,14, for their service in the army in 1300, and C 47/1/6, m. 35 and PW, i, 331 for the summonses. 
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for the first and final time, 66 whilst the Peter de Suthcherch with Walter de Teye can be 
traced on just one other campaign in the following year. 67 What we see then, during the 
late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, is an attempt by the Crown to reach out to 
the more humble members of the country gentry, and the gradual emergence of that 
social order as a military elite. 
Tracing the recruitment of `new' knights and sergeants in the military records is 
a difficult and imprecise exercise, particularly during the 1270s and 1280s when we lack 
a successive series of accounts such as those that are available for the Scottish wars. 
Despite the relatively poor source survival for some of these earlier campaigns, it is 
clear that Edward was willingly supported by his leading subjects in his struggles 
against the Welsh. By winning over the aristocracy upon his return from the Holy Land, 
the king paved the way for a successful partnership in war, one that bore fruit in the 
expeditions of the opening two decades of the reign. The full extent of the Crown's 
achievement in mobilising its forces only comes into full focus from the mid-1290s, but 
it was during these earlier expeditions that Crown-aristocracy relations were at their 
most harmonious. The extent of the nobility's involvement in the wars against Llywelyn 
and Dafydd is demonstrated by the concerns that were raised over the stability of the 
realm whilst the king's hosts were in Wales. In July 1277, orders were sent to the 
sheriffs throughout England to levy local policing forces which were to arrest those who 
sought to disturb the peace whilst the king and his magnates were at war. 68 Similar 
orders were issued to the sheriffs in June 1283, instructing them to deal with all 
criminals and evildoers who aimed to profit from the absence of the king and his nobles 
by sowing discord in the shires. 69 These precautionary measures demonstrate the king's , 
success in mobilising the landholding elite for his early military ventures, an 
achievement that is also reflected by comments made in the chronicles. The monk of 
Bury St. Edmunds wrote, albeit with some exaggeration, that the king took with him in 
1277 `an army comprising nearly all the knights of England'. 7° Pierre de Langtoft was 
equally hyperbolic, noting that both northerners and southerners accompanied the king 
to war five years later, with nobody holding back. 7' Although the martial enthusiasm of 
the aristocracy might have peaked during the first half of the reign, Edward and his son 
were still able to enlist the support of the military community for their later campaigns 
66 Service (C 67/12, m. 3); summons (PW, i, 293). 
67 Service (E 101/6/37, m. Ii; C 67/13, m. 5); summons (C 47/1/5, m. 4). 
68 CPR, 1272-81,218. 
69 CPR, 1281-92,66. 
70 Bury St. Edmunds, 63. 
71 Langtoft, 239. 
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against the Scots. In 1297-8, the justices of the Bench were informed that the `chevalers, 
serjauntz e tuz autres vigrous' of Yorkshire were unable to attend to judicial business in 
that county as they had been summoned to Scotland. 72 Six years later, a group of 
landholders from the palatinate of Durham informed the king that they were unable to 
treat with him at that time due to their commitments on the northern March. 73 
The anxieties expressed by the gentry and nobility during the crisis years of the 
mid-1290s were not, therefore, a consequence of any open hostility towards warfare per 
se. Rather, the Crown's military demands had by that stage created a certain war- 
weariness which meant that few landholders were prepared to take up arms without first 
assessing the likely benefits of doing so. In particular, whilst they were still willing to 
fight against aggressive enemies within the British Isles, the aristocracy were less keen 
on foreign wars and any attempts to force them to serve overseas. 74 An interesting 
insight into this mindset, enabling us to look beyond the comments made in the 
chronicles into the thought processes of the men involved, is provided by a letter written 
by the household knight and traitor, Thomas de Turberville, to the provost of Paris in 
1295. This correspondence reveals that there was widespread disaffection towards the 
war in France at a time when the leaders of society had other, more immediate threats to 
deal with in Wales and Scotland. He and the other magnates of the realm, Turberville 
assured the provost, had no stomach for the war in south-western France, for `we think 
we have enough to do against the Scotch'. 75 Credence is given to this view by the 
refusal of a number of leading magnates, including Walter de Huntercombe, Robert Fitz 
Roger, Philip de Kyme and Roger de Mohaut, to go to Gascony in 1295. Only the threat 
of punishment eventually persuaded some of these men to relent. 76 Such opposition 
towards continental ventures came to a head in 1297 when the constable and marshal of 
England refused to follow the king to Flanders at a time when the realm was surrounded 
by enemies much nearer at hand. 77 Similar fears were later expressed by Edward II's 
advisers shortly before the outbreak of the War of St. Sardos in 1324.78 
The difficulty facing Edward I in his later years, and Edward II, was therefore to 
ensure the continued commitment of the gentry and nobility to their military projects at 
72 SC 1/30, no. 136. 
73 PW, i, 405-6. 
74 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 39. 
75 Cotton, 437-8. 
76 Book of Prests of the King's Wardrobe for 1294-5, ed. E. B. Fryde (Oxford, 1962), xtviii. 
7' Bury St. Edmunds, 138-9. On the opposition to the king in 1297, which spread beyond the leading 
magnates and out to the country gentry, see Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-98 in England, ed. 
M. Prestwich, Camden Society 4 ser., xxiv (1980). 
78 Calendar of Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, ed. J. G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1935), 218. 
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a time when money and enthusiasm were rapidly drying up. This required a subtle 
combination of strong-arm tactics and palliative measures: the former, to deal with the 
more intransigent of the king's subjects; the latter, for the benefit of those who wished 
to serve, but who could not afford to do so. One of the greatest expenses shouldered by 
the aristocracy was that of equipping themselves with armour for the king's wars. 
Edward I attempted to assist his soldiers in meeting these costs whenever possible. 
Knightly armour consisted primarily of the coat of mail, war-helm, lance, shield and 
sword, the cost of which would appear, from grants made by Edward to some of his 
supporters in Gascony during the 1290s, to have been around five pounds per knight, or, 
the equivalent of between a quarter and an eighth of the annual income of a man of that 
rank. 79 This excludes the additional cost of the destrier, which would normally cost in 
excess of twenty or thirty pounds. In 1297, the king granted 510 pounds in custodies 
and marriages as compensation to William Martin, who had lost his armour and horses 
at sea when returning from Flanders. 80 Eight years later, he excused Hugh de Audley 
repayment of the fifty pounds that he had been granted for equipping his followers 
during the war in Gascony. 8' The king also provided a form of insurance for the families 
that were left behind when their fathers, brothers, or husbands had been killed on active 
duty. A sum of twenty pounds was made available to the wife and children of John de 
Home, who had died during the course of the first Welsh war. 82 In November 1302, 
Edward offered a more substantial 200 pounds towards the marriages of Margaret and 
Catherine de Creting, whose father, Adam, had given sterling service in Gascony prior 
to his death. 83 The soldier and chronicler Thomas Gray of Heton observed that the king 
looked particularly kindly upon those who had fought for him in Gascony. 84 This is 
confirmed by the large number of favours conferred on those who saw service in south- 
western France in 1294 and 1295.85 Realising that overseas campaigns were deeply 
unpopular among even his most experienced soldiers, Edward also made available a 
number of rewards to those of his countrymen who agreed to embark with him to 
Flanders in 1297. `Actions of novel disseisin were halted, debts owed to men on 
campaign were to be levied by the exchequer on their behalf, and in general the king 
tried to ensure that no one would suffer loss to their possessions because they had 
79 E 213/40; E 213/218. 
80 CPR, 1292-1301,340. 
81 SC 8/9, no. 414. 
82 CCR, 1272-79,575. 
83 CPR, 1301-07,72. 
84 Scalacronica, 15. 
85 CCR, 1288-96,357,422,465,496; CPR, 1292-1301,87,88,152-3. 
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chosen to accompany him overseas'. 86 Such incentives were certainly most welcome, 
but the costs and strain of war during the years of heaviest conflict remained too much 
for many landholders to bear. 
For the most part, then, Edward and his son tried to manage the recruitment 
process by offering as many incentives to their subjects to serve as possible. Whilst such 
an approach was preferred, the Crown was also prepared to resort to threats in its 
attempts to man its armies. One of the most effective ways of doing this was to keep 
records of those who had performed military service so as to bring pressure to bear on 
those who had chosen to remain at home. In February 1300, the king issued writs to the 
sheriffs throughout the realm, ordering them to draw up lists of those who had 
accompanied him or his magnates to Scotland since the start of the war. 87 Although 
none of these lists would appear to have survived, a few of the sheriffs who drew up the 
returns for the forty-librate holders in that year took the unusual step of indicating which 
men had made preparations to go to Scotland and which had not. The sheriff of 
Cornwall grouped his men into those who were setting out to join the army, those who 
were staying behind, and a third group about whose intentions he was unsure. Six men 
fell into the first category, eleven into the second, and fourteen into the third, supporting 
the suggestion made above that between a quarter and a half of the forty-pounders thus 
summoned actually took part in the campaign. 88 That these records were kept and 
- referred to is shown by a letter sent by the king to John Fitz Reginald in 1302, in which 
he expressed astonishment at his absence from recent campaigns. 89 In a separate 
incident, a certain William Pappeworthe had his granges sealed up, albeit unjustly, for 
not sending men-at-arms to Scotland in 1296.90 Edward I was also willing to use 
blackmail. He promised to restore the lands of the countess of Gloucester, who had 
married the parvenu Ralph de Monthermer, only on condition that she find a hundred 
men-at-arms for the king's expedition to the continent in 1297. A similar tactic was 
employed by Edward II when he pardoned Thomas de Vere for marrying the widow of 
Payn de Tibetot (whose former husband had recently been killed at Bannockburn) so 
long as he agreed to serve with twenty men-at-arms in Scotland. 91 In both cases, this 
86 Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-98,36. 
87 CCR, 1296-1302,375. 
88 C 47/1/6, m. 8. The sheriff of Bedfordshire and Buckinghamshire returned twenty men who were 
coming into the king's pay, nineteen who were serving in the retinues of the magnates or the bishop of 
Durham, and some forty who were not going, whilst in Herefordshire the ratio was twelve men going to 
thirteen who were not; ibid, mm. 3,24. These figures do not include ecclesiastics and women. 
89 PW, i, 367. 
90 CDS, ii, no. 732. 
91 PW, i, 296; CPR, 1313-17,303. 
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policy was probably pursued so as to ensure that the retaining power of the men who 
had died was not lost to the king as a result of the non-service of their successors. 
Ultimately, Edward I and his son were prepared to go to almost any lengths to 
recruit as many men to their armies as possible. The half century that followed the death 
of Henry III witnessed a relentless mobilisation programme, necessitated by the wars in 
Wales, France and Scotland. Through a variety of measures, Edward I was able to draw 
upon manpower reserves that had never previously been exploited; he created a new 
brand of warriors among the gentry who came to share in the military ethos promoted 
by their king. Hundreds of men whose fathers and grandfathers might have exercised 
arms only intermittently, if at all, were now encouraged, and if necessary forced, to 
become soldiers. If these efforts sometimes provoked a strong or hostile reaction, as 
they did during Edward's later years and the early years of the reign of his son, this was 
only to have been expected given the scale of what Edward I was trying to achieve. 
Furthermore, by offering incentives and admonishments in roughly equal measure, 
Edward I was able, for the most part, to manage the fallout of his policies with some 
success. Only during the reign of Edward II, who lacked the leadership qualities that 
had been characteristic of his father, did such difficulties become too much. In the end it 
would be left to Edward III to reap the full reward of his grandfather's audacity and 
foresight. 
**** 
The general success of Edward I's recruitment policies can perhaps best be illustrated 
by reference to the large cavalry forces that he was able to raise for his campaigns. 
Although the armies that he put into the field were not always of the same magnitude, 
sometimes barely exceeding the numbers mustered by his father, on other occasions he 
was able to mobilise his subjects on a scale that was seldom equalled during the Middle 
Ages. Calculating the sizes of medieval armies is an imperfect and imprecise exercise. 
Nevertheless, acquaintance with the sources at our disposal, as well as with the way that 
Edwardian armies were raised, enables us to make some informed estimates. The host 
that went to Wales in 1277 was one of the smallest of the reign, with perhaps 800 
cavalrymen serving on what was `a surprisingly uneventful' expedition. 92 Later armies 
in that sphere of war, particularly that which mustered for the war of conquest in 1282- 
3, appear to have been much larger than this, but calculations are hindered by the fact 
92 Prestwich, Edward I, 179. 
27 
that overall command was divided between several regional captains. We are on safer 
ground when we come to the Scottish wars that dominated the later years of Edward's 
kingship. Michael Prestwich has estimated that around 3,000 mounted soldiers were put 
into battle against the Scots at Falkirk in 1298.93 This seems plausible given that the 
horse lists alone name some 1,350 men in the king's pay. Many of the leading magnates 
in that year, including most of the earls, served without wages and paid their men from 
their own resources. 94 A similar-sized host was assembled in the spring of 1303.95 When 
we take into account that there were at most around 9,000 to 10,000 genteel families 
within England at the time, including the `marginal' parish gentry, it can be seen that a 
very sizeable proportion of the landholding community was engaged in the king's wars 
at one stage or another. 96 Nor were these levies exceptional. At least 2,000 cavalrymen 
were probably conscripted in 1300,97 a figure not dissimilar to the 2,500 mounted 
soldiers that J. E. Morris once estimated were on the English side at Bannockburn. 98 
Given that Scottish expeditions were taking place almost annually between 1296 and 
1314, the impact on the aristocracy must have been great. What we may be seeing, in 
fact, is a process of militarization, as a large number of noble and genteel families, 
`including recently established ones', became `conditioned to the acceptance of an 
active martial role'. 99 
Gaining insights into the mentality of the aristocracy is rather more difficult than 
providing estimates for the number of men who served in royal and baronial armies. 
Even more problematic is the task of trying to discern subtle variations in the way that 
the landholding classes perceived themselves, and their role within society, over time. 
One possible way of overcoming this problem is by analysing the concerns that 
occupied the thoughts of the gentry and nobility as they neared their deaths. Wills 
provide a rare insight into the minds of the leading men of the age, and a number that 
have survived from the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries reveal that martial 
considerations were often uppermost in their thoughts. When preparing for his death in 
September 1296, the earl of Warwick requested that two great horses be provided to 
carry his armour at his funeral. In this he followed his father, whose corpse had been 
93 Ibid, 479. 
94 Gough, 160-237; E 101/6/39,40. There were also around 900 protections; C 67/13. 
95 M. Haskell, `Breaking the Stalemate: The Scottish Campaign of Edward I, 1303-4', Thirteenth Century 
England VII, ed. M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1999), 229. 
96 C. Given-Wilson, The English Nobility in the Late Middle Ages: The Fourteenth-Century Political 
Community (London, 1987), 72-3. 
97 Cf. PDS, 209-3 1; Liber Quotidianus; E 10 1/8/23; C 67/14. 
98 J. E. Morris, Bannockburn (Cambridge, 1914), 41. 
99 A. Ayton, `The Battle of Crecy: Context and Significance', The Battle of Crecy, 31. 
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preceded by a horse `completely harnessed with all military caparisons'. 10° The panoply 
of the military funeral was not, however. restricted to those of comital rank. In 1311. 
just two years before his death, William le Vavasur requested that his best horse be 
equipped in full military apparel, the resulting cortege presumably having formed a 
most impressive sight to onlookers. Vavasur's fellow northerner, John Daudre. was 
similarly intent on martial display when he composed his will two years later. 1°' It is 
interesting that these men wished to be remembered, above all, for their military 
prowess. Equally revealing, in these wills, is the preoccupation with the conferment of 
military equipment. `The accumulation of arms and armour', it has been noted, was one 
of the most obvious `practical consequences' of the increased military activity of the 
reigns of the first three Edwards: the passing down of armour from one generation to the 
next helped to perpetuate traditions of military service. 102 Perhaps the most well-known 
instance of this practice is supplied by the will of Fulk de Penebrigg, dating from 13%5, 
in which he bestowed military equipment upon four members of his line. Strangely, for 
one with such an array of equipment to bequeath, he does not appear in the military 
sources, although he was summoned as a forty-librate holder in 1300 and 10 1.103 It is 
likely that he was one of the many landholders with estates on the Welsh March who 
served without Crown pay. The above-mentioned William le Vavasur, in like manner, 
conferred armour on two of his sons, Walter and Henry. Both of these men gave 
military service: the former with his father in 1306: the latter on the Weardale campaign 
of the opening year of the reign of Edward 111.104 Vavasur also bequeathed a lance from 
Gascony, where he had served on more than one occasion, to another regular 
campaigner, Ralph Fitz William, as well as additional armour to John de Crepping. 105 
The interesting bonds that these bequests reveal were in all probability strengthened by 
shared campaigning experiences. 
Unfortunately, wills are a far from perfect guide to the mindsets of the English 
aristocracy during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II. Besides not having survived in 
100 Testamenta l'etusta: Being Illustrations from Wills, of Manners, Customs etc. as well as of the 
Descents and Possessions of many Distinguished Families. ed. N. H. Nicolas, 2 vols (London, 1826), i. 
50-2. 
101 Wills and Inventories Illustrative of the History, Manners, Language and Statistics, etc. of the 
. 
Northern Counties of England from the Eleventh Century Downwards, Part 1. ed. J. Raine, Surtees 
Society, ii (1835), nos 14,16. This was probably the same man as the `John Dautrie' who accompanied 
the earl \Varenne to Scotland in 131 1; CCU', 354. Vavasur had fought in Wales in 1277 and 1282 (PU', i, 
199; C 67 8, m. 8), Gascony in 1294 and 1295 (RG, iii, 161,294), and on many campaigns to Scotland, 
including in 1298.1300 and 1306 (C 67/13, m. 7; C 47/2/13, m. 8; C 67/16, m. 10). 
102 Avton, 'Sir Thomas Ughtred', 1133, 
103 BL, Stowe Charter 622; M. Prestwich, Armies and Warfare in the Middle Ages: The English 
Experience (London, 1996). 26-7. For Penebrigg's summonses, see C 47/1 6. m. 45; PI1', i. 351. 
104 IF Ills and Inventories, no. 14: C 67i 16, m. 10: E 101118'6. 
105 11'ills and Inventories, no. 14. 
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sufficient quantity to enable anything beyond a superficial analysis. they also tell us 
little about changing attitudes to warfare over time. We can show that the gentry and 
nobility were actively engaged in the promotion of military culture and the dispersal of 
armour, but we lack the continuity in evidence that would enable us to make profitable 
comparisons with earlier and later decades. It is less in the written documentation of the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, than in the development of a visual martial culture to 
which this era bore witness, that the process of militarization among landed families can 
be most productively traced. The reign of Edward I was notable for the re-emergence of 
the Arthurian cult; indeed, military symbolism and pageantry played a key role in the 
development of a strong martial ethos among the social elite. Round Tables were held at 
Nefyn in Wales in 1284 and Falkirk in 1302 to celebrate the victories of the English 
over their enemies within the British Isles. ' 06 Likewise, in 1296, Edward held a banquet 
with his knightly companions to mark the abdication of john Bailiol. 107 These events 
helped to forge a spirit of camaraderie between the king and his soldiers and provided 
the aristocracy with a pseudo-historical framework for their actions. Yet the prevalence 
of a strong martial culture, represented through visual imagery and symbols, was most 
strikingly conveyed through the diffusion and celebration of heraldry. Langtoft wrote of 
how the unfurling of the king's banner at Falkirk, `ove les treys lepardz en place 
desplae', struck fear into the hearts of the Scots, 108 and two years later Edward added 
the sign of the cross to his standard to signify that he had divine support for his wars. 109 
Where the king led, the gentry and nobility naturally followed. Consequently, one of the 
most striking images of Edwardian England are the military effigies and brasses which, 
with increased regularity, were erected throughout the parish churches of the realm. 110 
The self-image which the nobility left on their tombs after their death was of the man- 
at-arms': the heraldry that adorned such images was central to the martial impression 
that the aristocracy wished to communicate. "' In life, too, the landholding elites were 
keen to portray themselves as warriors, as shown by the fact that `virtually all the seals 
106 Flores Historiarum, iii, 62; . 4nn. 
Lond., 104. 
107 Lanercost, 180. For the value of the tournament as one of the mediums through which Edward sought 
to promote enthusiasm for his wars, see J. R. V. Barker, The Tournament in England, 1100-1400 
(Woodbridge, 1986). 12-13. 
108 Langtot, 395. 
109 Chronica ct. Anales, 439. 
10 Cf. M. Clayton, Catalogue of Rubbings of Brasses and Incised Slabs (London, 1979), and for some 
revised dates, J. Coales ed., The Earliest English Brasses: Patronage, Style and [1'orkshops 12^0-1350 
(London, 1987). For details relating to effigies, see H. Lawrance, Heraldry from Military Monuments 
before 1350 in England and U'ales, Harleian Society, xcv iii (1946). 
Alexander, J., and P. Binski. eds., Alge of Chivalry: Art in Plantagenet England 1200-1-100 (London, 
1987), 246. 
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of noble lords in the thirteenth century show them in armour, on horseback, with some 
heraldic indication of their descent'. 112 
Such evidence supports Peter Coss' statement that `in Edwardian England 
knighthood and heraldry expressed the cultural hegemony of the landed upper class'. 113 
However, it is difficult to argue from the mere popularity of armorial display that the 
late thirteenth century bore witness to a process of militarization among the aristocracy. 
Heraldry was not new to the reign of Edward I, but had emerged during the mid-twelfth 
century following a period of `proto-heraldry' in the 1120s and 1130s. Initially, lords 
had placed symbols on their banners and shields as individual marks to aid the process 
of identification on the battlefield and tourney ground. True heraldry developed only 
once these designs had become hereditary within particular families. Although use of 
the face visor, which led to greater concealment, might have provided an important 
stimulus to the adoption of these images, Adrian Ailes has convincingly argued that 
changes in military accoutrements, most notably the development of the smooth shield, 
surcoat and lance pennon, are likely to have been decisive. ' 14 The practical origins of 
the science of heraldry are further demonstrated by the phrase `coat of arms', for `it was 
the practice of painting arms on the linen surcoats worn by knights over their mail 
which gave rise to the term "cote armure"'. 115 Once armorial imagery had become 
established on the battlefield its use spread rapidly into other areas of aristocratic life. 
By the mid-twelfth century, equestrian seals were already being employed in private 
correspondence, showing heraldic devices being `widely used on the decoration of horse 
harness and knightly equipment'. 116 More significant was the way that such patterns and 
designs filtered down from the earls and nobility to ordinary knights and eventually, 
during the early fourteenth century, to men of sub-knightly rank. `Peer pressure' 
ensured that lesser men were keen to adopt the martial images and symbols borne by 
their social superiors, so although the `esquires' of the 1290s and 1300s were still 
112 T. A. Heslop, `English Seals in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries', Age of Chivalry: Art in 
Plantagenet England 1200-1400, ed. J. Alexander and P. Binski (London, 1987), 116. On the rise in the 
use of the shield-of-arms on seals by the late thirteenth century, see P. D. A. Harvey and A. McGuiness, A 
Guide to British Medieval Seals (London, 1996), 50. 
113 P. Coss, `Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion in Edwardian England', Heraldry, Pageantry 
and Social Display in Medieval England, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), 40. 
114 A. Ailes, `The Knight, Heraldry and Armour: The Role of Recognition and the Origins of Heraldry', 
Medieval Knighthood IV, ed. C. Harper-Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1992), 16. Also, see M. Keen, 
Chivalry (London, 1984), 125. 
115 A. Payne, `Medieval Heraldry', Age of Chivalry: Art in Plantagenet England 1200-1400, ed. J. 
Alexander and P. Binski (London, 1987), 55. 
116 J Cherry, `Heraldry as Decoration in the Thirteenth Century', England in the Thirteenth Century, ed. 
W. M. Ormrod (Stamford, 1991), 124. 
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expected to wear the arms of their lords, 117 `by 1410 a non-armigerous gentleman was a 
rarity needing explanation'. 118 The diffusion of heraldry, therefore, took place over the 
course of several centuries, and was already well advanced by the time Edward I 
succeeded to the throne. 
What the intense and unprecedented scale of warfare in the late thirteenth 
century did was to instil this visual culture with renewed martial meaning at a time 
when heraldry was becoming detached from its origins in the practicalities of war. Put 
another way, `the Edwardian wars transformed an adopted military culture into a more 
vibrant one underpinned by collective experience and a shared mentality'. ' 19 Whilst the 
reign of Henry III had provided few opportunities for members of the gentry to share in 
the military pursuits of their feudal lords, the increased frequency and scale of warfare 
under Edward I meant that lesser landholders were once again serving in large numbers 
in the king's hosts alongside the nobility. In this atmosphere it was only natural that 
they should wish to share in the trappings and decorations of war that were so 
celebrated by their social superiors. It was partly as a consequence of the need to keep 
track of the growing number of armigerous families that heralds began to keep rolls of 
arms which listed, either in the form of heraldic charges or in blazon, the arms borne by 
a large number of the militarily-active men of the age. Whilst the first of these rolls, 
Glover's Roll containing around 200 names, dates from the 1250s, 12° it was not until the 
1270s that rolls of arms began to proliferate and the number of men recorded on them 
markedly increased. It is for this reason that Noel Denholm-Young has described the 
thirteenth century as `the great age of heraldry in Britain'. 121 Nineteen rolls have 
survived, either in the original or as copies, from the years 1272 to 1307, although the 
largest and most impressive, the Parliamentary Roll of Arms, dates from early in the 
reign of Edward II. Five of the armorials from the reign of Edward I, the Falkirk, 
Caerlaverock, Galloway, Stirling and Nativity rolls, were `occasional rolls' compiled to 
commemorate the men present at specific martial events. The remainder were `general 
rolls', probably put together by heralds to serve as works of reference. Taken together 
these rolls of arms `were the product of an intense, varied and continuous heraldic 
1' The Statutes of the Realm, 1101-1713, ed. A. Luders et al. (Record Commission, 1810-28), i, 230. 
118 A. R. Wagner, Historic Heraldry of Britain (London, 1939), 20. 
119 Ayton, `Sir Thomas Ughtred', 112. 
120Aspilogia IT Rolls ofArms, Henry III, ed. A. R. Wagner, Harleian Society, cxiii, cxiv (1961-2), 115-66. 
121 N. Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry 1254 to 1310: A Study of the Historical Value of the Rolls 
of Arms (Oxford, 1965), 15. 
32 
activity that would never be exceeded or even rivalled in any other time or place during 
the Middle Ages'. 122 
Although these records contain the names of only a few men below the status of 
knight bachelor, they do provide information on a remarkably wide body of men of that 
rank. Usually the shields are listed according to precedence; the earls and bannerets are 
placed above lower ranking knights. Alternatively, as we shall see in the following 
chapter, on the occasional rolls individuals sometimes appear in the battles in which 
they fought on campaign. It is the large number of lesser men named on the armorials, 
those of more humble origin who seldom appear in earlier heraldic records, except 
occasionally on seals, that provides the historian with the most interesting research 
possibilities. `What is new and perhaps most important here is the roster of second- and 
third-rank armigers in the reign of Edward I' . 
123 Given that Edward's wars saw the 
gentry engaged in military activity to an extent that had never been possible under 
Henry III, it is interesting to reflect on how many of the individuals named on these 
armorials came from newly-armigerous families that had been energised as a 
consequence of the king's campaigns in Wales, France and Scotland. Before discussing 
such possibilities, we need to establish what proportion of the men named on the rolls of 
arms fought as cavalrymen under Edward I and his son. By determining whether the 
rolls represent an attempt to record the names of active soldiers, or those of all bearers 
of arms regardless of whether they participated in the king's wars or not, we can learn 
much about the strength of the connection between heraldry and war during this 
militaristic age. For Maurice Keen, `we are still, at the turn of the thirteenth into the 
fourteenth century, very much in the period of the "practical use of heraldry in war and 
tournament"'. Consequently, the bearer of the heraldic insignia `was the sort of person 
who was entitled to appear in his own surcoat of arms and with his own blazoned shield 
at musters of important hosts or at tourneys'. 124 Denholm-Young was also of the mind 
that `in this period the use of armorial bearings was [probably] confined to the 
"strenuous" knights, i. e. those who had seen or hoped to see military action 125 
Although by the reign of Edward I `more was attached to the use of heraldry than its 
utility on the battlefield', 126 there are therefore strong grounds for believing that the rolls 
of arms emerged from a military context and with martial motives in mind. 
122 Aspilogia III, i, 41. 
123 Ibid, i, 75. 
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The only way to test this theory is to turn to the sources for military service and 
to discern what proportion of the men named on the armorials participated in the 
military campaigns of the first two Edwards. One of the largest rolls was the Lord 
Marshal's Roll, composed in 1295 shortly before the outbreak of war in Scotland. This 
armorial, of which the only version to have survived is a copy dating from the 
seventeenth century, contains 588 charges, but when kings, earls, Welshmen and 
Scotsmen are subtracted, together with the numerous unidentifiable blazons, we are left 
with 499 Englishmen of the ranks of banneret and knight bachelor. Of these, around 
405, or 81 per cent, can be traced in the service records between 1277 and 1314, but for 
a number of reasons this figure is likely to underestimate the total. As noted already, not 
all soldiers served for pay or as part of their feudal obligations. Unless they took out 
letters of protection or attorney, men such as these simply do not appear in the campaign 
records compiled by royal clerks. A more serious problem is that the seventeenth- 
century copy appears to be riddled with transcription errors. Some of the captions on the 
roll `are garbled', 127 and it has already been shown that the William Ughtred named on 
the roll, a man who does not seem to have existed, was a transcription error for Robert 
Ughtred who fought in the king's wars. 128 Of the ninety or so men on the roll who do 
not appear to have given military service, Gerard Brault has been unable to identify 
fifteen. The most likely reason is that there are a few mistaken identities. These errors 
were made because `Lord Marshal's Roll was a seriously flawed armorial at the 
outset.. . or [one] that had deteriorated badly'. 
129 
The largest armorial of the age was not the Lord Marshal's Roll but the 
Parliamentary Roll which dates from around 1312. This heraldic record, which contains 
some 1,100 names, including around 850 knights bachelor arranged, albeit imperfectly, 
by county, has been described as `the nearest that medieval England ever produced to a 
national armorial'. 130 Given the sheer number of men who are listed, the natural 
inclination would be to assume that most of the individuals whose coats are blazoned 
had never seen active military service. However, a prosopographical analysis of the 
knights named on the roll, utilising the military records for the four decades leading up 
to and including Bannockburn, shows that the majority had fought as mounted warriors 
at some stage in their careers. These results are summarised below. 
127 G. J. Brault, `A French Source of the Lord Marshal's Roll (1295-6)', The Antiquaries Journal, lxxiii 
(1993), 27. 
128 Ayton, `Sir Thomas Ughtred ', 115, n. 36. 
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Table 1.1: Military Service among the `County' Knights on the PRA 
County Total Number County Total Number 
knights who served knights who served 
Corn. /Devon 14 9 (64%) Derb. /Notts. 22 19 (86%) 
Dorset/Som. 20 17 (85%) Lincolnshire 58 48 (83%) 
Wilts. /Hants. 33 32 (97%) Yorkshire 43 38 (88%) 
Sussex/Surrey 26 22 (85%) Huntingdon. 12 8 (67%) 
Kent 41 39 (95%) Northants. /Rut. 36 29(81%) 
Middlesex 5 3 (60%) Leicestershire 40 32 (80%) 
Berkshire 13 13 (100%) Warwickshire 31 26 (84%) 
Oxfordshire 23 20 (87%) Worcestershire 11 10(91%) 
Buckingham. 29 22 (76%) Gloucestershire 54 47 (87%) 
Bedfordshire 21 14 (67%) Herefordshire 20 20 (100%) 
Hertfordshire 12 9 (75%) Cheshire 10 8 (80%) 
Essex 58 49 (84%) Shropshire 17 17 (100%) 
Suffolk 60 47 (78%) Staffordshire 12 11(92%) 
Norfolk 59 46 (78%) Cumb. /Northu. 28 26 (93%) 
Cambridge. 29 20 (69%) Westm. /Lancs. 17 13 (76%) 
Total number of men: 854 Total who had served: 714 ( 84%) 
Remarkably, a total of 714, or 84 per cent, of the knights bachelor whom it has been 
possible to identify on the county section of the PRA appear to have given military 
service between the first Welsh war of 1277 and the battle of Bannockburn. Nominal 
record linkage on such a scale, even when the various reference works are consulted, is 
a difficult and imperfect exercise, but the margin of error is unlikely to be great. 
Furthermore, when we consider that military service among genteel families is just as 
revealing as that given by individuals, the problem of duplicated names need not cause 
concern. With these caveats in mind, the figures presented here retain their significance, 
not simply as they mirror those given for the Lord Marshal's Roll, but also because they 
show that military service among the gentry was more widespread than has generally 
been perceived. Denholm-Young's suggestion, that `there were, including earls and 
barons, some 1,250 actual knights in England, as against some 500 fighting knights', 
has to be revised, not least because the 700 warriors noted above does not include the 
hundred or so earls and bannerets who are also listed on the PRA and who were, almost 
without exception, the most active campaigners of their day. '31 For some counties, this 
commitment to military service should not occasion surprise. Cheshire and Shropshire, 
along with other shires on the Welsh border, had become highly militarised during the 
Welsh wars. Many of the knights listed under those counties on the PRA gave regular 
131 N. Denholm-Young, `Feudal Society in the Thirteenth Century: The Knights', 87. 
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service in the retinues of the Marcher lords. John Pichard took out letters of protection 
with John Tregoz and Fulk Fitz Waryn on separate occasions; John de Orreby rode in 
the comitiva of Reginald de Grey in Wales in 1294, and Scotland in 1301 and 1303; and 
Roger de Chandos can be found in the retinue of the earl of Gloucester in 1306 before 
joining the earl of Hereford at Bannockburn. 132 The results for other counties with far 
less `geographical' connection with Edwardian theatres of war are more startling. Table 
1.2 provides a breakdown of the data for the knights listed under Berkshire where the 
proportion of those who had given military service was surprisingly high. 
Table 1.2: Military Service of Berkshire Knights on the PRA (1277-1314) 133 
Name Place and year of service 
Thomas de Coudray Gascony (1294), Flanders (1297), Scotland (x 7,1298-1314) 
Robert Achard Scotland (1300,1303,1306,1314) 
Richard Fokeram Wales (1294) 
Robert de Sindlesham Wales (1282), Scotland (1298) 
John de la Ryvere Wales (1294), Flanders (1297), Scotland (x 8,1298-1314) 
John de la Huse Wales (1294), Scotland (1303,1306) 
John de Lenham Wales (1277), Gascony (1294), Scotland (1304,1310) 
Adam Martel Scotland (1314) 
Roger de Ingelfeld Scotland (1306) 
William Videlou Flanders (1297), Scotland (1303) 
John de la Beche Scotland (1297,1301,1303,1306,1310,1314) 
Richard de Wyndesore Flanders (1297), Scotland (1300) 
John de Foxley Wales (1294) 
That so many of the knights listed under counties like Berkshire, Oxfordshire and Kent 
appear to have served as cavalrymen illustrates just how widespread military service 
was among the gentry. It also confirms the point made earlier on the strong connection 
between knighthood and war under Edward I and his son. More importantly, the 
132 Pichard: 1296 (C 67/11, m. 1); 1297 (C 67/12, in. 9). Orreby: 1294 (CCW, 46); 1301 (BL, Add. MS 
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in. 8); de la Ryvere (C 67/10, in. 5d; E 101/6/28, in. 2i; Gough, 216; C 67/14, m. 10; C 67/14, m. 2; E 
101/612/10, in. 1; CDS, v, 445; J. R. S. Phillips, Aymer de Valence, Earl of Pembroke 1307-1324: 
Baronial Politics in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford, 1972), appendix 2; C 71/5, in. 4; C 71/6, m. 5); de la 
Huse (C 67/10, m. 5; C 67/15, in. 15; C 67/16, in. 10; this individual has been distinguished, as far as 
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evidence provided by both the Lord Marshal's Roll and PRA indicates that the rolls of 
arms of Edward I and Edward II should be understood in a military context. Once it is 
accepted that the individuals named on the rolls of arms are primarily, if not 
exclusively, men who served as mounted warriors in the king's armies, we can begin to 
relate the information contained in the rolls to the military history of the two reigns. 
Particularly interesting in this context is the way that the appearance of knights on the 
rolls of arms often coincided with the onset of their military careers. Ingelram de 
Berenger is named on the Lord Marshal's Roll a year after serving for the first time in 
Wales. 134 Other men whose military careers began around 1295 and who are listed for 
the first time on that roll include Adam de Welles, John de Ralegh and Adam de 
Huddleston. 135 Still more striking, given the link between knighthood and military 
service that has already been noted, is the rapidity with which newly-made knights 
appeared on the rolls of arms following their receipt of that honour. At least seventeen 
of the men who were knighted at the Feast of Swans in 1306 are named on the Nativity 
Roll, which was probably composed in the following year. 136 Heralds were evidently 
very diligent in the modification of their records. Closely linked to this point is the way 
that many individuals appear in the heraldic records within a short time of being 
distrained to knighthood. Not only does this provide more evidence of the success of the 
distraint orders in creating new knights but it also, more importantly, enables us to trace 
the widening of the armigerous community to include new families and individuals who 
may never previously have borne coats of arms. 137 
The first distraint order issued by Edward I was of the twenty-librate holders in 
1278. Intriguingly, no fewer than thirty-three of the men who were forced to become 
knights on that occasion appear on the Heralds' Roll of the following year. It is difficult 
to know how many of the families thus represented were receiving coats of arms for the 
first time but it is clear that some, such as John d'Abernon of Surrey, whose arms azure, 
a chevron or can be found on a monumental brass in the parish church that bears his 
name, were simply assuming the charges that had been borne into battle by their 
ancestors. 1 38 Nevertheless, there were others, such as Richard de Ashburnham, Roger le 
Covert and Hamo Bonet, each of whom was distrained from the counties of Surrey and 
134 Aspilogia III, ii, 46; C 67/10, m. 5. 
135 Welles (C 67/10, m. 3); Ralegh (RG, iii, 170); Huddleston (RG, iii, 161). For their heraldic 
biographies, see Aspilogia III, ii, 233,355 and 451. 
136 Denholm-Young, History and Heraldry, 117. 
137 The number of knights in England `would seem to have risen somewhat in the time of, and as a result 
of the activities of, Edward I'; P. Coss, `Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation in 
England', TRHS, 6th ser., v (1995), 155. 
138 Clayton, Catalogue of Rubbings of Brasses, Plate 1. 
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Sussex, who might have been the first members of their families to bear arms. Given 
that we only have the returns from ten counties, a very large number of families were 
possibly adopting heraldic trappings in response to the distraint order of 1278. This 
pattern re-emerges later in the reign: eleven of the men who were distrained to 
knighthood in 1292 appear on the rolls of arms for the first time in either 1295 or 1300. 
By that time there had been ample opportunity for the forebears of these knights to have 
been named on the earlier armorials, but Alexander de Botheby, entered on the Lord 
Marshal's Roll of 1295, seems to have been the first, and perhaps only man of that name 
to bear the arms gules, two chevrons within a bordure argent. 139 The same applies to 
Robert de Flixthorp who appears on the rolls of arms for the only time in 1295.140 This 
influx of new men and families into the social and military elite continued into the reign 
of Edward II. Several men who were distrained to knighthood in 1312 or 1316, and 
whose ancestors seem never to have been knights, later emerged on the early rolls of 
arms of Edward III. Gilbert de Cokerington, who was distrained in Yorkshire in 1316, 
was perhaps the `G. de Cokerington' listed on the Ashmolean Roll of 1334,141 whilst the 
`Monsieur de Metstede', who is on both that roll and Cotgrave's Ordinary, might have 
been the Andrew de Medestede who was distrained for the counties of Surrey and 
Sussex in the same year. 142 No knights with these surnames appear in the military 
records, or rolls of arms, of the reign of Edward I. 
What the combined testimony of the military and armorial records reveals, 
therefore, is a process of heraldic diffusion which was both driven by, and reflective of, 
the heightened military demands of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. 
Warfare during this period was instrumental in instigating social and cultural change. It 
led to the militarization not of the leading magnates and nobility, whose interest in 
warfare probably never ceased even during the relatively peaceful reign of Henry III, 
but of the men who lay on the fringe of the social elite and whose previous experience 
of warfare is likely to have been minimal. 143 Furthermore, by adopting the arms of their 
feudal lords and military leaders, these new knights absorbed the militaristic ethos of 
their superiors. In this way, a visual culture which may otherwise have been in danger 
139 C 47/1/3, m. 2; Aspilogia III, ii, 66. 
iao He did not receive knighthood by the deadline in 1292 (E 198/3/5, m. 106d), but this pressure seems to 
have persuaded him to accept knighthood during the intervening years before the Lord Marshal's Roll 
was composed in 1295 (Knights of Edward I, ii, 74; Aspilogia III, ii, 178). 
14! C 47/1/8, m. 31; R. W. Mitchell ed. English Mediaeval Rolls of Arms: Volume 1,1244-1334 (Peebles, 
1983), 482. He should not be confused with the Cokington family who bore different designs. 
142 C 47/1/8, m. 26d; Mitchell, English Mediaeval Rolls of Arms, 483; N. H. Nicolas ed., Rolls of Arms of 
the Reigns of Henry III and Edward III (London, 1829), 38. 
143 This is a modification of the view expressed by J. France, Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades, 
1000-1300 (London, 1999), 58-9. 
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of gradual stagnation and decay was enlivened and enriched. Coss has shown that the 
Richard de Egebaston knighted at the Feast of Swans in 1306 abandoned the arms of his 
father and adopted those of the Astley family with whom he served on the campaign of 
that year. 144 Such modifications can also be detected among newly-distrained knights 
who were keen to associate themselves with prestigious figures within the military 
community. On the Lord Marshal's Roll William de Stopham, who was distrained to 
knighthood in Yorkshire in 1278, appears with the arms argent, a bend sable. By the 
time of Collins' Roll of the following year he had added an escutcheon bearing the lion 
rampant purpure of the earl of Lincoln with whom he served on numerous occasions. 145 
Roger le Bret, who was distrained by the sheriff of Lincolnshire in 1292, also made his 
armorial debut on the Lord Marshal's Roll where he bore the arms of his feudal lord and 
military leader Edmund Deyncurt differenced. 146 
The reason why prominent magnates like Deyncurt were prepared to allow 
lesser men to adopt arms similar to their own is demonstrated by an entry on the patent 
rolls dated February 1314. By that time, Deyncurt's thoughts were turning increasingly 
towards his death. Although he was to live on until 1327, he was already concerned that 
his surname and arms would be lost from memory in the person of his immediate heir, 
his daughter Isabella. He therefore begged Edward II to allow him to enfeoff 
whomsoever he wished of the lands that he held in chief, so that the persons whom he 
so enfeoffed might bear his surname and arms in his memory and honour. 147 This 
concern, to ensure that his name and arms, azure billety and a fess dancetty or, 
continued beyond his death, demonstrates the strong link between heraldry and lineage 
which, as David Crouch has shown, obtained in the Middle Ages. 148 It also reminds us 
of the image presented by Geoffrey Luterel in the famous psalter that bears his name 
where Sir Geoffrey, adorned in full heraldic trappings on his warhorse, is represented on 
the same folio as Psalm 108, which `makes it plain that the continuance of a lineage is 
dependent upon righteous living'. 149 Coats of arms carried several layers of meaning, 
both individualistic and familial. Indeed a magnate's armorial bearings were the most 
striking indication of his status and identity within aristocratic society, as well as of his 
144 Coss, `Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion', 63; C 67/16, m. 6. 
145 Aspilogia III, ii, 402. C 47/1/2, m. 5i; 1277 (CPR 1272-81,189); 1294 (RG, iii, 161); 1298 (C 67/13, 
m. 5); 1300 (C 67/14, in. 11); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10). 
146 Aspilogia III, ii, 73. C 47/1/3, m. 2 (distraint); for his links to Deyncurt, see PW, i, 204,230. 
147 CPR, 1313-17,89; M. Prestwich, Plantagenet England, 1225-1360 (Oxford, 2005), 408. 
148 D. Crouch, `The Historian, Lineage and Heraldry, 1050-1250', Heraldry, Pageantry and Social 
Display in Medieval England, ed. P. Coss and M. Keen (Woodbridge, 2002), 17-37. 
149 Coss, 'Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion', 43, after R. Marks, `Sir Geoffrey Luttrell and 
Some Companions: Images of Chivalry c. 1320-50', Wiener Jahrbuch fir Kunstgeschichte, Band 
XLVI/XLVII (1993/4), 351. 
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martial prowess. 15° Given the pride and honour that was invested in such images it is not 
surprising that members of the nobility and baronage were glad to see their associates 
bearing arms similar to their own. Furthermore, men who held just one knight's fee, or 
whose influence did not stretch beyond the shire, were just as keen to share in the 
national fame and reputations of their leaders. 
Through combined study of the military and heraldic records one can trace many 
men who, upon beginning their military careers, adopted differenced versions of the 
arms of their retinue commanders. The years from 1295 to 1300, when Edward began to 
call directly upon the services of the twenty- and forty-librate holders, were important in 
this respect, as many knights appear for the first time on the rolls during that time 
bearing arms similar to those of the men with whom they had recently begun their 
military service. Robert de Haustede senior, who had been a king's yeoman during the 
1280s, first appears on the Lord Marshal's Roll of 1295 with an erroneous tincture. On 
Collins' Roll of the following year the correct blazon is given as gules, a chief checky or 
and azure: the charge in the chief was that of Robert de Clifford who Haustede 
accompanied to Scotland in 1296 and 1297-8.151 A number of lesser knights had their 
arms listed for the first time on the Galloway Roll of 1300 which commemorates the 
men who were present during a skirmish at the river Cree in south-west Scotland. 152 
Some of these, too, were bearing more complex versions of the arms of their superiors. 
One of Adam de Welles' former knights Robert de Bavent, who was with him in 
Flanders in 1297, appears to have differenced the Welles arms or, a lion rampant with a 
forked tail sable. '53 Edmund Bacon, who followed the St. John family to Flanders and 
then to Scotland in 1298,1299,1302 and 1303, carried on his shield the charge gules, 
on a chief argent two mullets sable, which were the arms of St. John with different 
tinctures. 154 In like manner, Hugh de Paunton, 155 John le Moyne' 56 and William de 
1 50 The centrality of heraldry to the mentality of the aristocracy is highlighted by the content of the late 
thirteenth-century romance, Fouke Le Fitz Waryn, which records the coats of arms borne by many of the 
characters; Fouke Le Fitz Waryn, ed. E. J. Hathaway, P. T. Ricketts, C. A. Robson and A. D. Wilshere, 
Anglo-Norman Text Society, xxvi-xxviii (Oxford, 1975). 
151 Aspilogia III, ii, 221; E 101/5/23, m. li; E 101/6/30, m. liv. 
152 On the Galloway Roll, see N. Denholm-Young, The Country Gentry in the Fourteenth Century, With 
Special Reference to the Heraldic Rolls of Arms (Oxford, 1969), 151-2; idem, `The Galloway Roll', 
Collected Papers off. Denholm-Young (Cardiff, 1969), 131-2. 
153 E 101/6/37, m. 4; Aspilogia III, ii, 37. 
154 C 67/12, m. 1; E 101/8/26, m. 3; E 101/612/12, m. 6; C 67/15, m. 14; Aspilogia III, ii, 23. 
155 With Bek in Scotland in 1296 (C 67/11, m. 2) and Flanders in 1297-8 (C 67/12, m. 3d), and bore gules, 
two bars and in dexter chief a cross moline ermine, the chief containing the arms of Bek; Aspilogia III, ii, 
44,330. He also witnessed a notarial authentication for the bishop in 1303; Records of Antony Bek, 
Bishop and Patriarch 1283-1311, ed. C. M. Fraser, Surtees Society, clxii (1953), no. 84. 
156 With Robert de Tibetot in Gascony in 1296 (RG, iii, 349) and Robert's son Payn in Scotland in 1306 
and 1307 (E 101/13/7, m. 1; E 101/14/15, m. 9). He bore the arms or, a saltire indented gules, whereas 
both Robert and Payn de Tibetot bore argent, a saltire indented gules; Aspilogia III, ii, 295,415. 
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Beaumont' 57 each adopted and adapted the arms of their military leaders, namely the 
bishop of Durham, Payn de Tibetot and William de Ryther respectively. The complexity 
of many of these new arms is indicative of a visual culture which was expanding and 
constantly being updated as the hectic schedule of the years of crisis saw increasing 
numbers of men engage in military activity for the first time. 
The personal relations that led to this process of dissemination can often be 
traced back to landholding, marital and friendship ties, which is not surprising given the 
overlap between the military and social spheres that obtained during the Middle Ages. 
One need not see a dichotomy between heraldic links that arose from social connections 
and those which were the result of shared military experience, for war helped to 
strengthen the familial and tenurial bonds that existed within local communities. Indeed, 
the adoption of heraldic designs by one family from another as a result of marriage ties, 
such as those noted by Robert Norton in relation to the retainers of Eustace de Hacche, 
were invested with greater meaning when the men connected in this way had served 
together on campaign. 158 Social bonds, military service and heraldic adaptation went 
hand-in-hand, each reinforcing and strengthening the other. John de Crumwell seems 
originally to have differenced the arms of his military leader Roger de Mohaut, azure, a 
lion rampant argent, with whom he served on the Welsh expedition of 1294-5, by 
adding a forked tail and a crown of gold. '59 Following Mohaut's death and his marriage 
into the north-western Vepont family in 1301 he changed his arms to gules, six annulets 
or, which were those of his new patrons with tinctures reversed. Before this time he had 
already begun to forge military service connections with other genteel families on the 
western March. In the opening years of the Scottish war he fought alongside Thomas de 
Hellebek and Hugh de Louther in the retinue of the leading magnate from that region, 
Robert de Clifford. 160 Louther bore the arms or, six annulets sable, whilst Hellebek bore 
gules, six annulets or, a label argent. 161 Although Crumwell first appears with his new 
arms on the Stirling Roll of 1304 and John de Vepont did not go to war with him until 
the year of the marriage, it would seem that Crumwell's betrothal followed, rather than 
157 With Ryther in 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5) and 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1). He incorporated Ryther's 
crescents into his arms; Aspilogia III, ii, 42,369. 
158 R. Norton, `The Arms of Eustace Hatch and Others', The Coat of Arms, new ser., v (1982), 18-19. 
159 Aspilogia III, ii, 128,294; CCW, 51. The lion rampant emblem was not that of his father Ralph, who 
had borne argent, a chief gules surmounted by a bend azure. 
160 Cromwell: 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. liv); 1298 (Gough, 196); 1300 (Liber Quotidianus, 176). Hellebek: 
1298 (Gough, 196); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5). Louther: 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. liv); 1298 (C 67/13, m. 7); 
1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5). 
161 Aspilogia III, ii, 224,268. 
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preceded, his entry into the north-western military community. '62 By marrying into the 
Vepont family he therefore strengthened and expanded upon the social and military 
bonds that he had already begun to build in that region, bonds that gained expression 
through the distinctive six annulets charge. 
Arms were not only disseminated between retinue leaders and their followers, 
but also between men who fought alongside one another or who shared the same 
locality. This has been demonstrated by Andrew Ayton with reference to the Ughtred 
family of Yorkshire who shared the cross patonce design with other families in the East 
Riding. 163 A similar charge was borne by a number of north-western families who might 
have been associated with the Hollands or Banasters. 164 Giles de Trumpeton, a knight 
who regularly followed the earl of Lincoln to war between 1294 and 1306, used a 
canting device in the form of azure crusily and two trumpets pilewise or. Given the 
distinctiveness of the charge we can be sure that James de Neville, who served under the 
earl during the same years and bore the trumpets whilst changing the tincture of the 
field, adopted his coat from the Trumpeton family. ' 65 The Echingham and St. Leger 
families were also bound to one another by shared military experiences. Robert de 
Echingham, Thomas de St. Leger and Edmund de St. Leger fought as sergeants in the 
company of William de Leyburn in Flanders in 1297. At Bannockburn in 1314, Robert 
de Echingham can again be found alongside a member of the St. Leger family, this time 
in the retinue of the earl of Gloucester. The camaraderie that such shared endeavours 
must have forged between these families was proudly displayed in the common charge 
of azure fretty argent. 166 These arms were different from those of their leaders, Leyburn 
and Clare. Both Bartholomew de Avylers and John de Loudham, members of genteel 
families from Suffolk who can be found together in Ralph de Monthermer's comitiva in 
1314, displayed three escutcheons on a silver field. 167 Similarly, Philip de Geyton and 
Theobald de Neville of Northamptonshire, with John de Segrave on the Dunbar 
campaign in 1296, are listed close to one another on the Parliamentary Roll of Arms and 
bore variations on the same coat. ' 68 That such `horizontal' dissemination was taking 
place concurrently with the process of `vertical' dissemination between leaders and their 
162 Crumwell was still using the lion rampant charge in 1300 so the adoption of the new coat was clearly a 
consequence of his marriage to Idonea de Vepont in 1301; Aspilogia III, ii 128. John de Vepont was with 
Crumwell in 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/7, in. 3); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1). 
163 Ayton, `Sir Thomas Ughtred', 115-8. 
164 PW, i, 420. 
165 Aspilogia III, ii, 319,423. Trumpeton and Neville were with the earl in Gascony in 1294 and 1295 
(RG, iii, 161,294), and Scotland in 1300 (C 47/2/13, m. 8; C 67/14, m. 11) and 1306 (C 67/16, in. 10). 
166 E 10 1/6/37, m. 4; C 71/6, in. 5; C 81/1727, m. 11; Aspilogia III, ii, 157,374; PW, i, 412. 
167C71/6, m. 1; PW, i, 414. 
168 C 67/11, in. 6; Aspilogia III, ii, 191,321; PW, i, 417. 
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retainers supports Peter Coss' point about the vitality of heraldry within Edwardian 
England, and affirms the close connection that existed between martial display and 
martial conduct. 
169 
When we reflect on the evidence presented here, bearing in mind the intense 
recruitment programme that was undertaken by Edward I, it is evident that the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries bore witness to a fundamental shift in the 
activities and lifestyles of the aristocracy. Most especially, for the gentry, the reigns of 
the first two Edwards must have come as a shock to the system as the demands of the 
king's wars placed unanticipated strains on their resources, both human and financial. 
More detailed work on the lives and activities of genteel families must be conducted 
before we can gauge the true extent of this shift. Some attempt will be made towards 
that end in a later chapter. Yet, the evidence of the mobilisation programme, combined 
with the enthusiasm with which many genteel families adopted the martial culture of the 
nobility through the medium of heraldry and visual display, suggests that both the social 
and the cultural consequences of Edward I's wars were immense. It may be too soon to 
be writing about the creation of a socio-professional elite during these years, but it is 
undeniable that the number of families and individuals who were involved in warfare at 
some stage in their lives increased dramatically. Edward I had gone a long way towards 
expanding the manpower pool for his wars; it was now the responsibility of the nobility 
and baronage to provide the leadership with which to exploit those resources to the full. 
169 Coss, `Knighthood, Heraldry and Social Exclusion', 56. 
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2 
Captains, Retinue Leaders and Command 
The achievements of Edward I in mobilising the country gentry for his wars in the 
British Isles and on the continent should not disguise the fact that the responsibility for 
conducting the king's campaigns and those of his son still lay primarily with the upper 
ranks of the aristocracy. Whilst the scale of the Crown's ambitions required the 
enlistment of many individuals and families who had never previously seen active 
service, it was the leading magnates who provided both kings with the human and 
financial resources without which it would have been impossible to pursue their military 
objectives. The earls, barons and bannerets of the realm were Edward I's chief 
henchmen in his attempts to conquer and colonise Wales and Scotland, and it was their 
assistance that both kings relied upon most heavily when attempting to defend their 
lands in south-western France. Without the support of the large retinues brought to war 
by their magnates, the kings of England would have been powerless to meet their 
enemies in open battle. ' Military organisation in the Middle Ages rested as much upon 
the shoulders of the social elite as it did upon those of the king, and in many respects, 
not least in the link that they provided between Crown and gentry, theirs was the 
predominant role. Before proceeding to look at the identities of this elite, their careers in 
arms and the duties that they performed, this chapter will begin with two preliminary 
and closely-related questions: how did contemporaries refer to those men who held 
positions of military command, and what can these terms tell us about the different 
kinds of military leadership exercised by the aristocracy during this period? 
RANK AND TITLE IN EDWARDIAN ARMIES 
The terminology of rank in medieval warfare was dominated by nouns that for the most 
part tell us little about the details of military command. Knight, or miles, is a word of 
ancient origin that initially meant `soldier'. As a consequence of the barbarian invasions 
of the fourth and fifth centuries the term gradually became associated, on the continent, 
with mounted warfare, but in England it was only after the Norman Conquest that 
I As witnessed by the farcical expedition to Flanders in 1297, on which, see N. B. Lewis, `The English 
Forces in Flanders, August-November 1297', Studies in Medieval History Presented to F. M. Powicke, ed. 
R. W. Hunt, W. A. Pantin and R. W. Southern (Oxford, 1948), 310-18. 
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milites became synonymous with mounted soldiers, or equites. 2 The warriors who came 
to England with the Conqueror were men of varying pedigree. 3 However, towards the 
late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, due in part to its association with the Church 
and the crusading movement, knighthood began to acquire the more elitist status that it 
had finally attained by the reign of Edward 1.4 Crystallisation at the top of the military 
hierarchy led in turn, as Nigel Saul has demonstrated, to the development of other 
military ranks below the level of knight. Serviens, scutifer, armiger and vallettus were 
all employed by the late thirteenth century to describe those who continued to fight on 
barded horses, but could no longer afford the costly trappings of knighthoods 
Ultimately, such men were to become known as `esquires', a term of humble origin 
which by the time of the sumptuary legislation of 1363 had come to denote both `those 
who were on the same level economically as knights' and others with `all manner of 
gentle men below the estate of knight'. Only at this point did `esquire' truly arrive as a 
mark of social status. 6 Neither `knight' nor `esquire' had direct associations with 
positions of leadership on the battlefield, though here one needs to distinguish between 
knights bachelor and banneret. The latter received twice the pay of ordinary knights and 
bore rectangular banners rather than simple pennons. Unlike knights bachelor and 
esquires, for whom command over other soldiers was incidental to their rank, bannerets 
were expected to lead troops of men to war. The rectangular banner was a status symbol 
reflecting the wealth and social precedence of the man who bore it; but, unlike the other 
terms already discussed, `banneret' did not survive as either a social or military rank 
much beyond the chivalrous age. 7 
`Banneret', `knight' and `esquire' are the socio-military terms most familiar to 
students of the Middle Ages. The problem that military historians face, and which 
highlights one of the key differences between medieval hosts and modem forces, is that 
whilst there were various types of military command within Edwardian England, there 
was no fixed hierarchy of ranks to mirror those distinctions. Even the honour of 
`banneret', whilst denoting a position of authority in the field, is something of an 
anomaly and appears to have been conferred according to the landed wealth and social 
2 S. Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 1066-1135 (Woodbridge, 1994), 11. 
3 Cf. S. Harvey, `The Knight and the Knight's Fee in England', Past and Present, il (1970), 3-43; but also 
the revised view by D. F. Fleming, `Landholding by Milites in Domesday Book: A Revision', Anglo- 
Norman Studies XIII, ed. M. Chibnall (Woodbridge, 1991), 97. 
4 Crouch, Image of Aristocracy, 139; K. Faulkner, `The Transformation of Knighthood in Early 
Thirteenth-Century England', EHR, cxi (1996), 20-1. 
5 Saul, Knights and Esquires, 12-14. 
6 Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, 228-9. 
7 Ibid, 241-2; Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 13-15. 
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status of the recipient rather than as a reward for outstanding military ability; at least 
during the reigns of the first two Edwards. One reason for the absence of any clearly- 
demarcated system of titles or ranks is that the armies of Edward I and his son were 
social organisms knitted together from the communities and localities of genteel 
England, rather than political institutions imposed from above. Consequently there were 
few precise terms, other than that of banneret, to denote soldiers who led other men-at- 
arms to war. As Peter Coss has reminded us, `if we look for terminological exactitude in 
medieval sources we are likely, as often as not, to be disappointed'. 8 This problem is 
apparent in the military records throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries and is 
perhaps most clearly seen in the ordinances of war that were drawn up for Richard II's 
Scottish expedition of 1385. These regulations have been studied in some detail by 
Maurice Keen who noted that medieval hosts, unlike modem standing armies, were 
`forces raised in particular circumstances, and for a limited period of service'. 9 One 
consequence of this was that the terms used to denote army leaders were derived from 
social titles used in everyday life, as well as from designations more specifically 
associated with the conduct of war. Thus, in clause four of the ordinances it was ordered 
that `no one be so hardy as to go before, or otherwise than in the "battle" to which he 
belongs, under the banner or pennon of his lord or master', whilst in clause sixteen we 
find, in like manner, that every soldier was obliged to give a third of his booty `a son 
seignur, ou mestre'. 10 Use of such phrases speaks volumes about the continued 
importance of social ties to the formation of English hosts, even well into the era of 
`contract' armies. 
Another term more traditionally used by military historians when referring to 
troop commanders in medieval armies is that of `captain'. Indeed we find the words 
`chevytaigne' and `capitaigne' employed alongside `lord' and `master' in the army 
ordinances of 1385. It is not at all clear whether the words `captain', `lord' and `master' 
were synonymous, or even whether they were always being used in the same context or 
to refer to the same men. In 1282, the Marcher lord Roger de Mortimer was granted 
permission to accept the Welshmen of Builth into the king's peace, but the gesture of 
conciliation was not extended to their `captains' and `lords'. " Whether `captains' and 
8 Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, 218. 
9 M. Keen, `Richard II's Ordinances of War of 1385', Rulers and Ruled in Late Medieval England: 
Essays presented to Gerald Harriss, ed. R. E. Archer and S. Walker (London, 1995), 35. 
10 Keen, `Richard II's Ordinances of War', 38; Monumenta Juridica: The Black Book of the Admiralty, 
ed. T. Twiss, 4 vols, Rolls Ser., Iv (London, 1871-76), i, 453,456. For more on the structure of the army, 
see S. Armitage-Smith, John of Gaunt. King of Castile and Leon, Duke of Aquitaine and Lancaster, Earl 
of Derby, Lincoln and Leicester, Seneschal of England (London, 1964), appendix 2. 
11 C 77/3, m. 8; CVCR, 221. 
46 
`lords' were here simply different words used to refer to the same men is now 
impossible to discern. Nevertheless, some attempt at greater precision is necessary so as 
to distinguish between the two main types of military leadership exercised in the armies 
of Edward I and his son: the command of armies, garrisons and conquered territories on 
the one hand, and of small troops of men-at-arms on the other. Generally speaking, 
`captain' was used in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries to denote the 
superior type of commander. When war broke out in Wales towards the end of 1276, 
some prominent `captains' were sent to the border fortifications to defend the March 
and organise the armed forces in that part of the country. By late November of that year, 
the earl of Warwick was placed in command of the king's men-at-arms in Lancashire 
and Cheshire, whilst Roger de Mortimer kept guard of the central Marches from his 
strategic position as `captain' of Shropshire, Staffordshire, Herefordshire and the 
surrounding areas. 12 When Hugh de Vere was placed in charge of the garrison of St. 
Sever in Gascony in 1295, the chronicler Nicholas Trivet felt it appropriate to describe 
him as a capitaneus. 13 The word `captain' was also frequently employed when referring 
to the high-ranking officers who commanded the major divisions within royal and 
baronial armies. Thomas Wykes described the earl of Gloucester as the captain of a 
`battle' (aciei ... capitaneus) when 
he fought on the royalist side at Evesham. 14 
Furthermore, the roll of arms for the battle of Falkirk names the earl of Lincoln as the 
cheveteyn de la premiere batayle and the earl Warenne as cheveteyn de la quarte 
batayle. 15 
The type of military command with which the word capitaneus or cheveteyn was 
most closely associated was the leadership of regional armies, or of hosts gathered when 
the king could not be present in person. During the first Welsh war, Payn de Chaworth 
was active as a captain in west Wales whilst the main army was being assembled in the 
north. 16 Later, the earls of Richmond, Lancaster and Lincoln were employed in a similar 
capacity in Gascony at a time when Edward was distracted by rebellions in Wales and 
Scotland. 17 Such captaincies became increasingly common as Scottish resistance 
stiffened in the years following Bruce's rebellion. In 1306 the English force was 
divided, for strategic purposes, into several smaller hosts. The leaders of these armies - 
Aymer de Valence, Henry de Percy, and Robert de Clifford - were described as 
12 PW, i, 193. 
13 Trivet, 336. 
14 Wykes, 172. 
15 Aspilogia III, i, 406,415. 
16 Trivet, 296. 
17 Below, 62-3. 
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`captains' in the letter of confirmation sent by the king to the men of the north. ' 8 In 
some years, even though large royal armies ventured north of the border, it was 
necessary to appoint lieutenants to control the areas where the king could not be present 
in person. The host that campaigned in Scotland in 1303 spent much of its time in the 
north of the country, which left the south and the border counties of England open to 
enemy incursions. To reduce this threat, Edward appointed Aymer de Valence as 
captain south of the Firth of Forth. 19 During his tenure of that office, Valence referred to 
himself in his correspondence with the Crown as `cheventeyn del ost et lui tenaunt 
nostre seignur le Roi'. 20 In 1311, when the army of Edward II spent many months 
inactive in the vicinity of Berwick upon Tweed, the earl of Angus was made captain in 
the north of Scotland: his objective was to prevent Bruce from obtaining more 
supporters in that part of the country. Although he was joined by a small group of 
barons headed by Payn de Tibetot, only the earl was accorded the official title of 
capitaneus. 21 Following the complete breakdown of order on the northern border after 
Bannockburn, an attempt was made to return to the old system under which the 
peacekeeping powers of the custos had been combined with the military weight of the 
captain. 22 In 1315, Edward II and his council reacted to the threat of a further Scottish 
invasion of northern England by making Aymer de Valence, that most trusted leader, 
captain and warden of the March (capitaneus et custos Marchie). Once again, though 
joined by the powerful lords Mohaut and Badlesmere, it was made clear that overall 
command lay in the hands of the earl. 23 
`Captain' was not the only word used to denote military commanders during the 
wars of Edward I and Edward II. Walter of Guisborough employed duces to refer to 
John Giffard and Roger de Mortimer junior, two of the chief officers during the Welsh 
war of 1282. The same author felt that custodes was the most appropriate usage for the 
three main army leaders in 1307.24 Personal taste and stylistic idiosyncrasies are always 
likely to impose themselves on the neat constructs of historians, so one must be careful 
not to exaggerate the predominance of one particular mode of description over another. 
Despite his observation that the duties of the military captain and the custos pacis were 
separated early in the reign of Edward I, Alan Harding was aware that `on the Welsh 
18 C 66/127, m. 28; CDS, ii, no. 1754; CPR, 1301-07,426. 
19 CCR, 1302-07,59. 
20 SC 1/3 1, no. 33. 
21 Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, f. 52r. 
22 Cf. CPR, 1292-1301,185. 
23 E 101/376/7, f. 60r. For further discussion on such captains, see C. McNamee, The Wars of the Bruces: 
Scotland, England and Ireland 1306-1328 (East Linton, 1997), 147-52. 
24 Guisborough, 220,378. 
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March the captain and the custos pacis remained undifferentiated, for the subjugation of 
the Welsh was regarded as a matter of "the king's peace"' . 
25 A similar situation 
obtained in Scotland and the northern counties of England where the constant threat of 
enemy attack meant that the captain had defensive duties to perform not dissimilar to 
those of the custos. As we have seen, the two roles were sometimes combined under the 
same man. Fluctuating fortunes on the northern March meant that there was often little 
to distinguish aggressor from victim: raids from both sides were a common 
phenomenon of border life. The first appointment of a custos, or `warden', in disputed 
territories came in 1201 when Hubert de Burgh was named keeper of the border 
between England and Wales (custodem finium Angliae et Walliae). 26 During the early 
stages of the Anglo-Scottish wars of the late thirteenth century such appointments 
became increasingly common until by 1309 they had evolved into the permanent 
institution of Warden of the March. 27 Insurgent activity following the English victory at 
Dunbar meant that all of Scotland rather than simply the border area was regarded as a 
region requiring the attention of a permanent official. Consequently, one finds the earl 
Warenne being named custodem nostrum regni et terre Scotie in 1296 and Brian Fitz 
Alan offered the same position the following year. 28 The wording of these appointments 
suggests that the custos was primarily a territorial official, in contrast to the capitaneus 
for whom the emphasis was on command over other men-at-arms. However, given the 
notorious vagueness of medieval military terminology, it would be unwise to make too 
much of this distinction: wardens also commanded men-at-arms, just as captains 
patrolled regional zones. 
The captains and wardens of government record evidently possessed 
considerable authority, wielding powers that had been conferred on them by the king 
and his council. In other contexts the `captain' could be understood in a more pluralistic 
sense, sometimes referring, as in the later fourteenth century, to the lesser company 
leaders within the armies; but, it is unusual to find capitaneus employed in this way in 
the chancery and exchequer accounts of the period. 29 Contemporaries were aware of the 
need to distinguish between the different levels of military command within Edwardian 
hosts and sought, where necessary, to make such distinctions clear. This is shown by a 
25 A. Harding, `The Origins and Early History of the Keeper of the Peace', TRHS, 5`h ser., x (1960), 101. 
26 F. C. Suppe, Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches: Shropshire, A. D. 1066-1300 (Woodbridge, 
1994), 102. 
27 R. R. Reid, `The Office of Warden of the Marches; Its Origin and Early History', EHR, xxxii (1917), 
481-2. 
28 Rotuli Scotiae, i, 27,45. 
29 For a rare instance of such usage, see C 54/123, m. 8d; CCR, 1302-07,455. 
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list that has survived from 1315 containing the names of northern lords summoned by 
the archbishop of York to do military service. The archbishop wished to convene a 
meeting of the region's most influential landowners, to be held at Doncaster, for the 
purpose of defending the north of England against Scottish invasion. Some fifty men 
were summoned by name but only ten of these were described as chief captains 
(principales capitanei). This group included Robert de Clifford, Henry de Percy, Ralph 
Fitz William and Peter de Mauley: the elite of the northern soldiery. The remaining list 
ended with the word milites. Some prominent names can be found among this second 
group of `knights', such as Twenge, Furnivall, Meynill and Constable. 30 These were all 
men who led armed companies on royal campaigns in the hosts of Edward I and his son, 
but the distinction between the `chief captains' and `knights' is significant. It reflects 
the presence within medieval armies of different levels of power and authority, as well 
as the tendency to use social or quasi-social terms, such as barones or milites, for the 
lower rung of leaders. In this context it should be remembered that the ordinances 
drawn up for Richard II's campaign of 1385 referred to retinue leaders not only as 
`capitaignes' but also, more frequently, as `seignurs ou mestres'. Such usage was 
reflective of the fundamentally social nature of these tightly-knit companies. 
If, under Edward I and Edward II, the word `captain' normally referred to men 
appointed by royal commission to lead hosts or defend territorial zones, the question 
remains as to how we should characterise the smaller companies that comprised English 
armies. As we have seen, the leaders of these units were sometimes simply referred to 
as `lords' or `masters', but there were other alternatives. One way of describing these 
units was to refer to the banners that each lord led into battle. `Men who had banners 
were great men, for the practical reason that only a man with the resources to lead a 
company of troops would need such an item to distinguish himself from others'. 31 The 
army that the Lord Edward led towards London in 1267 consisted, we are told, of 109 
vexilla. 32 Bartholomew Cotton goes into greater detail on the English army at Falkirk. 
The host was divided into four `battles', the first of which consisted of twenty-three 
vexilla comitum et magnatum. 33 He puts the count for the second battle under the bishop 
of Durham at twenty-three banners, but Guisborough gives a higher figure of thirty-six 
vexillarii. 34 Cotton's account would appear to have been the more accurate of the two, 
30 Historical Papers and Letters from the Northern Registers, ed. J. Raine, Rolls Ser., lxi (London, 1873), 
246-7. 
31 Crouch, Image of Aristocracy, 114. 
32 Ann. Winton., 105. 
33 Cotton, 343-4. 
34 Ibid; Guisborough, 327. 
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for the Falkirk Roll names twenty-seven bannerets in Bek's division. 35 In 1324, it was 
reported that Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore was planning to cross to England as the 
`cheventein' of a rebel army along with `les autres bannis', traitors of the lord king. 36 
This highlights a terminological distinction between the main commander and his 
subordinate leaders. The significance of bannerets and banner-bearers at this level of 
military organisation is further suggested by the canon of Bridlington who described the 
rebel baronial army of 1322 as comprising multi ... 
barones et baneretti. 37 This division 
into battles and banners matched continental practice: J. F. Verbruggen has noted that 
the French army that fought the Flemish at Cassel in 1328 consisted of a dozen battles 
comprising a total of 196 banners. 38 Most other depictions of royal hosts tended to be 
less precise than this. The army that fought in Wales in 1277 consisted, we are told, of 
`earls and barons'. 39 Similarly, the host that the earl of Cornwall led into Wales against 
Rhys ap Maredudd in 1287 was led by the earl, as keeper of England, along with other 
`earls, barons, knights, and all the army of England'. 40 Few chroniclers entered into 
much detail concerning the composition of the king's forces. 
Such descriptions of medieval armies may strike the modern reader as imprecise 
and vague, but they reflect the way that these armies were formed. Military captains and 
wardens were essential to the smooth running of the Crown's campaigns; their power 
stemmed primarily from the fact that they were agents of the central administration. 
These officers, as revealed in the records of chancery and exchequer, were men who 
occupied specific positions of command, whether that was over garrisons in the Welsh 
borderlands or regional armies in the north of Scotland. For the most part, the 
contingents that comprised royal hosts were led not by `captains' of this kind but by 
`earls', `barons' and `knights', terms of a social origin. Bannerets formed the crucial 
tactical link between the battle commanders and the lesser company leaders, but such 
precise ranks were rare below the level of captain or warden. Both high command and 
retinue leadership were important elements of the martial dominance enjoyed by the 
social elite. Therefore, each must be considered separately if we are to appreciate the 
35 Aspilogia III, i, 408-11. 
36 The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325). Gascon Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents, ed. P. 
Chaplais, Camden Society 3`d ser., lxxxvii (1954), 72. 
37 `Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvon, Auctore Canonico Bridlingtoniensi, cum Continuatione ad A. D. 1377', 
Chronicles of the Reigns of Edward I and Edward II, ed. W. Stubbs, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., lxxvi (London, 
1882-3), ii, 74. 
38 Verbruggen, Art of Warfare, 81. 
39 Annales Cestrienses; or, Chronicle of the Abbey of St. Werburg, at Chester, ed. R. C. Christie, The 
Record Society for the Publication of Original Documents Relating to Lancashire and Cheshire, xiv 
(1886), 104. 
40 Ann. Lond., 96. 
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layered and multi-faceted nature of magnate authority and influence in war. To reflect 
this distinction, the words `captain' and `warden' are used throughout the ensuing 
discussion and the rest of the thesis to refer to those who held high command, whereas 
`retinue leaders' is employed to denote the leaders of the individual comitivae, however 
great or small the latter. 
HIGH COMMAND: POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
In the summer of 1297, Hugh de Cressingham, treasurer of Scotland and figure of 
hatred among the native population, sent a letter to Edward I on the state of affairs north 
of the border. Policing the country was proving difficult and, to make matters worse, a 
crisis had arisen among the leaders of the English force. Brian Fitz Alan's refusal to 
take up the position as keeper of Scotland had created uncertainty within the army as 
day by day the strength of the enemy continued to grow. In his report, Cressingham 
urged the king to appoint a new commander-in-chief with all haste, `for, in proportion 
as the matter is pressed onwards with good thought and good deliberation, so much the 
better for you'. 41 On 7 September the earl was reappointed as leader of the expedition, 
but just four days later, at a time when both he and his men were still coming to terms 
with the new command structure, the occupying army was routed by the Scots at 
Stirling Bridge. The treasurer was among those killed, his warning having been heeded 
too late to save his life and the lives of many others. Some twenty years later, in 1319, 
the English suffered yet another military setback at the hands of the Scots. As the host 
under Edward II besieged Berwick castle, a Scottish raiding force slipped across the 
border and proceeded to plunder the north of England. At Myton on Swale it met with 
resistance from a local militia organised by the archbishop of York, but the valiant 
defence did not last for long. According to the author of the Anonimalle Chronicle, `the 
Scots, who were well marshalled and well equipped for war, had great scorn for the 
English ... and soon the English were 
killed and defeated'. 42 What had begun as a battle 
degenerated into a massacre, and the unskilled and untrained Yorkshiremen proved to 
be no match for the enemy under experienced baronial commanders. 
The defeat at Stirling Bridge and the debacle at Myton, though separated by two 
decades and different in a number of respects, illustrate equally well the importance of 
strong and decisive leadership in medieval warfare. Though a number of errors, 
41 Stevenson, ii, 226. 
42 The Anonimalle Chronicle 1307-1334, From Brotherton Collection MS. 29, ed. W. R. Childs and J. 
Taylor, The Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Ser., cxlvii (1991), 99. 
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including tactical decisions made on the day of the battle, led to the catastrophe in 1297, 
the confusion over leadership of the army, together with the slow resolution of that 
problem, was undoubtedly a contributing factor. At Myton, the contrast between the 
trained and disciplined Scottish host and the piecemeal contingents put together by 
William de Melton meant that the outcome of the `battle' was never really in doubt. An 
army without competent leadership, no matter how brave the men in it, was little better 
than a disorderly rabble. Medieval military theorists, like modern historians, were able 
to discern the implications of such events. Writing early in the fifteenth century, 
Christine de Pizan observed that in war, `nothing has greater importance than the 
selection of military leaders'. 43 As military men themselves, most medieval kings were 
aware of the need to select captains whose good service and prestige would set an 
example to others. A problem that they faced, as in all ages, was to discern who the 
most able men were, for the numerous administrative and military qualities that were 
required in a leader were rarely found in one man. The processes by which military 
commanders were selected are now hidden from view, but by considering the 
characteristics of the soldiers who were entrusted with such responsibilities it may be 
possible to reconstruct the criteria according to which captaincy commissions were 
issued. 
Experience was perhaps the most relevant qualification that a candidate for 
military leadership could possess. It was the strong war record of the earl Warenne that 
made him such a promising choice for the custodianship of Scotland in 1297: the 
composer of a contemporary song on the Scottish wars observed that the king had 
appointed `a worthy man to the government of the kingdom, John de Warenne, whom 
he had often proved'. 44 The earl's military career had been suitably active for a man of 
his status. A veteran of the reign of Henry III, he had fought alongside the Lord Edward 
at Lewes before going on to serve with distinction throughout the Welsh wars, helping 
to put down the rising of Rhys ap Maredudd in 1287 whilst the king was in France. 45 
Although a sexagenarian by 1297, he had shown sufficient ability in defeating the 
Scottish feudal army at Dunbar in the previous year to suggest that his age need not be a 
43 Christine de Pizan, The Book of Deeds of Arms and of Chivalry, trans. S. Willard and ed. C. C. Willard 
(Pennsylvania, 1999), 23. 
44 Thomas Wright's Political Songs of England: From the Reign of John to that of Edward II, with 
introduction by P. Coss (Cambridge, 1996), 168. 
45 Chronica et Annales, 26. He received a prest in 1287 (E 372/132, m. 1), and obtained letters of 
protection for his men in 1277 (CPR, 1272-81,222), 1282-3 (C 67/8, mm. 3-4), and 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 
7). 
53 
bar to success. 46 For the greater part of his reign Edward placed his trust in those, like 
the earl, who were soldiers of his own generation. 47 A number of knights who had been 
on crusade with the prince during 1270-2, including Robert de Tibetot, Payn de 
Chaworth, William de Valence and the king's brother, Edmund of Lancaster, held 
positions of command during the Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282-3.48 Other veterans of 
the expedition to the east, most notably John de St. John, later gave prominent service 
in Gascony and Scotland, providing the king with an experienced and able leadership 
corps during the years of crisis. 49 Despite the arrival of a new generation of 
commanders in the late 1290s, the majority of those employed as wardens on the 
Scottish March had cut their teeth as retinue leaders during the wars against Llywelyn 
ap Gruffydd. Brian Fitz Alan was offered the position of custos of Scotland in 1297, 
twenty years after first campaigning against the Welsh; 50 and William le Latimer, 51 
Robert Fitz Roger52 and John de Segrave53 were just a few of those for whom command 
in the Scottish wars was reward for a lifetime of military activity on behalf of the 
Crown. 
From the mid-1290s, when the scale of warfare increased due to the outbreak of 
hostilities in France and Scotland, military experience was less difficult to come by than 
it had been during the relatively peaceful period following Edward I's accession. When 
the earl of Pembroke was appointed as captain and keeper in Scotland in 1314, it was 
observed that he had been selected because of the industry and diligence that he had 
shown in the past. 54 In the seventeen years since first serving as a retinue leader on the 
Flanders campaign in 1297, he had fought, not uncommonly for those coming of age at 
that time, on at least eight different expeditions, seven of which had been conducted 
north of the border. 55 Following a successful apprenticeship as captain in southern 
46 The earl was born `in or after August 1231'; Complete Peerage, xii (i), 503. On the battle of Dunbar, 
see G. W. S. Barrow, Robert Bruce and the Community of the Realm of Scotland, 3rd edition (Edinburgh, 
1988), 72. 
47 Cf. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 49. 
48 For their participation in the crusade, see S. Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade 1216-1307 
(Oxford, 1988), appendix 4; B. Beebe, `The English Baronage and the Crusade of 1270', BIHR, xlviii 
(1975), appendix. For their appointments to captaincies in Wales, see: Tibetot (PW, i, 222); Chaworth 
(CCR, 1272-79,366); Valence (PW, i, 227); Lancaster (CPR, 1272-81,213). 
a9 Below, 56,58-9,61-6. 
so Service in Wales (CPR, 1272-81,190). For his appointment in 1297, see above, n. 28. 
51 Captaincy (PW, i, 319); in Wales (E 101/4/1, m. 2); household service (E 101/4/9; E 101/351/26, m. 1). 
52 Captaincy (PW, i, 301); Wales in 1277 (E 101/3/12), 1282 (C 67/8, m. 8d), 1287 (E 372/132, m. 1), 
1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 6); Scotland in 1296 (C 67/11, m. 3). 
53 Captaincy (Foedera, II, i, 70); service in Wales (PW, i, 206,233). 
54 Foedera, II, i, 252. 
ss Flanders in 1297 (BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 68r); Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 216), 1300 (C 67/14, m. 11), 
1301 (E 101/9/24, m. ld), 1302 (C 67/15, m. 16), 13034 (E 101/612/8, m. 1), 1306 (E 101/13/16) and 
1307 (C 67/16, m. 3). He was also on the March in the winter of 1311-12; C 71/5, m. 4. 
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Scotland in 1303, he went on to lead small armies north of the border in 1306 and 1307. 
During that time, he confronted Robert Bruce in battle on two occasions and defeated 
his adversary at Methven. When the northern counties of England were faced with 
repeated Scottish raids in the months following Bannockburn, he was the commander to 
whom Edward II naturally turned to stem the tide. Reappointments of this kind were 
common as an elite band of warriors was repeatedly drawn on to occupy the most 
important military positions. Robert Fitz Roger served on the eastern March in 1297, 
then again in 1300, before leading a group of Northumbrian stipendiaries in 1306.56 
John de Segrave was employed as a captain on the March throughout much of the 
opening decade of the fourteenth century. 57 Earlier, both William de Valence and 
Reginald de Grey had provided an important thread of continuity throughout the Welsh 
campaigns of the first three decades of the reign. 58 
Not all men appointed by the Crown to important positions of command were 
experienced war veterans. Robert de Clifford was in his early twenties and had only 
recently begun to serve as a retinue leader when he was named keeper of the western 
March in 1296.59 In this instance, geographical proximity to the sphere of war appears 
to have been decisive, as the Cliffords were the largest landowning family in the 
affected area. It has been suggested that `lack of money' sometimes forced the king `to 
engage as his captains the men who had a personal interest in keeping the Marches 
safe'. 60 In all likelihood, such men were especially strenuous in the fulfilment of their 
military duties. During the Welsh wars, the comital families of Clare and Bohun, 
alongside the baronial dynasties of Mortimer, Grey and Lestrange, played prominent 
roles in the conflicts fought close to their own lands. Scottish landowners, such as 
Alexander d'Abernethy, the earl of March, and the earl of Angus, were not infrequently 
called upon to serve as captains north of the border. Membership of the king's 
household could also be a factor in the selection of officers as those in receipt of fees 
could be supervised with less difficulty than comital warriors who liked to remind the 
king of their rights and privileges. Authority in the Welsh and Scottish Marches was 
often committed to household knights. Four of the king's bannerets, Robert de Clifford, 
John de St. John, John Botetourt, and Richard de Siward, each acted as warden of the 
Scottish March between 1296 and 1307. Both Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore and 
56 PW, i, 301,340; CDS, ii, no. 1760. 
57 In 1302-3,1305 and 1309-10; Knights of Edward I, iv, 236-7. 
58 Valence: 1277 (CPR, 1272-81,211); 1282-3 (C 67/8, m. 8); 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 7). Grey: 1277 (CPR, 
1272-81,189); 1282-3 (C 67/8, m. 5); 1287 (E 372/132, in. ld); 1294-5 (E 101/5/18, m. 14). 
59 Complete Peerage, iii, 290-1; CDS, ii, no. 734. 
60 Reid, `Office of Warden of the Marches', 490. 
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Roger Lestrange were members of the household during their periods of command in 
the second Welsh war of 1282-3.61 Despite this, the role of the household knights as 
military leaders should not be exaggerated. For all their reliability, `the major military 
commands were rarely entrusted to them'; 62 and, owing to the objections that the king 
would have faced from the higher nobility, `no household knight was ever made 
commander-in-chief of a battalion in a major campaign'. 63 
Alongside experience, ability was the most desirable component of the war 
captain. However, as J. R. Maddicott has reminded us, `one of our chief difficulties in 
writing about medieval nobles is our lack of the means to judge their capabilities'. 64 
Those upon whom the Crown most frequently relied, such as Aymer de Valence, were 
probably also the men who possessed the greatest ability in the field. Unfortunately, 
detailed descriptions of commanders in action, such as that of the earl of Warwick at the 
battle of Maes Moydog in 1295, are rare. 65 In any case, social status and material wealth 
were important prerequisites of military leadership: without these, even the most 
competent soldiers would find it difficult to exercise their authority. When offered the 
position of keeper of Scotland in August 1297, Brian Fitz Alan famously declined the 
post, explaining to the king that `the goods which I have would be too small, as far as I 
can stretch them, well to keep that land to your honour'. The earl Warenne had 
struggled to perform his duties owing to insufficient resources, and Fitz Alan claimed 
that with an annual income of just a thousand pounds he would find it difficult to keep 
fifty armed horses in the field as befitted the status of the commander-in-chief. 66 In the 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries social eminence was still regarded, for the most 
part, as a necessary precondition for the exercise of high command. The Scottish force 
that invaded Weardale in 1327 was led by `les plus haults barons de tout le royaume 
d'Escoce'. 67 In Edwardian England, too, the leading positions of command were almost 
invariably given to men drawn from the upper echelons of noble society. Combatants of 
comital rank disliked the notion of serving under men of inferior status. In 1277, Payn 
de Chaworth, who had been a captain in west Wales since the end of the previous year, 
was placed under the higher authority of the earl of Lancaster as king's lieutenant in the 
61 R. L. Ingamells, `The Household Knights of Edward I', University of Durham D. Phil. thesis, 1992,2 
vols, i, 105, ii, 48. 
62 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 60. 
63 Ingamells, `Household Knights of Edward I', i, 102. 
64 J. R, Maddicott, Simon de Montfort (Cambridge, 1994), 358. 
65 Chronica et Annales, 148. 
66 Stevenson, ii, 223. 
67 Chronique de Jean le Bel, ed. J. Viard and E. Deprez, 2 vols (Paris, 1904-5), i, 52. 
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area. 68 Five years later, Robert de Tibetot was replaced as captain in south Wales by the 
earl of Gloucester after only two weeks in the office. 69 It was not easy to reconcile the 
king's wish to appoint the most able commanders with the traditional precedence 
afforded in such matters to men of comital rank. 
One way around this problem was to issue joint commands so that young men 
of high social status could learn their trade in the company of more experienced 
baronial leaders. On 1 July 1294, John de St. John was made seneschal of Gascony and 
the young earl of Richmond captain of the king's forces there. According to Nicholas 
Trivet, St. John and another knight, Robert de Tibetot, had been specially chosen to act 
as advisors to the young earl as they were experienced and skilled in war. 70 This must 
have seemed quite natural as St. John was the earl of Richmond's senior by some 
twenty years. 7' Joint commissions of this kind were not uncommon. In October 1294, 
the earl of Arundel, who was in his late twenties at the time, was sent on an expedition 
to Bere castle in Wales along with Robert Fitz Walter, a veteran of the first and second 
Welsh wars. Although the earl was officially made captain, in recognition of his high 
social standing, it was understood that he was `to succour and furnish the said castle' 
according to the recommendations given to him by Fitz Walter. The earl was assisted 
not only by the latter but also by a number of experienced Marcher lords, including 
Roger Lestrange and Peter Corbet. 72 In like manner, the earl of Gloucester was only 
seventeen when he was made captain of an expeditionary force to Rutherglen in 
Scotland in 1308. Whilst the earl was appointed captain of the expedition (capitaneus 
nostrum expeditionis), John de Crumwell was made leader of the knights, valets, 
sergeants, and footmen. 73 Crumwell and those serving under him were officially 
subordinated to the young earl's command. However, given the latter's inexperience 
and the fact that Crumwell had served with distinction as a retinue leader on several 
previous campaigns, it is likely that Crumwell was expected to act in an advisory 
capacity to the future tragic hero of Bannockburn. 
The man responsible for the appointments of the earl of Gloucester and John de 
Crumwell in 1308, Edward II, had undergone a similar period of tutelage in the art of 
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military command as a teenage prince. Like the young Gilbert de Clare, Edward had 
acquired little military experience prior to his appointment as leader of an army in 
western Scotland in 1301. On that occasion he was accompanied by a number of elder 
bannerets, including William de Leyburn and Reginald de Grey, who were trusted 
associates of the prince's father. 74 Members of the royal family shared with sons of the 
higher nobility the need to obtain training in war from an early age; indeed, many of the 
commissions that were given to young men can be explained in this light. Be that as it 
may, not all joint commissions were granted because of the need to combine status with 
experience, or wealth with ability. In August 1315, in response to an attack on Carlisle 
by Robert Bruce, the earl of Lancaster was made commander-in-chief (superiorem 
capitaneum) over all men-at-arms and foot between the River Trent and Roxburgh. 75 
The earl of Pembroke had already been appointed as captain in that area in July and 
would appear to have been a more able and trustworthy commander than the king's 
troublesome cousin. J. R. S. Phillips has suggested that `the major reason for putting 
Pembroke under Lancaster's orders on 8 August may have been because the immediate 
Scottish threat to Carlisle was close to Lancaster's home base and also because 
Pembroke's forces happened to be in the area at the time'. If this was so, then it may 
well be that captaincies were sometimes conferred in recognition of a noble's claim to 
territorial supremacy, rather than for the purpose of strengthening national defence. `In 
effect', Phillips pointed out, `Pembroke and his men were doing Lancaster's job for 
him'. 76 
Several factors influenced the selection of military captains, not least 
experience, ability, wealth, and social status. The process by which these captains were 
chosen is of interest in its own right. In mid-fourteenth century France, during a period 
of national crisis following the capture of John II at the battle of Poitiers, a series of 
ordinances were issued aimed at regulating the process by which military captains were 
appointed. In May 1358, it was announced that, owing to the way that many captains 
had been ordained in various parts of the country without due consideration of their 
merits, and had spent a great deal of the king's money for no apparent profit, all 
captains were to be chosen in future in full council. 
77 Within England, the method of 
appointing military captains only after consideration by the king and his advisers seems 
to have been adopted from a relatively early date. Following the death of the veteran, 
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John de St. John, in 1302, some thought was given to who should replace him as 
warden on the western March. The treasurer, Walter de Langton. informed the king that 
he believed John Botetourt to be a suitable man for the position, but Edward. despite 
being aware that the latter was a `bon homme et sage et suffisant'. declared that he was 
not willing to make a decision until he had had the opportunity to talk with his council 
at the next parliament. 78 In the event, Botetourt was appointed as custos just three 
months after this letter was written. The discussion of such issues in council was not 
confined to this one occasion. Captaincy commissions were often made per regem et 
consilium suum, as witnessed by the appointments of the earl of Angus in 1311 and the 
earl of Pembroke in 1315.79 This is what one would expect given that defence of the 
realm was a matter of concern for everyone, not just the king. 
Following the selection process the captain or warden was invested with wide- 
ranging powers which he exercised in the name of the Crown. Royal support was 
essential if these captains were to retain control over the hundreds of soldiers placed 
under their authority: the more prominent these soldiers were, the more carefully the 
king's officials had to tread. This was particularly the case during the Welsh wars when 
the traditionally independent and very powerful Marcher lords had to be cajoled into 
cooperating with the captains placed over them. In 1282, Roger de Mortimer of 
Wigmore was placed in command not only of the lesser men-at-arms of the central 
Marches, but also over ten leading border magnates, including Ralph de Tony, Peter 
Corbet and Roger Lestrange. Each of these men was sent an individual summons by the 
chancery clerks, informing him of the appointment. 80 Following Mortimer's death in 
October, one of these men, Lestrange, was given the captaincy in his stead. The 
magnates who had previously served under Mortimer were now bound to his 
leadership. 8' Such local appointments made practical sense and would have been less 
objectionable to the Marchers than the appointment of `outsiders. It was also necessary 
to divide the captains' spheres of influence into clearly-defined regional zones. During 
the second Welsh war. Reginald de Grey was given command of Cheshire and Flint; 
Roger de Mortimer possessed control on the central Marches; and Robert de Tibetot 
held sway in west Wales. 82 The king's household force. meanwhile, led operations in 
Gwynedd. When John de St. John was made captain in 1300. his authority was spread 
over a large area to incorporate 'Cumberland. Westmorland, Lancaster, Annandale, and 
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the whole Marches to the bounds of Roxburgh'. 83 In the summer of 1310, Alexander 
d'Abernethy was given authority over the area inter aquam de Forth et montes Scocie. 84 
Within these regions, captains were empowered to call on the services of all men fit to 
bear arms. To facilitate the smooth transition to wartime government, orders were sent 
to the men of the towns and counties, via sheriffs and other royal officials, ordering 
them to be obedient to the commanders who had been placed over them. 85 It was 
necessary to supply the captains with a strong body of men-at-arms if they were to 
exercise control over these areas effectively. Sometimes the number of men-at-arms to 
be retained at the king's wages was agreed in the contracts. An indenture drawn up with 
Robert de Clifford in 1296 stipulated that he was to have 140 men-at-arms and 500 
foot, 86 and the earl of Richmond and John de Segrave each had sixty mounted warriors 
in their comitivae whilst serving as keepers of Scotland in 1307 and 1309.87 
These terms of service provided a basic framework upon which captains and 
other royal officials could build their authority, but the powers that they exercised by no 
means stopped there. This is most vividly demonstrated by a commission issued early 
in the reign of Edward I's grandson, Edward III. On 25 April 1338, the earl of Arundel 
was appointed as captain and leader of the English forces in Scotland. As part of his 
duties, he was given full powers to punish transgressions and felonies committed by all 
men within the army; to elect as many men-at-arms, hobelars and archers as he required 
between the March of Scotland and the river Trent; to meet with the keepers of the 
various castles and garrisons within Scotland to arrange for their better defence; to 
supervise the armaments at the said garrisons; to raise all men between the ages of 
sixteen and sixty within the northern counties, placing them into infantry troops of 
thousands, hundreds and twenties; and to imprison all those who disobeyed his orders. 88 
Although such a long list of powers and responsibilities was quite exceptional, this 
gives some idea as to the degree of control that English war captains could theoretically 
possess over those placed under their charge. It is probable that as Edward III's 
thoughts were moving increasingly towards France and the Low Countries, he was all 
the more willing to confer freedom of action upon those who stayed behind in northern 
England to keep the Scots in check. Although it is rare to find all of these powers 
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bestowed upon one man, various aspects of the command exercised by the earl of 
Arundel in 1338 were also possessed by English war captains during the reigns of 
Edward I and Edward II. 
Of all the powers conferred on Richard Fitz Alan by Edward III, perhaps the 
most important were the judicial and punitive rights that he enjoyed. Although military 
captains and keepers were granted extensive authority over large numbers of soldiers, 
they had no way of enforcing their will unless the king gave them the right to use 
coercion and punishment. One of the main problems facing the Crown's agents in 
Scotland, Wales and Gascony was that of desertion. An entry on the close rolls dated 13 
December 1295 reveals that William Fitz Waryn had left the king's service in Gascony 
and returned to England without the permission of the captain of the king's men in 
those parts. 89 Such actions are likely to have been commonplace, but it is only when 
large numbers of aristocratic warriors deserted simultaneously, as they did during the 
Scottish campaign of 1306, that any particular motives or groupings can be discerned 
among the men involved. 90 To deal with such offences, captains were given powers to 
punish and discipline those who disobeyed their orders, or who rebelled against their 
authority. 91 This enabled them to deal with such malefactors without having to resort to 
the king's courts. On 10 December 1297, the earl Warenne was given authority to 
arrest, imprison and punish those under his command if he deemed it necessary for the 
better pursuance of the king's business and the defence of the realm. 92 Six years later, 
both John Botetourt and John de Segrave, captains on the western and eastern Marches 
of Scotland respectively, were given full power to arrest all those who they found to be 
disobedient or rebellious. 93 Although such powers were primarily conferred to deal with 
the problem of infantry desertion, which was a far more common occurrence than 
desertion among the gentry and nobility, it seems likely that they were also used to deal 
with more socially-elevated offenders whenever necessary. 
Prerogatives of punishment and distraint were an essential feature of the 
captain's weaponry in his struggle against disobedience and apathy. In addition to such 
disciplinary responsibilities, the king's officers were expected to deal with matters 
pertaining to castles and garrisons. Indeed this was one of their principal duties for, 
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once the armies had returned to England, the castle garrisons were all that remained to 
remind the conquered of their subordinate condition. In a letter of 1300, the king gave 
to John de St. John full powers to garrison and victual all castles that were surrendered 
to him or which he had taken by force. Exceptions were made in the case of forts that 
the king had already granted to his other magnates. 94 Captains appear to have enjoyed 
some independence in the methods that they used to obtain strongholds from the 
enemy. In the course of the second Welsh war, William de Valence and Roger 
Lestrange promised eighty pounds to the Welsh garrison at Bere if they would 
surrender the castle. 95 Once they had acquired a fortification, English commanders were 
expected to hold on to it, occupying it as they saw fit, unless another member of the 
landholding elite had a prior claim on the castle. In June 1282, Edward ordered the earl 
of Gloucester, his captain in south Wales, to give seisin of the castle of Llandovery to 
John Giffard of Brimpsfield. 96 Giffard had occupied that fort during the war of 1277 
and had since laid claim to it through his wife, but his designs in that part of Wales had 
been put on hold due to a legal dispute with a native lord, Rhys Fychan. 97 The conquest 
enabled Giffard and many more like him to take a more secure hold on their disputed 
possessions. On the English side of the borders, castle supervision took on added 
significance in the years following Bannockburn. John de Crumwell and the earl of 
Angus, wardens of the March of Northumberland in 1319, were obliged, as part of their 
contracts with the Crown, to defend Newcastle upon Tyne and to supervise and supply 
each of the garrisons in the county. Any shortcomings in the defence of the region were 
their responsibility, and many of the fine details, such as the number of men to be 
stationed in the garrisons, were left to the wardens' discretion. 98 
More mundane, but just as significant, were the many administrative duties that 
captains had to perform. One of the most important of these was the reception of men 
into the king's peace. In 1306, Aymer de Valence was empowered to absolve the lesser 
men (mediocres homines) of Scotland who wished to surrender. 99 The following year 
the offer was extended to all the king's former enemies, except those who had 
participated in, or assented to, the murder of John Comyn. loo When the feudal levy was 
called out it was sometimes the responsibility of those in command of regional armies 
94 CCR, 1296-1302,334. 
95 Littere Wallie, ed. J. G. Edwards (Cardiff, 1940), no. 325. 
96 CVCR, 222. 
97 Morris, Welsh Wars, 117,125,147. 
98 E 101/15/26. For the powers enjoyed by these officers, see M. L. Boyle, `Early History of the Wardens 
of the Marches of England towards Scotland, 1296-1377', University of Hull M. A. thesis, 1980,103-4. 
99 E 101/331/17. 
100 E 39/95/10. 
62 
to record the proffers that were made. In 1282, the king ordered all soldiers on the 
central Marches and in the south to perform their service under the regional 
commanders rather than with his own army in the north. Consequently, captains like 
William de Valence were called on to testify to the performance of feudal service 
throughout the course of that campaign. 101 William's son, Aymer, fulfilled a similar 
role during his spell as captain in southern Scotland twenty years later. 102 Captains were 
also responsible, wholly or in part, for a wide range of administrative duties, such as the 
payment of wages (or declaring when such payment should begin); 103 the receipt of 
attorneys for their men; 104 the provision of horse compensation; 105 and the distribution 
of letters sent by the king to the other prominent men in their hosts. ' 06 When reading 
indentures for service or writs of commission it is easy to forget the many difficulties 
that military leaders must have faced on an everyday basis, for in addition to the 
punitive powers that they exercised captains might also be required to oversee the 
building of bridges; 107 to send for warhorses from abroad; ' 08 or to raise revenues from 
vacant sees within occupied territories. ' 09 Each of these duties added to the overall 
power wielded by the captains, but the many obligations incumbent on them may 
indicate why military leadership was not to everyone's taste. 
Military commanders within the British Isles possessed extensive powers, but 
compared to their counterparts in Gascony the scope of their authority was rather 
limited. Despite spending many years at war in Wales and Scotland, Edward I would 
have preferred to have committed more of his time to the pursuit of his ambitions on the 
continent. His attempts to concentrate on his interests in France were held back by 
rebellions closer to home. This, perhaps, explains why he was willing to give free rein 
to the seneschals, captains, and lieutenants who represented him in Gascony. In 1294, 
both John de St. John and the earl of Richmond, seneschal and captain in the province 
respectively, were empowered to make agreements of friendship with the king of 
Castile and with powerful local lords such as the count of Foix. 
llo The writs of 
commission appointing the earls of Lancaster and Lincoln as captains and lieutenants in 
1295 illustrate even more clearly the extraordinary independence of action enjoyed by 
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the king's representatives in south-west France. Not only were the earls given full 
powers to make agreements with kings and princes whomsoever they may be (amicicias 
et confederaciones cum quibuscumque regibus vel principibus) but they were also 
granted special authority to appoint lieutenants, captains, seneschals, sub-seneschals, 
castellans, mayors, and other ministers as they saw fit throughout the region. "' In 
effect, the king's captains and seneschals in Gascony were empowered to act almost as 
petty kings. This freedom of action gave men like John de St. John and the earl of 
Richmond much of the experience that they were later able to draw on as leaders in the 
war against the Scots. 
The king's willingness to alienate so much of his power to representatives in 
Gascony throws into sharp relief the more restrictive nature of his relations with his 
commanders in northern England, Scotland and Wales. Closer to home, Edward 
attempted to retain in his own hands as much of the responsibility for the conduct of the 
war as possible. This could only be achieved so long as the lines of communication 
between the king and his captains remained open. For their part, commanders in the 
field were expected to correspond with the Crown on a regular basis about a wide range 
of subjects. In the spring of 1277, Payn de Chaworth and the earl of Warwick wrote to 
Edward informing him that their men had come to the end of their periods of service. 
Both men were aware of the need to keep these soldiers in the field, but were powerless 
to act without first obtaining Edward's consent. 112 When Alan Plukenet sent a letter to 
the chancellor in 1294-5 requesting assistance with the business of the men staying with 
him in Wales, he betrayed a reliance on the lines of communication between the central 
administration and the war front which must have been a hindrance to the soldiers on 
the ground. l' 3 Captains were also expected to contact the king whenever a castle came 
into their possession, supplying details of its location and features, as well as of how 
they had armed the fortress. Prince Edward, leader of the army in western Scotland in 
1301, wrote to his father in that year informing him of the way that the castle at 
Turnberry was being guarded and provisioned. 114 The king also wished to be notified of 
all movements in the field, even if he was far removed from the theatre of war in which 
they were taking place. In the summer of 1297, the earl Warenne and Henry de Percy 
maintained regular contact with Edward about their activities in Scotland, explaining 
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the reasons for their decisions and assuring him that as soon as their circumstances 
changed, they would let him know `with all the haste possible'. 115 
Correspondence of this kind flowed in both directions as the king kept his 
captains well informed about his decisions and requirements. On some occasions, the 
news that Edward sent to his commanders could prove vital for their safety and the 
security of the lands under their control. In his long message to John de St. John in 
1300, he warned that the Scots were planning to surround him as soon as he had crossed 
the border into enemy territory. Edward had been updated, about enemy movements in 
south-western Scotland, by John de Clavering, and his position as supreme commander 
of all armed forces enabled him to relay news from one war zone to another with 
relative ease. 116 The following year, Edward wrote to Alexander de Balliol, reporting 
that John de Soules was active in the passes of Galloway with a large company of 
Scots. Balliol was ordered to inform the wardens of the March immediately and to 
employ spies in the area to keep abreast of the enemy's activities. 117 The image of the 
king as a spider at the centre of an intricate web of communications should not be 
overstated, for this was an age when news still took some time to pass from sender to 
receiver. As already noted, the king's attempts to pull so many strings might even have 
had the opposite of the desired effect. Whatever the truth of this, it is clear that Edward 
had more than one reason for keeping the lines of communication open: there were also 
times when he sought counsel from those beneath him in the command hierarchy. In the 
spring of 1298, for example, the king wrote to the earl Warenne, confirming that he 
would be at York by Whitsuntide and requesting that the earl come in person, together 
with a suitable number of barons, to discuss the business of the forthcoming Scottish 
campaign. 118 Having spent several months in Flanders, the king needed to be briefed 
about the prevailing situation in Scotland. For that purpose there was no better man to 
consult than the keeper who had governed that land in his absence. 
Although Edward sometimes wrote to his captains and other military leaders 
warning them of enemy movements, or requesting their counsel, his main concern was 
to ensure that they were acting in accordance with his wishes. Early in 1298, he ordered 
his captain and keeper in Scotland, the earl Warenne, not to wait until the arrival of 
levies of footmen coming from Wales but to proceed against the enemy immediately. 119 
At the time of writing, Edward was seeking to resolve the problems of his own army in 
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Flanders, so his interference in the earl's decisions suggests that he did not have full 
confidence in the wisdom of his subordinate. This was possibly a consequence of 
Warenne's failings during the previous year at Stirling Bridge, yet it seems likely that 
Edward was generally inclined to meddle in the affairs of his officers. John de Segrave 
and the cofferer, Ralph de Manton, might have felt so, for in the autumn of 1302 they 
were expressly ordered to march by Stirling and Kirkintilloch, keeping in close contact 
with the enemy without straying too far from English-held lands. The foray being 
completed, they were to dispatch a special messenger to explain to the king how they 
had fared. 120 Edward's orders reveal an obsession with attention to detail and micro- 
management which must have infuriated experienced soldiers like Segrave. In response, 
some of his captains resorted to silence when things were not going their way. Such, at 
least, was the method employed by Aymer de Valence, John de St. John and Henry de 
Percy early in 1307, when the Scots under Robert Bruce were beginning to show signs 
of recovery. Edward intimated in a writ to his treasurer that events had gone so badly 
that they did not wish him to know. 121 Being a competent military leader in his own 
right, the king felt that it behoved him to direct military operations in person, so far as it 
lay within his power to do so. To some extent, this type of centralised command 
structure was retained during the reign of the less martially-inclined Edward II. In 1315, 
John Botetourt, the captain of the royal fleet, was reprimanded for delaying to proceed 
against the Scots. 122 Eight years later, Andrew de Harcla, earl of Carlisle, was executed 
for treacherous behaviour in his dealings with the enemy. 123 Captains in Britain were 
rarely afforded the freedom of action enjoyed by their counterparts in Gascony, a 
consequence, perhaps, of the more immediate threat to national security posed by the 
warfare on the northern and western Marches, but also of the difficulties involved in 
communicating between Westminster and south-western France. 
Edwardian captains had to maintain regular contact not only with the Crown, 
but also with other military leaders appointed by the central government. When the earl 
of March was chosen as captain of the king's men-at-arms in the garrisons of southern 
Scotland in 1298, a series of overlapping areas of jurisdiction were created. So as to 
clarify the situation, it was set out in the terms of the earl's commission that should it be 
necessary for them to assemble, the earl would be captain of all, and each constable 
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would be captain of his own men. 124 Relationships also had to be forged with the 
bureaucrats sent by the king to assist the captains in organising and supplying their 
armies. On most campaigns the responsibility for supplies of victuals and money lay 
with clerks stationed in the main border towns such as Chester, Carlisle and Berwick 
upon Tweed. Relations between commanders and these bureaucrats were essential to 
the smooth running of the armies. The bishop of St. Davids supervised payments to the 
army in south Wales in 1282.125 Normally, however, such duties were performed by 
men who had obtained their administrative experience as barons of the exchequer. 
Edward was aware that conflicting interests might arise between his captains on the one 
hand, and the clerks sent to assist them on the other, so in the spring of 1300 he 
explained to John de St. John why he had employed Richard de Abingdon to work 
alongside him, making it clear that Abingdon was there to assist him, not to interfere in 
his plans. 126 The following year St. John complained to Ralph de Manton that payments 
had fallen into arrears and that the poor people in his area of jurisdiction were suffering 
for want of victuals: this indicates that not everything had gone according to plan. '27 
Nevertheless, for the most part the system of engaging royal administrators to assist 
military officials appears to have worked tolerably well. 
Given the numerous duties that military leaders were expected to perform, and 
the potentially grave consequences should they fail to carry them out successfully, the 
onus was on the king to provide sufficient rewards to his captains for their services. 
K. B. McFarlane believed that under Edward I `lifelong and devoted service was too 
often inadequately rewarded', but the situation was a little more complex than that. 128 
Whilst it is true that the king did not create any new earldoms, he did try to reward his 
chief military officers in other ways. The chronicler Ranulph Higden noted how, during 
the campaign of 1282-3, Edward divided the central Welsh lands among the leading 
men of the realm whilst keeping the coastal castles for himself. 129 So extensive were his 
grants that `the Edwardian endowments... transformed the March in terms both of its 
political geography and of the personnel of its lords'. 130 The earls of Gloucester, 
Hereford and Pembroke might have felt poorly rewarded, but a number of military 
leaders and captains, including the Mortimers, Reginald de Grey, and the earls of 
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Lincoln and Warenne, had much reason to be pleased with the lands granted to them. ' 31 
A similar policy was adopted throughout the Scottish wars. After Falkirk, Edward 
announced that his earls and barons were to be rewarded with property in the conquered 
territories. 132 The shifting political situation north of the border meant that the king was 
not always able to fulfil his promises. Still, those who were frustrated in their attempts 
to occupy the lands conferred on them in Scotland were sometimes compensated with 
grants or wardships in England. 133 The final windfall of the reign came following 
Bruce's rebellion in 1306. His titles and estates were distributed among some of 
Edward's most faithful servants, including Robert de Clifford and Henry de Percy. '34 
However, such opportunities for largesse were few and far between at a time when the 
Crown's financial reserves were stretched to their limit. Bearing these problems in 
mind, it seems that the scarcity of rewards noted by McFarlane was probably, for the 
most part, a consequence of necessity rather than of choice. 
So far we have examined in detail the powers and responsibilities incumbent 
upon military captains and commanders-in-chief, but those were not the only men who 
exercised military authority within Edwardian England. The most important officers 
responsible for the organisation and discipline of the king's armies were the marshal 
and constable. Richard II's ordinances for the Scottish expedition of 1385 reveal that, 
by the late fourteenth century, these individuals possessed extensive powers over all 
men within the armies. Those who broke ranks, robbed, caused disturbances within the 
host, or committed any other offences whilst in battle array, were referred to them for 
punishment. The marshal and constable were also responsible for the guarding of 
prisoners and the distribution of ransoms, as well as for all matters relating to discipline 
and order. '35 A plea roll for the host that campaigned in Scotland in 1296 shows that 
these officers discharged similar functions in the armies of Edward I. All manner of 
transgressions, ranging from neglect of watch and ward through to trespass and 
robbery, were dealt with and recorded on the deputy marshal's roll. 136 Indeed `one of 
the many striking features of the document', according to its editor C. J. Neville, `is the 
tremendous development in the judicial powers of the marshal which it attests'. 137 In 
13' Cf. Prestwich, Edward I, 204. 
132 Guisborough, 328-9. 
133 M. Prestwich, `Colonial Scotland: The English in Scotland under Edward I', Scotland and England 
1286-1815, ed. R. A. Mason (Edinburgh, 1987), 10. 
134 Guisborough, 369-70. 
135 Monumenta Juridica, 453-8; Keen, `Richard II's Ordinances of War', 40-2. 
136 'A Plea Roll of Edward I's Army in Scotland, 1296', ed. C. J. Neville, Miscellany U, Scottish History 
Society, 5t' ser., iii (1990), 7-133. 
137 Ibid, 13. 
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addition to such judicial responsibilities, the marshal and constable played a pivotal 
organisational role in the build-up to royal campaigns. Writing in the 1380s, the French 
military theorist Honore Bonet noted how medieval armies were divided into `battles', 
`which each marshal of the host makes large or small at pleasure'. 138 Although it is 
difficult to be sure how much influence the marshal and constable possessed over 
tactical dispositions within the armies of Edward I and his son, it seems likely that they 
were the kings' main supporters, alongside the captains, in ensuring that operations ran 
smoothly. 
Under Edward I both the constable, the earl of Hereford, and the marshal, the 
earl of Norfolk, held their positions by hereditary privilege. Yet these were not merely 
honorific titles devoid of any significance in the field. On the contrary, it was necessary 
for practical purposes that these officials, or associates representing them, were with the 
armies. When the earl of Hereford could not be present at the start of a campaign during 
the Welsh wars he appointed his uncle, John de Bohun, to take his place until his 
arrival. 139 In like manner, the king sent a letter to the earl of Norfolk in 1301 requesting 
that if, due to bodily weakness, he was unable to come in person, he should appoint 
another good and sufficient man to serve as marshal of the host in his stead. 140 Not only 
was it essential to have a marshal and constable with the main army led by the king, but 
it was also sometimes deemed advantageous to assign men to these positions within the 
regional armies under noble captains. At the beginning of the Welsh uprising of 1294-5, 
the earl of Norfolk was sent to south Wales to serve in the regional host under William 
de Valence, so the king appointed the banneret Roger de Molis to occupy the post of 
temporary marshal for his own troops in the north. 141 Similarly, when the earl of 
Hereford was assigned to the Prince of Wales' army in the west of Scotland in 1301, the 
king requested that the earl send somebody else to act as constable with the main force 
setting out from Berwick upon Tweed. 142 In return for fulfilling their duties, both the 
constable and marshal claimed special privileges. Whilst the former demanded two 
pence in every pound that was paid to the king's stipendiaries, the marshal asserted his 
right to the weaponry of the enemy keeper whenever a castle or town fell into the king's 
hands. 143 The significance of these positions is further demonstrated by the military 
capabilities of the men who succeeded the earls of Hereford and Norfolk and who took 
138 The Tree of Battles of Honore Bonet, ed. G. W. Coopland (Liverpool, 1949), 130. 
139 SC 1/22, no. 117. 
140 Foedera, I, ii, 927. 
141 CPR, 1292-1301,126. 
142 CCR, 1296-1302,487. 
143 SC 1/12, no. 170; C 47/2/21, m. 23. 
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their places when they could not be present. Following the death of Roger le Bygod in 
1306 the rank of marshal was bestowed upon Robert de Clifford, one of the king's 
ablest soldiers, and then, for a more prolonged period, on Nicholas de Segrave. l44 
Humphrey de Bohun's refusal to perform his duties on the Scottish campaign of 1310- 
11 meant that Bartholomew de Badlesmere, who had sixteen years of military service 
behind him, was called upon to act as the constable's lieutenant. 145 
Besides captains, constables and marshals, `battle commanders' held the most 
elevated rank within Edwardian armies. Although the men who occupied these 
positions seem to have enjoyed disciplinary rights over the troops under their command, 
their most important function was as leaders of tactical units in combat. Contemporary 
battle narratives often placed these sub-commanders in the forefront of the action. 
Guisborough's version of the battle of Falkirk shows that they were responsible for the 
movements of the massed ranks of cavalry under their authority. '46 The English defeat 
at Bannockburn might have been due to the ineffective functioning of these divisions at 
the start of the battle: Thomas Gray recalled, possibly on the testimony of his father 
who had been present, that the English were unable to fight effectively because the 
main divisions of the army were jammed together. 147 There is no evidence for the 
activities of these men during Edward I's Welsh wars, but we do possess the names of 
the soldiers who led the English battles in a number of later encounters. Experience in 
this role, as in the main positions of command, appears to have been desirable, as three 
of the battle commanders at Falkirk, the earl of Lincoln, earl Warenne, and the king 
himself, were also employed in the same capacity two years later at Caerlaverock. 148 
The only alteration came when the young Prince Edward, who was only seventeen at 
the time, replaced the bishop of Durham. The latter had been in command of the second 
battle at Falkirk but his appointment, as an ecclesiastic, to such an important position, 
seems to have created some resentment among the knights under his command. 149 As 
with the Black Prince at Crecy, Edward was expected to earn his spurs as a sub- 
commander within the main army before going on to lead large hosts on later 
campaigns. The author of the heraldic Song of Caerlaverock noted how six barons were 
144 Clifford could draw on a wealth of experience as a leader on the Marches, including during the winter 
of 1298-9: PW, i, 318; E 101/7/19, m. 2. Segrave fought throughout the Scottish wars following his 
father's death in 1295. 
145 Badlesmere had served in Gascony in 1294 (RG, iii, 97), Flanders (C 67/12, m. 1), and in Scotland in 
1298 (Gough, 190), 1300 (Aspilogia III, i, 443), 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2), 1303-4 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 
59v), 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1), 1307 (CDS, v, 445) and 1308 (CDS, v, 447). 
146 Guisborough, 327-8. 
147 Scalacronica, 75. 
148 Aspilogia III, i, 406-17,43443. 
149 Guisborough, 327 
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placed alongside the prince as his `conductors and guardians'; John de St. John and 
William le Latimer were set aside `to array his squadron'. 150 That these posts were 
reserved for members of the royal family and the higher nobility indicates the value that 
was attached to the `battle' as a tactical division in war. 
Below this there were a number of other officers within Edwardian armies such 
as millenars, centenars and vintenars. These were commanders of infantry and the men 
who occupied such positions tended to be drawn from lower down the social scale. 151 
The leading members of the Edwardian aristocracy were only willing to serve the 
Crown in more elevated capacities. From the evidence presented here it can be seen that 
Edwardian captains and wardens were the most influential members of the aristocratic 
leadership corps. To be a captain required a combination of wealth, status, and ability, 
as well as a capacity to exercise leadership over large numbers of independently- 
minded men. Despite possessing a wide range of military and judicial powers, these 
commanders were agents of the Crown who, whether paid by the king or not, were 
expected to conform to the terms of service by which they had been employed. To 
ensure that they were performing their duties the Crown kept a careful watch over all of 
their activities. Even so, some captains, such as those serving in Gascony, enjoyed a 
greater freedom of action than those engaged closer to Westminster. Though the 
rewards for service could at times be sizeable, the responsibilities incumbent on the 
offices probably outweighed any perquisites that might have been on offer. Only the 
most dedicated soldiers and trusted confidants, like John de St. John, Robert de 
Clifford, and Aymer de Valence, were charged with such commissions, and if a military 
elite existed within England at this time then it was surely personified by these men. 
RETINUE LEADERS 
The tenor of the discussion so far suggests that military leadership in Edwardian armies 
issued outwards from the centre. Appointments to captaincies, custodianships and other 
positions of high command were the prerogative of the king and his council; the pool of 
men employed in this way was not very large. An important distinction therefore has to 
be made between the command exercised by those chosen to lead armies, hold castles 
and defend border areas, and the very different kind of authority enjoyed by soldiers 
who led companies to war as part of royal or baronial hosts. Whilst the former were 
150 The Roll of Arms of the Princes, Barons, and Knights who attended King Edward I to the Siege of 
Caerlaverock, in 1300, ed. T. Wright (London, 1864), 19-20. 
151 Men of knightly rank did sometimes perform such roles, as in 1296; E 101/5/23, m. lii. 
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government agents whose influence rested on the political power conferred on them by 
the Crown, the latter derived their pre-eminence solely from the social prestige arising 
from the lands that they held at a local and regional level. Many of these company 
commanders served at their own expense because of the subordination that acceptance 
of royal wages would have implied. Indeed, each leader was master of his own comitiva 
in much the same way as the king was lord of the whole. Edwardian hosts were 
therefore conglomerates made up of numerous aristocratic contingents. Just as the lack 
of modern communications placed limits on the coercive power of the government at a 
local level, so the absence of a standing officer corps forced the Crown to rely on the 
aid of semi-independent retinue leaders drawn from the shires. In short, whilst Edward I 
was a strong centralising monarch, his ability to enforce his will through armed struggle 
would have been seriously curtailed had it not been for the cooperation of the wider 
military community. 
The companies that combined to form royal armies had a separate existence 
independent of Crown control: each lord exercised dominion over his own sphere of 
influence. Private warfare remained a threat to internal peace and stability throughout 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, as demonstrated by the actions, in 
1273, of Hugh de Turberville and Reginald Fitz Peter, who wasted the earl of 
Hereford's lands in Wales. '52 Recurring violence was also a major problem among the 
gentry of south Lancashire in the months and years leading up to the battle of 
Boroughbridge. l53 Such conflict was endemic among the landholding elites, but the 
legal distinction between criminal and legitimate acts of violence should not disguise 
the fact that public and private warfare had many features in common. The banner was 
raised in feuds just as it was in the royal host. Furthermore, when a lord's men pillaged 
the lands of his neighbour, he took a share of the booty as was his right under the 
king. 154 Essentially, the warband served much the same function in national armies as it 
did in local disputes, resembling an army in miniature dependent upon its immediate 
lord. Just as prominent landholders employed receivers and attornies to manage their 
financial and judicial affairs in peacetime, so they needed men with military and 
administrative expertise to assist them when summoned to arms by the king. We have 
seen how the marshal of England performed an important judicial and organisational 
role throughout the wars of Edward I. Perhaps in imitation of this, the earls and leading 
152 CCR, 1272-79,56. 
'53 South Lancashire in the Reign of Edward II, ed. G. H. Tupling, Chetham Society 3`d ser., i (1949), 
passim. 
154 Cf. CVCR, 337-8. 
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magnates had their own marshals with them when on campaign. Gilbert de Lyndeseye 
served as marshal for the earl of Hereford in Scotland in 1296, finding lodgings for his 
lord's men at the end of each day's march, and John de Morley performed the same 
function for Robert de Tateshale on that expedition. 155 Some retinue leaders also took 
their own secretariats with them to war to facilitate correspondence with the king or to 
oversee payments to their soldiers: Piers Gaveston had five clerks in his company as 
earl of Cornwall during the campaign of 1310-11.156 It is unlikely that retinue leaders 
had time to carry out the many administrative tasks incumbent upon them in person, so 
clerks such as these were an essential feature of a large number of retinues. 
Hundreds of men of varying status served as retinue leaders during the reigns of 
Edward I and Edward II; indeed, the sheer weight of numbers precludes any 
generalisations about this group as a whole. Command over other men-at-arms, even at 
the very lowest level, required some degree of influence within the royal household or 
in the provinces, but ability, wealth and experience varied considerably from one 
individual to the next. Some soldiers served under other men for several campaigns 
prior to becoming company leaders in their own rights. Henry de Appelby followed 
Robert de Tateshale as a knight in the war against Madog in 1294, in the opening 
campaign of the Scottish war, and to the siege of Caerlaverock, before establishing 
himself as a valued member of the Prince of Wales' household by 1304. He served the 
prince as a company commander in 1306 and 1307 and continued to act in that capacity 
once Edward had become king. ' 57 Appelby was not alone in finding himself elevated 
into the royal household following a successful spell of service as the companion of a 
leading magnate. John de Usflete staffed the retinue of John de Eyville during the 
second Welsh war and was with Peter de Champayne throughout the rebellion of 1294- 
5. The following year he appears as a knightly leader on the household horse inventory 
before proceeding to lead companies of men on the Flanders, Falkirk and Caerlaverock 
campaigns. He appears to have ended his career as a company leader in 1301.158 There 
was no more prestigious aristocratic household in which to obtain military experience 
than that of the much-praised Robert de Clifford. John de Crumwell fought under the 
latter's banner within the household division at Falkirk in 1298. Three years later he 
iss 'Plea Roll, 1296', nos 160,168. 
156 C 71/4, mm. 8,10. 
157 With Tateshale (C 67/10, m. 7; C 67/11, m. 5; C 67/14, m. 10); as leader/sub-leader (BL, Add. MS 
8835, f. 58r; PDS, 271; E 101/13/7, m. 2; E 101/14/15, m. 9; CDS, v, 445; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 4r). 
158 With Eyville (C 47/2/7, m. 8); with Champayne (C 67/10, m. 2); as leader, 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. Iii); 
1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 6i); 1298 (Gough, 176); 1300 (Liber Quotidianus, 234); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2). 
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began a long period of service as a household retinue leader in his own right. '59 Whilst 
some soldiers moved up through the ranks before establishing themselves at the head of 
a group of companions, others led troops of men to war from the beginning of their 
military careers. Lineage could qualify men to hold authority over other men-at-arms 
even when experience was lacking. Bartholomew de Badlesmere began his military 
career at the head of a small troop in Gascony in 1294. He served independently at 
Falkirk and Caerlaverock before being absorbed into the households of Robert de 
Clifford and the earl of Gloucester. 160 His father, Guncelin, had fought in the Welsh 
wars, and it is probable that Bartholomew was encouraged from an early age to follow 
in his footsteps. Likewise, Payn de Tibetot probably owed his prominent place at court 
to the reputation of his father, Robert, for prior to appearing as a sub-leader of Prince 
Edward in 1303 he had only been giving military service for two or three years. '61 
The earls and leading barons were the most important retinue leaders within 
Edwardian armies as a consequence of the resources, both human and financial, that 
they could bring to bear. For the same reason, the absence of some of these men in 
crisis years such as 1297,1310 and 1314 might seriously undermine the king's military 
plans. Yet, not all retinue leaders were men of such high social status, and even the 
lowliest sergeants would occasionally go to war with small troops of one or two men 
under their command. John de Bilton, a valet-at-arms from Northumberland, petitioned 
Edward II for the arrears of 153 pounds that he was owed for service alongside three 
men-at-arms in the Scottish wars. Two of his brothers had died at the hands of the 
king's enemies, and Bilton evidently felt aggrieved at the Crown's lack of urgency in 
meeting his costs and expenses despite the sacrifices that he and his family had made. 162 
Such small companies can often be detected in royal pay documents. However, retinues 
led by men of sub-knightly rank were not quite as common during this period as they 
were to be later in the fourteenth century when the status of the `esquire' had risen 
considerably. An examination of the horse inventories drawn up for campaigns between 
1282 and 1307 shows that generally, between a half and two-thirds of retinue leaders 
were accorded the title Dominus, indicating knightly rank. Most troop commanders 
159 For his service with Clifford in 1297,1298 and 1300, see chapter 1 n. 160. For 1301; E 101/9/23, m. 1. 
160 Above n. 145. He was with the earl of Gloucester in 1307,1308 and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13) and acted as 
a sub-leader for him in 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5; C 81/1727, m. 18). 
161 E 101/612/11, m. 2d. 
162 Ancient Petitions Relating to Northumberland, ed. C. M. Fraser, Surtees Society, clxxvi (1966), no. 
143. 
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`were the heads of established and prominent county families'. 163 In the later stages of 
the Hundred Years War, it was quite normal for esquires to contract for service with 
one or two other men-at-arms. ' 64 The horse lists also provide a rare opportunity to 
compare the status and prestige of the retinue leaders with that of the men who followed 
them to war. Surveying the inventories for the reign of Edward III, Andrew Ayton 
noted that the horse of each leader `would generally be more valuable than those of his 
retainers and often of higher quality than those employed by others of comparable 
military rank' . 
165 In this he was in agreement with Philippe Contamine who observed 
that in the armies of mid-fourteenth century France, the chefs de montre possessed 
greater social prestige than their companions: they disposed of the best equipment and 
the most valuable mounts. '66 Table 2.1 compares the horse valuations of retinue leaders 
with those of their companions for a number of royal armies. 
Table 2.1: Mean Warhorse Values (£) for Retinue Leaders and their Men167 
Year Retinue leaders Knightly All retainers 
retainers 
1282 17.5 (67 men) 12.3 (70 men) 7.3 (476 men) 
1296 16.9 (47) 14.3 (16) 8.3 (190) 
1297-8 23.6 (89) 21.4 (64) 10.5 (690) 
1298 20.8 (131) 18.6 (130) 9.7 (941) 
1300 26.5 (67) 19.8 (51) 11.6 (385) 
1301 24.1 (96) 21.1 (64) 10.7 (553) 
1303-4 24.9 (107) 19.9 (57) 10.2 (634) 
1306 24.2 (53) 19.7 (37) 10.1 (245) 
1307 17.2 (36) 15.3 (17) 7.8 (154) 
1311-14 19.3 (10) 8.6(7) 6.8 (184) 
It was normal, during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II, for company leaders to 
possess mounts worth around ten pounds more than that of an average follower, and in 
163 A. R. J. Junca, `The Knights of Edward I: An Investigation of the Social Significance of Knightly Rank 
in the Period 1272-1307 based on a Study of the Knights of Somerset', University of Birmingham D. Phil. 
thesis, 1976,202. 
164 Cf. M. R. Powicke, `Lancastrian Captains', Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson, 
ed. T. A. Sandquist and M. R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), 375. 
165 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 229. 
166 P. Contamine, Guerre, Etat et Societe ä la Fin du Moyen Age, Etudes sur les Armees des Rois de 
France 1337-1494 (Paris, 1972), 80. 
167 Sources: Wales 1282 (C 47/2/7); Scotland 1296 (E 101/5/23); Flanders 1297-8 (E 101/6/19,28,37); 
and Scotland 1298 (Gough, 160-237); 1300 (E 101/8/23); 1301 (E 101/9/23,4); 1303-4 (E 101/612/7,8, 
9,11); 1306 (E 101/13/7; E 101/612/15,19); 1307 (E 101/612/20,21; E 101/14/15 m. 9); 1311-14 (E 
101/14/15, mm. 1-5). The section headed `all retainers' includes clerks, `masters' and those ascribed no 
rank as well as knights and valets, but not `independent' men-at-arms. Many archers had horses appraised 
on the March in 1313-14 which explains the low valuations in the bottom row. Not all men had appraised 
horses, hence the slight difference between some of these figures and those presented below in table 2.2. 
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some years, such as 1297,1300 and 1301, the difference was even greater. As we have 
seen, most of those who led contingents to war in the late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth centuries were men of knightly status. For the most part, there was a great 
gulf between them and the lowliest sergeants in their companies. In 1296, Hugh le 
Despenser was in Scotland with a horse valued at seventy marks, but thirteen of the 
twenty-four men in his company, twenty-one of whom were valets, had mounts worth 
less than ten pounds. ' 68 An examination of the composition of Edwardian armies shows 
that, in most years, over 75 per cent of men-at-arms were of sub-knightly rank, so a 
comparison between retinue leaders and the average man-at-arms who accompanied to 
war them is always going to show a marked divergence in values. 169 More indicative of 
the social and material pre-eminence of the retinue leaders is the fact that they also 
served with horseflesh of greater quality than that of the other men of knightly status 
under their command. In 1282, William le Latimer served on a mount valued at fifty 
marks whilst the other six knights in his comitiva campaigned on horses worth thirty- 
five marks or less; l 70 and twenty-four years later, Robert de Clifford was on a steed 
appraised at thirty marks more than that of the most valuable mount among his knightly 
companions. l71 
The horse inventories enable us to quantify the difference in status between 
retinue leaders and their followers in a way that is not possible with any other source. 
Yet, the value of a man's mount was probably less important as an indicator of his 
credentials in the eyes of his contemporaries than the number of men whom he was able 
to lead to war under his command. `A man's worship, his standing among his fellow 
noblemen, and his influence in his own county, were measured by the number and 
consequence of those who were enrolled in his meinie'. 172 This is most graphically 
demonstrated by the contents of a petition sent to the king by one of the most prominent 
members of the military community, Walter de Huntercombe. Since the beginning of 
the Scottish war, Huntercombe claimed, he had served at the siege of Berwick with 
twenty mailed horse, at Stirling Bridge with thirty-two horse, and at Falkirk with a 
troop of thirty men-at-arms, as well as in Galloway two years later. It was the ability to 
lead such large troops of men to war which placed certain individuals in the forefront of 
168E 101/5/23, m. li. 
169 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 5. 
170 C 47/2/7, mm. 4,6. 
171 E 101/612/15, mm. 1,2. 
172 McFarlane, The Nobility of Later Medieval England, 106. 
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the military community. ' 73 Not all retinue leaders were able to command followings as 
powerful as those of Walter de Huntercombe, however, and the evidence of the horse 
inventories drawn up between the second Welsh war and the battle of Bannockburn 
indicates that companies of rather more modest size were common. 
Table 2.2: Average Retinue Sizes based on the Horse Lists (1282-1314)"a 
Year Leaders Knight 
retainers 
Av. per 
Leader 
Other 
retainers 
Av. per 
Leader 
Total 
retainers 
Av. per 
leader 
1282 87 71 0.8 409 4.7 480 5.5 
1296 51 16 0.3 176 3.5 192 3.8 
1297-8 114 64 0.6 648 5.7 712 6.2 
1298 151 136 0.9 835 5.5 969 6.4 
1300 90 51 0.6 336 3.7 387 4.3 
1301 113 64 0.6 495 4.4 559 4.9 
1303-4 143 58 0.4 594 4.2 652 4.6 
1306 60 37 0.6 210 3.5 247 4.1 
1307 61 18 0.3 141 2.3 159 2.6 
1311-14 12 7 0.6 224 18.7 231 19.3 
Total 882 522 0.6 4068 4.6 4588 5.2 
The average aristocratic contingent, as revealed on the horse lists, consisted of only five 
men-at-arms, the majority, if not all of whom, were soldiers of sub-knightly rank. (In 
this respect the figures for the retinues on the Scottish March for the years 1311-14 
should be regarded as an anomaly, caused by the exceptional circumstances of the war 
on the border and the small number of retinues contained within that sample). It is 
striking, particularly considering that the vast majority of the company commanders 
were knights, that most of these units did not contain a single follower who had been 
girded with the belt of knighthood. Although these figures do not encompass the 
companies led to war by the earls and other leading barons, who did not accept Crown 
pay, or the unpaid parts of other retinues, they do highlight the significant role played 
by a large number of small companies within Edwardian hosts. Knights, followed to 
war by just a few valets, such as Thomas Paynel in Flanders in 1297,175 or John Fitz 
Simon in 1300,176 were a common phenomenon, and for every man who led a large 
company of more than a dozen men there were likely to be several accompanied by less 
173 Parl. Roll., ii, 475. In 1282-3 he served at wages with two knights and seven sergeants (C 47/2/7, m. 7), 
and on the horse list of 1300 he had 21 men-at-arms (E 101/8/23, m. 7). 
174 Information compiled from the same sources as in Table 2.1. 
175 E 101/6/37, m. 2ii. 
176E 101/8/23, m. 1. 
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impressive followings. Of some ninety retinues and sub-companies on the horse 
inventory for the second Welsh war in 1282, around fifty consisted of fewer than five 
soldiers. In contrast, only one unit, that of William le Latimer, comprised more than 
twenty men-at-arms. '77 Analysis of the various lists compiled for the army that 
campaigned in Scotland in 1303 shows that just three companies, those of Robert de 
Clifford, John de Drokensford and John de Benstede, were staffed by more than a score 
of cavalrymen, whereas about ninety consisted of four men or fewer. 178 Many of the 
most prominent magnates who led larger companies to war do not appear on these lists, 
either because they did not receive wages or because the inventories are incomplete. 
Urian de St. Peter can be seen on the main pay roll in 1282 with nine knights and thirty- 
one sergeants, but the value of his mount and those of his men are not given. 179 As a 
rule, the company sizes of the leading earls can only be estimated from the letters of 
protection. However, the earl of Warwick had the horses of twenty-seven men 
appraised in 1297 before withdrawing from the Flanders campaign, eighteen fewer than 
were listed under the earl of Lancaster for the Falkirk campaign the following year. ' 80 
The royal wardrobe books for 1297,1300,1301 and 1303 offer more precise figures for 
the company sizes of knights bachelor and banneret: these sources differentiate, unlike 
the inventories, between the two kinds of leader. This data is presented in the table 
below. 
Table 2.3: Company Strengths of Knights Bachelor and Banneret18' 
1297 1300 1301 1303-4 
Bann. Bach. Bann. Bach. Bann. Bach. Bann. Bach. 
Leaders 22 49 25 39 31 41 20 28 
Knights 55 7 66 6 60 4 35 1 
Average 2.5 0.1 2.6 0.2 1.9 0.1 1.8 0.04 
Sergeants 230 151 267 108 293 102 182 68 
Average 10.5 3.1 10.7 2.8 9.5 2.5 9.1 2.4 
Total av. 13 3.2 13.3 3.0 11.4 2.6 10.9 2.44 
177 C 47/2/7 passim; ibid, mm. 4,6. 
178 The wardrobe book for 1303-4 shows that payments were made to Drokensford's three knights rather 
than to the keeper of the wardrobe himself. Two of these knights had also been with him in 1301; BL, 
Add. MS 8835, f. 58r; BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 85v. 
179E 101/4/1, in. 13. 
180 E 101/6/37, in. 6i; Gough, 179-81. Earls did occasionally accept pay. The earl of Lincoln served at the 
king's wages with 6 knights and 23 sergeants in 1277 (E 101/3/12), and the earl of Arundel was paid for a 
company of 39 men-at-arms in 1298 (E 101/6/35, f. 12r). 
181 25 Edward I (BL, Add. MS 7965); 28 Edward I (Liber Quotidianus); 29 Edward I (BL, Add. MS 
7966a); 32 Edward I (BL, Add. MS 8835). One or two large retinues brought from overseas, such as that 
of the earl of Ulster in 1301, have been left out so as not to distort the figures. Optimum retinue figures 
have been used for the purposes of analysis as retinue sizes changed frequently. 
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Michael Prestwich has previously observed, based on information contained in the early 
thirteenth-century Histoire of William Marshal, that each banneret was responsible for 
an average of around thirteen men-at-arms. ' 82 The figures presented in the above table, 
though based on evidence that does not lend itself easily to statistical analysis, seem to 
bear that statement out. Whilst knights bachelor seldom received pay for other belted 
soldiers, bannerets could usually count two or three men of knightly rank among their 
followers. Furthermore, the average banneret led around ten men more than knights of 
inferior rank, the latter generally being accompanied by just two or three sergeants on 
campaign. 183 Given the divergence in the armed strengths of companies led by 
bachelors and bannerets, it may be assumed that promotion from one rank to another 
brought with it greater expectations and responsibilities. John Botetourt had one knight 
and seven sergeants in his comitiva on the Flanders campaign in 1297 and was 
promoted to the rank of banneret on 23 August. At Falkirk, in the following year, he 
can be found on the horse lists with three knights and thirteen sergeants, a reflection no 
doubt of his newly-won status. 184 The special position of the knights banneret among 
the military elite of Edwardian England is well illustrated by the pre-eminence given to 
them on the Parliamentary Roll of Arms. Following a section devoted to the king, the 
earls and the bishop of Durham, the roll lists some 150 bannerets with their arms given 
in blazon. These are then followed, as we have seen, by the other knights of England 
divided into the counties in which they held their principal lands. 185 The importance of 
the bannerets in organisational terms is also indicated by Jean le Bel's account of the 
Weardale campaign in 1327, where he describes how each morning all the men-at-arms 
arranged themselves under the appropriate banners before the army set out. ' 86 Besides 
the earls and the king himself, bannerets were the most indispensable component of 
royal armies. 
Many of the most powerful magnates served as bannerets within the familia 
regis at some stage during their careers. Robert de Clifford, John de Crumwell and John 
de St. John were just several of the prominent men in receipt of fees and robes during 
the period of the Scottish wars, whilst family groups such as the Badlesmeres, Latimers 
and Beauchamps supplied a thread of continuity within the royal household throughout 
182 Prestwich, Armies and Warfare, 14. 
183 These figures conceal variations between the retinue sizes of individual bachelors and bannerets. On 
the Flanders campaign of 1297-8 Geoffrey de Geneville led a company of four knights and twenty-two 
sergeants, but another banneret, Simon Fraser, had a contingent of only one knight and two sergeants; BL, 
Add. MS 7965, if. 64r, 68r. 
184 BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 64r; Gough, 166-7. 
185 PW, i, 410-20. 
186 Chronique de Jean le Bel, i, 55. 
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much of the reign. ' 87 R. L. Ingamells has shown how many of the household bannerets 
in the 1270s and 1280s were soldiers who had previously served asfamiliares of either 
Henry III or the Lord Edward. A large number of household retainers during the 
Scottish wars of the later part of the reign were the sons of these men. ' 88 The wealth of 
documentation on the king's household makes it possible to follow the careers of 
knights and bannerets in receipt of the king's livery in greater detail than those who fell 
outside the purview of the wardrobe clerks. Some soldiers worked their way up the 
military hierarchy from relatively humble origins to become important members of the 
king's personal following. Aymer de la Bret was a king's sergeant in the wardrobe 
account for 1286 and still occupied the same rank three years later. By 1300 he can be 
found receiving pay as a banneret. ' 89 In this instance, persistent service on behalf of the 
Crown appears to have been rewarded with gradual recognition. For others, the rewards 
might come more rapidly. In 1304, Payn de Tibetot was made a banneret despite the 
fact that he had never been knighted and had inherited his father's lands just a few years 
previously. 190 Such a double promotion was highly unusual and may indicate a desire 
on Edward's part to create a new and younger leadership corps capable of supporting 
his son following his own death. Whatever the reason for this exceptional measure, it 
would seem that special favour could accomplish in one moment what it took others 
many years to achieve. 
That bannerets were the most important company leaders in Edwardian armies 
is indicated by the fact that, usually, only soldiers who held that rank were named on 
the occasional rolls of arms, the Galloway Roll being the prime exception. These rolls 
offer an intriguing insight into the structure of these armies which is often lacking in the 
more mundane pay documents drawn up by the wardrobe clerks. One of these rolls, that 
for the Falkirk campaign of 1298, has been considered in some detail by J. E. Morris 
and Michael Prestwich, both of whom observed that only forty-eight of the 115 men 
named on the roll also appear on the horse lists drawn up for that year. 191 Though 
Morris did not draw out the full significance of this discovery, Prestwich used it to 
show how large numbers of magnates were giving unpaid gratuitous service in the 
armies of Edward I. This observation has improved our understanding of late thirteenth- 
and early fourteenth-century armies, providing an insight into the independence 
retained h\ many baronial warriors during their service on behalf of the Crown, as well 
187 On the military role of the household, see Presw ich, War, Politics and Finance, 42. 
188 Ingamells, `Household Knights of Edward I", i, 36. 
189E 101/35 1 /226, m. 1; E 101 /352'31, m. 1, Lihcr- Ouotidianus, 200. 
190 BL, Add. MS 8835. ff. 55v. 114r: Knights of Edward 1, v. 24. 
191 Morris, I1''elsh it ars, 314, Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 68; Aspilogia 111, i, 406-417. 
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as an awareness of the mixed `paid', `unpaid' and `feudal' elements within the hosts. 192 
From a structural perspective, it should also be noted that there are 107 company 
leaders who appear on the horse inventory who are not named on the heraldic roll, 
together with a further twenty-eight leaders who obtained protections for their men but 
who are named on neither the roll nor the horse list. The implication is that the leaders 
of these smaller companies were serving independently of the bannerets named on the 
armorial, which would suggest an extremely atomised structure, or were incorporated 
into these larger companies for the duration of the campaign. 
A comparison of the three main sources at our disposal, the roll of arms, the 
horse inventory and the letters of protection, suggests that many of the smaller 
companies were attached to the larger retinues led by bannerets. Richard de Herthill, 
Fulk Lestrange and Hugh de St. John each obtained letters of protection for small troops 
of men-at-arms, but all three also had letters enrolled for service in the company of 
Ralph de Monthermer, the earl of Gloucester. 193 Both John de Heselarton and Gerard 
Salveyn led their followers within the greater comitiva of William le Latimer senior, 
whilst John de Kyngeston and Gilbert Talebot served as small company leaders under 
the umbrella retinue of the household steward, Walter de Beauchamp. 194 What appears 
to have happened is that the smallest companies, the social units which constituted the 
most fundamental components of Edwardian armies, fed into the larger retinues of the 
bannerets to increase the organisational and tactical cohesion of the armies. Viewed 
from this perspective, the bannerets appear not only as leaders of large groups under 
their own immediate command, but also as focal points around which other smaller 
units would assemble. Furthermore, this process of integration took place independently 
of any central planning, the initiative coming from the bannerets who applied for letters 
of protection for the lesser company leaders under their authority. Although the marshal 
and constable played an important organisational role at the muster, it is probable that 
the larger companies consisting of a number of smaller units arrived at the start of 
campaigns already constituted. Nor did the grouping process end there. Many of the 
bannerets who appear on the rolls of arms were evidently serving under associates of 
the same or superior rank. The herald who composed the Song of Caerlaverock for the 
army that fought in Galloway two years after Falkirk grouped many of the bannerets 
together into larger troops under noble and comital commanders. 195 A similar policy 
192 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 91. 
193 C 67/13, mm. 5,6d, 8 and 9. 
194 C 67/13, m. 5; Gough, 185; C 67/13, m. 8. 
195 The Siege of Caerlaverock, 4,6. 
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seems to have been adopted by the herald who composed the Falkirk Roll. Henry de 
Pinkeney appears in the household division immediately after Thomas de Furnivall with 
whom he had his horse appraised for the campaign; elsewhere, Aymer de Valence is 
listed just two places before his companion, Thomas de Berkeley. '96 Seven bannerets 
had letters of protection enrolled with the bishop of Durham, who was the leader of the 
second battle, and all seven fittingly appear among the bishop's followers on the roll of 
arms. 197 Leadership within Edwardian armies was therefore exercised on more than one 
level: knightly leaders of small companies served under bannerets, and the latter 
gathered together under battle commanders and other noble warriors. 
The army of 1298 was by no means unique in the way that it was organised. For 
the host that campaigned in Wales in 1282 the main cavalry pay roll can be compared 
with the horse lists and letters of protection to show the presence of around 200 
company leaders. A number of prominent magnates, including Thomas de Berkeley, 
Reginald Fitz Peter and Edmund de Mortimer, appear on neither the main pay roll nor 
the inventory. 198 In all likelihood there were many other company leaders in other parts 
of Wales who have gone undetected in the army records for that year. A comparison of 
these three sources shows that many of the smaller companies were grouped together 
within larger baronial comitivae, as with the army at Falkirk. Ingelram de Bovyngton 
and John de Bordell appear as leaders of independent retinues and sub-companies on 
the pay roll, but on the horse list both men are entered as knights within the company of 
John de Eyville. 199 William de Derneford is named on the main pay roll independently 
alongside a William de Hodenet, as well as in the larger retinue of the banneret, Ralph 
Basset of Drayton. 200 In 1282, as with the army at Falkirk, a number of bannerets can be 
found grouped together under the authority of prominent earls and captains. Thomas de 
Berkeley, Richard Fitz John and Robert de Wilughby, for example, each served under 
the earl of Gloucester, captain in south Wales. 201 The presence of such prominent 
landholders within the larger comital companies may explain how a later earl of 
Gloucester, the son of the man who had fought in Wales, was reportedly able to put 500 
men-at-arms in the field at Bannockburn. 202 
196 Gough, 211,216,222; Aspilogia III, i, 412-3,416. 
197 C 67/13, mm. 1,5d, 6d, 7, Aspilogia III, i, 408-11. 
198 For their protections, see C 67/8, mm. 2d, 4d, 6d, and 7d. 
199 E 101 /4/ 1, mm. Ili, 12; C 47/2/7, in. 9. 
200 E 101/4/1, in. 5; C 47/2/5, in. 2. A man of that name also appears on the pay roll for west Wales with 
John de Columbers, who was in Basset's retinue on the inventory; C 47/2/4, in. 2. 
201 SC 1/22, no. 158; PW, i, 234; C 67/8, in. 8d. 
202 C 71/4, mm. 8-14; Vita Edwardi Secundi, 93. 
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The processes by which numerous smaller companies joined together to create 
larger retinues are generally hidden from view in the pay documents drawn up by royal 
clerks. There is, however, a corpus of documents that enables us to examine this 
phenomenon more closely. Enrolled letters of protection provide neat summaries of the 
main company leaders within the army and the men-at-arms in their service: they 
generally offer little insight into any subdivisions that might have existed within these 
units. However, the fiat warrants for protection, which were `the product of an earlier 
stage in the process of retinue recruitment', sometimes enable us to see more clearly the 
way that aristocratic companies were constructed in the build-up to royal campaigns. 203 
The earl of Gloucester's retinue in 1310, already referred to, is a particular case in 
point. In that year the Scottish roll shows forty-five men with letters of protection 
enrolled in the earl's company. Presented in this way the evidence suggests that all of 
these soldiers stood in a direct relationship towards the earl, but a protection warrant 
drawn up prior to this enrolment indicates that at least one sub-unit existed within this 
larger whole. The banneret Geoffrey de Say is listed at the head of a small contingent 
consisting of two knights and three sergeants, with each of these men-at-arms identified 
as Say's personal retainers. At the side of these men, who are bracketed together, is 
written the name of the earl of Gloucester. 204 When we look again at the enrolled letters 
of protection on the Scottish roll we find the same six soldiers listed in the order that 
they appear on the warrant, but no indication is given that Say was a sub-leader within 
the larger company, or indeed that these men formed a separate group of companions at 
all. For the Bannockburn campaign of four years later, the weight of the earl's troop 205 
was enhanced by eleven knights and twenty sergeants brought to him by Bartholomew 
de Badlesmere. 206 Nicholas de Segrave junior also acted as a sub-recruiter, taking a 
troop of seven men-at-arms into the comitiva of the earl of Hereford during the earlier 
Welsh wars. 207 One protection warrant issued by the earl Warenne, probably for one of 
the Scottish campaigns early in the reign of Edward II, suggests that such sub-leaders 
were expected to obtain letters of protection for their own men. 208 We are fortunate if 
that was the case, for otherwise there would be little way of knowing about the 
existence of these small sub-units. 
203 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 161. 
204 C 81/1738, m. 66. 
205 C 71/4, m. 13. 
206 C 81/1727, m. 18. 
207 C 81/1728, m. 55. 
208 C 81/1741, m. 63. 
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Careful scrutiny of the military sources yields much information about the 
structure of the armies of the first two Edwards. No less crucial in determining how 
these forces performed in the field was the experience of the men who led these 
contingents to war. So far we have said little about the collective experience of the 
retinue leaders of our period, partly for the reasons outlined by Michael Jones in his 
study of the English commanders in Brittany during the 1340s. 209 Large-scale 
reconstruction of this kind inevitably fails to do justice to the individuals concerned. 
Nevertheless, examination of the bannerets named on the Falkirk Roll, which offers a 
manageable sample of an elite band of warriors, shows that English armies at the 
beginning of the Scottish wars were led by a substantial number of veterans of the 
Welsh campaigns of the 1270s and 1280s. Of the 115 bannerets who are named on the 
armorial, some fifty had given service in either one or both of the main expeditions 
against Llywelyn in 1277 and 1282. Reginald de Grey, 210 Walter de Huntercombe, 211 
Peter de Mauley212 and Hugh Pointz213 were among several who had fought in every 
major army raised against the Welsh, including those gathered to put down the risings 
of 1287 and 1294-5. These men were joined at Falkirk by numerous other veterans of 
the first two Welsh wars, such as Peter Corbet, 214 Ralph Fitz William, 215 Walter de 
Beauchamp216 and Thomas de Berkeley. 217 A further group of around twenty bannerets 
appear to have gained their first experience of war during the later Welsh conflicts 
against Rhys ap Maredudd and Madog ap Llywelyn, with Adam de Welles, Hugh le 
Despenser, Henry de Percy and John Wake counting among this number. 218 A 
minimum of around three-quarters of the bannerets named at Falkirk had therefore seen 
service in Wales before the focus of attention moved to the north and the war with the 
Scots. Of the remainder, many were the sons of soldiers who had died during the 1290s 
after many years of military service on behalf of the Crown. The fathers of Hugh de 
Courtenay, Philip Darcy, John de Engayne and Thomas de Furnivall all died between 
209 M. Jones, `Edward III's Captains in Brittany', England in the Fourteenth Century, ed. W. M. Ormrod 
(Woodbridge, 1986), 101. 
`1o Above, n. 58. 
211 PW, i, 201; C 47/2/7, m. 7; CPR, 1281-92,272; C 67/10, m. 7d. 
212 PW, i, 199; C 67/8, in. 7; CPR, 1281-92,274; C 67/10, in. 7d. 
213 E 101/3/13; C 67/8, m. 7; CPR, 1281-92,272; C 67/10, m. 7. 
214 PW, i, 204; C 67/8, m. 7. 
215 PW, i, 204; C 47/2/7, m. 6. 
216 PW, i, 199; C 67/8, m. 4d. 
217 PW, i, 204; C 67/8, m. 6d. 
218 For their service in 1294-5, see C 67/10, mm. 5,5d, 6,7. 
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1291 and 1297, leaving their offspring to perform the leadership roles at Falkirk 
formerly carried out by themselves. 219 
Such continuity from father to son helped to guarantee a certain element of 
stability within the leadership corps of these armies. Lineage was probably just as 
important as individual ability in determining which men served as retinue leaders. 
Some soldiers were fortunate in having several sons who were able to carry on the 
leadership baton handed down to them. James de Audley, the justice of Chester who 
accompanied the Lord Edward on the crusade of 1270, had one son, William de 
Audley, who gave service during the Welsh wars before being killed at the bridge of 
boats in 1282, whilst his youngest son, Hugh, later led small bands of men-at-arms 
during the Scottish wars. 220 Not all magnates were so lucky. The destruction of the 
English army at Bannockburn, and the deaths there of a large number of prominent 
warriors, should remind us that the fortunes of warfare did not always favour those of 
most distinguished rank. Many of the magnates who succumbed to the Scottish 
pikemen were men who either had no children or whose descendants were too young to 
supply their places immediately. The earl of Gloucester's lands were divided among his 
three sisters when it was found that his wife had not conceived. 221 William de Vescy, 
Edmund Comyn, and John Lovel, meanwhile, were just three of the lesser company 
leaders who either had no heirs or whose lands passed to young daughters. 222 Although 
Payn de Tibetot did have a son of just over one year old, it would be some years before 
he would be able to occupy the boots previously filled by his father. 223 These 
mortalities show that the problem facing the Crown after 1314 was not only a lack of 
earls, but also the absence of numerous other prominent men who had been killed in 
battle. The deaths of these leaders seriously depleted the forces available to the king 
during the years of crisis that followed, illustrating just how important such company 
commanders were to the military fortunes of the Edwardian kings. 
`19 Knights of Edward I, i, 243,266,307; ii, 92-3. 
220 For James' service, see Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade, appendix 4. His second son William 
is named in the annals of Chester as one of sixteen knights drowned in the crossing from Anglesey in 
1282; Annales Cestrienses, 110-11. 
221IPM, v, no. 538. 
222 Ibid, nos 534 (Vescy), 499 (Comyn) and 520 (Lovel). 
223 Ibid, no. 519. 
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3 
The Military Community 
Although of central importance to the Edwardian war effort and to the organisation of 
English hosts in this period, captains, wardens and retinue leaders were in a minority 
when set against the total number of landowners and non-landed gentry who took up 
arms in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Attempts to calculate the size 
of this pool, a community of men-at-arms consisting of both regular and occasional 
campaigners, have hitherto been hindered both by the sheer bulk of the records relating 
to military service and the interpretative problems associated with their use. However, 
such a quantitative approach is necessary if we are to gauge the extent of the English 
aristocracy's involvement in war during the reigns of the first two Edwards. By 
analysing the service records that provide information relating to military rank, 
(primarily the horse inventories but also pay rolls, proffer rolls and others) it has been 
possible to identify some 1,350 knights and 4,900 men of sub-knightly status, or 
sergeants, who took part in campaigns in Wales, Scotland and on the continent between 
1272 and 1314. Given that the said records are far from complete, that sources not 
providing information relating to rank, such as letters of protection and attorney, have 
not been included in this calculation, and that between a half and two-thirds of mounted 
soldiers tended to serve without Crown pay, it may be estimated that around 1,700 
knights and 6,000 sergeants acquired some experience of war between the accession of 
Edward I and the battle of Bannockburn. ' For the historian, attempting to interpret and 
summarise the broad range of experience encompassed by these figures is a most 
difficult task. Behind every name inscribed on parchment there lies a different story 
waiting to be told. The aim of this chapter is to trace the aspects of war that were 
common to these men-at-arms, whilst acknowledging the unique details that made many 
of their careers so remarkable. 
1 These figures have been extracted from a database containing some 38,000 records relating to the 
performance of military service, not including data on distraints to knighthood and military summonses. 
The figures of 1,350 and 4,900 were originally increased by 50 per cent to account for soldiers who do 
not appear in the service records or with specified ranks on particular campaigns. However, as some of 
these would have been accorded ranks on other occasions the rate of increase has been reduced to 25 per 
cent. Such calculations are necessarily imperfect. The fact that there are over 18,000 letters of attorney 
and protection, as well as respites of debts, pleas and fines, including duplicates, which do not normally 
specify soldiers' ranks, highlights the potential shortfall in the figures given here. 
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MEN-AT-ARMS AND THE FORTUNES OF WAR 
During times of war, ordinary men were capable of performing extraordinary feats. In 
the winter of 1282, the last native Prince of Wales, Llywelyn ap Gruffydd, was killed 
near Builth as he struggled with a regional English army under the command of the 
Marcher lord Roger Lestrange. His death was one of the most significant events of the 
Edwardian wars, depriving the men of Gwynedd of their natural leader and thereby 
accelerating the English conquest of Wales. Such an important historical figure 
deserved a fitting end, yet of the man responsible for Llywelyn's demise, identified by 
the chronicler Walter of Guisborough as Stephen de Frankton, we know relatively 
little. 2 Although J. E. Morris was able to identify him as an associate of Lestrange who 
later served as an infantry commander in the war of 1287, he has left few other traces in 
the military sources. 3 It is not until 1314 that we again find a man of that name 
preparing to go to war, and there is no way of knowing whether the Stephen de 
Frankton who obtained a letter of protection with Theobald de Verdon for the 
Bannockburn campaign was the man who had played so singular a role in the events of 
thirty-two years earlier. 4 Frankton's story demonstrates the important contribution that 
the more obscure members of the Edwardian military community made to the English 
war effort, but it also highlights the difficulties that are involved in trying to reconstruct 
the military careers of such men. Too often, individual soldiers of modest status are 
captured only momentarily, their names recorded because of some courageous act or 
villainous treachery, before they disappear, leaving the historian with few traces of their 
other activities. 5 One such man was Peter de Kirkeswold, who wrote to the king in the 
autumn of 1297 stating that he had been present in the garrison at Berwick during the 
siege of that town by the Scots. In a display of great courage, he had swum the Tweed in 
a desperate bid to reach the earl Warenne at Norham with letters of assistance before the 
town fell into the hands of the enemy. Although he claimed to have served the king in 
Wales and Scotland, the only other evidence of his service is as a crossbowman in north 
Wales under John de Havering in 1295.6 For information on men like Kirkeswold and 
Frankton, the source materials can be infuriatingly incomplete. For this reason, a large 
number of the men-at-arms who served in English armies during this period must 
2 Guisborough, 220-1. 
3 Morris, Welsh Wars, 210. 
4C 71/6, m. 3. For other possible candidates for Llewellyn's assassin, see L. B. Smith, `The Death of 
Llywelyn ap Gruffydd: The Narratives Reconsidered', WHR, xi (1982), 200-13. 
5 The chroniclers were particularly keen, for example, to record the name of one Peter de Spalding who 
treacherously betrayed the garrison of Berwick to the Scots in 1318: Trokelowe, 103; Ann. Paulini, 282. 
6 Stevenson, ii, 228-9; E 101/5/18, m. 1. 
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remain as nothing more than names. In this respect it is not difficult to empathise with 
Edward II who, upon receiving a petition from a certain William de Cranbergh c. 1320 
requesting some reward for his service in Scotland, wished to know `qi il est et de son 
service'. 7 
Whilst it is not always possible to know who these men were and what service 
they had performed, there can be no doubt that the attempts of Edward I to establish his 
supremacy throughout the British Isles and in south-west France placed great demands 
on the lesser landowners of England. `Fighting war on an unprecedented scale', Scott 
Waugh has noted, `demanded more out of communities in terms of both money and 
men than they had been accustomed to providing'. 8 Few genteel families could have 
escaped the burdens imposed by the king's wars completely. During the years of crisis, 
between the outbreak of war with France in 1294 and the victory over the Scots at 
Falkirk in 1298, the pressure placed by the Crown on its subjects was particularly 
intense. Fighting wars in Wales, France and Scotland required the maximisation of 
human resources. This inevitably had consequences both for those who were expected 
to send men to war and those who were serving in the field. In the closing months of 
1294, Edward wrote to John Giffard of Brimpsfield ordering that in addition to the men 
that he had sent to Gascony under the earl of Lancaster, he must dispatch more soldiers 
to Wales to fight under the earl of Hereford. 9 In the following year, similar orders were 
sent to the earl of Cornwall, demanding that he raise a troop of men to go to Scotland 
despite the fact that some of his tenants were already fighting on his behalf in France. '° 
Unsurprisingly, the knights and sergeants who shouldered the burden of these orders 
sometimes found themselves being called on to serve in several spheres of war at once, 
or accused of trying to avoid military service even though they were performing it 
elsewhere. In the summer of 1297, an anonymous writer sent word to Edward informing 
him that James de Multon could not be present at the forthcoming muster as he was 
staying `en la compaignie monsieur Henri de Perci e monsieur Robert de Clifford en 
ceste guerre Descoce as chevaux e armes'. 11 That August, the king also received a letter 
from the bishop of Durham explaining that John de Craystok had not been able to attend 
the muster arranged by Henry de Percy for a raid into Scotland because he was already 
7 SC 8/82, no. 4083. 
8 S. L. Waugh, `The Third Century of English Feudalism', Thirteenth Century England VII, ed M. 
Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1999), 54. 
9 PW, i, 266. 
ºo Ibid, 277. 
SC 1/21, no. 167. Multon was in Gascony in 1294 (RG, iii, 120) and 1295 (RG, iii, 318) before 
switching to Scotland in 1297,1298 (C 67/13, m. 5d), 1300 (C 67/14, m. 14) and 1304 (C 67/15, m. 4d). 
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with the bishop elsewhere north of the border. Craystok had wrongly been accused of 
non-service, for which default his lands had been taken into the king's hand. 12 
Once men like Multon and Craystok had been conscripted it is most difficult to 
reconstruct their campaigning experiences and to know whether they enjoyed giving 
military service, or regarded it as an unwanted burden. Whilst it is sometimes possible 
to trace the daily activities of leading captains like Robert de Tibetot and John de St. 
John as they corresponded with the Crown and issued orders to their subordinates, the 
picture becomes increasingly blurred as one goes further down the military hierarchy. 
Many of the less wealthy knights and sergeants might have hoped for nothing more than 
to perform their service without suffering any personal damage or losses, for war could 
be both a risky and expensive business. One major concern was the protection of 
military equipment: the warhorse, in particular, was frequently at the centre of disputes 
between men-at-arms on campaign. In a case brought before the king's council in 1295, 
Ralph Saunsaver complained that the warhorses provided for him by William de 
Breouse for his service in Gascony had not been of sufficient quality. He had 
covenanted with Breouse for a hundred pounds which the latter had met by giving him 
sixty pounds and two horses; as the horses did not meet his expectations, Saunsaver 
demanded ten marks more. 13 Arguments over military equipment and the rightful 
ownership of horses can also be traced on the plea roll for the army that went to 
Scotland in 1296. Laurence de Preston complained that Matthew de Forneys was 
withholding a grey horse of his valued at eight marks which had run away from its 
groom. In another incident, Alan Fitz Waryn launched a suit against Robert de St. Paul 
for a similar theft. 14 Such material concerns are hardly surprising given that `the horse 
represented a very major investment for a knight, perhaps in many cases equivalent to a 
years income', 15 and the importance of having a ready mount was increased due to the 
severe shortage of warhorses in England at this time. 16 
The misfortunes of war often amounted to much more than the mere loss of a 
horse whilst on campaign. For many men the experience of war was a savage and brutal 
one, leading to personal disfigurement, the loss of property or even death. Fatalities and 
heavy casualties, whilst not common, were encountered with sufficient regularity by the 
English throughout this period to ensure that men-at-arms could not take military 
12 SC 1/21, no. 123. 
13 Select Cases Before the King's Council, 1243-1482, ed. I. S. Leadam and J. F. Baldwin, Selden Society, 
xxxv (1918), 16. 
14 `Plea Roll, 1296', nos 38,63. 
15 M. Prestwich, `Miles in Armis Strenuus: The Knight at War', TRHS, 6`h ser., v (1995), 211. 
16 Cf. Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 201. 
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service lightly. In addition to the heavy losses suffered at the bridge of boats in 1282, 
Stirling Bridge in 1297, and Bannockburn, there were also some lesser battles and 
skirmishes in which English soldiers were discomfited. 17 Financial difficulties were 
regularly encountered by those who had served in the king's wars: the author of the 
Song of Trailbaston probably spoke for many when he bemoaned the fact that despite 
many years of service in Gascony, Flanders and Scotland he had made little gain. 18 One 
man who might have empathised with the author of this poem was William de Weston, 
a northern sergeant who, despite years of service in Flanders, Scotland and in the 
garrison at Berwick, was some 600 pounds out of pocket in owed wages and lost horses 
when he petitioned the king in 1318.19 Weston's petition was typical of many that were 
sent to the king and his council by ordinary men-at-arms who had suffered loss and 
damage during the course of their service to the Crown. Particularly common were 
petitions for financial assistance by men who had been captured by the enemy and 
forced to pay ransoms for their release. John le Fraunceys wrote to the Crown in 1307 
of how he had been taken by the Scots at the battle of Roslin, losing the horses, armour 
and other equipment that were with him, and had been detained north of the border for 
fifty-seven weeks until he had found the forty marks that he needed to secure his 
release. 20 The Northumbrian men-at-arms John de Heselrigg and Robert de la Vale were 
both imprisoned following the debacle at Bannockburn. They were later forced to pay 
200 marks and 500 marks respectively before they could return to their war-torn lands. 21 
A further petition highlights the way that the pitfalls of war affected not only the men 
who served, but also their families. During the reign of Edward II a certain Simon de 
Rosse wrote of how his father Wadyn, who had served the king and his father `en vos 
gweres de gaschoun galis et descoce' for thirty years and more, had been decapitated, 
leaving Simon and his four siblings in a state of destitution. 22 Evidently, military service 
under Edward I and his son was no guarantee of prosperity, or even financial security. 
The risks involved in warfare meant that many men-at-arms deemed it desirable 
to enlist the patronage of more prominent figures within the military community. For 
most soldiers, this meant entering the service of a retinue leader of some standing. As 
17 E. g. Cotton, 319. 
18 Thomas Wright's Political Songs, 232. 
19 Northern Petitions Illustrative of Life in Berwick, Cumbria and Durham in the Fourteenth Century, ed. 
C. M. Fraser, Surtees Society, cxciv (1981), no. 33. A William de Weston was in garrison at Berwick in 
1298[? ] (E 101/7/5, in. 1), 1301 (E 101/9/9, f. 2v), 1303 (E 101/612/9, m. 2), and 1310 (BL, Cotton Nero 
C VIII, i 5r). 
20 Parl. Roll., ii, 449. 
21 Ancient Petitions Relating to Northumberland, nos 115,122. However, see King, `War, Politics and 
Landed Society', 129-30. 
22 SC 8/87, no. 4309. For Wadyn's service; E 101/10/5, m. 9. 
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we have seen, military service was strewn with potential hazards, and it could prove 
difficult for obscure sergeants and lesser knights, acting on their own behalf, to obtain 
redress for losses, or to gain some other favour from the Crown. By entering the service 
of more prominent men, such individuals were able to find some insurance against the 
worst that military campaigning had to offer. Retinue leaders would sometimes write to 
the king on behalf of those in their service to ask that they be released from the debts 
that they owed to the Crown, as the earl of Warwick did on behalf of Roger de 
Springehose who was with him in Wales in 1294.23 Alternatively, such patronage was 
used by some men to obtain writs excusing them from the performance of military 
service, which is how Gilbert Sikelfont benefited from his relationship with the earl 
Warenne in 1312, the year he was distrained to knighthood. 24 The quid pro quo of this 
favour was that men-at-arms were expected to perform reliable service for their lords 
whenever and wherever it was required. Indeed it was in the process of fulfilling their 
side of the bargain that rank-and-file soldiers demonstrated their value to their military 
leaders. Apart from fighting, which was the most obvious and also the most important 
service that men-at-arms could provide, such individuals might be employed on special 
logistical missions on behalf of their lords. The yeoman John le Bret was sent to Ireland 
by Robert Fitz Walter in 1282 to purchase victuals for him and the members of his 
retinue in Anglesey. 25 Similarly, a number of commanders in Gascony in 1294 and 1295 
dispatched sergeants from their retinues to obtain much-needed supplies from within the 
British Isles. 26 In 1297, the earl Warenne employed two of his knights, Elias d'Aubeny 
and Saer de Huntingfeld, on a special mission to inspect the castles of Scotland. 27 Later, 
in 1310, two of the earl of Richmond's valets acted as the eyes and ears of their lord, 
relaying news to him from the Scottish campaign whilst he was engaged on diplomatic 
business in France. 28 
In addition to such `vertical' relationships, men-at-arms could normally find 
support among others of equal status residing within their own counties and localities. 
Whilst there has been much debate about the importance of the `county community' 
within medieval England, and, indeed, over whether such communities existed at all, 29 
23 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 148. 
24 PW, II, ii, 419; C 47/l/7, m. 3. 
25 CVCR, 241. 
26 RG, iii, 173,214. 
27 Stevenson, ii, 175-6. 
28 CDS, iii, no. 166. 
29 For contrasting views, see J. R. Maddicott, `The County Community and the Making of Public Opinion 
in Fourteenth-Century England', TRHS, 5th ser., xxviii (1978), 43; M. Prestwich, English Politics in the 
Thirteenth Century (London, 1990), 58-9. 
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there can be little doubt that landholders of the same region would tend to find 
themselves operating in close proximity to one another when on campaign. During the 
second Welsh war, the men of Somerset, Dorset, Devon and Cornwall were ordered to 
perform their feudal service in west Wales with William de Valence, whilst those of 
Herefordshire, Shropshire and Staffordshire were commanded to serve at Montgomery 
under Roger de Mortimer. 30 Evidence of men-at-arms from the same county serving 
together can also be found during the years when England was at war with France: the 
sheriff of Essex claimed in 1295 that the knights and free tenants of the county were 
unable to attest a proof of age as too many of them were guarding the coast against 
French invasion. 31 When war broke out with Scotland in 1296 the focus shifted to the 
north of England, and there is plentiful evidence to suggest that the men-at-arms of the 
northern counties fought alongside their landed neighbours. Rishanger noted how in 
1297 Henry de Percy launched a raid into Scotland cum militia Comitatus Karleoli. 32 
His statement is supported by a chancery warrant which confirms that the men of 
Cumberland and Westmorland served under Percy and Robert de Clifford in that year 
without Crown pay. 33 Voluntary service was also given for a short time by the men of 
Northumberland under John de Segrave in 1303.34 Anthony Tuck has questioned 
whether the extent of soldiering among the gentry of the latter county during the later 
fourteenth century was in any way exceptional, 35 but it would seem that, under Edward I 
and his son, the men of the eastern March were heavily engaged in military activity. A 
contemporary song indicates that many of those killed at Stirling Bridge in 1297 were 
landowners from the north-east, 36 and Edward reportedly employed a group of 
Northumbrians to garrison Stirling castle in the following year. 37 Although writing 
some time after these events, John Barbour was probably justified in assigning to the 
men of Northumberland a prominent place in the border warfare of the reign of Robert 
Bruce. 38 Indeed, recent work by Andy King has confirmed the important contribution 
made by the men of the March to the Anglo-Scottish wars. 39 For the men-at-arms of 
30 CVCR, 254. 
31 Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench under Edward I, ed. G. O. Sayles, 3 vols, Selden Society, lv- 
lviii (1936-9), iii, no. 20. 
32 Chronica et Annales, 171. 
33CCW, 98. 
34 CPR, 1301-07,101. 
3s A. Tuck, `The Percies and the Community of Northumberland in the Later Fourteenth Century', War 
and Border Societies in the Middle Ages, ed. A. Goodman and A. Tuck (London, 1992), 184. 
36 Thomas Wright's Political Songs, 173. 
37 Chronica et Annales, 388. 
38 The Bruce, 201,287. 
39 A. King, `Englishmen, Scots and Marchers: National and Local Identities in Thomas Gray's 
Scalacronica', Northern History, xxxvi (2000), 225-8; idem, "`Pur Salvation du Roiaume": Military 
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communities like these, `horizontal' ties with fellow genteel soldiers were often more 
important than the patronage offered by a leading earl or banneret. 
Middling landowners from counties that lay close to the theatres of war were 
particularly well placed to take advantage of the office-holding opportunities created in 
the conquered territories. Soldiering during these years was not as profitable as it was 
later to prove for many during the Hundred Years War, but gainful employment was to 
be had for those willing to reside in hostile regions for a prolonged spell. The conquest 
of Wales ensured the creation of new offices for the purposes of wartime and peacetime 
government. Whilst the major captaincies and custodianships were offered to men of 
high social standing, such as Roger de Mortimer and Roger Lestrange, lesser positions 
were available to men-at-arms of more modest status. Following the war of 1282-3, the 
native aristocracy were excluded from the prominent positions that they had formerly 
held. 40 Overwhelmingly, `the personnel of the new governmental dispensation in Wales 
was ... "colonial" 
in its recruitment' . 
41 Among those who stepped into the breach were 
middling families with connections to Wales, like the Camvilles of Llanstephan. During 
the second Welsh war, Geoffrey de Camville played a prominent role in the garrisons of 
west Wales, where he served at his own cost. Maintaining this family tradition, William 
de Camville was later appointed as keeper of the counties of Carmarthenshire and 
Cardiganshire. 42 Roger de Springehose, the member of a Shropshire family and sheriff 
of that county in 1282, was placed in charge of the garrison at Oswestry in that year 
during the absence of Roger de Mortimer, and was rewarded for his services with the 
lands of a Welsh rebel. 43 Another family that came to prominence in the office-holding 
community of post-conquest Wales was the Stauntons of Staffordshire. Robert de 
Staunton was appointed as the sheriff of Merioneth in March 1284 and his son Vivian 
later found employment as the constable of Harlech castle, where he was serving by the 
time of the revolt of 1294-5.44 Some of the men elevated to office in post-conquest 
Wales appear to have been landowners of modest means. Hugh de Wlonkeslowe, 
granted the constableship of Harlech in October 1284, held only half a knight's fee in 
the vill of Longslow, Shropshire, at the time of Kirkby's Inquest, and it is probable that 
Service and Obligation in Fourteenth-Century Northumberland', Fourteenth Century England II, ed. C. 
Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2002), 13-31. 
40 A. D. Carr, `An Aristocracy in Decline: The Native Welsh Lords after the Edwardian Conquest, WHR, v 
(1970), 103-29. 
41 R. R. Davies, Conquest, Coexistence, and Change: Wales 1063-1415 (Oxford, 1987), 366. 
42 CVCR, 229,354. 
43 Ibid, 222,265. A sergeant of that name later served under John de Havering at Falkirk; Gough, 229. 
44CVCR, 283; Calendar of Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales (Thirteenth to Sixteenth Century), ed. W. 
Rees (Cardiff, 1975), 507; E 10 1/5/17, m. 5. 
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he relied on the hundred pounds that he received from that office yearly to maintain his 
family in the rank of knighthood to which they aspired. 45 
Similar office-holding opportunities were available to the men of the northern 
March during the war with Scotland. Whilst the major captaincies were given, as we 
have seen, to prominent figures of a national standing, such as Robert de Clifford and 
the earls of Pembroke and Richmond, auxiliary posts were sometimes granted to knights 
bachelor whose interests were usually confined to one county or region. Richard le Brun 
and Hugh de Multon were employed as keepers of Cumberland and Westmorland in 
1302 under the higher authority of John de St. John. 46 A year into Bruce's rebellion 
Brun was again employed on the western March with John de Wigeton, a fellow 
Cumbrian knight, whilst Roger Heron and Simon Warde of Northumberland and 
Yorkshire respectively were made keepers of the peace on the eastern March. 47 More 
numerous opportunities for employment were created in the towns and castles north of 
the border during the years when the English were in the ascendancy. Following the 
victory at Dunbar in 1296 Edward had initially allowed many Scots to retain possession 
of their castles, 48 but in the wake of Wallace's revolt this policy changed and numerous 
Englishmen were appointed as garrison constables and sheriffs over the ensuing years. 
As the Scottish chronicler Andrew de Wyntoun later ruefully reflected, Edward took 
possession of all the Scottish castles `and stuffit thaim with Inglismen'. 49 By no means 
were all of those appointed to Scottish castles and shrievalties drawn from the northern 
counties. Whilst Robert de Joneby and John de Huddleston of Cumberland found 
service in Dumfries and Galloway, 50 offices in Scotland were regularly granted to 
household knights drawn from various parts of the country, 51 to pro-English Scots, 52 
and to leading magnates who had already obtained experience of colonial government 
from other spheres of war. 53 Characteristic of the latter was the Staffordshire knight 
45 CVCR, 291; Feudal Aids, iv, 221. It is not clear whether this Hugh de Wlonkeslowe was a knight, but 
his son later appears bearing arms on Collins' roll; Aspilogia III, ii, 264. 
46 PW, i, 364. 
47 PW, II, ii, 369. 
48 Scotichronicon by Walter Bower, ed. D. E. R. Watt et al., 9 vols. (Aberdeen and Edinburgh, 1987-98), 
vi, 81. 
49 The Original Chronicle of Andrew of Wyntoun, ed. F. J. Amours, 6 vols, The Scottish Text Society, 1- 
lxiii (Edinburgh, 1903-14), v, 346. Also, see Bower, vi, 293; Johannis de Fordun Chronica Gentis 
Scotorum, ed. W. F. Skene, The Historians of Scotland Series, i (Edinburgh, 1871), 335. 
50 S. J. P. Howarth, `King, Government and Community in Cumberland and Westmorland c. 1200-c. 1400, 
University of Liverpool D. Phil. thesis, 1988,230. 
51 Prestwich, `Colonial Scotland', 12. 
52 M. Brown, `War, Allegiance, and Community in the Anglo-Scottish Marches: Teviotdale in the 
Fourteenth Century', Northern History, xli (2004), 226,236. 
53 Watson, Under the Hammer, 99. 
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Robert de Hastang senior who had been employed in Ireland before using this expertise 
as constable of Roxburgh castle. 54 
The establishment of an English hegemony throughout the British Isles created 
opportunities for advancement in the service of the Crown which might to some extent 
have offset the hazards of war. In truth, the path to promotion was available to relatively 
few of the thousands of knights and sergeants who engaged in warfare; and it would be 
a mistake to assume that those who held constableships and other offices in conquered 
territories made rich pickings during their periods of tenure. On the contrary, castle 
constables and other royal officers who resided in enemy territory on a permanent basis 
were in a precarious position and had to be constantly vigilant. Robert Hastang, for one, 
frequently found it necessary to draw his sword during his time as constable at 
Roxburgh. 55 He and men like William Biset, the sheriff of Clackmannan and Stirling, 
were forced to employ spies and scouts in their service because of the constant threat of 
enemy attack. 56 Far from being the route to prosperity and individual glory, service for 
the Crown in Scotland, aptly described by Fiona Watson as the `Siberia of English 
office-holding', was a dangerous and energy-sapping task. 57 Nor were such dangers and 
burdens restricted to those who held office in Scotland, for constables and sheriffs who 
were employed in other areas of war also encountered numerous difficulties during the 
course of their employment. In c. 1308-9 Hugh de Paunton, the former constable of 
Haverford in Wales, claimed that despite having spent large amounts of his own money 
on restoring and maintaining the castle there, he was now unable to recover his outlay 
because the fort had been granted to the earl of Pembroke. He had received no 
assistance, financial or otherwise, and was being forced from the office to which he had 
devoted so much energy without having anything to show for his efforts. 58 Seven years 
later, the king's yeoman John de Scudemor wrote to Edward II of how he lived in fear 
of reprisals by his enemies in Wales who sought revenge for the judicial punishments 
that he had carried out whilst constable of the castle at Llanbadam Fawr. He and other 
English officials were the most hated men in Wales, so it was a timely decision on the 
part of the Justice, William Martin, to remove him from his post before the situation 
deteriorated still further. 59 
sa Ireland (Documents Illustrative of English History in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries [London, 
1844], ed. H. Cole, 73); Scotland (E 101/7/7, m. 2; E 101/9/9, f. 2r). 
ss Scalacronica, 45. 
56 CDS, ii, no. 1221; SC 1/12, no. 71. 
57 Watson, Under the Hammer, 209. 
58 Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales, 100. 
59Ibid, 285. 
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Although the number of men-at-arms who served under these constables in the 
garrisons of Wales and Scotland was negligible when set against the size of the military 
pool as a whole, their contribution to the English war effort was essential. Garrison 
service tended to be dominated by soldiers of fairly humble origins: sergeants far 
outnumbered knights in the retinue lists and pay accounts drawn up by royal clerks. 
Four sergeants were stationed at the castle of Dryslwyn in the late 1280s, in addition to 
the numerous crossbowmen and archers who were a common feature of garrison life. 60 
At Roxburgh in 1301, there were just three knights alongside twenty-seven men-at-arms 
of inferior rank. 61 One important sub-group within this larger body of low-ranking 
soldiers was the king's sergeants-at-arms. Whilst the work of these men has tended to 
be overshadowed by that of the knights and bannerets who staffed the royal household, 
their activities were of the utmost importance to the stability of Edwardian government 
within the conquered territories. Under Henry III, the king's sergeants-at-arms had 
sometimes been stationed in strategically-important castles such as Carmarthen and 
Montgomery. 62 Once his son had come to the throne, they were able to continue with 
such activities over a broader geographical range. In the spring of 1279, two of these 
officers, John le Convers and Robert de Vilers, were sent on the king's business to 
Llanbadarn Fawr. 63 Six years later, Adam de Riston was granted land near to Rhuddlan 
castle: presumably to aid his service in that part of Wales. 64 Following the outbreak of 
war with Scotland in 1296 large numbers of these men were employed in the garrisons 
of Scotland. Richard de Chaumbre, John de Enefeld, William de Hulle and several 
others could be found in the garrison of Linlithgow in 1302, and eight of the king's 
sergeants-at-arms were employed at Dundee in 1311.65 It was no surprise that when a 
raiding force from the Berwick garrison was ambushed by the Scots in the years 
following Bannockburn, the majority of those either captured or killed in the attack 
66 were sergeants drawn from the royal household. 
The king's sergeants-at-arms were not alone in giving repeated service in these 
hazardous theatres of war. Whilst most men-at-arms were probably keen to avoid 
garrison service, others carried it out willingly for a number of years; their motives for 
60 E 101 /4/23, m. 1. 
61 E 101/9/9, f. 3v. 
62 Calendar of the Liberate Rolls, 6 vols (London, 1916-64), iii, 7. For information relating to the 
sergeants-at-arms more generally, see C. Given-Wilson, The Royal Household and the King's Affinity: 
Service, Politics and Finance in England 1360-1413 (London, 1986), 21-2. 
63 CPR, 1272-81,309. 
64 CPR, 1281-92,173-4. 
65 E 101/10/5, m. 9; Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, if. 30r-v. 
66 CDS, iii, nos 470,477. 
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doing so are, however, difficult to discern. During the course of their prolonged service 
in enemy territory, some soldiers appear to have formed strong bonds with their fellow 
garrison members. In 1305, for example, we find evidence of a communal identity 
among the men of the Linlithgow garrison, who petitioned as a group for the arrears of 
their pay. 67 There seems, for the most part, to have been a clear distinction between the 
majority of men-at-arms, whose experience of military service was obtained by 
campaigning in royal hosts, and a smaller group, who spent most of their time walled up 
in strongholds and fortified towns. A typical member of the latter was John de Untank, 
who resided in the garrison at Carstairs in 1302 before going on to serve at Kirkintilloch 
in 1303-4 and Linlithgow in 1305.68 Another soldier, Hugh de la Mare, was at Berwick 
between 1298 and 1301, and Edinburgh in 1302, before later re-appearing at Berwick at 
the time of Edward II's first expedition as king. 69 Given the close quarters in which 
these soldiers were forced to live, as well as the arduous nature of garrison life, it is not 
surprising to find that many men-at-arms chose to serve alongside their kinsmen. Four 
members of the Bilton family can be found among the garrison at Carstairs in 1302.7° 
Elsewhere, the brothers John and William de Cotes fought alongside one another for a 
number of years at Roxburgh; and, Hugh, John and Robert de Herley were each 
engaged as sergeants at Linlithgow. 7' Kinship groups such as these are likely to have 
enhanced garrison camaraderie. 
These bonds were important because garrison service was a risky business for 
the men-at-arms employed in them, just as it was for the constables placed over them. 
Gerald of Wales had written in the twelfth century of the bloodthirsty nature of the 
struggles between the English garrisons and the native populations in Wales. 72 The 
situation at the time of the Edwardian conquest was no different. The author of the Brut 
y Tywysogyon noted that the only reason that Gruffudd ap Maredudd and Rhys Fychan 
spared the lives of the men of the Aberystwyth garrison in 1282 was because of the 
approach of Easter. 73 On other occasions and in other parts of the Edwardian empire, the 
English were not so fortunate. Inevitably, the risks facing those stationed in enemy 
67 Memorando de Parliamento, or, Records of the Parliament holden at Westminster on the Twenty- 
Eighth Day of February, in the Thirty-Third Year of the Reign of King Edward the First (A. D. 1305), ed. 
F. W. Maitland, Rolls Ser., xcviii (London, 1893), 170. 
68 E 101/10/5, m. 9; E 101/12/18, f. 4r; E 101/12/38. 
69 E 101 /7/ 1, m. 9; E 101 /7/7, m. 1; E 101 /9/9, f. 2v; E 101 / 10/5, m. 9; BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 5r. 
70 E 10111015, m. 9. 
71 The Cotes family (E 101/9/9, f. 3v; E 101/12/18, if. Iv-2v), and the Herleys (E 101/12/18, f. 4v; E 
101/12/38). 
72 Giraldi Cambrensis Itinerarium Kambriae, et Descriptio Kambriae, ed. J. F. Dimock, Rolls Ser., xxi 6 
(London, 1868), 49-50. 
73 Brut y Tywysogyon or The Chronicle of the Princes, Peniarth MS. 20 Version, trans. T. Jones (Cardiff, 
1952), 120. 
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territory on a permanent basis were markedly greater than for those who simply 
embarked on a short spell of campaigning each year. Geoffrey de Ampelford, for one, 
noted that he had been maimed in the right eye during his service at Carstairs, and it is 
likely that many soldiers were forced to retire from military service early because of the 
injuries that they had sustained. 74 This kind of damage to life and limb might have been 
worthwhile had garrison service offered much prospect of material gain, but it is more 
likely that the reverse was the case, particularly during the years when the English were 
on the back foot following Bannockburn. Robert de Blakeburn of the Berwick garrison 
was perhaps typical of the fortunes of many, for by 1320 his long military career had 
left him with nothing to live off following the fall of that town to the Scots. 75 Such 
stories give some idea of the reality of warfare for many ordinary English soldiers, and 
remind us that warfare in the age of chivalry was not all about glory and material gain. 
THE CAVALRY AT FALKIRK 
Evocative as the above evidence may be, the snapshots of military service provided by 
petitions and other personal testimonies shed light on the experiences of only a small 
proportion of the homina ad arma who went to war. The historian who wishes to know 
more about the `average' mounted soldier and his career in the service of the Crown 
must rely on more prosaic materials, such as pay rolls and letters of protection, which 
often supply little more than the names of the knights and sergeants who participated in 
particular campaigns. But it is precisely these sources which, when taken together, 
provide us with the names of thousands of warriors who fought for the English cause 
under Edward I and his son, and offer the most accurate impression of the size and 
composition of the military community. Furthermore, by linking the names found in 
these records, a complex exercise known as `military service prosopography', 
76 it is 
possible to reconstruct at least some portion of the careers in arms of thousands of 
individuals who fought during these years. The difficulty, when dealing with such a 
large and amorphous body of men, is to know how to sample the group in such a way so 
as to facilitate meaningful analysis and discussion whilst retaining the diversity of the 
whole. Most historians whose research has brought them into contact with the gentry, 
both those preoccupied with their military service as well as others whose interests have 
lain elsewhere, have sought to solve this problem by adopting a land-centric approach, 
74 SC 8/9, no. 443. 
75 Northern Petitions, no. 35. 
76 Ayton, `The English Army at Crecy', 160. 
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thereby rooting knights and esquires in the counties and localities where they resided. 77 
Such a method, whilst enabling detailed scrutiny of the personal networks of the 
landholders of medieval England and providing some idea as to the military 
commitments of the men of particular localities, is less suitable for a study such as this 
which aims to create a more universal picture of aristocratic military service. 78 
So as to cut across local and regional boundaries a different sampling technique 
has here been employed. Ideally, one would seek a group of soldiers both large enough 
to encompass a wide range of military experience and sufficiently diverse in terms of 
rank, status and geographical origin to justify the claim to universality. For this purpose 
the most appropriate type of source, offering a slice through the military community at a 
particular moment in time as many of its constituent members prepared for war, are the 
horse inventories. The greatest yield of detailed nominal data on the "ordinary" men-at- 
arms in Edwardian armies is to be had from the horse inventories, where the modestly- 
priced mounts of these men are listed alongside the destriers and coursers of their 
wealthier or more celebrated comrades-in-arms'. 79 By providing the names of hundreds 
of cavalrymen of both knightly and sub-knightly rank as they had their horses appraised 
at the beginning of royal campaigns, these lists offer the ideal starting point for a 
discussion of the military service of the aristocracy. From this corpus of documents the 
most suitable sample is provided by the inventories drawn up for the Falkirk campaign 
of 1298: these contain a larger number of men-at-arms than any of the other horse lists 
of the period. Furthermore, the Falkirk expedition took place only twenty-one years 
after the first Welsh war, and sixteen before Bannockburn. It is therefore possible, by 
using these lists, to trace the activities of veterans from the early wars of Edward I, as 
well as those of men who would later go on to fight under his son. 
Knights 
22 July 1298 was a momentous date in the Anglo-Scottish wars. On that day a large 
English host of around 3.000 cavalry and 25.000 infantry routed a Scottish force under 
" For the aims of such studies, see M. J. Bennett, Community, Class and Careerism: Cheshire and 
Lancashire Society in the Age of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight (Cambridge, 1983). 3. Bennett drew 
inspiration from R. H. Hilton, A Medieval Society: The West Midlands at the End of the Thirteenth 
Century (London, 1966). On a more cautious note, see C. Carpenter, 'Gentry and Community in 
Medieval England', Journal pof British Studies, xxxiii (1994). 345-52: D. Crouch, `From Stenton to 
McFarlane: Models of Societies of the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries', TRHS. 6th ser., v (1995), 192- 
78 For military service within particular localities, see Morgan, War and Society, and Saul, knights and 
Esquires. 36-59. For a later. campaigns-based perspective, see Bell, War and the Soldier. 
79 Avton, Knights and Warhorses. 5. 
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command of William Wallace at Falkirk. Although the victory was not decisive, either 
politically or militarily, it did ensure that the English retained the upper hand in warfare 
north of the border for many years to come. As G. W. S. Barrow once noted, `not for 
another sixteen years did the Scots attempt a full-scale pitched battle against the 
English'. 80 For the men-at-arms who rode north of the border with Edward I, the events 
of that day must have constituted the high point in their military careers. Success no 
doubt tasted all the sweeter given the dismal defeat at Stirling Bridge the previous year, 
and the devastation caused by Scottish raids into northern England throughout the 
winter months that followed. 8' It is therefore to be regretted that the names of only a 
proportion of the English cavalrymen who took part in the Falkirk campaign can now be 
recovered. The horse lists for that year reveal the identities of 136 knights serving 
within the companies, not including the retinue leaders themselves, and a further four 
who were taking part in the campaign `independently'. It is these `lesser' knights who 
will form the subject of our enquiry. Given that only forty-eight of the 115 earls and 
bannerets named on the Falkirk Roll also feature on the horse lists, including the retinue 
of just one earl, Thomas of Lancaster, it can be readily estimated that there were around 
350 knights within the retinues. If we also allow for men-at-arms on the horse lists 
whose ranks are not specified, as well as for those who were with leaders not named in 
either source, then there were probably around 450 knights in the companies at Falkirk, 
or 650 knightly combatants in total. 82 The 140 men in our sample therefore represent 
around 30 per cent of the knights in the English retinues when the hosts clashed in open 
field on St. Magdalene's day. This figure puts the group under investigation into 
quantitative context, and indicates the important contribution made by the large number 
of combatants who did not receive Crown pay. 
Our 140 knights were distributed throughout forty-eight retinues: over a hundred 
of the fighting units recorded on the Falkirk inventories could boast no knights at all. 
Eighty-nine soldiers were in the household division whilst the other fifty-one were 
brought into pay for the duration of the campaign. As noted already, four of these men 
were serving independently. 83 Thirty-nine of the retinues in which knights can be found 
were manned by three belted warriors or fewer whereas just two, those of Hugh le 
Despenser and the earl of Lancaster, contained ten or more. By 1298, some of these 
80 Barrow, Robert Bruce, 103. 
81 C. J. McNamee, `William Wallace's Invasion of Northern England in 1297', Northern History, xxvi 
(1990), 40-58. 
82 The ranks of 283 men are not stated and it is possible that a few of these were knights. I have confined 
the sample group to those who definitely were knights for the purposes of clarity. 
83 Robert de Bures, John de Luda, Adam de Blida and John Kirkpatrick (Gough, 161,163,175,228). 
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men-at-arms had been landowners for many years; indeed, a few knights were already 
in possession of their estates in the mid-1270s at the time of the Hundred Roll enquiries. 
Robert Barry, who was in the retinue of Ralph Pipard at Falkirk, had been accused in 
1276 of withholding a suit concerning the lands that he held of the king in Billing, 
Northamptonshire. 84 This may explain why it seems to have taken some time before he 
was willing to lend his support to the king's military projects. 85 Also in possession of 
their estates in the 1270s were William de Scalebroke, another knight of Ralph Pipard, 
and John de Blakeford, who was with Simon de Montacute at the battle. 86 William de 
Horkesley, who inherited from his father Robert in December 1295, joined the landed 
elite just a few years before serving in the king's army at Falkirk; others, like Robert de 
Haustede junior, had to wait until well into the reign of Edward II before receiving their 
patrimonies. 87 To draw distinctions between the numbers of landed and non-landed 
knights who served at Falkirk would therefore be to miss the point: in 1298, military 
service attracted both those whose landholding status carried a concomitant military 
obligation, and others for whom a lack of land might have acted as a stimulus for 
adventure. Likewise, it would be wrong to distinguish too sharply between military 
service given by older and younger sons, for members of both groups can be found 
among our sample of knights. 88 
Most of those who had come into possession of their inheritances by 1298 held 
land in more than one county, which was normal for the knightly class. An inquisition 
into the men-at-arms available for coastal defence in Essex in 1295-6 showed that of 
102 knights who held land in the county, only around twenty-four were residing there, 
with a further eleven being unfit for service. 89 Many of those not present might have 
been away on military service. Thomas de Scales, who was with Fulk Fitz Waryn at 
Falkirk, had landed interests in Cambridgeshire, Hertfordshire and Norfolk; William de 
Hardreshull, meanwhile, held numerous lands in Lincolnshire, in addition to his manor 
of Hartshill in Warwickshire. 9° Nevertheless, most middling knights, as opposed to the 
leading earls and bannerets, tended to hold their lands in one part of the country, so it is 
84 Rotuli Hundredorum temp. Hen. III. and Edw. I. in Turr' Lond' et in Curia Receptae Scaccarii Westm. 
asservati, ed. W. Illingworth and J. Caley, 2 vols (Record Commission, 1812-18) ii, 13. 
85 Below, 106. 
86 Ibid, ii, 714,764-5; i, 65,86-7. 
87 IPM, iii, no. 345; ibid, vi, no. 316. 
88 On the prospects for older and younger sons, see G. Duby, `Youth in Aristocratic Society: 
Northwestern France in the Twelfth Century', The Chivalrous Society (London, 1977), 117-8. Younger 
sons among the knights at Falkirk included Edmund Foliot, Fulk Peyforer and Henry de Segrave, whilst 
among the elder sons were Ingelram de Berenger and Nicholas Pointz. 
89 PW, i, 273-4. Cf. J. C. Ward, The Essex Gentry and the County Community in the Fourteenth Century, 
(Essex Record Office, 1991), 20. 
90 IPM, ii, no. 520; ibid, nos 185,807. 
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possible to divide the 140 knights in our sample into the regions in which they appear to 
have held most of their lands. One product of this enquiry is that relatively few 
northerners, defined as those who held their main estates in Cumberland, Westmorland, 
Lancashire, Yorkshire, Durham or Northumberland, can be found among the knights on 
the inventories. This is contrary to what one would expect given that the campaign was 
in Scotland and that knights from the northern counties were closest to the border. 
Comparison with the Falkirk Roll shows that the reason for this is that a relatively large 
number of northern bannerets were not receiving Crown pay. Of the bannerets who 
appear on both the roll of arms and the horse inventory only five, Robert de Clifford, 
Thomas de Furnivall, William de Ryther, William de Cantilupe and Nicholas de 
Meynill, held their main estates in the north, whereas seventeen of those who do not 
appear in pay on the inventories were northerners. 91 What one finds, therefore, in the 
group of knights who appear in the retinues on the Falkirk inventories, is a picture of the 
military community which is very much orientated towards those who held lands in the 
midlands and the south. A particularly large group of around thirty-two knights came 
from the south-west under leaders like Robert Fitz Payn, Hugh de Courtenay, John de 
Beauchamp of Somerset and Simon de Montacute. The next largest subset (around 
twenty knights) was drawn from the south-east. 
Diversity is evident not only in the knights' geographical origins but also in their 
ages at the time of the campaign. The Statute of Winchester of 1285 had specified that 
all between the ages of fifteen and sixty were to be assessed and sworn to armour. 92 In 
November 1298, just a few months after the battle, Thomas de Furnivall was ordered to 
raise men-at-arms in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire between the ages of twenty and 
sixty. 93 An Edwardian soldier's career was therefore potentially a very long one, and 
there was nothing to prevent men from taking up arms as early, or retiring as late, as 
they wished. Nicholas Orme has noted how late-medieval writers encouraged young 
men to undertake military training in their mid-teens; 94 a point echoed by the author of 
the Song of Lewes who stipulated that many of the knights on the baronial side under 
Simon de Montfort were adolescents and novices in war. 95 John de Claron, who was 
with Henry de Beaumont at Falkirk, was later said to be forty years-old in 1324, which 
91 For a fuller list, see C. H. Hunter Blair: `Northern Knights at Falkirk, 1298', Archaeologia Aeliana, or 
Miscellaneous Tracts Relating to Antiquity, ed. C. H. Hunter Blair, 4th ser., xxv (1947), 68-114. 
92 Statutes of the Realm, i, 97. 
93 CPR, 1292-1301,387. 
94 N. Orme, From Childhood to Chivalry: The Education of the English Kings and Aristocracy 1066-1530 
(London, 1984), 182. 
95 The Song of Lewes, ed. C. L. Kingsford (Oxford, 1890), 4. 
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would have made him just fourteen in 1298. Whilst there is every reason to doubt the 
accuracy of the Inquisitions Post Mortem as a source for age, it seems likely that he was 
in his teens at the time that the host was raised. 96 Other youngsters included Robert de 
Haustede junior, who was `36 and more' when he inherited his father's lands in 1323, 
placing him roughly in his mid-teens at the time of Falkirk, and Maurice de Berkeley, 
who was perhaps seventeen when he accompanied his father to war. 97 At the other end 
of the age spectrum were men like the Staffordshire knight William de Mere, who 
claimed that he was eighty in 1323 at a proof of age, making him about fifty-five in 
1298.98 Of the same generation was Thomas de Berkeley senior: aged fifty-three. 99 The 
majority of the knights at Falkirk whose ages can be estimated from the evidence of 
such inquisitions naturally fell somewhere in between these two extremes, with Thomas 
de St. Loe, aged around twenty-nine in 1298; Geoffrey de Aubermarle, thirty-one; and 
Nicholas de St. Maur, in his mid- to late-twenties; characteristic of this group. '°° 
The broad range in age, wealth and experience among the `lesser' knights at 
Falkirk was naturally reflected in the varying quality of the horses that accompanied 
them to Scotland. To some extent the horse valuations serve as a convenient indicator as 
to the status of these men. At the lower end of the scale were two knights, Stephen de 
Depham and Nicholas de la Launde, who were on horses valued at just 8 marks. '°1 
Those who had been landholders since the 1270s, not surprisingly, had higher value 
mounts: Robert Barry's equus was appraised at 24 marks. But the most expensive 
chargers were reserved for regular campaigners like Roger de Bilney (50 marks) and 
William de Hardreshull (80 marks); men who were sub-retinue leaders or bannerets, 
such as Thomas de Berkeley senior (60 marks), William de Ferrers (70 marks) and John 
ap Adam (100 marks); and the sons of the retinue leaders, like Thomas de Leyburn, who 
was with his father William (100 marks). 102 Judged simply by the concentration of high 
valuation horses in his retinue, Hugh le Despenser led the most prestigious company. 
The distinction between retinue leaders and their men was blurred at the edges. Knights 
96 IPM, vi, no. 422. On the IPMs, see J. T. Rosenthal, Old Age in Late Medieval England (Philadelphia, 
1996), chapter 1, and for the methods that were used to calculate age; J. Bedell, `Memory and Proof of 
Age in England 1272-1327', Past and Present, clxii (1999), 3-27. 
97 IPM, vi, no. 316; Complete Peerage, ii, 128. For evidence of teenage soldiers, see A. Ayton, `Knights, 
Esquires and Military Service: The Evidence of the Armorial Cases before the Court of Chivalry', The 
Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, 
ed. A. Ayton and J. L. Price (London, 1995), 92; M. Keen, `English Military Experience and the Court of 
Chivalry: The Case of Grey v. Hastings', Guerre et Societe en France, en Angleterre et en Bourgogne 
XIVe-XVe siecle, ed. P. Contamine, C. Giry-Deloison and M. Keen (Lille, 1992), 131. 
98 IPM, vi, no. 354. 
99 Complete Peerage, ii, 127. 
10° IPM, v, no. 157; ibid, ii, no. 720; ibid, iii, no. 386. 
101 Gough, 169,226. 
102 Ibid, 220,209,191,216,189,187 and 194. 
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like Berkeley senior, John ap Adam and William de Ferrers led small companies of their 
own within the larger comitivae of their patrons, a phenomenon which, as we have seen, 
was very common. Thomas de Berkeley senior had been constable of the army in 
Flanders during the previous year. 103 Even lesser knights like Reginald de St. Martin 
and Robert de Bures had led small troops of two or three men to war in the past. '°4 The 
knights in the retinues at Falkirk were therefore diverse in their social status and 
military standing, a point that should be borne in mind as we consider their careers in 
arms in greater detail. 
The first thing that we would like to know about the military service of our 
knights is the lengths of time that they had been participating in the king's wars prior to 
Falkirk. Based on the evidence available between the Lord Edward's crusade of 1270-2 
and the expedition of 1298, the following table shows the years in which the 140 
knights in our sample appear to have taken up arms. 
Table 3.1: First Recorded Military Service of `Lesser' Knights at Falkirk 
1270 1277 1282 1287 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 
Holy Land 2-------- 
Wales -6 12 3 21* ---- 
Gascony ---- 15 1-2- 
Flanders ------- 20 - 
Scotland ------ 20 4 34 
Total 26 12 3 36 1 20 26 34 
* Includes those who served in Wales in both 1294 and 1295 
It should be noted that these figures must not be taken at face value. Not only is the 
survival of records containing the names of English soldiers rather patchy, but on all 
campaigns there were a large number of knights who did not receive Crown pay, and 
who therefore do not appear on the pay rolls and horse inventories. Maurice le Brun is 
first mentioned in the service records in 1298, but the plea roll for the first year of the 
Scottish war shows that he was militarily active at least two years before that time when 
he was accused of killing a man. tos Some knights were summoned some years before 
they appear to have begun their military service. Simon de Ralegh was ordered to Wales 
103 Chronica etAnnales, 173. 
104 BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 79r; E 10 1/6/37, m. I i. 
105 'Plea Roll, 1296', no. 127. 
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in 1294, but is first named on the household inventory in Scotland two years later. 106 
Hugh Godard and Henry de Mortimer had letters of protection for the Gascon campaign 
of 1294 with Roger de Mortimer of Chirk; but he was exempted from service there 
because of the Welsh rebellion, and his men might have followed him to Wales. 107 
Others, like Nicholas de Carru, who spent much of his military career in Ireland, served 
in spheres of war away from the purview of the royal paymasters. ' 08 The above figures 
are, therefore, biased towards more recent military activity and service given for Crown 
pay, meaning that a few men-at-arms probably began giving military service earlier than 
is indicated here. Nevertheless, the data as presented do point towards some general 
trends. Whilst many had fought in the early Welsh wars, most of the knights appear to 
have taken up the sword during the crisis years between 1294 and 1298 when the 
English were almost simultaneously at war with all of their rivals. This is not surprising 
given that this was when military commitments placed the greatest strain on the 
Crown's resources: the regnal year 1294-5 witnessed the greatest royal expenditure in 
the reign. 109 There were also quite a few debutants in 1298, which is as one would 
expect given the size of the host that was gathered in that year. 
Although table 3.1 gives some idea as to when the knights at Falkirk began their 
military service, it does not reveal the full extent to which they had participated in 
previous campaigns under Edward I. This information is presented in the table below. 
Table 3.2: Previous Military Service of Knightly Followers at Falkirk 
1270 1277 1282 1287 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 
Holy Land 2- ---- - -- 
Wales -7 17 5 38* - - -- 
Gascony -- -- 18 7 1 6- 
Flanders -- ---- - 68 - 
Scotland -- ---- 34 8 140 
Total 27 17 5 56 7** 35 82 140 
* Includes those who served in Wales in both 1294 and 1295 
**Not including those continuing their service from Wales in the previous year 
106 PW, i, 265; E 101/5/23, in. 2. 
107 RG, iii, 167-8. For Mortimer's exemption, see PW, i, 260. 
108 Siege of Caerlaverock, 7. No English expeditionary forces served in Ireland during our period; R. 
Frame, `Military Service in the Lordship of Ireland 1290-1360: Institutions and Society on the Anglo- 
Gaelic Frontier', Medieval Frontier Societies, ed. R. Bartlett and A. MacKay (Oxford, 1989), 102. 
109 Book of Prests, Iii. 
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Whilst the aforesaid caveats must be borne in mind, it is possible to discern three or four 
distinct groups with varying levels of military experience. A substantial minority fell 
into the `veteran' category. Two knights, William Wyther and William de Detling, had 
fought in the Holy Land with Edward and his brother Edmund at the beginning of the 
1270s. 110 Detling was proffered as a knight in the war of 1277 prior to campaigning in 
France, and appears to have given his last service with Aymer de Valence in 1301, three 
years before his death. l ll Two other soldiers to have registered their service as knights 
at the feudal muster in 1277 were Thomas de Eyville, who was in the comitiva of 
Thomas de Furnivall in 1298, and Thomas de Berkeley senior who had fought, as a 
teenager, during the Barons' Wars. ' 12 Some in the veteran group began their military 
careers as servientes during the first two Welsh wars. William de Wygebere, with 
Robert Fitz Payn at Falkirk, registered his service as a sergeant in 1277.1 13 Stephen de la 
More, John de Bracebridge and Robert de Bavent were probably all very young men 
when they fought as servientes in the great war of 1282-3.114 Others who took up arms 
at that time and whose ranks during the war with Llywelyn are not specified include 
Ralph le Bygod, Humphrey de Beauchamp and Robert Fitz Nigel. ' 15 A few of these 
men appear on the rolls of arms at an early date: Detling and Fitz Nigel on Heralds' Roll 
(c. 1279); and Ralph le Bygod on Charles' Roll (c. 1285). "6 In addition to these 
survivors from the early Welsh wars there was a second group who had first seen active 
service in Wales or Gascony in the later 1280s or mid-1290s. This category included 
Hugh de St. Philibert; Ingelram de Berenger; Roger de Bilney; Thomas de Coudray; and 
Laurence de Hameldon; amongst others. 117 
The above tables suggest that the majority of the knights at Falkirk were relative 
novices in war; therefore, most retinues would have had their fair share of younger 
recruits serving alongside more seasoned campaigners. By 1298, many of these knights 
110 Lloyd, English Society and the Crusade, appendix 4. 
11 1277 (PW, i, 207); 1294 (RG, iii, 179); 1298 (Gough, 194); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. ld). 
112 Eyville served in 1277 (PW, i, 197), 1282 (C 67/8, m. 5), 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d), and for the final time 
in 1298 (Gough, 211). In addition to the Barons' Wars (Complete Peerage, ii, 127-8), Berkeley had 
fought in 1277,1282 (see chapter 2, n. 217), 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 4), and 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i). 
113 He was in Wales in 1277 (PW, i, 206), 1282 (C 47/2/4, m. 8) and 1294 (C 67/10, m. 7). 
114 De la More was in Wales in 1282 (PW, i, 234), and 1295 (C 67/10, m. 3) and in Flanders in 1297 (E 
101/6/37, m. Iii), Bracebridge in 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 2), in Wales then Gascony in 1295 (C 67/10, m. 5d; 
RG, iii, 298) and Flanders in 1297 (C 67/12, m. 2), and Bavent in 1282 (E 101/4/1, m. 9), 1294 (Book of 
Prests, 51) and as a knight in Scotland by 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3). There were two John de Bracebridges 
but the sergeant in 1282 was the son as the father had been a knight in 1273. M. Jones, `An Indenture 
between Robert, Lord Mohaut, and Sir John de Bracebridge for Life Service in Peace and War, 1310', 
Journal of the Society ofArchivists, iv (1972), 387; CCR, 1272-79,41. 
115 Bygod (C 67/8, m. 7); Beauchamp (C 67/8, m. 4d); Fitz Nigel (C 67/8, m. 4). 
116 Aspilogia III, i, 139,294. 
h17 St. Philibert (CPR, 1281-92,273); Berenger (C 67/10, m. 5); Bilney (C 67/10, m. 3); Coudray (RG, iii, 
166); Hameldon (RG, iii, 168). 
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had been girded with the belt of knighthood for no more than a year or two. For men 
such as these, the Falkirk campaign must have constituted a pivotal stage in their 
progression towards fully-fledged membership of the knightly elite. One such individual 
was Waleran de Rocheford. He had been knighted on 25 March 1296 in the retinue of 
John de Engayne, the man who he followed to war again two years later. 118 Several 
other bachelors in our sample, Adam de la Forde; William de Chabenore; Philip de 
Welles; Philip Paynel; Simon le Chamberleyn; Simon de Asshton; Nicholas Pointz; and 
Ralph de Seccheville; each received the honour in Flanders on All Saints' Day 1297 at 
what was clearly a mass knighting ceremony. 119 Bartholomew de Somerton and Robert 
de Scales' follower John de Vaux, both of whom served as sergeants in 1297, might 
have been among the young men who were knighted at the beginning of the Falkirk 
campaign. 120 Many of these new milites were among the forty-six who began their 
military careers either in 1296 or the following year, but when we look in more detail at 
the knights who seem to have taken up arms at that late stage we find one or two 
surprises. Among those who appear in the military records for the first time in 1297 or 
1298 are a few, like John de Blakeford and Robert Barry, who had been in possession of 
their lands for many years. It may be that they had hitherto served without Crown pay 
and avoided the attention of the royal clerks, but it is likely, given that the Falkirk host 
was the largest of the reign, that many of the more established knights were forced out 
of their country idylls for the first time in 1298. 
For up-and-coming knights, as well as for some of the veterans who were not yet 
ready to hang up their swords, the Falkirk campaign was not the end but perhaps the 
beginning of many more years of militAry service. An attempt has been made to 
summarise this post-Falkirk activity below. 
Table 3.3: Service by the Falkirk Knights in Scotland (1298-1314) 
1298 1300 1301 1302 1303 1306 1307 1309 1310 1314 
Independent* 4 19 7- 7 12 2 1 2 5 
Retainer 136 51 38 1 42 27 10 3 15 13 
Ret. Leader - 5 15 3 18 9 9 1 1 4 
Total 140 75 60 4 67 48 21 5 18 22 
* Includes those who took out letters of protection or attorney with the king 
118 E 101 /5/23, m. I i. 
19 BL, Add. MS 7965, f 64v, 68r, 69r, 78r. 
120 E 101/6/37, mm. li, 2i; Guisborough, 325. 
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Many of the Falkirk knights, as we have seen, only began their military service three or 
four years before 1298, but it was precisely those individuals, for the most part, who 
formed the core of English armies for the Scottish expeditions that followed. That is not 
to say that the veterans of the earlier Welsh wars had all died or stopped fighting within 
a few years of Falkirk, for a few, such as Robert de Bures, Henry de Glastingbury, 
Edmund Foliot and Stephen de la More, had numerous campaigns still ahead of them. 121 
Yet the long-term future naturally lay with those soldiers, like the men who were 
knighted in 1296 or 1297, whose military careers coincided with the onset of the 
Scottish wars. Continuity of service beyond 1298 was very high; and we should 
remember that these are minimum figures, that some of the later armies, such as those 
of 1306 and 1307, were relatively small, and that source survival for several campaigns, 
particularly that of 1314, is poor. Among the knights whose careers seem to have begun 
at Falkirk, but who featured prominently in the campaigns that followed, was the 
Hampshire knight John de Scures, who served in 1300,1301,1303,1306 and 1314.122 
One or two others, like Robert de Haustede junior and Nicholas de Meynill junior, 
continued beyond Bannockburn into the later stages of the reign of Edward 11.123 
Twenty-one of the knights at Falkirk later obtained letters of protection in 1314 and 
would therefore appear to have taken part in the two great battles of the era, 124 but given 
the absence of any pay documents for Bannockburn this is probably only the tip of the 
iceberg. In any case, quite a few soldiers continued to serve beyond that convenient cut- 
off point: Robert Fitz Nigel, a veteran of the war of 1282, was at the siege of Berwick in 
1319; and the relatively fresh-faced Walter de Beauchamp junior, the son of Edward I's 
steward, was still in arms on the Weardale campaign in the first year of the reign of 
Edward 111.125 Some twenty-seven of the Falkirk knights were returned in the lists of 
men-at-arms drawn up from the counties in 1324, even if one, Thomas de Scales, was 
by that stage unfit for service. 126 Although the men mentioned here were evidently very 
active campaigners, not all possessed the same appetite for the king's wars. There were 
12' Bures appears in the military records for the final time in 1307 (C 67/16, m. 3), whilst Glastingbury, 
Foliot and de la More, whose service likewise began in the second Welsh war, can still be traced in 1306, 
1307 and 1310 respectively (E 10 1/ 13/7, m. 1; E 10 1/612/21, m. 1; C 71/4 m. 10). 
'" 1300 (Liber Quotidianus, 202-3); 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 71v); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 5); 1306 
(C 67/16, m. 9); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). 
123 Haustede served in 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 1), 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a f. 87r), 1303 (BL, Add. MS 
8835, f. 58v), 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3), 1319 (C 71/10, m. 4), and 1322 (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 60r), and 
Meynill in 1300 (C 67/14, m. 12), 1301 (C 67/14, m. 2), 1303 (E 101/612/10, m. 1), 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1) 
and 1319 (C 71/10, m. 9). 
124 Those present in 1314 included Ingelram de Berenger (C 71/6, m. 3), John de Scures (C 71/6, m. 3), 
Maurice le Brun (C 71/6, m. 4), Walter de Beauchamp junior (C 71/6, m. 4), Simon le Chamberleyn (C 
71/6, m. 1), Henry de Segrave (C 71/6, m. 3) and Walter Haket (C 71/6, m. 5). 
125 Fitz Nigel (C 71 /10, m. 5); Beauchamp (C 71 /11, m. 6). 
126 PW, II, ii, 637-57. 
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some who took up arms far more frequently, and over a longer period of time, than 
others. Some indication as to the varying commitment to military service among the 
knights in our sample group is given in the table below. 
Table 3.4: No. of Campaigns fought on by Falkirk Knights (1270-1314) 
Hosts 
served in 
Number 
of knights 
% of total 
1 19 13.6 
2 17 12.1 
3 15 10.7 
4 15 10.7 
5 17 12.1 
6 18 12.9 
7 15 10.7 
8 9 6.4 
9 9 6.4 
10 5 3.6 
11 0 0 
12 1 0.7 
Nineteen of the knights at Falkirk seem to have given military service on no other 
occasion. However, included among the men who fall into this category are ten knights 
who were with overseas commanders such as Pons de Castillion, Peter de Burdegala 
and Otto de Casnawe. 127 The number of English knights who fought only in that year 
was, therefore, not so great. At the other extreme was a group of thirty-nine knights who 
served on seven occasions or more, including Maurice le Brun who took up arms eight 
times between 1296 and 1314; Stephen de la More and Thomas de Coudray who can be 
located in nine different hosts; and Henry de Segrave, who wielded the sword a further 
nine times following his debut alongside his father, Nicholas, in Wales in 1295.128 
These figures are most impressive given that we are only considering service given up 
to 1314, but the prize for the most bellicose record would be taken by John de 
127 The origins of some of these knights, such as Ebles de Lignan, have been traced by Malcolm Vale; 
M. G. A. Vale, `The Gascon Nobility and the Anglo-French War 1294-98', War and Government in the 
Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, ed. J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 
infra 135 and 136. 
128 Brun: 1296 ('Plea roll, 1296', no. 127); 1298 (Gough, 176); 1300 (C 47/2/13, m. 8), 1301 (C 67/14, m. 
4), 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10), 1307 (CDS, v, 446), 1314 (C 71/6, m. 4). De la 
More: for his service prior to Falkirk, see above n. 114, and 1298 (Gough, 183); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2); 
1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. ld); 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 10). 
Coudray: see chapter 1 n. 133. Segrave: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3); 1297 (C 67/12, 
m. 9); 1298 (Gough, 187); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 6); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 15); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 6); 1307 
(CDS, v, 445); 1311 (C 71/4, m. 6); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). 
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Crumwell, who can be traced in twelve armies between 1294, when he had a letter of 
protection for service in Wales, and 1314.129 The careers of these knights seem to test 
the view that a professional soldiery did not emerge until a later era in English history, 
but knights like Segrave and Crumwell were exceptional. Table 3.4 shows that it was 
more normal for knights to participate in royal campaigns on between four and seven 
occasions, supporting Keen's observation that `a very common pattern of service. . . 
is 
one that lies somewhere between the professional and the occasional'. 130 Representative 
of this group were Adam de la Forde, who participated in four expeditions between 
1297 and 1301, and John de Caltoft, who appears in the records the same number of 
times between 1294 and 1306.131 
Such varied recruitment patterns produced military careers that differed 
markedly in length, many lasting for a good number of years. Given that landholders 
were obliged to possess arms between the ages of fifteen and sixty, it is not surprising to 
find that the martial activities of some of the Falkirk men spanned several decades. 
Whilst none of the knights at Falkirk were able to match the records of Sir John Sully or 
Sir Thomas de Rokeby, who claimed during the Scrope-Grosvenor dispute of 1385 to 
have served for eighty and sixty years respectively, 132 quite a few can be shown to have 
been militarily active for over two or three decades. At least nine knights bore arms for 
over thirty years, including John de Bracebridge, Thomas de Berkeley junior, William 
de Detling, John ap Adam and Robert Fitz Nigel, whilst a further twenty-nine engaged 
in military service for two decades or more. 133 When we bear in mind that the service 
records are incomplete, it seems probable that most militarily-active knights bore arms 
for at least fifteen years, even if there was a significant minority who took part in only 
one or two campaigns during their lives. This accords well with the evidence provided 
by the depositions in the Court of Chivalry case between Thomas, lord Morley, and 
John, Lord Lovel, during the reign of Richard II, when careers spanning thirty or forty 
129 For his service on five expeditions between 1294 and 1301, see chapter 1 nn. 159-60, and chapter 2 n. 
159. He also fought in 1303 (E 101/612/7, m. 3), 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1), 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9), 
1308 (CDS, v, 446), 1309 (CDS, v, 448), 1310 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 2r) and 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). 
130 Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, 62. 
131 Forde: 1297 (BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 64v); 1298 (Gough, 164); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5); 1301 (E 
101/9/23, m. 1). Caltoft: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 4); 1298 (Gough, 172); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (C 
67/16, m. 11). 
132 The Controversy between Sir Richard Scrope and Sir Robert Grosvenor in the Court of Chivalry, A. D. 
MCCCLXXV-MCCCXC, ed. N. H. Nicolas, 2 vols. (London, 1832), i, 74,116. On the tendency during 
the Middle Ages for old people to exaggerate their age and experience, see S. Shahar, Growing Old in the 
Middle Ages: "Winter Clothes us in Shadow and Pain " (London, 1997), 30. 
133 The start and end dates for those mentioned who served 30 years and more are: Bracebridge 1282- 
1315 (C 47/2/7, m. 2; E 101/15/6, m. 2); Berkeley junior 1294-1335 (C 67/10, m. 7; C 71/15, m. 26); 
Detling 1270 (and before that the Barons' Wars)-1301 (Lloyd appendix 4; E 101/9/24, m. Id); ap Adam 
1277-1307 (CPR, 1272-81,217; CDS, v, 446); Fitz Nigel 1282-1319 (C 67/8, m. 4; C 71/10, m. 5). 
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years were shown to have been quite common. 134 Certainly, there is reason to believe 
that the grandparents and great-grandparents of those men, who lived during the reigns 
of Edward I and Edward II, had been just as martially inclined, if not more so. For all 
that, there came a day when even the most strenuous knights had to sheath their swords 
for good. Perhaps in old age some of these men had time to reminisce on the fortunes of 
former years. In doing so, they encouraged a new generation of warriors whose 
successes in France would one day surpass even their own endeavours. 
Sergeants 
Throughout the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries knights continued to 
perform an important role within royal armies, providing the Crown with a hardened 
core of regular campaigners. What the careers and experiences of the knights at Falkirk 
do not reveal is that this was also a time when the proportional contribution of these 
elite soldiers to the manpower of English hosts was gradually decreasing. This shift was 
due not to any decline in the number of knights engaged in military activity under 
Edward I, for quite the reverse was true. Rather it was reflective of the heightened 
demands placed on the lesser tenants and rear-vassals of the shires and localities which 
saw the `squire', or `sergeant', gradually replace the knight as the mainstay of the king's 
forces. Some indication as to the extent of this shift can be given by comparing the 
armies raised by Henry III with those of his son. In 1223, at least 387 knights and 145 
sergeants appeared at the feudal muster to go against Llywelyn the Great, whilst for the 
Deganwy campaign of twenty-two years later there were around 354 knights as against 
306 men of lesser rank. 135 Under Edward I, by contrast, both the feudal levies and the 
armies at large were weighted far more heavily towards mounted soldiers of more 
modest rank and status. Whilst the forty knights and 366 sergeants registered at the 
feudal muster for the Scottish campaign of 1300 may be indicative less of a general 
trend than of a specific policy regarding the provision of feudal service, 136 it was 
nevertheless the case that sergeants normally outnumbered knights in the armies of 
Edward I and Edward II by around three to one. In some years the imbalance was even 
greater. Figures for the Flanders campaign of 1297-8 reveal that at its peak the army of 
that year contained 140 knights and bannerets with 755 squires. ' 37 At Falkirk, the 734 
134 Ayton, `Knights, Esquires and Military Service', 88. 
135 Walker, `The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 182,510 
136 PDS, 209-231. 
137 Lewis, `The English Forces in Flanders', 312-3. 
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men described on the inventories as valletti represented some 74 per cent of the total 
number of men-at-arms in Crown pay. If the proportion in receipt of royal wages was 
the same as for the knights, which seems more than likely, then around 2,400 English 
sergeants were engaged north of the border in that year. 
It is not surprising, given the growing dependence of the Crown on its sub- 
knightly combatants and the increase in the squire's social standing, that the `knightly 
class' in its widest sense has attracted a great deal of attention among historians. Much 
ink has been spilled on `the rise of the esquire'. Moreover, the shifting boundaries 
between knights and those below them in the social hierarchy, and the extent to which 
such boundaries became less or more solidified over time, have occupied the thoughts 
of many prominent scholars. 138 Social and economic theories of growth and crisis have 
naturally contributed much to the debate. 139 Even the problem of definition has 
sometimes proved difficult to resolve: for David Crouch, at least, `to talk of squires as 
potential, rather than actual, aristocrats would be safest before 1300'. 140 Whilst that may 
be the case, the consensus is that the squires were rising, inexorably so, and that the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries lay at the heart of that process. Where disagreement 
has arisen is between those who have traced the new-found confidence of the `squires' 
to their control over lands in the shires and localities, and others for whom the military 
nexus was more pertinent. If, according to Peter Coss, `territoriality is crucial to the 
understanding of the gentry as a social formation', 141 then for Maurice Keen, it was 
through military service that the squires came of age as a social group. The imposition 
of military obligations on non-knights by Edward I created a greater self-awareness 
among that body of men. Later in the fourteenth century, campaigning became `a 
principal forcing experience, teaching the esquire to aspire to a coat [of arms]. ' 142 Given 
the heavy recruitment of the country gentry during these years, war was almost certainly 
a driving factor behind the changes taking place. 
The emergence of `esquire' as a prominent social rank during the course of the 
fourteenth century should not obscure the fact that the men of sub-knightly status who 
138 E. g. Coss, `Knights, Esquires and the Origins of Social Gradation', passim; M. Bennett, `The Status of 
the Squire: The Northern Evidence', The Ideals and Practice of Medieval Knighthood I, ed. C. Harper- 
Bill and R. Harvey (Woodbridge, 1986), 1-11; J. Scammell, `The Formation of the English Social 
Structure: Freedom, Knights, and Gentry, 1066-1300', Speculum, lxviii (1993), 613. On the early 
terminology used for men of sub-knightly rank, see D. Crouch, The Birth of Nobility: Constructing 
Aristocracy in England and France 900-1300 (Harlow, 2005), 249-50. 
139 P. Coss, `Sir Geoffrey de Langley and the Crisis of the Knightly Class in Thirteenth-Century England', 
Past and Present, lxviii (1975), 26-7; D. A. Carpenter, `Was there a Crisis of the Knightly Class in the 
Thirteenth Century? The Oxfordshire Evidence', EHR, xcv (1980), 748-52. 
140 Crouch, Image of Aristocracy, 171. 
141 Coss, Origins of the English Gentry, 9. 
142 Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, 81. 
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took up arms under Edward I were an extremely heterogeneous group. In fact, the focus 
on the `squire' as a social category is misleading for, as Nigel Saul has noted, `there was 
no stratification of landed society below the rank of knight in 1300'. 143 For this reason, 
it is more accurate to talk of `sergeants' rather than `squires' when discussing the lesser 
cavalrymen within early Edwardian armies. However we choose to describe them, the 
point of real significance is that these men were defined less by a unity of status and 
wealth, than by a process of deduction whereby, as non-knights, they came to share a 
common identity as mounted soldiers of the secondary order. The sergeants of the 
reigns of Edward I and Edward II lacked any common social origin, for whilst they 
included `the descendants of landed families who could count knights in their ancestry', 
there were also others, `of non genteel, urban or even peasant origins'. 144 Warfare 
therefore provided the bonds that other forms of social and political activity could not. 
More particularly, it was their position as mounted combatants that distinguished the 
lesser sergeants from the massed ranks of peasants in the infantry and which, for 
military purposes at least, brought them into contact with the social mores of the upper 
echelons of the aristocracy. This was not an equal relationship: knights remained the 
elite soldiers of English armies, and at the feudal muster the service of two sergeants 
was seen as equivalent to that of one knight. '45 Even so, the proportional contribution of 
these lesser cavalrymen to the armed strengths of royal hosts does appear to have led to 
an increased recognition of their role. It is perhaps significant that by the time of the 
Weardale campaign of 1327, Jean le Bel was seeing fit to rank `chevaliers et escuiers' 
together at the heart of Edward III's army, distinguishing between them and the other 
mounted soldiers `sur petites hageneez', 146 
These developments lay in the future, but the martial instincts of the squires who 
rode across France with Edward III and the Black Prince can be traced back to the 
experiences of their fathers and grandfathers during the reigns of the first two Edwards. 
Many of the sergeants who took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298 could certainly 
have staked a claim to as strong a military pedigree as their more celebrated scions who 
took up arms during the Hundred Years War. Fortunately, the details of some of their 
careers have survived in the form of petitions and other personal testimonies. One such 
sergeant was a certain William de Walhope who claimed that he had been present at the 
143 Saul, Knights and Esquires, 16. 
144 Keen, Origins of the English Gentleman, 73. 
145 As shown by the preparations made by the abbot of Ramsey for his feudal contingent to serve in 
Gascony in 1294; Select Pleas in Manorial and other Seignorial Courts Volume One: Reigns of Henry III 
and Edward I. ed. F. W. Maitland, Selden Society, ii (1888), 80. 
146 Chronique de Jean le Bel, i, 53. 
J 
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conquest of Berwick in 1296, Dunbar, and `la baille de la Vere Chapele', before joining 
the garrisons of Berwick and Melrose. 147 Walhope does not appear on the horse lists for 
the Falkirk campaign so was presumably one of the 1,500 or so cavalrymen of lesser 
rank who served in the retinues of magnates not in receipt of Crown pay. 148 One soldier 
who does appear on the forinsec inventory was Alan de Walingford, a man-at-arms 
from Berkshire. During the reign of Edward II a man of that name wrote to the king 
stating, among other things, that he had served him and his father `trente aunz et plus en 
totes vos guerres de Gales, Gasconie e Escoce'. 149 The most celebrated account to have 
come down to us is that relating to a certain John de Thirlewall who, according to a 
deposition given by his son during the Scrope-Grosvenor controversy, had seen Richard 
de Scrope's grandfather, William, knighted during the Falkirk campaign. Thirlewall was 
said to have been 145 years old at the time of his death, making him the oldest esquire 
in the north, and to have given military service for sixty-nine years. 'j0 Although the 
veracity of much of this story has rightly been questioned, two men named John de 
Thirlewall did have their horses appraised in 1298: one appears as a man-at-arms from 
Northumberland, the other in the retinue of Adam de Swyneburne. 151 As such the 
deposition, fantastical as it was, did have some grounding in truth. Testimonies such as 
these show that sergeants, just as much as their knightly counterparts, were often 
seasoned campaigners, a point that is sometimes obscured by the relatively poor 
documentary survival for the men of that rank. 
As already noted, to analyse the sergeants at Falkirk as a single body of men 
would be to miss the very important distinction between the more wealthy sergeants, 
those descended from knightly families and who would eventually go on to become 
knights themselves, and the lesser men-at-arms like Walhope and Thirlewall. J. E. 
Morris noted this dichotomy many years ago when he commented on the presence 
among the sergeants of this period of `both the young aspirants to knighthood and the 
plebeian troopers who never rose higher. Some of the former can be detected among 
the sergeants at Falkirk. Economically, the upper crust among the valletti in 1298 were 
147 CDS, ii, no. 1969. 
148 A sergeant of that name was in Scotland earlier in 1298 (E 101/6/35, f. I Iv) and was drawn as a man- 
at-arms from the county lev\ in Northumberland in 1301 (BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 95r; E 101/9; '15). 
149 SC 8 152, no. 7563. Walingford served in the armies of 1298 (Gough, 210) and 1301 (BL, Add. MS 
7966a, f. 96r), before staying in the Edinburgh garrison between 1302 and 1304 (E 101/10'5, m. 9; E 
101/12'11; E 101/12/20). He had also been in the Berwick garrison following Falkirk (E 101/7/1, m. 9). 
'so Scrope-Grosvenor Controi'ersj% i, 181-3. 
'`' Gough, 195,210. 
152 J. E. Morris, 'Cumberland and Westmorland Militar,, Levies in the Time of Edward I and Edward IF, 
Transactions of the Cumberland and ii estmorland . -tntiguarian and Archaeological 
Society, new ser.. iii 
(1903 ), 310. 
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those twenty- and forty-librate holders who were summoned from the counties for royal 
campaigns and who could hold their own against the lesser knights in terms of income. 
William de Launceleyn, summoned from Northamptonshire as a twenty-pounder in 
1297,153 and Benedict de Blakenham, also recruited from the counties for the Flanders 
expedition, ' 54 would certainly have been among the more affluent sergeants to venture 
north of the border in 1298. One can also trace on the rolls of arms those sergeants who 
went on to become knights later in their military careers, as well as a few who were 
listed on such armorials even before they were knighted. Giles de Argentein, one of the 
most celebrated knights of the early part of the fourteenth century, served as a valet at 
Falkirk in the retinue of Hugh le Despenser. He appears on Collins' Roll five years 
before we first encounter him as a knight in the military records. '55 Others among the 
more prosperous sergeants at Falkirk may be traced among the sixteen who went on to 
be knighted alongside the Prince of Wales in 1306, including Stephen de Burgherssh, 
Hugh de Pikeworth and John de Chandos. 156 They, like Henry de Broke, who was with 
John de Beauchamp of Somerset in 1298 prior to being distrained to knighthood 
eighteen years later, were evidently men of some substance. ' 57 
The presence of knights at Falkirk who appear to have received the honour at the 
beginning of their military careers should not lead us to conclude that those sergeants 
prosperous enough to aspire to knighthood were automatically fast-tracked to the top of 
the military hierarchy. On the contrary, quite a few of the Falkirk sergeants spent many 
years among the sub-knightly ranks before they were accepted into the exclusive club of 
the chivalrous elite. Some, such as William Botetourt, fought as lower ranking soldiers 
on three or four campaigns before appearing in the service records as knights, and it 
may well be that he and other sergeants from knightly families were very young and 
inexperienced soldiers in 1298.158 Thomas de Monteny first appears in the service 
records as a valet on the Scottish expedition of 1296. He continued to serve as a man of 
that rank in 1300,1303 and 1306 before finally receiving the belt of knighthood at some 
point before 1311 when he fought as a knight under Robert de Clifford. l59 A lack of 
resources might have placed limits on the military and social aspirations of some 
153 PW, i, 289; Gough, 191. 
154 PW, i, 290; Gough, 175. 
iss Gough, 189; Aspilogia III, ii, 16; E 101/9/23, m. 1. 
156 Bullock-Davies, Menestrellorum Multitudo, 185,187. 
157 Gough, 193; C 47/1/8, m. 25. 
158 Botetourt was a sergeant in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. ii), 1298 (Gough, 166), 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 3) and 
1302 (E 101/612/12, m. 6), before appearing as a knight in 1304 (PDS, 272). 
159 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. liv); 1298 (Gough, 197); 1300 (Liber Quotidianus, 
176); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1); 1311 (BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 20r). 
--lid 
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individuals, but one way around this problem was to find service in the royal household 
where there were greater opportunities for advancement than elsewhere. Ralph de 
Kerdiff s military career appears to have begun as a valet at Falkirk in 1298 in the 
retinue of Robert de Mohaut. 160 Thirteen years later he can still be found receiving a 
prest as a sergeant on the Scottish campaign of 1310-11, but on 23 June 1311 he was 
knighted, before being admitted into the household as a miles simplex the following 
day. 161 The Parliamentary Roll of Arms contains the names of around forty of the 
Falkirk sergeants and they, like Kerdiff, were probably among the younger soldiers who 
rode to Scotland in 1298. 
Whilst squires such as Kerdiff may be regarded as knights-in-waiting for 
whom the length of apprenticeship depended on their age and wealth at the time of the 
Falkirk campaign, mounted soldiers at the other end of the sub-knightly spectrum were 
very much the finished product, in so much as they were not expected to make further 
progress, either socially or militarily. Some of these men, `squires who were descended 
from squires rather than knights', as Helen Nicholson has put it, 162 still retained a degree 
of gentility, but there were also others, `members of modestly endowed families 
"hovering perilously close to the level of the richer peasantry"', who were not 
aristocratic or genteel by even the most admissive standards. 163 These were possibly the 
kind of men that the author of the Anonimalle Chronicle had in mind when he wrote of 
the `fraunkleyns' who were captured by the royalists during the baronial uprising of 
1322,164 and who Nigel Saul has depicted as the sub-genteel parvenus of the later 
fourteenth century. 165 There were certainly a good number of less wealthy sergeants 
among the ranks in 1298, yet it is far from easy to distinguish between those who had 
their feet on the lowest rungs of the genteel ladder, and others who were rummaging 
around at its base for scraps. Perhaps the most obvious place to look for evidence of the 
latter is among those with the lowest appraised horses at the muster for the Falkirk 
campaign. Around 23 per cent of the 700 or so soldiers listed as valletti had mounts 
valued at a hundred shillings or less. It may be that men like William Howel, who had a 
horse appraised at just sixty shillings under Robert de Scales, relied on military service 
160 Gough, 209. 
161 Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 197, if. 8v, 26v, 33r. 
162 H. Nicholson, Medieval Warfare: Theory and Practice of War in Europe 300-1500 (Basingstoke, 
2004), 56. 
163 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 5, quoting C. Carpenter, Locality and Polity. A Study of Warwickshire 
Landed Society, 1401-1499 (Cambridge, 1992), 38. 
'64 
. 4nonimalle Chronicle, 
110. 
165 N. Saul, `The Social Status of Chaucer's Franklin: A Reconsideration', Medium Aevum, Iii (1983), 22. 
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as their main source of income. 166 Still, we must be cautious about generalising from 
evidence such as this, for members of prominent knightly families such as Geoffrey de 
Bracebridge also served with low priced mounts on the Falkirk campaign. 
More profitable subjects of enquiry are the middling sergeants and squires who 
fought at Falkirk, those owners of fractional fees and landholders in small vills who 
constituted the emerging squirearchy in its truest sense. It has been possible to trace 
around a third of the sergeants at Falkirk in the various landholding enquiries carried out 
in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. 167 Soldiers such as John de 
Rothewell, who held the third part of a fee in Orby, Lincolnshire, in 1303, and John de 
Cary, a modest landowner in Dorset during the reign of Edward II, were representative 
of the kind of men who seem to have formed the bulk of the valets at Falkirk in 1298.168 
Though neither wealthy, nor perhaps ambitious enough to take up the rank of knight or 
to find service in the royal household, many of these middling landholders served quite 
happily for many years whilst retaining the rank of sergeant. Among those who forged 
the longest careers were a few who appear to have had previous experience of the wars 
in Wales, something that is not always possible to trace owing to our reliance on letters 
of protection for a number of earlier campaigns. Ralph de Worteley was probably one of 
the older sergeants at Falkirk, for a man of that name had his horse appraised as a valet 
during the second Welsh war before disappearing from the military records following 
the Caerlaverock campaign of 1300.169 Nominal record linkage becomes more difficult 
as one goes further down the military hierarchy, but other Falkirk sergeants who appear 
to have been veterans of the early Welsh wars include Henry de Curzon, a soldier with 
Roger de Mortimer in 1282, and Roger de Bray, who was proffered as a serviens in 
1277 prior to fighting in Wales in 1294.170 Some, such as Isambert de St. Blimund and 
William le Skirmissour, began their service during the years of crisis and went on to 
fight as sergeants into the reign of Edward II, despite never attaining the rank of 
knight. l71 Furthermore, three of the valets with Aymer de Valence in 1298 - William 
Symeon, John de Stodley and John de Gacelyn - were still being summoned as 
166 Gough, 170. 
167 Feudal Aids, passim. 
168 Feudal Aids, iii, 161; ibid, ii, 39. For Cary, see The Dorset Lay Subsidy Roll of 1327, ed. A. R. Rumble, 
Dorset Record Society, vi (1980), 91. 
169 Worteley was with William le Latimer in 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 4) and later served in Gascony (RG, iii, 
156), before going north of the border in 1298 (Gough, 178) and 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2) 
170 Curzon was in Wales in 1282 (C 67/8, m. 4), and Bray served there in 1277 (PW, i, 208) and 1294 (C 
67/10, m. 4). 
171 Both began their service in Wales: St. Blimund (C 67/10, m. 7); Skirmissour (C 67/10, m. 2). St. 
Blimund later took out a letter of protection for the Bannockburn campaign whilst Skirmissour was also 
in Scotland in 1314: C 71/6, m. 1; E 101/14/15, m. 5d. 
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sergeants from the Home Counties into the 1320s. '72 The careers of middling men such 
as these show that war service appealed to a wide cross section of English landed 
society. 
Among the mounted soldiers listed on the inventories there were over a hundred, 
the majority not placed within retinues, who were described as coming from particular 
counties and who seem to have been drawn from shire levies conducted by sheriffs and 
other royal officials. We find, for example, a Johannes Sampson de comitatu Eboracum 
and Nicholaus de Leeke de comitatu Notingham. 173 Similar arrays were conducted for 
other campaigns, including those of 1297,1300 and 1301. Many of these individuals 
were sent to serve in the garrisons of Berwick and Roxburgh and it is therefore unlikely 
that they took part in the battle. The remainder possibly served independently, or fought 
alongside one another in small groups. Although not denoted as holding any particular 
military rank, these were evidently individuals of quite humble status. Table 3.5 shows 
the number of men-at-arms who were raised in this way in each of the represented 
shires. 
Table 3.5: Men-at-Arms on the Horse Lists drawn from the Counties (1298) 
County No. of men County No. of men 
Berkshire 2 Northants. 7 
Buckinghamshire 1 Northumbria 9 
Cheshire 3 Nottinghamshire 3 
Derbyshire 1 Oxfordshire 1 
Essex 1 Shropshire 5 
Hampshire 1 Somerset 2 
Herefordshire 3 Staffordshire 2 
Lancashire 2 Suffolk 1 
Leicestershire 2 Warwickshire 1 
Lincolnshire 5 Westmorland 6 
London 2 Wiltshire 1 
Middlesex 1 Worcestershire 1 
Norfolk 2 Yorkshire 48 
Total: 26 counties 113 men-at-arms 
Whilst the knights and sergeants in the retinues on the Falkirk horse lists were drawn 
primarily from the southern counties and midlands, most of the soldiers recruited 
directly from the shires were northerners. Comparison with other military sources 
suggests that all of these men were sergeants, with the exception of Sir John de Boys of 
172 PW, II, it, 588. 
173 Gough, 206. 
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Lincolnshire who led one other man on the campaign. 174 The lack of landholding 
information for most of these soldiers indicates that the larger part were of very obscure 
origin. Some, like Adam de Doxford of Northumberland, seem to have been reasonably 
wealthy individuals at a local level, 175 but the average man-at-arms raised from the 
counties was of only moderate status. According to the survey of 1303, Robert de 
Essington held just three bovates of land in Nunburnholme in the East Riding of 
Yorkshire. 176 His fellow Yorkshireman, Hugh de la Mare, had four bovates in the North 
Riding vill of Yafforth, being assessed at four shillings and four pence for a fifteenth on 
his moveable goods in the thirtieth year of the reign. '77 Despite the lowly origins of 
some of these men, quite a few do appear in the military records on other occasions. 
This should occasion no surprise given that such individuals probably had only limited 
responsibilities at a regional level. Some fought as valets in later hosts under local 
retinue leaders: in 1301, John de Ixinynge was with Robert de Scales; 178 and Nicholas 
Lenginneur of Cheshire was in the company of Hamo de Mascy. 179 Others remained in 
Scotland once the army had returned to England and continued to receive pay in the 
garrisons there. John de Hedlegh was sent to Roxburgh in 1298. Later, he was stationed 
under his fellow Northumbrian William de Felton in the garrison at Linlithgow. 180 
Another man to accompany a castle constable from his own county was Adam de 
Chetewynde of Staffordshire, who was with Richard de Hastang at Jedburgh from 
October 1298, having been apportioned to the garrisons that summer. 181 Several among 
the large group of Yorkshiremen, such as Thomas Nowel and Peter de Tadcaster, were 
called out in the following year to defend the north-eastern counties. 182 
The sergeants raised in the shires in 1298 were quite a bellicose subset of the 
military community, comprising a surprisingly large number of regular campaigners for 
such a socially-obscure group of individuals. Most valets on the horse lists, however, 
were serving not independently, nor in the garrisons, but within the retinues of the 
leading earls and bannerets. The earl of Lancaster had a contingent comprising thirty- 
one men of sub-knightly rank. Analysis of his retinue in that year shows that the system 
observed by Simon Walker, by which John of Gaunt was able, later in the fourteenth 
º7a Ibid. 
175 The Northumberland Lay Subsidy Roll of 1296, ed. C. M. Fraser (Newcastle upon Tyne, 1968), 160. 
176 Feudal Aids, vi, 147. 
177 Ibid, 100; Yorkshire Lay Subsidy being a Fifteenth, collected 30 Edward 1(1301), ed. W. Brown, The 
Yorkshire Archaeological Society Record Ser., xxi (1897), 11. 
178 Gough, 214; E 10 1/9/24, m. 2. 
179 Gough, 211; E 101 /9/23, m. 2. 
180 Gough, 214; E 101/10/12, m. 2; E 101/12/38. Also, see CDS, iii, 423. 
181 Gough, 215; E 101/7/7, m. 2d; E 101/8/7, m. ld; E 101/9/9, f. 4r; E 101/12/18, f. 2v. 
182 BL, Add. MS 37654, if. 12r-v. 
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century, to recruit retainers from twenty-two different counties where he exercised some 
control, was already, to some extent, in place under the earlier earls of Lancaster. 183 J. R. 
Maddicott has shown that Thomas of Lancaster's knightly retainers were drawn from 
several regions: the north Midlands; the south Midlands and East Anglia; Yorkshire; the 
far north; Lancashire; and the Welsh March. 184 Whilst the geographical origins of many 
of the sergeants with him at Falkirk are less easy to ascertain, there appears to have been 
a similar spread. Some, such as Robert de Jorz and William de Basing, became fairly 
established figures in the north and east Midlands. l 85 John de Kenilworth and Richard 
de Melbourne, though more difficult to pin down, seem to have come from Lancaster's 
estates in Warwickshire and Derbyshire respectively. ' 86 There was also a smattering of 
Yorkshiremen and Lancastrians, not least of whom was the infamous Robert de 
Holland, who later betrayed his lord in 1322. His relationship with Lancaster, as it 
developed in the years following Falkirk, has been described by Maddicott as one of 
`junior partner' rather than retainer. ' 87 
Lancaster's ability to draw on sergeants from several parts of the country, 
including a number of prominent men who later went on to become knights, was rare 
but by no means exceptional. Robert de Clifford also recruited valets whose demesne 
lands lay far from the main concentration of his own estates in the north-west. Whilst 
most sergeants with Clifford at Falkirk, such as Robert de Whiterugg, Thomas de 
Hauteclou and William de Boyville, were Cumbrians and Westmorlanders, '88 he could 
also call on the services of Gilbert and John de Ellesfeld, Thomas de Monteny, and 
Gilbert Mauduyt, who had significant landed interests in other parts of the country. ' 89 
Each of these men went on to receive knighthood, though Mauduyt's future was not 
completely prosperous as he was hanged for his adherence to Bruce in 1306.190 Even 
men like Lancaster and Clifford, however, had their fair share of obscure sub-knightly 
associates riding alongside these knights-in-waiting. Indeed the average sergeant in the 
retinues at Falkirk was a man of more modest wealth and status than those discussed so 
far. Whilst Nicholas de Audley's retinue included prominent Shropshire lords such as 
William and Ralph le Botiller of Wem, men like Richard de Cleobury and Simon de 
'8' S. Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity 1361-1399 (Oxford, 1990), 32. 
184 J. R. Maddicott. Thomas of Lancaster 130--1322. - .4 
Study in the Reign of Edward II (Oxford. 1970), 
54-5. 
185 Knights of Edward 1, ii, 274; 1PM, v, no. 566. 
186 Kenilworth and Melbourne were Lancastrian estates. 
18' J. R. Maddicott, `Thomas of Lancaster and Sir Robert Holland: A Stud\ in Noble Patronage', EHR, 
lxxxvi (1971). 450. 
188 IP: 1I, iv, no. 264: IPAI, v. no. 533,303: IP: 11, vi. no. 238,143-4. 
189 Knights o> Eddi and 1. i, 303 -4. iii. 129,194. 
190 CPR, 1301-07.482. 
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Madeley would be difficult to place were it not for toponymical evidence linking them 
to areas close to where Audley and the Botillers had their estates. At the core of Hugh 
de Courtenay's retinue were three Devonshire men, Robert Beaupel, Ralph Beaupel and 
John de Chevreston, figures of some standing locally but who had little influence 
outside of their own county. 191 Surrounding this nucleus were more obscure individuals 
like Richard de Wastehose, Eustace de Eyville and Alan de Roseles, the latter two 
perhaps younger sons or members from cadet branches of families in Yorkshire. '92 
Although the net was here being cast beyond the county, the sergeants drafted in from 
outlying regions by Courtenay were of more humble status than those with Lancaster 
and Clifford. 
If the geographical origins and wealth of the sergeants in the retinues at Falkirk 
were varied, then one may also expect to find a similar lack of uniformity in their 
military activities. The evidence available for the military service of men of sub- 
knightly rank is less complete than that for their knightly counterparts and this, 
combined with the prosopographical pitfalls of working with a group of men for whom 
landholding records and reliable reference guides are largely unavailable, means that the 
large-scale reconstruction carried out for the knights at Falkirk cannot be repeated here. 
Nevertheless, a closer examination of the military activities of the sergeants in one of 
the retinues, that of Hugh de Courtenay, may serve as a convenient indicator as to some 
of the more general trends arising from the evidence. 
Table 3.6: Military Service of Sergeants with Hugh de Courtenay in 1298 
Name of valet Years of military service to 1314 
John de Chevreston 1298,1303,1306 
Richard de Wastehose 1298,1310 
William de Sully 1296, 1298, 1303,1307,1310 
Auger Joce 1298 
Alan de Roseles 1298 
Eustace de Eyville 1282, 1296, 1297,1298,1303,1311 
Robert Beaupel 1295, 1296, 1298,1300,1306,1314 
Ralph Beaupel 1295, 1298 
Nicholas de Romesey 12989 1299, 1300 
191 Feudal Aids, i, 351,359-62; The Tax Roll for Devon 31 Edward I, ed. T. M. Whale, Transactions of the 
Devonshire Association for the Advancement of Science, Literature, and Art, xxxi (1899), 383,389,407- 
13; The Devonshire Lay Subsidy of 1332, ed. A. M. Erskine, Devon and Cornwall Record Society, new 
ser., xiv (1969), 6-8,25-8,55,62,76,83,122. 
192 For the holdings of the Eyville and Roseles families in Yorkshire, see Feudal Aids, vi, index. 
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Courtenay's retinue contained a mixture of regular campaigners, such as Eustace de 
Eyville and Robert Beaupel, occasional soldiers, exemplified by John de Chevreston, 
and men who do not appear in the service records at any point before or after 1298, like 
Alan de Roseles and Auger Joce. 193 Although it is impossible to know for certain 
whether the Eustace de Eyville who fought in the second Welsh war was the same 
individual as the man of that name at Falkirk, it would be surprising if there were not a 
few veterans of the early Welsh wars spread among the younger comrades in arms, as 
was the case with the knights. When we look at the sergeants in the retinues at Falkirk 
we sometimes find the same combination of veterans and virgin soldiers, and of regular 
and occasional campaigners, as we did among those of higher rank. One veteran of the 
Welsh wars was Peter de Ros, a valet of William de Echingham described by Nigel Saul 
as akin to `those protean administrators ... who could turn their 
hand equally to land 
management, man management, and soldiering'. 194 Others who appear to have begun 
their military careers in Wales in the 1280s include: Adam de Cateby, a valet of Thomas 
de Furnivall; 195 Roger le Burgilloun, who was with Nicholas de Audley at Falkirk, 
having previously served with William de Audley in 1282; 196 and John de Kenilworth, a 
follower of the earl of Lancaster. 197 Whilst the careers of these men add to the point 
made about the lengthy service given by sergeants as well as knights, we should also 
note that a much larger number of sergeants appear to have served on only two or three 
occasions, not to mention the many whom it is difficult to trace in military or any other 
kinds of record either before or after 1298. Of the valets with Hugh Bardolf, a few, such 
as Warin de Bassingburn, 198 William de Calveley'99 and Alexander de Montfort, 200 can 
be found on four or more campaigns; but six of the ten sergeants with John Tregoz do 
not appear in the military records on any other occasion than at Falkirk. The same can 
be said to a greater or lesser extent of most of the retinues in the army. 
193 Eyville: Wales in 1282 (C 67/8, in. 6d); Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3); Flanders in 1297 (E 
101/6/37, in. 6i); Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 208); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 6); 1311 (C 71/4, m. 6). Robert 
Beaupel: Gascony in 1295 (RG, iii, 326); Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, in. 2); 1298 (Gough, 208); 1300 
(C 67/14, m. 10); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1314 (C 71/6, in. 5). Chevreston: 1298 (Gough, 208); 1303 (C 
67/15, m. 8); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 5). 
194 C 47/2/5, in. 2; N. Saul, Scenes from Provincial Life: Knightly Families in Sussex 1280-1400 (Oxford, 
1986), 65-6. 
195 C 67/8, in. 5d; Gough, 211. 
196 Gough, 219; C 47/2/7 m. 7. 
1 97 C 67/8, m. 4d; Gough, 180. 
198 1298 (Gough, 221); 1300 (PDS, 224); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. 1); and possibly 
later campaigns. 
199 1294 (RG, iii, 156); 1298 (Gough, 221); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/8, m. 1). 
200 1294 (RG, iii, 156); 1298 (Gough, 221); 1300 (PDS, 224); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/8, 
m. 1); 1306 (C 67/16, M. 12). 
-Iqq 
122 
Although there were sergeants, therefore, who can be shown to have been just as 
prolific in their military activities as the bachelors and bannerets whose orders they 
obeyed and by whose martial culture they were imbued, there were probably many more 
who have escaped the attention of the historian completely. Not only do the surviving 
records leave an image that distorts the contribution of knights and sergeants to the 
English war effort in favour of the former, but the sergeants on whom we are more fully 
informed are generally those, like Giles de Argentein and Thomas de Monteny, who 
went on to become knights. If it is true that the military activities of English men-at- 
arms during this period can only ever be partially reconstructed, then it is just as 
important to stress that those of sub-knightly rank are the ones for whom the process of 
reconstruction tends to be least satisfactory. These reflections should serve to remind us 
that many of the sergeants whose names appear on the Falkirk inventories for whom no 
other trace of military service has survived, might in fact have been among the most 
committed soldiers of their day. It is at least worth bearing in mind that were it not for 
the testimony of his son during the reign of Richard II, John de Thirlewall, the `oldest 
squire in the north' and veteran of numerous martial adventures, would have been, like 
so many others, nothing more than a name on parchment. 
War and Public Service: The Wider Context 
Many of the knights and sergeants who took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298 were, 
then, regular campaigners. Furthermore, a substantial number surrounding this core 
gave military service on four or five occasions. The heavy involvement of the gentry in 
the wars of Edward I and his son attests to a continued predilection among the 
landholding elites for the heat of the battlefield and camaraderie of the march; a 
disposition that was doubtless enhanced by the successes achieved against the Welsh. 
Yet, the kinds of service patterns outlined above were all the more impressive given that 
this was also a time of increased genteel activity in the affairs of local government and 
shire administration. The first twenty years of Edward I's reign were marked by 
campaigns waged against corruption and the alienation of royal rights: campaigns that 
placed demands on the king's subjects scarcely less tasking than those of the Welsh 
wars. 201 Several of the Falkirk knights had served on juries during the Quo Warranto 
201 For an idea of the numbers involved in the hundred enquiries, see H. M. Cam, `Studies in the Hundred 
Rolls: Some Aspects of Thirteenth-Century Administration', Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History, 
ed. P. Vinogradoff, vi (Oxford, 1921), 131, where evidence is given for Norfolk. 
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proceedings; many more had been summoned to testify before the king's justices. 202 if 
such responsibilities were exceptional then the growing number of commissions issued 
by the Crown ensured that there were plenty of other activities to keep the gentry busy. 
The appointment of keepers of the peace to enforce the articles of the Statute of 
Winchester in 1287 marked an important stage in the arrival of those officials in local 
government. 203 The increased military requirements of the reign also led to a more 
prominent role for commissioners of array, as well as for collectors of the lay subsidies 
that were granted by parliament. 204 War was the prime catalyst behind many of these 
developments, not least in the process by which representatives from the shires came to 
be summoned regularly from the mid-1290s to give assent to the Crown's tax-raising 
initiatives. 205 For G. L. Harriss, `the need for representatives to come with full powers 
and participate in common counsel was an inescapable concomitant of the demand for 
the war taxation of these years of emergency'. 206 On many levels, and not only in war, 
the reign of Edward I required a great effort on the part of the gentry, placing constant 
demands on their services and binding them more firmly to the king. 
The intensification of local government inevitably added to the pressure placed 
on the middling landowners of medieval England to contribute to public life. During 
times of peace, the gentry would have been able to shoulder such burdens with ease; 
but, the heavy recruitment demands created by the wars in Wales, France and Scotland 
meant that, from the mid-1290s at least, relatively few landholders were able to avoid 
public service completely. This was not a time when the military service of English 
landholders `was being transformed into the exercise of territorial authority in the name 
of a developing state', 207 as had been the case during the reign of Henry III, for under 
Edward I the proliferation of commissions and the extension of the obligation to serve 
in the king's armies ran along parallel lines. Rather, genteel service, as in the later 
fourteenth century, was becoming more complex, producing `a lifestyle in which 
military and civilian responsibilities, family interests and private passions competed for 
202 The jurors were John de Blakeford, Richard de Kirkebride, William de Mere and William Wyther; 
Placita de Quo Warranto temporibus Edw. I. II. and III. in Curia Receptae Scaccarii Westm. asservata, 
ed. W. Illingworth (Record Commission, 1818), 701,119,713,708. For comment on the intensity of the 
proceedings, see D. W. Sutherland, Quo Warranto Proceedings in the Reign of Edward 11278-1294 
(Oxford, 1963), 2. 
203 H. M. Jewell, English Local Administration in the Middle Ages (Newton Abbot, 1972), 167. 
204 On the latter, see G. O. Sayles, `Parliamentary Representation in 1294,1295 and 1307', The English 
Parliament in the Middle Ages, ed. H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles (London, 1981), 110. 
205 Cf. D. A. Carpenter, The Beginnings of Parliament', The Reign of Henry III (London, 1996), 393-4; D. 
Pasquet, An Essay on the Origins of the House of Commons (London, 1964), 197. 
206 G. L. Harriss, King, Parliament, and Public Finance in Medieval England to 1369 (Oxford, 1975), 52. 
207 A. Harding, England in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, 1993), 180. 
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precedence whilst becoming interwoven'. 208 The requirements of war did not always sit 
easily alongside the more mundane business of local administration. Whilst it may be 
true that there were enough knights and squires within the country to keep the cogs of 
government turning when armies were put into the field, the military expeditions that 
took place almost annually from 1294 removed from the equation many of those most 
qualified for office. 209 In 1295, Osbert de Spaldington had to be replaced as the justice 
of gaol delivery in Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire because he was with the king's 
army in Wales. 210 Twelve years later, John de Hotham was too busy with Henry de 
Percy north of the border to fulfil his duties as a coroner in Yorkshire. 21 1 Evidently, one 
could not be a soldier and at the same time take part in local administration. Many, 
therefore, might have followed the example of John de Swyneford, who in 1306 
surrendered his office as a coroner in Huntingdonshire and committed himself to the 
calling of arms. 212 The dual requirements of the king's wars and of provincial 
government created a tension that could not always be easily resolved. 
In this respect, the experiences and career paths of the knights and sergeants who 
took part in the Falkirk campaign can tell us much about the way in which the gentry 
responded to these dual pressures. As soldiers they encompassed a broad range of 
military experience, from those who appear to have served in the king's armies only 
once or twice during their careers, to others who campaigned relentlessly over two or 
three decades. Still, these men were also members of a social order from which the 
leaders of local society were being recruited in ever-increasing numbers. One way of 
reconciling these conflicting roles was through specialisation. Philip Morgan, in his 
study of the military community of Cheshire, noted that `many of its members found 
only a somewhat truncated role in county society as a consequence of their military 
careers'. 213 The evidence for the knights at Falkirk, for whom the record is more 
complete than the sergeants, to some extent supports this conclusion. If we discount the 
nineteen non-English knights who rode north of the border in 1298 we are left with 121 
men in our sample, of whom fifty-two appear never to have served in any of the five 
major capacities of sheriff, knight of the shire, arrayer, keeper of the peace and tax 
208 A. Ayton, `Edward III and the English Aristocracy at the Beginning of the Hundred Years War', 
Armies, Chivalry and Warfare in Medieval Britain and France (Stamford, 1998), 175. 
209 Cf. Saul, Knights and Esquires, 57-9. The evidence from Lincolnshire suggests that the campaign of 
1298 did not leave a major imprint on the affairs of local government, but the Welsh expedition of 1276-7 
affected the hearing of pleas: A Lincolnshire Assize Roll for 1298, ed. W. S. Thomson, Lincoln Record 
Society, xxxvi (1944), xxxiv; Select Cases in the Court of King's Bench, i, no. 21. 
210 CCW, 55. 
211 CCR, 1302-07,487. 
212 CCR, 1302-07,389. 
213 Morgan, War and Society, 168. 
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assessor. 214 Some of these were the less active men of their day, preferring to manage 
their estates rather than trouble themselves with local or national affairs. Such, perhaps, 
was Ralph de Picheford, who appears in the military records on just two occasions in 
1294 and 1298, but never in any other capacity; and William de Horkesley, who seems 
to have served only at Falkirk. 215 Yet some of these men, such as Edmund Foliot, who 
served in nine different hosts, Thomas de St. Loe, present on eight campaigns between 
1296 and 1307, and Hugh Godard, were regular campaigners who would appear to have 
put their military responsibilities before all other commitments. 216 
Even if such a group of specialist soldiers did exist, one cannot draw a simple 
distinction between knights who served in royal hosts and others who were responsible 
for maintaining law and order in the localities. At least sixty-nine of the knights in our 
sample, or some 57 per cent when we exclude the foreigners, served in some form of 
administrative capacity during the course of their careers. Table 3.7 compares the 
different forms of public service given by these men up to 1335. 
Table 3.7: Forms and Frequency of Service given by Falkirk Knights (1270-1335) 
Service given by the knights at Falkirk as: 
Frequency 
Soldier MP Sheriff Arrayer KP Taxer 
1 (occasion) 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 or more 
3 18 8 16 13 9 
6 7 4 5 7 6 
5 8 1 3 3 3 
5 2 - 2 2 1 
9 3 - 2 2 - 
8 1 - 1 2 - 
9 3 - 1 1 - 
10 - - - - - 
7 - - - - - 
7 - - - - - 
Total 69 42 13 30 30 19 
214 I acknowledge the kindness of Dr. Richard Gorski of the University of Hull for allowing me to consult 
his database on administrative personnel from which this, and much of the following evidence, has been 
extracted. 
215 Picheford: Wales in 1294 (C 67/10, m. 5); Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 192). Horkesley; Gough, 203. 
216 Foliot: 1282 (C 67/8, m. 7d); 1296 (C 67/11, m. 4); 1298 (Gough, 211); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9); 1301 (C 
67/14, m. 1); 1302 (E 101/10/12, m. 3); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 10); 1306 (E 101/612/19, m. 1); 1307 (E 
101/612/21, m. 1). St Loe: Flanders in 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 3i); Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 
1298 (Gough, 224); 1300 (Liber Quotidianus, 196); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 
1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1309 (CDS, v, 448). Godard: Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 224); 1301 (E 101/9/23, 
m. 2); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 11); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 8); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13); 1314 (C 71/7, m. 9). 
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Given that the activities of over half of the knights at Falkirk extended beyond the 
purely military sphere, it cannot be said without some qualification that these men were 
professional soldiers. At the same time, it would be equally misleading to draw too 
sharp a distinction between military and civilian duties, for it was precisely their 
experience of war that qualified many of these men for office. An acquaintance with 
arms was certainly advantageous for those appointed as commissioners of array and 
keepers of the peace, for both posts required the use of strong-arm tactics to discipline 
troops and restore order. 217 Furthermore, the election of experienced soldiers as knights 
of the shire to some extent mirrored the prevailing practice among the peerage, who 
were summoned both to military assemblies and to parliament. 218 The one post for 
which a strong campaigning record was perhaps less necessary was that of sheriff, 
whose military duties, it has been argued, had become `purely auxiliary' by the late 
thirteenth century. '9 Nevertheless, as both Nigel Saul and Richard Gorski have 
demonstrated, many of the sheriffs appointed during the fourteenth century did have 
military experience. 220 Looked at from another angle, the evidence suggests that a few 
of the knights at Falkirk seem to have served in administrative capacities far more 
frequently than they did as soldiers. For men such as these, the campaign of 1298 
probably came as an unwanted distraction from their normal activities. One such knight 
was William Trumwyn who in 1298 went to war, in the retinue of James de la Plaunche, 
for what appears to have been the only time in his career. He was knight of the shire for 
Staffordshire on four occasions, keeper of the peace the same number of times, tax 
assessor thrice and commissioner of array two times. 221 Likewise, Robert Barry served 
in the royal host on only three occasions: 1298,1300 and 1301. He was knight of the 
shire for Buckinghamshire three times and for Northamptonshire twice, in addition to 
receiving several other commissions. 222 Such overt commitment to administrative rather 
than to military service was rare among the Falkirk knights. Nevertheless, these 
examples indicate that men who normally served as officials in local government did 
`'" Cf. A. Verduyn, The Selection and Appointment of Justices of the Peace in 1338', BIHR, Ixviii 
(1995), 7; Gorski, Fourteenth-Century Sheriff, 145-6. 
'18 P. W. Smith, 'A Study of the Lists of Military and Parliamentary Summons in the Reign of Edward I: 
The Families of Lists and their Significance', University of Iowa D. Phil. thesis, 1967,2 parts, ii, 544-5. 
219 W. A. Morris, The Medieval English Sheriff to 1300 (Manchester. 1927), 237. Cf. B. Breslow, `The 
English Sheriff during the Reign of King Edward I'. University of Ohio D. Phil. thesis, 1968,136; H. M. 
Cam, The Hundred and the Hundred Rolls: An Outline of Local Government in Medieval England 
(London, 1930), 85-7. 
, 20 Saul, Knights and Esquires, 55-6; Gorski, Fourteenth-Century Sheriff, 144. 
, 2' Gough, 199; List of RMPs, 15.18,49 and 51: CPR, 130--13,31,53, CPR, 1313-17,107,123; CPR, 
130 '-13.23, CPR, 1313-17.474.530; Rotuli Scotiae, i. 97; CPR, 1313-1 r, 461. 
--- Gough, 320. C 47/1, '6, m. 3, E 101'9'?,, m. l; List of: 11Ps, 5.25.35,42.53; CPR, 1281-92.26-5, CPR, 
1292-1301,104. CPR, 1307-13.185, CFR. iii, 31. 
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occasionally go to war, just as career soldiers were perfectly adept at carrying out other 
duties. 
One of the most striking features to emerge from the figures presented in table 
3.7, despite the presence of leading players in local government like Trumwyn and 
Barry, is the preponderance of military service over other forms of public service given 
by the knights at Falkirk. To some extent this is to be expected given that the sample 
group has been taken from a military source. Nevertheless, the sheer frequency with 
which these men took part in royal expeditions in comparison with others forms of 
public service indicates that most knights spent far more time at war than they did 
attending parliament, or keeping the peace in the shires. Whilst war did not exercise a 
monopoly over their activities, it did take up enough of their time to prevent them, at 
least for a large part of their careers, from taking part in local government on anything 
more than an intermittent basis. As Nigel Saul noted in his study of fourteenth-century 
Gloucestershire, `the strenui milites ... cannot 
be identified exclusively with the men 
who shouldered the burden of local administration'. 223 Of the sixty-nine knights at 
Falkirk employed in administrative capacities at some point in their lives, around a 
quarter performed the role of the soldier on at least five occasions more than they did 
that of county administrator or MP. Characteristic of this group were men like Nicholas 
de St. Maur, a follower of Thomas of Lancaster who rode in eight different hosts 
between 1294 and 1306 but whose sole contribution to peacetime affairs was as knight 
of the shire for Gloucestershire in 1313; 224 and Robert Fitz Nigel, a frequent campaigner 
whose involvement in local government was limited to one spell each as an arrayer and 
peace commissioner in Buckinghamshire in the 1320s. 225 That archetypal career soldier 
John de Crumwell was present at the battle of Halidon Hill some forty years after 
making his military debut in Wales. During his long career, his work in the shires 
amounted to no more than three appointments to commissions of array. 226 Such 
examples could be multiplied, and support Andrew Ayton's point that `of the forms of 
223 Saul, Knights and Esquires, 55. 
224 Military service: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 3); 1295 (RG, iii, 296); 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1); 1298 (Gough, 
179); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 7d); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 12); 1306 (C 67/7, m. 3). For his 
appointment as knight of the shire, see List of MPs, 37. 
2 
appointment 
For his military service, see chapter 4, n. 156 and n. 212, plus 1294 (RG, iii, 161); 1297 (RG, iii, 346); 
1298 (Gough, 221). For his other duties, see CPR, 1324-27,221; CPR, 1327-30,89. 
226 For his military career up to 1314, see above n. 129. He went on to serve in 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 21r); 
1322 (CPR, 1321-24,185); 1327 (C 71/11, m. 6); 1333 (C 71/13, m. 31). For his work as an arrayer, see 
Rotuli Scotiae, i, 159; CPR, 1321-24,212,265. 
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public service open to men of gentle blood, that which was performed by the largest 
number, if only occasionally, was campaigning in the king's armies'. 227 
For most of the knights at Falkirk, participation in expeditions to Wales, France 
and Scotland provided a far more regular focus for activity than work in the shires. 
Nevertheless, even the most frequent campaigners tended to give other forms of service 
in addition to their military duties. Some idea as to the way that they were able to 
combine such activities can be obtained by considering the decades in which these 
knights began different forms of public service. 
Table 3.8: Decades in which Falkirk Knights began Different Forms of Service 
Soldier MP Sheriff Arrayer KP Taxer 
1270-79 5- - - - - 
1280-89 9- - 1 3 - 
1290-99 55 6 1 1 - 4 
1300-09 - 17 5 4 9 6 
1310-19 - 17 3 12 6 7 
1320-29 -1 3 10 8 - 
1330-39 -1 1 2 4 2 
The evidence presented here shows that few of the Falkirk knights had served in an 
administrative capacity prior to riding north of the border in 1298. Most, in fact, did not 
commence their activities as knights of the shire and in local government until the 
closing years of the reign of Edward I or later. To some extent this can be explained by 
the problems of documentary survival for the final years of the reign of Henry III and 
the first half of that of his son, for whilst representatives from the shires participated in a 
number of parliaments during the 1260s, 1270s and 1280s, the returns of the names of 
the knights present at those assemblies have been lost. 228 In like manner, the lack of 
service given by the knights as keepers of the peace before 1298 is due in large measure 
to the fact that those officials were not appointed on a regular basis until the reign of 
Edward 11.229 Whilst these caveats have to be borne in mind, the lack of evidence for the 
administrative service of the Falkirk knights before the opening decades of the 
fourteenth century is primarily a consequence of a deliberate division of labour between 
"7 Ayton, `Edward III and the English Aristocracy', 202. 
228 See J. R. Maddicott, `Edward I and the Lessons of Baronial Reform: Local Government, 1258-80', 
Thirteenth Century England I, ed. P. R. Coss and S. D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1986), 16-17; idem, `The 
Crusade Taxation of 1268-1270 and the Development of Parliament', Thirteenth Century England II, ed. 
P. R. Coss and S. D. Lloyd (Woodbridge, 1988), 113. 
229 B. H. Putnam, `The Transformation of the Keepers of the Peace into the Justices of the Peace, 1327- 
1380', TRHS, 4`h ser., xii (1929), 23. 
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the earlier and later parts of their careers. In her study of the men appointed to office in 
Yorkshire between the mid-thirteenth and mid-fourteenth centuries, Helen Jewell noted 
that `men became most active in administration around the age of forty'. 230 A similar 
trend has been discerned by J. S. Illsley in his study of the knights of the shire returned 
from Essex under Edward I. 231 Not all individuals conformed to this pattern, and there 
were certainly many veteran soldiers and young administrators at work within 
Edwardian England. 232 Still, the careers of the Falkirk knights add weight to the theory 
that regular campaigners did not usually turn their hands to shire administration until 
later in life. John de Scures gave military service on six occasions between 1298 and 
1314 and was first returned as a knight of the shire during a year of relative peace in 
1309. He then went on to serve as a representative for Hampshire in 1314 and 1322, 
sheriff for that county in 1321, arrayer on seven occasions during the 1320s and 1330s, 
and peace commissioner three times during the same decades. 233 Stephen de Haccombe 
fought six times between 1294 and 1306 before being returned as knight of the shire for 
Devon twice, keeper of the peace once and commissioner of array five times over the 
following twenty years. 234 Meanwhile, Thomas de Coudray campaigned regularly from 
the mid-1290s to Bannockburn before beginning an equally intensive administrative 
career in the southern counties in 1318.235 For individuals such as these, the most active 
men of their day, a division of duties according to different stages in the life cycle was 
the most appropriate way of reconciling the pressures of military service with the need 
to participate fully in the affairs of the shire. 
Although it is possible to create a more complete picture of the careers of the 
knights who took part in the Falkirk campaign than it is for their sub-knightly comrades 
in arms, it would be a mistake to presume that local administration under Edward I and 
Edward II was monopolised by men who held that rank. On the contrary, the expansion 
230 H. M. Jewell, `Local Administration and Administrators in Yorkshire, 1258-1348', Northern History, 
xvi (1980), 12-13. 
231 J. S. Illsley, `Parliamentary Elections in the Reign of Edward I', BIHR, xlix (1976), 37. Also, see 
Jufica, `Knights of Edward I', 223. 
232 Gorski, Fourteenth-Century Sheriff, 142-3. 
233 For his military service, see above, n. 122. Also, see List of MPs, 29,45,16; List of Sheriffs for 
England and Wales, From the Earliest Times to A. D. 1831, PRO Lists and Indexes, ix (London, 1893), 
54; CPR, 1321-24,96,213,267, CPR, 1324-27,220, Rotuli Scotiae, i, 249,370, Foedera, II, ii, 1071; 
CPR, 1324-27,228,285, CPR, 1330-34,293. 
234 He campaigned in Wales in 1294 (C 67/10, m. 7) and in Scotland in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li), 1298 
(Gough, 208), 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9), 1303 (C 67/15, m. 8) and 1306 (C 67/16, m. 9). Also, see List of 
MPs, 30,33; CPR, 1317-21,459; CPR 1321-24,213,267,274, CPR, 1324-27,8,218. 
235 For his military service, see chapter 1 n. 133. Also List of MPs, 54,67; CPR, 1327-30,429, CPR, 
1330-34,295, CPR, 1334-38,210,357,368; CPR, 1324-27,8, CPR, 1327-30,571, Rotuli Scotiae, i, 249, 
CPR, 1334-38,138, Rotuli Scotiae, i, 329,370. His only administrative work before 1314 was as a 
commissioner of array for Hampshire in 1311; Rotuli Scotiae, i, 97. 
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of government and the proliferation of commissions meant that increasing numbers of 
squires were being called upon to participate in shire administration. Consequently, it is 
not surprising to find that some of those who fought as sergeants on the Falkirk 
campaign also made notable contributions to other spheres of public life. A significant 
portion of these men, as one would expect, were the more prominent sergeants who 
went on to become knights later in their careers. John de Haustede was in the company 
of his father, Robert, in the household division in 1298. During the course of his career 
he benefited extensively from Crown patronage, progressing from a yeoman in the 
household of Prince Edward during the opening years of the fourteenth century to the 
ranks of the parliamentary peerage in the 1330s. 236 Following a long military career, 
which began in Flanders in 1297 and appears to have ended with the war of St. Sardos 
in the 1320s, he was appointed as a justice of the peace for Buckinghamshire in 1332 
and returned as a knight of the shire for the same county three years later. 237 His service, 
like that of many of the other knights-in-waiting at Falkirk, closely mirrored that of the 
knights already discussed. Reginald de Paveley, a sergeant with Robert Fitz Payn in 
1298, went on to serve in Scotland in 1300,1301,1306 and on the Bannockburn 
campaign before receiving his first commission as a keeper of the peace for Wiltshire in 
1320.238 John de Twyford, with Ralph Pipard at Falkirk, was first returned to parliament 
in 1315, five years after appearing in the military records for the final time. 239 Each of 
these men had already attained the rank of knight when they embarked upon service in 
local government. 
`Lesser' or `permanent' sergeants also made an important contribution to public 
life, even though they did not occupy the leading offices of sheriff and knight of the 
shire as frequently as their sons and grandsons were to do later in the fourteenth century. 
Of the sergeants at Falkirk who never became knights, only a few appear to have served 
in either of those capacities during the course of their careers. Adam de Skelton, a 
sergeant under Thomas of Lancaster in 1298, who still held that rank when he 
accompanied Andrew de Harcla on the Scottish March eighteen years later, was 
236 J. S. Bothwell, Edward III and the English Peerage: Royal Patronage, Social Mobility and Political 
Control in Fourteenth-Century England (Woodbridge, 2004), 17. 
237 He served in Flanders in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 2ii), Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 170), 1300 (E 101/8/23, 
m. 1), 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1), 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3d), 1306 (E 101/13/7, m. 2), 1319 (E 101/378/4, 
f. 26v), 1322 (CPR, 1321-24,188), and Gascony in 1324-5 (BL, Add. MS 7967, f. 33v). For his 
administrative service, see CPR, 1330-34,293; List of MPs, 90. 
238 1298 (Gough, 171); 1300 (PDS, 229); 1301 (E 101 /9/24, m. 1 d); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1314 (C 71/6, 
m. 5). For his other work, see CPR, 1317-21,462, CPR, 1327-30,429, CPR, 1330-34,137,286; List of 
MPs, 77; CPR, 1321-24,124,268, CPR, 1324-27,8,221; List of Sheriffs, 152. 
239 He served in Scotland in 1298 (Gough, 220); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1310 (PW II, ii, 406). Also, see 
List ofMPs, 46,52,55; CPR, 1330-34,137,295,401,445. 
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possibly the man of that name returned as knight of the shire for Cumberland in 1318.240 
Richard de Cleobury was also elected to parliament without ever appearing to have 
obtained the rank of knight. He was a sergeant with Nicholas de Audley in 1298 prior to 
representing Worcestershire eighteen years later. 241 Inevitably, the activities of such 
men are more difficult to trace than those of their more established comrades. For 
example, it is impossible to know whether the John de Stafford who served the earl of 
Lancaster in 1298 was the same individual as the man of that name returned as a man- 
at-arms from Staffordshire in 1324, and who was a knight of the shire for that county in 
133 9.242 On the whole, we are probably right to err on the side of caution. It is far more 
common to find the sergeants at Falkirk occupying the lesser positions of arrayer, tax 
assessor and keeper of the peace than among the names of those returned to parliament 
or appointed as sheriffs. Commissioners of array in Yorkshire were drawn from both the 
`knightly class' and `the squirearchy immediately below it'. 243 Evidence relating to the 
Falkirk sergeants indicates that the `squirearchy' had a similar role to play in other 
counties. William Hathewy, a valet of the Marcher lord John Tregoz, can be found 
levying troops in Gloucestershire in 1311; 244 Robert de Whiterugg was appointed in that 
capacity in Cumberland in 1307; 245 and William de Colebroke, with Ralph de Manton at 
Falkirk, was an arrayer for Middlesex in 131 1.246 Whilst such men appear to have 
contributed relatively little as individuals to the running of the shires, collectively their 
services were vital at a time when the demands placed on the gentry were increasing by 
the year. 
As with their military service, so with their administrative service, there is 
perhaps a tendency to underestimate the contribution made by men of sub-knightly rank 
to the Edwardian polity. Whilst in the military sphere this is due primarily to the way 
that many of the records are biased in their coverage towards the landholding elite, 
elsewhere the problem is related to the kind of office in which most squires tended to 
serve. If A. J. Musson is right that most sub-keepers of the peace in the hundreds `were 
perhaps minor gentry and included some who were substantial peasants', then it may be 
that many of the Falkirk sergeants carried out activities of this kind that are sometimes 
240 Military service: 1295 (RG, iii, 298); 1298 (Gough, 180); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 8); 
1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1311 (E 101/14/15, m. 3); 1314 (E 101/14/15, m. 2). Also, see List ofMPs, 52. 
241 He fought in 1298 (Gough, 220); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 3); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3d); 1306 (C 67/16, 
m. 11); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). Also, see List of MPs, 49. 
242 Gough, 181; PW, II, ii, 647; List of MPs, 107. 
243 Jewell, `Local Administration and Administrators in Yorkshire', 14. 
244 Rotuli Scotiae, i, 100. 
245 CPR, 1301-07,498. 
246 Rotuli Scotiae, i, 98. 
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difficult to trace in the records. 247 Other sergeants might have been employed as 
coroners who assisted the sheriffs in much of their work in the provinces. 248 However, 
given that almost half of the knights in our sample appear to have given no major 
administrative service at all, and that the majority of those who did served far more 
regularly as soldiers than in any other capacity, it might simply be that most of the 
sergeants who campaigned in Scotland in 1298 had also chosen to follow the military 
calling and therefore had little opportunity to carry out other duties. The incompleteness 
of both the military records and the administrative records unfortunately prevents the 
kind of meaningful comparisons that were made for the knights. Yet it seems likely that 
the valletti who fought at Falkirk, like the knights who served alongside them, spent far 
more time at war than they did at work in the shires. For both ranks of men, military 
service in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries constituted far more than an 
occasional break from the daily routine of shire administration. On the contrary, 
between 1294 and 1314 the demands of war were almost incessant: for the first time in 
several generations a career in arms had become a viable alternative to the mundane 
business of estate management. Many of the men who took part in the Scottish 
campaign of 1298 evidently saw some wisdom in pursuing the life of the soldier. In 
doing so, they helped to forge a military tradition that was to serve the kings of England 
well in the years to come. 
247 A. J. Musson, `Sub-Keepers and Constables: The Role of Local Officials in Keeping the Peace in 
Fourteenth-Century England', EHR, cxvii (2002), 20. 
248 Cf. R. F. Hunnisett, The Medieval Coroner (Cambridge, 1961), 173. 
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4 
Recruitment Networks 
A cautionary note must always be struck when attempting to apply abstract concepts 
and phrases to complex historical phenomena. Nevertheless, it does not seem 
inappropriate, if we understand the term to mean a large society of frequent 
campaigners who were connected to one another through an extensive web of personal 
relationships, to suggest that there was a military community in late thirteenth and early 
fourteenth-century England. To comprehend the dynamics of that community, given its 
scale and the variety in rank and social status of its members, is probably beyond the 
capacity of any historian working independently. Still, the evidence of the previous 
chapter demonstrates that there are sufficient data available to reach some conclusions 
about the military service patterns, length of careers, and frequency of employment of a 
large number of men-at-arms who went to war under Edward I and his son, particularly 
those of knightly rank. To gain a greater appreciation of the social bonds and personal 
networks that brought such men into the Crown's service, and to understand why so 
many individuals were willing to risk life and limb on an almost annual basis 
throughout the years of heaviest campaigning from 1294 to 1314, it is necessary to 
consider in greater detail the relationships between the military leaders and those who 
followed them to war. By the reign of Edward I this still meant the personal connections 
and mutual obligations of lords and their men. With the aid of the records for military 
service it is possible to analyse such bonds across a wider spectrum than for any 
previous reign, but first we must consider the main characteristics of the lordship nexus 
as it had evolved by the late thirteenth century. 
THE LORDSHIP NEXUS 
Few forms of social relationship were as pervasive and adaptable within medieval 
England as that between lords and their men. Scratch their surface and the comitivae of 
the earls and barons who went to war under Edward I do not appear so very different 
from the warbands which were so prominent a feature of the military landscape in 
Anglo-Saxon England, or the retinues which accompanied the duke of Normandy and 
his followers on their fateful expedition in 1066. Indeed `lordship and hierarchy were 
ýd 
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present in Germanic society from the very beginning of the Middle Ages'. ' 
Furthermore, this type of connection transcended emerging national frontiers and 
formed the common currency of the chivalric culture of medieval Christendom. Not 
only Germanic societies but also lands on the Celtic fringe were dominated by the 
political rivalries and internecine strife engendered by the potentially stabilising, but all- 
too-often destabilising influence of powerful lords and their bellicose followers. 2 
Binding the lord and his men together during times of war was the military retinue, 
aptly described by Robert Bartlett as `one of the basic social organisms of medieval 
Europe'. 3 Even in less threatening circumstances, `horizontal relations among the 
gentry... would always be supplemented by vertical ties to the local nobleman where 
possible'. 4 The nature of the relationship between lord and man and, in particular, the 
honour due from soldiers to their lords in war and peace, occupied the thoughts of a 
number of influential writers during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, including 
Ramon Lull and Geoffrey de Charny. 5 One can also trace in the annals of the reigns of 
Edward I and his son the conspicuous presence, albeit variably expressed, of lords and 
their retainers. We read how in 1296 the earl of Lincoln departed for Gascony with `son 
menage'; 6 elsewhere, John de Trokelowe used the word commilitones to describe the 
earl of Gloucester's followers at Bannockburn. 7 The annalist of St. Paul's noted how the 
magnates who followed Edward II to Scotland in 1319 were accompanied by their 
sectae, or suites, 8 and three years later the king is said to have evaded the Scots at 
Blackmoor Forest cum suis secretioribus. 9 Despite the variety of terms used, the 
regularity with which passages about lords and their followers occur in the chronicles 
tells us a great deal about the social significance of such bonds. 
Be that as it may, it is necessary to distinguish between the part of a lord's 
following which was retained on a permanent basis and his wider society of `hangers- 
' R. P. Abels, Lordship and Military Obligation in Anglo-Saxon England (London, 1988), 22. 
2 Suppe, Military Institutions on the Welsh Marches, 11; S. Davies, Welsh Military Institutions, 633-1283, 
(Cardiff, 2004), chapter 1; The Annals of Loch Ce, ed. W. M. Hennessy, 2 vols, Rolls Ser., liv (London, 
1871), i, 491,521. 
3 R. Bartlett, The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350 (London, 
1993), 45. 
4 C. Carpenter, `Who Ruled the Midlands in the Later Middle Ages? ', Midland History, xix (1994), 7. 
5 The Book of the Ordre of Chyvalry, translated and printed by W. Caxton from a French version of 
Ramon Lull's "Le Libre del Orde de Cavayleria", ed. A. T. P. Byles, Early English Text Society, clxviii 
(London, 1926), 29-33; The Book of Chivalry of Geoffroi de Charny: Text, Context, and Translation, ed. 
R. W. Kaueper and E. Kennedy (Philadelphia, 1996), 106-9. 
6 Langtoft, 299. 
Trokelowe, 85. 
8 Ann. Paulini, 286. 
9 Adami Murimuthensis Chronica sui Temporis, nunc primum per Decem Annos aucta (M. CCC. III- 
M. CCCXLVI) cum eorundem Continuatione (A. D. M CCC. LX. ) a quodam Anonymo, ed. T. Hog, 
English Historical Society (London, 1846), 38. 
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on'. When Henry III's baronial opponents put their case before Louis IX of France in 
1264, one of their complaints was that Roger de Mortimer had disturbed the peace by 
allowing his men and members of his household (homines ... etfamiliares ipsius Rogeri) 
to attack one of the earl of Leicester's castles and its constable. 1° The distinction 
between Mortimer's `men' and the members of his familia was a common one, 
reflecting contemporary perceptions about the dual nature of magnate affinities. " In 
1312, the constable of Dublin castle, John le Ussher, was accused of appropriating the 
money given to him for the purpose of retaining twelve additional soldiers and of using 
it to pay the members of his own household. 12 Despite considerable overlap between the 
two, the familia and the larger expanded group of men-at-arms did not, therefore, 
amount to the same thing. Nigel Saul has inferred from this that by the fourteenth 
century it was perhaps the looser, less stable element of magnate retinues that performed 
the most important military role: by then, `magnates kept their corps of household 
knights and esquires with a view to peacetime, not wartime, conditions'. 13 Far from 
being of diminished military importance under Edward I and Edward II, however, 
household knights and sergeants seem to have formed the core of most magnate retinues 
that were organised for war, and to have continued to do so for some time afterwards. '4 
Less easy to dismiss is the concept of `bastard feudalism' which emerged from this 
perceived cleavage between the traditional core of household retainers and tenants on 
the one hand, and a wider circle of associates on the other. 15 Whilst any discussion of 
military lordship in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries must take `bastard feudalism' 
and all its connotations into account, there is no consensus as to the extent to which 
retaining practices under Edward I and Edward II differed from those of previous 
reigns. G. A. Holmes long ago described `bastard feudalism' as `a misnomer'. 16 More 
recent critics of the concept have included J. M. W. Bean and David Crouch, both of 
whom have stressed continuity over change in lordship practices. ' 7 Whilst the debate 
will continue to rage, it is reassuring to note that lordship, and military lordship in 
particular, retained many of its older features. 
10 Documents of the Baronial Movement of Reform and Rebellion 1258-1267, selected by R. F. Treharne 
and edited by I. J. Sanders (Oxford, 1973), 266. 
11 E. g. CCR, 1272-79,315; M. Hicks, Bastard Feudalism (London, 1995), 68. 
12 Historical and Municipal Documents of Ireland AD 1172-1320, ed. J. T. Gilbert, Rolls Ser., liii 
(London, 1870), 304-8. 
13 Saul, Knights and Esquires, 84. 
14 Cf. Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity, 9. 
'S The seminal study remains K. B. McFarlane, `Bastard Feudalism', BIHR, xx (1943-5), 161-80. 
16 G. A. Holmes, The Estates of the Higher Nobility in Fourteenth-Century England (Cambridge, 1957), 
83. 
17 J. M. W. Bean, From Lord to Patron: Lordship in Late Medieval England (Manchester, 1989), 234; D. 
Crouch, `Debate: Bastard Feudalism Revised', Past and Present, cxxxi (1991), 176. 
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The household was the single most consistent element of magnate retinues 
throughout the Middle Ages; its important place within medieval society has long been 
recognised. '8 Much of this chapter will be dealing with the military role performed by 
the households of the lords of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, but it is 
important to recognise that the familia was much more than a collection of men 
organised for war. 19 The aristocratic household was a social and political organism 
which provided for the every need of its lords: its value as a source of patronage and 
political control is attested by the many attempts that were made to interfere in the 
organisation of the kings' households by their enemies during times of political turmoil, 
most notably in 1258 and 1311.20 Viewed in its widest sense, a lord's household would 
consist of `a body of knights, esquires and men-at-arms involved in the fulfilment of his 
quota of military service, the nucleus of officials who carried out the administration of 
his estates, and other officials who handled the routines of everyday life'. 21 In essence 
the magnate retinue, in its widest sense as an affinity of well-wishers but particularly in 
its core household organisation, provided a form of cement which held together the 
different strata of medieval society under powerful leaders. The binding nature of the 
familia is well illustrated by the attempts made to bring men to justice following the 
Barons' Wars by identifying which households they had belonged to at the time of the 
troubles. 22 Retainers were judged by the political principles of their lords and held to be 
equally culpable for their wrongdoings. In the law book Fleta, an attempt was made to 
distinguish between felonies committed by men on the orders of their superiors and 
crimes carried out according to their own whims. 23 Membership of a magnate household 
or retinue therefore constituted a substantial personal commitment that was not to be 
entered into lightly, particularly during times of political turmoil. 
One feature of lordship that was of particular importance for the pursuit of war 
was the practice of retaining large numbers of men, often on a short-term basis, through 
the granting of fees and robes. `Livery - the issue of cloth, or clothing, to members of 
18 Cf. C. M. Woolgar, The Great Household in Late Medieval England (London, 1999). 
19 For examples of household lists and accounts, see: A Roll of the Household Expenses of Richard de 
Swinfield, bishop of Hereford, during part of the years 1289 and 1290, ed. J. Webb, 2 vols, Camden 
Society 1st ser., lix, lxii (1854-5), i, 194-7; Household Accounts from Medieval England, ed. C. M. 
Woolgar, 2 parts, Records of Social and Economic History, new ser., xvii-xviii (Oxford, 1992-3), ii, no. 
25. 
20 Documents of the Baronial Movement, 111; Sources of English Constitutional History: A Selection of 
Documents from A. D. 600 to the Interregnum, ed. C. Stephenson and F. G. Marcham, 2 vols (London, 
1972), i, 195. 
21 M. W. Labarge, A Baronial Household of the Thirteenth Century (London, 1965), 53. 
22 E. g. Calendar of Inquisitions Miscellaneous (Chancery), 8 vols (London, 1916-2003), i, no. 936. 
23 Fleta, ed. H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, 3 vols, Seiden Society, lxxii, lxxxix, xcix (1953-83), in, 
55. 
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the household - was a practice at least as old as the middle of the twelfth century', 
24 but 
it would appear that the granting of livery to members of the wider affinity was a 
slightly more recent development. The larger the body of men that one could put into 
the field bearing one's designs on their clothing, the greater one's prestige was likely to 
be amongst one's fellow soldiers. In this sense, livery offered a more flexible symbol of 
association than retaining by fee or annuity: it enabled a lord to extend his circle of 
followers with relative ease. 25 There is evidence that the granting of robes was being 
used for subversive purposes long before the end of the thirteenth century. 26 Despite 
this, livery had great practical value and was particularly useful as a reflection of 
seigneurial power on campaign. When Richard of Cornwall set out on crusade in 1250, 
he was attended by a large retinue consisting of forty knights, all of whom wore the 
same splendid new garments. 27 Likewise, the earls who witnessed the coronation of 
Edward I were reputedly joined by a hundred knights each, adorned in their arms. 28 
Sporting of a common uniform was therefore an important visual expression of the bond 
between a lord and his men: it might even have been a means of distinguishing between 
the followers of different retinue leaders on military ventures. Livery could also indicate 
one's allegiance to a political cause, as in 1321 when the king's enemies were all attired 
in the same way. 29 Consequently, the clothes one wore might say a great deal not only 
about one's place within the military community, but also about one's stance on some 
of the most pressing issues of the day. 
Whilst the granting of livery was a common phenomenon by the late thirteenth 
century and was practiced by many men of different rank and status, relatively few lords 
had sufficiently large households and retinues to play a major leadership role on 
military campaigns. John de Hastings led 160 men-at-arms to the siege of Caerlaverock 
on behalf of the bishop of Durham. 30 However, the household accounts of prominent 
lords suggest that the full-time companies of knights and sergeants permanently 
attendant on them were much smaller than this. A list of the members of Edward of 
Caernarfon's familia in 1301, the year that he led an army in western Scotland, shows 
that it contained three bannerets, six knights and fifty-eight valletti et servientes. Such a 
large household appears to have been exceptional, understandably so for the future 
24 Woolgar, The Great Household, 9. 
25 Bean, From Lord to Patron, 21-2. 
26 N. Saul, `The Commons and the Abolition of Badges', Parliamentary History, ix (1990), 306. 
27 Chronica Majora, v, 97. 
28 The Brut, or the Chronicles of England, ed. F. W. D. Brie, 2 vols, Early English Text Society, cxxxi, 
cxxxvi (London, 1906-8), i, 179. 
29 Scalacronica, 85; Trokelowe, 109. 
30 Siege of Caerlaverock, 23. 
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king. 31 Surviving lists are less readily available for ordinary members of the aristocracy. 
Nevertheless, additional passing references allow one to supplement such accounts with 
other material. John de Vescy was reported to have had at least seventeen knights in his 
familia in 1280 when the said men were accused of a collective trespass. 32 Twenty years 
later, the earl of Lincoln took eight household knights with him on his journey to the 
papal court. 33 Households of the size and strength discussed here were capable of 
providing magnates with a significant portion of their war retinues, yet they were 
seldom sufficient on their own. For this reason, the permanent corps of soldiers was 
usually supplemented by additional men drafted in for the duration of a campaign. 
At their full extent, war retinues might contain men who were only loosely 
associated with their lord, or who had joined the comitiva as members of sub-units 
under his bachelors and bannerets. Yet, at the heart of the retinue, it was still common 
for the leader to be accompanied by his kinsmen and close friends; a phenomenon that 
dated back many centuries. In his study of Cheshire, Philip Morgan noted how `the 
extended kinship group, expanded within the locality, shaped the character of many of 
the retinues in the county during the later medieval period'. 34 John de Eyville's 
company in Wales during the first Welsh war included Gocelyn and Thomas de Eyville, 
amongst others. 35 Similarly, three members of the Zouche family, Philip, Aymer and 
William, accompanied Alan la Zouche to Scotland in 1306.36 It has been noted that 
`family and neighbourhood connections were probably as important' to the formation of 
magnate retinues `as formal contracts', 37 and contemporary chronicles abound with 
evidence of family members fighting alongside one another. 38 Of the four Neville 
brothers active in Scotland under Edward II, one was killed and the other three were 
taken prisoner for ransoms. 39 According to Langtoft, John de Segrave's brother and son 
were captured alongside him on an expedition into Scotland in 1303.40 Such incidents 
31 E 101/360/17. Also, see E 101/370/29; H. Johnstone, Edward of Carnarvon, 1284-1307 (Manchester, 
1946), 74-6. 
32 CCR, 12 79-88,19. 
33 CCR, 1296-1302,370. Cf. M. Cherry, `The Courtenay Earls of Devon: The Formation and 
Disintegration of a Late Medieval Aristocratic Affinity', Southern History, i (1979), 72-3, and G. G. 
Simpson, `The Familia of Roger de Quincy, Earl of Winchester and Constable of Scotland', Essays on 
the Nobility of Medieval Scotland, ed. K. J. Stringer (Edinburgh, 1985), 121, for household numbers in 
later and earlier periods. 
34 Morgan, War and Society, 13. 
35 C 47/2/7, in. 8; C 67/8, in. 5. 
36 C 67/16, in. 8. 
37 Prestwich, Plantagenet England, 382. The importance of kinship ties to lordly retinues can be traced 
back to the early Middle Ages; S. S. Evans, The Lords of Battle: Image and Reality of the Comitatus in 
Dark-Age Britain (Woodbridge, 1997), 34. 
38 E. g. Ann. Wigorn., 484-5. 
39 Northern Petitions, no. 132. 
40 Langtoft, 410. 
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show that the fortunes of military retainers, whether they were kinsmen of their lords or 
not, frequently followed those of their leaders. Despite the protection that the lord could 
confer in the form of office or land grants, support often ended with the death of the 
patron. Gaveston's followers are said to have borne the news of his execution in 1312 
with great sorrow: not surprisingly given the generous donations that he had made in his 
lifetime. 41 Worse still, membership of a retinue could have catastrophic consequences 
during times of war. When Brian Jay, Master of the Order of the Templars in England, 
was killed at Falkirk in 1298, five or six of his squires are reported to have died 
alongside him. 42 In a similar incident, William de Muntchensy of Edwardstone's 
household followers were crushed by the walls that killed their lord in Wales in 1287.43 
Such evidence gives some idea of the close proximity with which knights and sergeants 
stood in relation to their lords when engaged in military activity. It is also interesting to 
note the harshness with which the followers of the Contrariants were treated by Edward 
II. The wives, sons and familiares of those who had opposed the king were stripped of 
their lands and goods, 44 and the earl of Lancaster's men pursued through judicial 
inquests. 45 This mirrors the eagerness with which rebels were tracked down after 
Evesham, and shows that the receipt of fees could be something of a poisoned chalice. 
From what has been said, it is clear that there was both a positive and a negative 
aspect to retaining during the reigns of Edward I and Edward II. Used appropriately, the 
familia and the wider affinity could provide the lord with important support in war and 
contribute to the stability of the realm. All too often, though, the converse was true, and 
such bonds were exploited for personal gain and illegal activities. The `Song Against 
the Retinues of the Great People', written during the later years of the reign of Edward 
I, reveals a contemporary mistrust of the large gatherings of associates who 
accompanied lords on their travels. 46 There is plentiful evidence to suggest that such 
fears were justified. Writs against confederations and the maintenance of friends in 
lawsuits were issued by Edward I in 1279,1288 and 1289: these were sorely needed 
given the growing tendency for great men to misuse their powers for criminal pursuits. 47 
41 Vita Edwardi Secundi, 51; J. S. Hamilton, Piers Gaveston, Earl of Cornwall 1307-1312: Politics and 
Patronage in the Reign of Edward II (Detroit, 1988), 44-5. 
42 Lanercost, 192. 
43 Cotton, 168. 
44 Melsa, ii, 343. 
as South Lancashire in the Reign of Edward II, 5. 
46Thomas Wright's Political Songs, 237-40. 
47 CCR, 1272-79,519; CCR, 1279-88,547; CCR, 1288-96,45. Also, see J. Bellamy, Crime and Public 
Order in England in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1973), 23-4; J. R. Maddicott, Law and Lordship: 
Royal Justices as Retainers in Thirteenth- and Fourteenth-Century England, Past and Present supplement 
iv (1978), 13-14. 
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In 1274, a group of archers and other armed men of the earl Warenne were accused of 
encroaching upon the lands of Robert Aguillon in Sussex. 48 Three years later, Fulk Fitz 
Waryn was found to be using members of his affinity to influence land inquests on the 
Welsh March, 49 and in 1308 the earl of Warwick employed his bachelor and sheriff of 
Leicestershire, John de Dene, to sway elections to the post of coroner in that county. 5° 
Such actions, symptomatic of `bastard feudalism', 51 were by no means confined to these 
prominent lords. Both Edward II at one extreme, and lesser members of the gentry at the 
other, also exploited their personal ties and social networks in the pursuit of material 
gain or local influence. 52 More seriously, opponents of the king, such as Thomas of 
Lancaster, increased the size of their affinities to pursue their struggles. 53 In 1297, the 
earl of Norfolk had been ready, with his adherents among the earls and barons, to resist 
Edward I's attempts to force him to serve overseas. 54 Such nefarious activities 
demonstrate the potentially detrimental effects of large-scale retaining. 
Be that as it may, the attendance of large companies of armed men on their lords 
remained a necessary evil if the Crown was to gain the support that it needed for its 
wars. Maurice Keen was undoubtedly right to argue that large-scale retaining had its 
most positive impact when used `in the military context of warfare against external 
enemies'. 55 `Bastard feudalism', or the extended web of connections that the term 
implies, has been described as `a central mechanism for the waging of war'; 56 rightly 
so, for the demands of warfare remained one of the greatest incentives for the gathering 
of large companies of men in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Both Simon de 
Montfort and Thomas of Lancaster countered the claims levelled against them that they 
were retaining too many armed men by stating that they were doing so for the stability 
and defence of the realm. The latter drew attention, in 1317, to the fact that Edward II 
had ordered a muster at Newcastle upon Tyne to go against the Scots with as many 
armed men as possible. 57 Although such claims were possibly nothing more than 
calculated ruses to cloak their political objectives, both earls were aware that neither 
king could cope without the support of the recruitment networks of their leading men. 
48 CCR, 1272-79,116. 
49 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 83. 
50 CCW, 271. 
51 Cf. D. A. Carpenter, `Debate: Bastard Feudalism Revised', Past and Present, cxxxi (1991), 178-9. 
52 CCW, 487-8; State Trials of the Reign of Edward the First 1289-1293, ed. T. F. Tout and H. Johnstone 
Camden Society 3`d ser., ix (1906), no. 12. 
53 J. F. Baldwin, `The Household Administration of Henry Lacy and Thomas of Lancaster', EHR, xlii 
(1927), 191. 
54 Melsa, ii, 266. 
ss Keen, England in the Later Middle Ages, 15. 
56 Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, 2. 
57 Documents of the Baronial Movement, 209; `Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvon', 50. 
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Indeed, it was difficult for the Crown to oppose a system of recruitment that it exploited 
so well for its own benefit: Edward I's personal company formed the core of the armies 
that he led to Wales in 1294 and Flanders in 1297, as well as on other occasions. 58 
When the need arose, all lords, including the king, desired first and foremost that their 
men be available to them for the pursuit of war. In 1300, the earl of Hereford tried to 
have his retainer, Richard Damory, taken off the justice rota in Oxfordshire because he 
required his services in Scotland. 59 The following year, Walter de Teye managed to 
have one of his men removed from the position of coroner in Sussex for the same 
reason. 60 In wartime, it was evidently more important for the martial elite to have their 
men with them in the field than at work in the counties. 
The demands of warfare under Edward I, particularly from 1294, meant that 
landholders did not always find it easy to persuade their men to follow them into hostile 
territory. Ahead of the expedition to Flanders in 1297, the earl of Arundel wrote that he 
could not find anyone willing to go with him unless he granted away more lands. 61 The 
burdens of overseas service might, in fact, have been one of the main reasons for the 
increased use of military contracts. Although these were used for the Lord Edward's 
crusade and the Welsh war of 1287,62 the largest number of indentures drawn up for any 
single year during the reign of Edward I was in 1297: the year of the Flanders 
campaign. A few, including those between John de Grey of Rotherfield and Robert de 
Tothale, and John Bluet and William Martel, refer specifically to service overseas and 
the war against the king of France. 63 The link between the wars of Edward I and the 
production of such contracts seems clear enough. TM However, it may be that the 
household force continued to be the most important element of magnate companies 
organised for war. The idea that contracting grew out of an older system of household 
retaining has been put forward by J. M. W. Bean, and the continued emphasis on lordly 
obligations in such contracts seems to support his view. 65 Both Scott Waugh and David 
Crouch have asserted that the indentured retinue was a continuation of, rather than a 
58 Cotton, 253; Chronica etAnnales, 379. 
59 CCW, 111-2 
60Ibid, 146. 
61 Documents Illustrating the Crisis of 1297-98, no. 132. 
6.. H. G. Richardson and G. O. Sayles, The Governance of Mediaeval England from the Conquest to Magna 
Carta (Edinburgh, 1963), 463-5; N. B. Lewis, `An Early Indenture of Military Service, 27 July 1287', 
BIHR, xiii (1935), 85-9; CCR, 1279-88,486. 
63 'Private Indentures for Life Service in Peace and War 1278-1476', ed. M. Jones and S. Walker, 
Camden Miscellany )000, Camden Society, 5t' ser., iii (1994), nos 6,7. 
64 On the link between Edward's wars and the development of the contract system, see N. B. Lewis, `The 
Organisation of Indentured Retinues in Fourteenth-Century England', TRHS, 4th ser., xxvii (1945), 31. 
65 Bean, From Lord to Patron, 129,143; idem, "Bachelor" and "Retainer"", Medievalia et Humanistica: 
Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Culture, new ser., iii (1972), 125-6. 
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break with, the past. The latter's claim, that `the honorial barons [of the twelfth century] 
were the political and often physical ancestors of the indentured retainers of the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries', speaks volumes about the tenacity of traditional 
methods of lordship, whatever their guise. 66 Not surprisingly, indentures sometimes 
seem to have formulated new relationships between men who were serving together for 
the first time. Aymer de Valence and Thomas de Berkeley, and Edmund de Stafford and 
Philip de Hardreshull, can first be found together in Flanders in the year that their 
contracts with one another were drawn up. 67 In like manner, the granting of an annuity 
by Hugh de Neville for John Filiol in 1300 in return for service in the Scottish war 
appears to have created a new connection between the two men who set out together in 
that year. 68 On other occasions, such agreements merely formalised bonds that had 
existed de facto for some time. Nicholas de Hastings had been going to war with Ralph 
Fitz William for eleven years before an indenture between the two men was drawn up in 
1311.69 The purpose of such contracts therefore varied from case to case. 
Whatever their function and purpose, military contracts emphasise the key role 
played by retinue leaders as the hubs of recruitment networks. For this reason, it was 
essential that the king always had a ready supply of lords ready and willing to perform 
military service with their bands of retainers, whether indentured or not. The author of 
the Vita Edwardi Secundi had the right idea when he referred to the magnates as `the 
king's chief member, without which the king cannot attempt or accomplish anything of 
importance'. 70 A clear indication of the truth of this statement is provided by the pitiful 
failure of the Flanders expedition when Edward had proceeded to the continent without 
the support of the military community. 7' The need to have a ready supply of magnates 
available for military service may explain why the earl of Cornwall issued a quittance of 
the common summons of the eyres of Buckinghamshire and Gloucestershire to Ralph 
Pipard in the spring of 1287.72 Pipard was frequently summoned to give military service 
throughout our period. The regent could ill afford to have men like him tied up on duties 
in the shires at a time when tensions were increasing across the border in Wales. For his 
66 S. L. Waugh, 'Tenure to Contract: Lordship and Clientage in Thirteenth-Century England', EHR, ci 
(1986), 839; D. Crouch, The Beaumont Twins. The Roots and Branches of Power in the Twelfth Century 
(Cambridge, 1986). 101. 
67 `Private Indentures for Life Service', nos 4,8. Valence and Berkeley (E 101 %6'28, m. 2i); Stafford and 
Hardreshull (BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 68r). 
68 DL 25, no. 1318; Liber Quotidianus. 216. 
69 `Private Indentures for Life Service', no. 19; 1300 (C 67/14. m. 12); 1301 (C 67 14, m. 4); 1306 (C 
67/16, m. 1-1); 1309 (CDS, v, 449); 1310 (C 714. m. 10). 
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'' Langtoft, 386. 
72 SC 125, no. 64. 
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part, Edward I was always keen to exploit the personal contacts and relationships of the 
leading families of the realm. In 1303, for example, he ordered that Henry de Percy be 
delivered from prison in Yorkshire so that he could join the king on his journey north of 
the border. 73 Still, and despite his best efforts, it would appear that for major campaigns 
the king could never be sure just how large an army he would have at his disposal. The 
royal proclamation at Udimore in August 1297 shows that it was only possible to 
ascertain the size of the force available to the king for service in Flanders once the 
muster had been convened. 74 In the age of the pre-contract armies, planning military 
campaigns with any precision must have been very difficult indeed. 
The nature of such decentralised recruitment, whereby groups of men were 
organised around the banners of their leaders, means that any study of the war retinues 
of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries must begin with the lords 
themselves. A single military summons list might contain in excess of 300 names, as it 
did in the aftermath of Bannockburn. 75 It would therefore be impractical to attempt to 
analyse the retaining practices of all lords who led companies to war, or the loyalties 
and shifting allegiances of the whole of genteel society. For this reason, and to enable 
more detailed analysis, a sample of retinue leaders has been chosen based on the lords 
named on the Falkirk horse inventories of 1298. The benefits of these lists as a basis for 
the sample have already been outlined in chapter 3. Of the 150 or so lords who appear 
with armed contingents on those inventories, fifty, or a third, have been selected for 
closer analysis. 76 A number of factors were taken into account when deciding which 
lords and retinues to include in the sample and which to leave out, including: the size of 
the companies with them at Falkirk; whether or not there is sufficient evidence of the 
identities of their retainers from other campaigns to allow for meaningful analysis over 
time; and whether the lords had connections, familial or otherwise, with other prominent 
leaders within the military community. Available service records vary considerably 
from one lord and retinue to another according to the status and importance of the 
leader. The earl of Lancaster had forty-five men in his service at Falkirk and in total we 
have information on some ninety men with him in the years prior to Bannockburn, not 
including those who campaigned at one point or another with his father, Edmund, or 
brother, Henry. 77 Aymer de Valence had forty-nine fighting men with him at Falkirk. A 
73 CCR, 1302-07,27. 
74 English Historical Documents, iii (1189-1327), ed. H. Rothwell (London, 1975), 478. 
75 PW, II, ii, 427-430. 
76 For a full list of these lordship groups and a summary of their retinue personnel continuity, see 
Appendix. Only the sample leaders' surnames are used in most subsequent footnotes. 
77 Gough, 179-81. 
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total of around 400 can be traced in his company up to and including the expedition that 
78 he led to Scotland as captain in 1315. At the other end of the scale, the household 
retainer Edward Charles and the northern lord John Fitz Reginald led only four men at 
Falkirk; evidence for soldiers associated with these men in other years is quite sparse. 79 
Not a great deal separates lords such as these and others who have been left out of the 
sample. Finally, in several instances, such as with Hugh le Despenser senior and junior, 
and Peter and John de Chavent, the retinues of the father and son have been considered 
as one, either because they served in close proximity to one another on a number of 
military ventures, or because their careers overlapped at around the time of the Falkirk 
campaign. 80 
As much of the rest of this chapter will be based primarily on the knights and 
sergeants who served with these lords rather than the leaders themselves, it may first 
prove useful to enter into a little detail about the military experiences and career patterns 
of these fifty men, or lordship groups. Firstly, it is important to note that whilst the 
landed wealth and social status of these lords varied a great deal, each was a prominent 
and powerful individual in his own right. The number of manors of a man like William 
le Brun differed markedly from those held by Aymer de Valence, but even the former 
was a lord of some stature in Hampshire and Dorset where most of his estates lay. 8' 
Whilst service on more than seven campaigns was quite exceptional among the knights 
in the retinues at Falkirk, the majority of the retinue leaders in our sample took part in at 
least eight military ventures during their careers. Eighteen can be traced in the service 
records on ten or more occasions whilst one man, Henry de Beaumont, fought in 
seventeen hosts between 1296 and the Scottish campaign of Edward III in 1335, 
including as commander in Scotland in 1332.82 Furthermore, Bartholomew de 
Badlesmere, 83 Robert de Clifford, 84 one or other of the Despensers85 and Aymer de 
78 Ibid, 216-18; E 101/15/6. 
79 Gough, 195,207. 
80 Cf. N. Saul, `The Despensers and the Downfall of Edward II', EHR, xcix (1984), 6. Other fathers and 
sons whose retinues will be considered as one are: Peter (d. 1303) and John (d. 1344) de Chavent; Nicholas 
de Meynill senior (d. 1299) and junior (d. 1322); Alan Plukenet senior (d. 1298) and junior; Fulk Fitz 
Waryn senior (d. 1315) and junior (d. 1336) and Robert de Haustede senior (d. 1321) and junior (d. 1330). 
81 IPM, iv, no. 34; IPM, vi, no. 518. 
82 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 7); 1298 (Gough, 172); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2); 1301 
(E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1); 1306 (E 101/13/16, f. 2r); 1308 (Rotuli Scotiae, i, 57-9); 
1309 (CDS, v, 447); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 11); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3); 1319 (E 101/378/4, f. 31r); 1322 (CPR, 
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m. 17). For a summary of his military activities, see S. Cameron and A. Ross, `The Treaty of Edinburgh 
and the Disinherited (1328-1332), History, lxxxiv (1999), 251-2. 
83 See chapter 2 n. 145 and n. 160 for his military service up to and including Bannockburn, and 1315 (E 
101 /3 76/7, if. 60r) and 1319 (E 101 /378/4, f. 19v) for his activities after that time. 
84 1294 (C 67/10, m. 4); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 1297 (E 101/6/30, m. 1); 1298 (Gough, 196); 1300 (E 
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Valence86 can each be traced in at least a dozen instances, almost invariably with 
identifiable men-at-arms under their commands. The distinction made previously 
between the knights and sergeants in the retinues at Falkirk and their leaders is therefore 
reflective of a significant split that most soldiers at the time would have recognised. 
Most of these men were born into positions of authority, as indicated by the fact that 
around a half served as leaders on the first occasion that they appear in the military 
records. None fought in the retinues of other lords for any great length of time. 
What of the military experience of these lords prior to the Falkirk campaign, and 
their service beyond Bannockburn? As with those with them in 1298, the lords who 
took part in the Falkirk campaign included a mixture of veterans of the early Welsh 
wars and younger, more recent recruits. Nineteen of the individuals in the sample had 
taken part in one or both of the Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282-3, but only eight 
(including Walter de Beauchamp, Eustace de Hacche and William de Leyburn) were 
retinue leaders on either of those occasions. 87 Nevertheless, this allows for comparison 
between the composition of their retinues in the Scottish wars and for earlier campaigns. 
Of the remainder, a few fought for the first time in 1287.88 The greater part, however, 
began their military service during the years of crisis, whereas just one, Edmund de 
Mauley, made his bow at Falkirk. Such a breakdown does not highlight the full range of 
military service data available on these men and their followers, for most continued to 
fight for many years after 1298. Fourteen performed their duties as retinue leaders 
beyond Bannockburn; three, Henry de Beaumont, Fulk Fitz Waryn junior, and Richard 
Lovel, were still leading companies into war during the early years of the reign of 
Edward I's grandson. 89 Ten lords were around at the siege of Berwick in 1319; seven 
took part in the ill-fated campaign of three years later, not including those who appear 
as tenants-in-chief only. 90 Therefore, our sample of fifty retinue leaders allows much 
101/612/15, m. 1); 1307 (E 101/14/15, m. 9); 1309 (CDS, v, 448); 1310 (E 101/374/5, if. 76r-v); 1314 (C 
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scope for reflection on the changing composition and personnel of military retinues over 
a number of years and decades. The documentation for these campaigns is variable and 
frequently patchy, but this should not detract from the vast amount that can be 
recovered about the affinities and recruitment networks of these men. This is even more 
the case when we consider the familial relationships that existed between many of these 
soldiers and other military leaders. Although Ralph Basset of Drayton died in the year 
following Falkirk, his son of the same name continued to lead retinues on the campaigns 
of Edward II and Edward 111.91 Thomas Bardolf, the son of Hugh who died in 1304, 
took up the leadership reins within a couple of years of his father's death. 92 In sum, the 
survival of voluminous records for military service from the reigns of Edward I and his 
son offers an ideal opportunity to study military lordship at work. 
TAPPING THE GENTEEL POOL 
The English defeat at Bannockburn in 1314 makes it easy to forget that Edwardian 
armies during the decades preceding that setback were, for the most part, quite 
successful. Although they have failed to receive the critical acclaim bestowed upon later 
English hosts which won famous victories at Crecy, Poitiers and Agincourt, the 
achievements of these earlier forces were far from negligible. 93 Within just over a 
decade of his accession, Edward I and his men had succeeded in conquering Wales: a 
thorn in the side of many earlier English kings. Furthermore, victories on the battlefields 
of Dunbar and Falkirk helped pave the way for what seemed, by 1305, to be the 
permanent subjugation of the Scots. There were, of course, reversals along the way, 
most notably at the bridge of boats in 1282, Stirling Bridge in 1297 and at Roslin in 
1303; but the fact that the English were able to retain a hold on Gascony whilst 
simultaneously pursuing these conquests closer to home speaks volumes about the 
capacity of the English war machine at that time. The defeat in 1314 revealed that there 
were still many flaws susceptible to exploitation by enemy commanders, and a 
fundamental restructuring was required before the triumphs of Edward III could be 
achieved. 94 Yet already, by the end of the reign of Edward I, many of the traditions of 
Despensers (BL, Stowe MS 553, if. 61r-v); Haustede junior (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 60r); Lovel (BL, 
Stowe MS 553, f. 60v); Mohaut (CPR, 1321-24,198); Valence (BL, Stowe MS 553, f. 56r). 
91 1319 (C 71/10, m. 3); 1333 (C 71/13, m. 31). 
92 C 67/16, m. 9. 
93 For a critical view of these earlier armies, see S. Reynolds, `How Different was England? ', Thirteenth 
Century England VII, ed. M. Prestwich, R. Britnell and R. Frame (Woodbridge, 1999), 15. 
94 For the reforms of Edward III and the composition of later hosts, see Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 
chapter 1; idem, `English Armies in the Fourteenth Century', Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the 
i 
147 
military service that were to benefit later English armies on the battlefields of France 
were in place. As such, it seems pertinent to consider whether the service bonds 
between the leaders of these armies and their men contributed in any way to the 
cohesion of the king's forces. Did the armies of Edward I and his son benefit from the 
kind of stable retinue composition and group camaraderie which historians working on 
armies from the eleventh through to the late fourteenth century have shown to be of 
practical importance to the conduct of war? 95 If it is true that `constant training was 
necessary then, as now, to make a capable soldier', then it was essential that lords and 
their men-at-arms should be acquainted with one another and accustomed to fighting 
together in the melting pot of war. 96 Only through closer scrutiny of the service bonds 
between lords and their men can we ascertain the extent to which the armies of Edward 
I and his son were built upon firm foundations. 
Exceptional in size and in the social and military standing of its members, the 
royal household is nevertheless a good place to begin any study of retinue composition. 
This is due to the survival of numerous lists of fees and robes recording the names of 
knights and sergeants who staffed the familia regis. The royal household had played a 
central role in the organisation and conduct of war since Anglo-Norman times, 97 and the 
king's knights and sergeants were still recruited for primarily military purposes during 
the reign of Edward I. Many of those who received fees and robes during the first half 
of the reign were no longer members of the household by the time of the French and 
Scottish wars. This was due in most cases to natural factors, such as old age and death, 
rather than any desire to enter the service of other men. 98 Viewed from a short-term 
perspective, it is evident that the composition of the familia changed little on an annual 
basis. Of twenty-two bannerets listed in the wardrobe accounts for the end of the 
thirteenth year of the reign, seventeen were still members five years later. A similar 
degree of retention can be traced for the knights bachelor. 99 Conflict with the barons and 
other leading members of the military community placed a great strain on the loyalties 
of the king's followers between 1307 and 1326, as it had done under John. '°° 
Hundred Years War, ed. A. Curry and M. Hughes (Woodbridge, 1994), 21-38; N. B. Lewis, `The 
Recruitment and Organization of a Contract Army, May to November 1337', BIHR, xxxvii (1964), 1-19. 
95 E. g. R. A. Brown, `The Battle of Hastings', Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and 
Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare, ed. M. Strickland (Woodbridge, 1992), 176; A. 
Goodman, John of Gaunt: The Exercise of Princely Power in Fourteenth-Century Europe (Harlow, 
1992), 213. 
96 V. B. Redstone, `Some Mercenaries of Henry of Lancaster, 1327-1330', TRHS, 3`d ser., vii (1913), 153. 
97 J. O. Prestwich, `The Military Household of the Norman Kings', EHR, xcvi (1981), 1-35. 
98 Ingamells, `Household Knights of Edward I', i, 27. 
99 E 101/4/13, m. 1; E 101/4/27. 
100 Cf. S. D. Church, The Household Knights of King John (Cambridge, 1999), 104. 
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Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that even the unpopular Edward II could rely, at 
least in some years, on the adherence of a large number of his associates. Between the 
tenth and eleventh years of his reign, eight of eleven bannerets and forty-nine of sixty- 
three lesser knights remained in his service. '0' In subsequent years, continuity levels 
were less impressive as the threat of civil war loomed large and men hedged their bets 
in deciding between the king and his cousin. Many of the bachelors and bannerets 
present in 1318 had left the household by 1322.102 Unfortunately, we lack a series of 
magnate household lists to compare with those of the king, so it is necessary to consider 
the question of retinue stability among the aristocracy on a much broader scale. For this 
purpose, our fifty sample retinues provide an ideal focus for analysis. 
Before consulting the military records for evidence of the recruitment networks 
of these fifty lords, we must first consider in more detail the availability and reliability 
of the evidence at our disposal. Too often statements have been made about patterns of 
retaining and levels of retinue stability within Edwardian armies without due 
consideration of the pitfalls of working with this kind of material. Through careful 
scrutiny of the service records available to historians of Edwardian armies, Andrew 
Ayton has done much to redress this problem. 103 All the same, it is worthwhile 
reiterating some of his points here and linking them to the evidence available for our 
fifty leaders. One of the main obstacles to a full understanding of the recruitment 
practices of these men is that two of the sources on which we are most reliant for names 
of their followers, letters of protection and attorney, regularly reveal the names of only a 
third or fewer of the soldiers in their companies. Only three of the eleven men with 
William de Cantilupe on the household inventory of 1300, for example, also took out 
letters of protection. ' 04 In such instances the problem can be overcome by consulting 
other records; in others, however, the protections and attornies are the only sources 
available. For the campaign of 1310-11 we lack an inventory, so of the four knights and 
twenty-five sergeants who were with Robert Fitz Payn in Scotland in that year, only ten 
of whom received protections, the identities of the majority remain unknown to us. '05 
When a lord appears with a well-documented retinue for some campaigns, but less well- 
documented companies for others, the resulting data is inevitably skewed, giving an 
101 Society of Antiquaries of London MS 120, if. 58v-61r, 82r-82v, 86r-86v; Society of Antiquaries of 
London MS 121, ff. 36v-38v, 55r-55v, 62r-62v. 
102 M. Prestwich, `The Unreliability of Royal Household Knights in the Early Fourteenth Century', 
Fourteenth Century England II, ed. C. Given-Wilson (Woodbridge, 2002), 5. 
103 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, chapter 5. 
104E 101/8/23, m. 2; C 67/14, m. 11. 
105 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 6r; C 71/4, m. 13. 
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impression of retinue continuity which suggests a higher rate of turnover than was 
probably the case. Thomas de Furnivall is recorded with ten men on the forinsec 
inventory in 1298, including his sub-commander Henry de Pinkeney. In 1296 we have 
the name of just one man who took out a letter of attorney, and four years later only two 
with protections. 106 Sometimes the imbalance in the data is due to the changing status of 
the lords, as some men, such as Bartholomew de Badlesmere and Henry de Beaumont, 
grew in importance in the years leading up to Bannockburn. 1 07 A further problem is the 
presence of sub-units within the retinues. Soldiers tended to take out protections for 
some campaigns with their sub-leaders, but for others with their main company 
commanders. This can inflate the impression of instability, particularly in our period 
when the process of sub-contracting is often difficult to discern. 108 
The impression of retinue composition provided by the service records is 
therefore distorted in such a way as to decrease the number of times that knights and 
sergeants appear to have served with their lords. Bearing this in mind, it cannot be 
stressed enough that the figures and statistics given in the remainder of this chapter are 
minimum figures, probably dramatically so in some cases. This will be taken into 
consideration throughout the discussion. Nevertheless, minimum figures have their uses, 
and can be relied upon to the extent that they err on the side of caution. Of the military 
campaigns that took place between the Welsh war of 1277 and Bannockburn, the 
parameters set for this study, the Falkirk campaign of 1298 was the only one (for 
obvious reasons) on which all fifty of our sample leaders were present and served with 
armed contingents. Service continuity data for all fifty companies put into the field on 
that occasion can be found in the Appendix, but some of the main conclusions can be 
summarised here. Of the 647 knights and sergeants who appear on the horse lists in the 
retinues of these lords in Scotland in 1298, a total of 289, or 45 per cent, can be traced 
in the service of the same men on at least one other campaign between 1277 and 1314. 
In addition to this, 169, or 26 per cent, served within the same retinue on two other 
occasions or more. This suggests a fairly high level of continuity, particularly given that 
106 Gough, 211,222; C 67/11, m. 4; C 67/14, m. 9. 
107 One man took out a protection with Badlesmere for Gascony in 1294 (RG, iii, 101), one had a 
protection for service in Flanders (C 67/12, m. 1), four appear on the horse list in 1298 (Gough, 190), and 
then only five took out protections with him for the Scottish campaigns of 1301 (C 67/14, in. 2), 1303 (C 
67/15, mm. 7,13), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13) and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13). In contrast, some fifty men appear in 
his sub-retinue at Bannockburn; C 71/6, mm. 1,5; C 81/1727, m. 18. For Beaumont we have the names of 
one man in 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 3), five in 1297 (E 101/6/37, in. 7), five in 1298 (Gough, 172), six in 
1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2), seven in 1301 (E 101/9/24, in. 1), six in 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1), and two in 
1306 (E 101/13/16, f. 19r). For his larger companies in 1309 and 1314: CDS, v, 447-9; C 71/6, mm. 3,4. 
108 Evidence of sub-retaining becomes more obvious during the Hundred Years War. Cf. J. Sherborne, 
`Indentured Retinues and English Expeditions to France, 1369-80', War, Politics and Culture in 
Fourteenth-Century England, ed. A. Tuck (London, 1994), 25; A. Curry, Agincourt: A New History, 62-3. 
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some of these retinues are poorly documented and therefore bring the average down. 
John de Havering, the justice of Wales who played a prominent role in putting down the 
Welsh rebellion of 1294-5, was present at Falkirk with a retinue of twenty-five men, but 
little evidence survives of his followers from other campaigns. 109 In contrast, nineteen 
of the sample retinues at Falkirk reveal continuity levels of 60 per cent or higher. All 
four of the sergeants with Edward Charles, namely John de Boxstede, Roger de Aston, 
William de Shoreham and Thomas de Harlesdon, had been with him the previous year 
in Flanders. Two of these, Boxstede and Harlesdon, followed him to war on a third 
occasion. 110 Other modestly-sized retinues at Falkirk which display high continuity 
ratios include those of Hugh Pointz (four out of five men with him on other 
campaigns), " William le Brun (seven out of eight men)' 12 and John Botetourt (eleven 
out of sixteen men). ' 13 Whilst it is not possible to enter into detail on all of these 
retinues, the service continuity of the men with Robert de Mohaut in 1298 reflects the 
recruitment practices of many other lords of similar wealth and status. 
Table 4.1: Service given with Robert de Mohaut by Men in his Retinue in 1298114 
Name of soldier Campaigns served on with Mohaut 
John de Bracebridge (k) 1297,1298,1301,1303,1307,1310 
Roger de Bilney (k) 1297, 1298,1301,1303,1310 
Nicholas de Mohaut (s) 1298, 1301,1303 
William de Bilney (s) 1298, 1300,1301,1303 
Ralph de Kerdiff (s) 1298 
Robert Botevilleyn (s) 1298, 1301,1303 
Thomas Fattinge (s) 1297, 1298,1300,1301,1303 
Richard Strech (s) 1298, 1300,1301,1303,1310 
Adam Place (s) 1298 
Adam de Werington (s) 1298 
Nicholas de Lalleford (s) 1298 
Bartholomew de Morley (s) 1298 
William de Bibington (s) 1298 
John de la Mare (s) 1298, 1300,1301 
Geoffrey de Bracebridge (s) 1298 
109 Ann. Wigorn., 522; Gough, 228-9; E 101/5/18, m. 1; SC 1/27, no. 24. 
110 Gough, 195; E 101 /6/37, m. 7; E 101 /5/23, m. I i; E 101/612/11, m. 6. 
111 Including two men, his son Nicholas and Isambert de St. Blimund, who were with him on a further 
three campaigns in 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 7), 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1), and 1300 (C 67/14, m. 9). 
112 Including four men who were with him in 1297 and 1300, namely John de Roches, Peter de Roches, 
Reginald de la Forde and Hugh de Godeshulle (Gough, 176; E 101/6/37, m. Ii; E 101/8/23, m. 4). 
113 His kinsman William Botetourt was with him on six other occasions, for most of which service, see 
chapter 3 n. 158. Also, see: 1301 (C 67/14, m. 6); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 3). 
114 1297 (C 67/12, m. 2,7); 1298 (Gough, 209); 1300 (PDS, 231); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2); 1303 (C 
67/15, mm. 8,12; E 101 /612/8, m. 1); 1307 (CDS, v, 445-6); 1310 (C 71/4, mm. 6,12). 
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Re-service within the Mohaut retinue was even greater than is shown here as a number 
of these men, including Roger de Bilney, John de Bracebridge and Bartholomew de 
Morley, had taken out letters of protection with Robert's older brother, Roger, in the 
mid- i 290s. 115 The presence of a group of men with several years of collective 
experience must have added to the cohesion and mutual trust of the Mohaut retinue at 
Falkirk. Many of the thirty-two lords who led companies to the Low Countries in 1297 
and then to Scotland in the following year were accompanied by men who served with 
them on both occasions: 172 of the 387 soldiers in their retinues in Flanders (44 per 
cent) subsequently followed them north of the border. One of these lords was Aymer de 
Valence. His retinue in Flanders in 1297 consisted of fifty-four soldiers, including those 
with letters of protection or attorney, of whom twenty-seven went on with him to 
Falkirk. Of those present on both occasions, thirteen, or around a half, also appear in his 
retinue on at least one other campaign. Well-known associates, such as Walter de 
Gacelyn and John de la Ryvere, led the way. 116 These patterns of re-service match what 
has been said for the men at Falkirk in general. Furthermore, they show that it was not 
only the leaders of more compact or average-sized retinues, like Mohaut, who could 
count on the continued support of many of their men. Another of the larger retinues in 
Flanders, that of the steward Walter de Beauchamp, reveals similar trends: seventeen of 
the thirty-four men with him and his son in 1297 also appeared in his company at 
Falkirk, eleven of whom were with him on more than just those two expeditions. Eight 
had also accompanied him to Scotland in 1296,117 whilst at least three - Roger de la 
Mare, John Paynot and William le Skirmissour - had been connected to him since the 
Welsh war of 1294-5.118 Therefore, even though the Falkirk campaign took place at an 
early stage in the Scottish wars, some retinues were already benefiting from military 
experience that had been acquired during the wars in Wales and France. There is no 
ideal standard against which retinue stability can be tested. Indeed historians probably 
differ in the criteria that they set in this respect. Yet, evidence of service with the same 
lord on at least two campaigns for around 50 per cent of the men in the retinues in 
Flanders and at Falkirk, and on at least three expeditions for around 25 per cent of these 
men, seems to contradict prevailing thoughts on this issue. Certainly, it cannot be said 
without some qualification that war retinues in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
115 RG, iii, 121,298. 
116 Gacelyn: 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i); 1298 (Gough, 216); 1299 (Phillips, Aymer de Valence, appendix 
2); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1302 (Phillips, Aymer de Valence, appendix 2); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 7); 1311 (C 
71/5, m. 4). For de la Ryvere's service, most of which was with Valence, see chapter 1 n. 133. 
"7 E 101/5/23, m. 2. 
118 CCW, 48. 
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centuries did not show much stability in membership. ' 19 This becomes clearer still when 
we consider the re-service rates of the soldiers who were with the sample lords in 
Scotland in 1296. 
Table 4.2: Retinue Continuity for Sample Leaders in Scotland, 1296 (1277-1314). 
Leader Number of men with leader: % Times served with 
continuity leader other than in 
1296: 
In 1296 In 1296 (who 1234567 
also served in 
another year) 
Audley 3 2 66 1 1 - - --- J. Beauchamp 3 1 33 - - 1 - --- W. Beauchamp 10 8 80 1 1 - 4 2-- Beaumont 1 1 100 - - - 1 --- Brun 2 1 50 1 - - - --- Charles 3 1 33 - 1 - - --- Chavent 9 4 44 - 2 - 1 1-- Clifford 14 8 57 3 3 1 - -- 1 Courtenay 2 2 100 1 - 1 - --- Despenser 26 12 46 6 2 2 1 1 
Fitz Payn 7 5 71 - 2 1 1 1- Fitz Waryn 11 1 9 1 - - - --- Furnivall 1 1 100 - 1 - - --- H. Mortimer 1 1 100 1 - - - --- Plukenet 13 5 38 2 1 2 - --- Scales 4 4 100 - 1 - 1 2-- Tony 1 1 100 - 1 - - --- Tregoz 1 0 0 - - - - --- Tuchet 2 0 0 - - - - --- Welles 8 3 38 - - 1 - 1 1- 
Total 122 61 50 17 16 9 8 722 
Once again, these figures indicate that, on average, the retinue leaders who went to war 
during the opening stages of the Scottish war could count on re-service levels of at least 
around 50 per cent. For some lords, such as the future steward of the royal household 
Robert Fitz Payn, the 1296 campaign brought together a group of men who would serve 
119 For views and evidence of retinue compositions and instability, see Prestwich, War, Politics and 
Finance, 65; Saul, Knights and Esquires, 83; K. Fowler, The King's Lieutenant: Henry of Grosmont, 
First Duke of Lancaster, 1310-1361 (London, 1969), 182-3 and appendix III; D. S. Green, `Politics and 
Service with Edward the Black Prince', The Age of Edward III, ed. J. S. Bothwell (Woodbridge, 2001), 
58-9; Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity, 50; C. Carpenter, `The Beauchamp Affinity: A Study of Bastard 
Feudalism at Work', EHR, xcv (1980), 519-20; S. Stewart, `Simon de Montfort and his Followers, June 
1263', EHR, cxix (2004), 967-8. In contrast, see Ayton, `Sir Thomas Ughtred', 123; idem, `The English 
Army at Crecy', 204-15; Bell, War and the Soldier, 97-8. 
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together several times in future years, even though they apparently had no collective 
military experience at that date. Of the seven men who are known to have been with 
him in that year, five can be found in his retinue in the Low Countries and the later 
Scottish wars, but none appear in his retinue before that time. ' 20 This may be the result 
of unbalanced documentary survival, for other leaders, such as Hugh le Despenser 
senior and Nicholas de Audley, could count on men-at-arms who had been with them in 
Wales. 121 The truly striking feature of the data presented in this table, when compared 
with what has already been noted for the Falkirk campaign, is the large number of men 
who served with their lords on more than two occasions up to 1314. Forty-four of the 
122 individuals who can be identified in the sample retinues in 1296, or 36 per cent, 
gave military service with their 1296 leaders on at least three ventures, compared with 
26 per cent of the men at Falkirk. Among these were two soldiers, Thomas de Monteny 
with Robert de Clifford and John de Haudlo with Hugh le Despenser senior, who rode 
with their lords a further seven times. 122 Adam de Welles, meanwhile, could count on 
the service of Thomas de Brumwych in no fewer than six other hosts. 123 The higher rate 
of re-service in 1296 is possibly due to our reliance for some of the retinues on letters of 
protection and attorney, which tend to name those who were most closely associated 
with their lords. In contrast, the 1298 horse lists provide the names of many middling 
sergeants whose service on other campaigns is difficult to trace. That is not to say, 
however, that the Falkirk data are the more reliable of the two, for the presence on the 
inventories of so many lesser men who did not take out letters of protection for other 
campaigns inevitably increases the number of one-timers in that year. This point raises 
the more general issue of whether the rank of the soldier in any way influenced the 
likelihood of his re-service with the same lord. So as to avoid the documentary pitfalls 
outlined above, five successive campaigns for which horse lists are available have been 
analysed to investigate whether there was any great disparity between the continuity 
120 John de Cary was also with him in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1), 1298 (Gough, 171), 1300 (PDS, 221), 
1303 (C 67/15, m. 6), 1306 (C 67/16, m. 4), and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13), John de Derneford in 1297 (E 
101/6/19, m. 1), 1298 (Gough, 171), and 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13), Geoffrey de Harden in 1297 (E 101/6/19, 
m. 1), 1298 (Gough, 171), 1300 (PDS, 221), and 1303 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 46v), Geoffrey de la Linde 
in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1) and 1298 (Gough, 171), and Simon de Ralegh in 1297 (E 101/6/19, m. 1) and 
1298 (Gough, 171). For 1296; E 101/5/23, m. 2. For earlier campaigns we have the names of three men 
proffered by Fitzpayn in 1277 (PW, i, 202) and three in 1282 (PW, i, 229). 
21 At least five of the men with Despenser, namely John de Haudlo, John Hastang, Robert de Stanegrave, 
Henry le Tyes and Theobald de St. George, and two of those with Audley, John de Everus and Robert de 
Meynill, were with them in Wales in 1294-5: C 67/10, mm. 5d, 6; CCW, 46. 
122 Monteny; see chapter 3 n. 159 for his service up to and including 1311, and 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1). 
Haudlo: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (Gough, 187); 1300 
(C 47/1/6, m. 3); 1303 (CVCR, 82); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 6); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). 
123 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 4); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 
1303-4 (BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 49r); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 11). 
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patterns of knights and those of lesser rank. From these hosts, eleven companies which 
appear on each of the said inventories have been selected for closer scrutiny. The data is 
presented on a year-by-year basis so as to provide an impression of continuity from 
campaign to campaign as it might have been discerned at the time. 
Table 4.3: Service Continuity in Selected Retinues by Rank (1297-1303) 124 
Leader Retinue continuity from campaign to campaign: * 
1297-1298 
KS 
1298-1300 
KS 
1300-1301 
KS 
1301-1303 
KS 
Beaumont 1/1 3/4 1/1 3/4 1/1 2/5 0/1 2/6 
Benstede 2/2 2/5 - - 2/2 3/9 1/2 4/10 
Bykenore - 2/3 - 1/3 - 2/2 - 3/3 
Drokensford 1/3 6/25 3/3 10/21 3/6 7/21 2/3 9/20 
Haustede - 2/4 - 1 /3 - 1 /2 - 1 /3 
Leyburn 1 /4 7/18 1 /3 4/12 3/6 4/15 2/3 5/12 
Lovel - 2/3 - 2/5 - 4/5 - 4/8 
Malemains - 2/6 - 0/3 - 2/2 - 1 /4 
Scales 0/1 3/8 0/1 1/6 0/1 2/6 0/3 2/14 
Tony 2/2 2/12 1 /2 3/14 1 /2 4/8 0/3 1115 
Welles 0/1 7/13 1/3 3/11 1/4 3/11 1/2 3/10 
Total 7/14 38/101 7/13 28/82 11/22 34/86 6/17 35/105 
(% by rank) (50%) (38%) (54%) (34%) (50%) (40%) (35%) (33%) 
* Clerks not included. Only one clerk is named on the 1300 inventory with Benstede 
so his figures for 1300-1301 are carried over from the Falkirk campaign. 
The figures given here offer a more nuanced insight into levels of retinue stability 
showing that, on a campaign-by-campaign basis, lords could usually rely on the 
continued service of around 40-55 per cent of the knights who had been with them in 
the previous year, compared with 35-40 per cent of the sergeants. Before reading too 
much into this, a couple of factors must be taken into consideration. Firstly, the 
tendency of large retinues to contain a number of smaller sub-units probably had a much 
greater impact on the re-service ratios of sergeants than knights as in such instances the 
bachelors, rather than the sergeants, would have acted as the secondary recruiters. This 
is well illustrated by the retinue of the earl Warenne during the War of St. Sardos, which 
shows that no less than eighty of the lesser men-at-arms in his extended retinue were 
recruited by his sub-leaders, primarily his bachelors such as Ralph de Cobham and 
124 1297 Flanders (E 101/6/IQ, 28,37), 1298,1300,1301 and 1303 Scotland (Gough, 160-237; E 
101 /8/23; E 101 /9/23,24; E 101 /612/7,8,9,11). 
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Ralph Dacre. 125 Just as significantly, although the continuity rate among the sergeants 
seems to have been relatively low when viewed from a proportional perspective, in real 
terms sergeants tended to contribute more of a lord's regular followers than did his 
knights. Thus, taking the five years as whole, the keeper of the wardrobe John de 
Drokensford could count on a pool of eight sergeants who served with him twice, seven 
who were with him on three occasions, two (John de Flambard and William de 
Fauconberg) who were with him four times, and one, Thomas de Burghunt, who loyally 
served him on all five of his expeditions between 1297 and 1303.126 Similar re-service 
rates can be found among the sergeants who accompanied Drokensford's fellow 
wardrobe clerk John de Benstede, as well as among those with lesser lords, such as 
Richard Lovel and Thomas de Bykenore. 127 These figures, therefore, do not show that 
sergeants were less inclined to follow the same lords to war repeatedly, merely that the 
pool of sergeants was so large that retinue leaders could afford to recruit a few new men 
of that rank each time that they were summoned by the king. Retaining the services of a 
loyal body of knights and sub-recruiters was probably a more pressing concern. 
Nevertheless, the particularly high continuity of the knights is worthy of our attention, 
revealing as it does that the more established members of the gentry - precisely the kind 
of individuals whom, it has been suggested, were more inclined to pursue their own 
interests - were not averse to giving repeated service in the retinues of the same lords. 
Both of the knights with Robert de Tony in Flanders, Adam de la Forde and William de 
Chabenore, were with him in 1298,128 whilst Fulk Peyforer served with William de 
Leyburn in all five years. 129 One notable exception was Robert de Scales who recruited 
almost a new set of knights for each campaign. Only one of his knights, John de Vaux, 
served him more than once, in the hosts of 1298 and 1301, although he had also 
previously accompanied Scales to Flanders as a sergeant. '30 
Whilst providing a detailed short-term insight into continuity patterns at the 
height of Edward I's wars, the above figures do not account for the many men who 
125 E 101/17/31. 
126 For Drokensford's retinues on these campaigns: E 101/6/37, mm. 2i-ii; Gough, 174-5; E 101/8/23, 
mm. 3-4,7d; Liber Quotidianus, 202-3 (the latter for confirmation that the men on the 1300 inventory 
were indeed with Drokensford); E 101 /9/24, mm. 1 d, 3,4; E 101/612/11, m. 5. 
127 One sergeant, Alexander de Norton, was with Benstede on all four campaigns for which men-at-arms 
are listed whilst two others, Richard de Dunmowe and John de Aulton, are named three times: E 
101/6/37, m. 2iii; Gough, 177; E 101/9/24, m. 2; E 101/612/11, m. 3. All the men-at-arms with Lovel and 
Bykenore were sergeants, William de Punchardon serving with the former, and John de Bykenore with 
the latter, in all five armies. Punchardon: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1298 (Gough, 179); 1300 (E 101/8/23, 
m. 1); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1). J. de Bykenore: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1298 
(Gough, 162); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 4); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 3). 
128 E 101/6/37, m. 4; Gough, 164. 
129E 101/6/37, m. 4; Gough, 194; E 101/8/23, m. 4; E 101/9/23, m. 3; E 101/612/11, m. 5d. 
130 Gough, 170; E 101/9/24, m. 4; E 101/6/37, m. 2i. 
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disappeared from service with their lords between 1297 and 1303 only to turn up again 
in their retinues in later armies. Connections between lords and their men often lasted 
much longer than would seem to have been the case from a cursory glance at the 
military records. The sergeant Thomas de Hauteclou was with Robert de Clifford at 
Falkirk and was possibly in his company on some of the campaigns that followed, but 
the next time that he appears with his lord in a martial context was when he had his 
horse appraised on the Scottish March during the winter of 1311-12.131 Similar evidence 
is available for men in other retinues. The interesting point arising from such gaps is 
that the length of time that some men spent in the service of their lords reveals a degree 
of continuity much greater than that suggested by a consideration of their frequency of 
service alone. It is only when one consults other kinds of record that many more lasting 
connections begin to emerge. The sergeant Roger de la Mare served with Walter de 
Beauchamp on six occasions between 1294 and 1301, but it would seem, from the 
evidence of a commission of oyer and terminer issued in Worcestershire in 1284, that 
the two men had been connected for at least a decade by the time of the great Welsh 
rebellion. 132 Likewise, William Malherbe, who took out a letter of protection with 
Richard Lovel for the only time in 1314, had been granted a weekly market in Somerset 
at Lovel's request five years earlier. 133 Evidently, it would be wrong to assume that all 
of the men who accompanied their lords to war on only one occasion were previously 
unfamiliar to them. This is most clearly indicated by an analysis of the arms of the 
knights who fought at some stage or other within the retinue of William de Leyburn. Of 
the various knights who served with Leyburn between the first Welsh campaign of 1277 
and his death in 1310, at least six bore variations of the Leyburn coat azure, six lions 
rampant argent. Yet all six of these knights, Thomas de Sandwich, 134 Nicholas 
Pessun, 135 Richard de Rokesley, 136 John le Sauvage, 137 Roger de Tilmanston138 and 
William de Detling, 139 can be found in Leyburn's company on no more than one 
occasion. It seems highly likely that all of these south-eastern landholders and their 
families had close links with the Leyburn family in Kent. However, were it not for such 
131 Gough, 197; E 101/14/15, m. 3. 
132 1294 (see above, n. 118); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. 2); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. Iii); 1298 (Gough, 183); 
1300 (Liber Quotidianus, 174); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2). Also CPR, 1281-92,144. 
133 C 71/6, m. 3; Cal. Ch. Rolls, iii, 128. 
'34 Aspilogia III, ii, 380; E 101/13/7, m. 2 (1306). (Or, on a chief azure three lions rampant argent). 
135 Aspilogia III, ii, 339; PW, i, 203 (1277). (Ermine, on afess azure three lions rampant argent). 
136 Aspilogia III, ii, 368; E 10 1/8/23, m. 4 (1300). (Azure, afess gules between six lions rampant argent). 
137 Aspilogia III, ii, 381; E 101/6/37, m. 4 (1297). (Ermine, on a chief azure three lions rampant argent). 
138 Aspilogia III, ii, 416; C 47/2/5, m. 2 (1282-3). (Gules, six lions rampant with forked tails argent). 
139 Aspilogia III, ii, 141; Gough, 194 (1298). (Sable, six lions rampant argent). 
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armorial evidence, one might be inclined to suspect that their ties to Leyburn did not last 
beyond the one military expedition. 
Having established that soldiers who appear to have served with their lords on 
only one or two occasions often had more lasting connections to them, the question 
remains as to where these lords drew their most regular military followers from. This is 
a problem that has attracted many historians in a variety of contexts. In his study of the 
men who rebelled against John in 1214-15, J. C. Holt observed that familial, tenurial and 
neighbourhood bonds each played conflicting and overlapping roles in influencing the 
way that men acted during times of political crisis. 140 Kinship, land and locality likewise 
determined the composition of a large proportion of the military retinues that were 
brought together during the wars of Edward I and Edward II. Soldiers related to their 
lords can be found at the heart of many retinues in our sample: it was often these 
individuals who accompanied the retinue leaders to war most frequently. The kinship 
bond between the families of Badlesmere and Burgherssh certainly had practical 
resonance in the field. Stephen de Burgherssh went to Scotland with Badlesmere in 
1298 and 1303 before serving with him at the Dunstable tournament in 1309, and 
Robert and Bartholomew de Burgherssh also appear in his retinue. 141 In like manner, the 
marriage contract drawn up between the families of Valence and Hastings in 1275 to 
overcome an enmity that had arisen during the Barons' Wars had lasting consequences: 
John de Hastings junior was in the earl of Pembroke's comitiva north of the border 
several decades later in 1311,1314,1315,1319 and 1322.142 Despite the perceived 
decline in the importance of `feudal' tenants to the composition of war retinues by the 
late thirteenth century, such landed ties still retained much of their vitality. Henry de 
Beaumont's inquisition post mortem in 1340 shows that five of the men who had served 
with him prior to 1314, or their descendants, were tenants of his in Lincolnshire, 
including a William Marmyon, possibly the man of that name who had been with him to 
Scotland in 1308,1309,1310, and 1314.143 Robert de Clifford's inquisition in 1314, the 
year of his death at Bannockburn, shows that no fewer than seventeen individuals or 
140 J . C. Holt, The Northerners: 
A Study in the Reign of King John (Oxford, 1961), 36. 
14' For the kinship bond, see SC 8/66, no. 3291. Also: Gough, 190; C 67/15, m. 7; A. Tomkinson, 
`Retinues at the Tournament of Dunstable, 1309', EHR, lxxiv (1959), 76; E 101/15/6, m. 3. 
142 Calendar of Entries in the Papal Registers Relating to Great Britain and Ireland: Papal Letters, ed. 
W. H. Bliss et al., 20 vols, vols i-xiv (London, 1893-1960), vols xv-xx (Dublin, 1978-2005), i, 450. For 
Hastings' service with Valence: 1311 (C 71/5, m. 4); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3); 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1); 1319 
(C 71/10, m. 5); 1322 (CPR, 1321-24,186). 
'431PM, viii, no. 271; 1308 (Rotuli Scotiae, i, 59); 1309 (CDS, v, 449); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 11); 
1314 (C 
71/6, m. 3). The other families were St. Loe, Bayouse, Doune and Darcy. 
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families who had given military service with him were, in fact, his tenants. 144 Some of 
these men might have been granted lands or rents as a consequence of their military 
service. Richard de Harley, who was in Roger de Mortimer of Chirk's service in 1306 
and 1310 before joining the retinue of his nephew in 1314, was favoured with rents in 
Shropshire. 145 John de Wymer and Fulk Peyforer, regular campaigners with Robert de 
Tony and William de Leyburn respectively, received similar remuneration for their 
continued loyalties. 146 
The most substantial forms of reward for military service were bound up in the 
terms of indentures of retinue, but it is difficult to reconcile the great emphasis that has 
been placed on indentured retainers by historians with the lack of evidence for such 
connections. The first indenture that was drawn up between the Crown and a contractor 
for a military campaign dates from 1316-17.147 It may be that few lords went to the 
trouble of employing them in their own relationships until the Crown began to use the 
indenture system more frequently. The few that relate to the lords in our sample and 
their men support the view that where used, such contracts could be very useful in 
guaranteeing the re-service of a small core of soldiers. Adam de la Forde, an indentured 
retainer of Robert de Tony, was with his lord on four occasions between 1297 and 1301 
after an agreement was drawn up during the preparations for the Flanders campaign; 148 
and John Darcy was among Aymer de Valence's most regular campaigners, following 
him to war frequently during the reign of Edward 11.149 The overlap between the 
household and indentured retainers has already been noted by J. M. W. Bean. 150 It would 
seem that members of a lord's familia were just as important as the indentured group in 
providing him with a reliable source of manpower. The chronicler Nicholas Trivet 
observed that Geoffrey de Langley, who was with Edmund of Lancaster in Wales in 
1282 and Gascony in 1295, was a member of Lancaster's household. l51 His son, 
144 IPM, v, no. 533. Thomas de Hellebek, Andrew de Harcla, Richard de Musgrave, Robert de Askeby, 
Robert le Engleys, the Tailleboys family, Thomas de Multon of Gilsland, John de Harcla, the Coupland 
family, the Helton family, Thomas de Hauteclou, the Engayne family, the Swyneburne family, the 
Mauleverer family, John de Penreth, John le Engleys and the Monteny family. 145 C 67/16, m. 4; C 71/4, m. 13; C 71/6, m. 1; C 143/106/2. Cf. I. Mortimer, The Greatest Traitor: The 
Life of Sir Roger Mortimer, 1 S` Earl of March, Ruler of England, 1327-1330 (London, 2003), 66. 
146 Wymer: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 5); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 1); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 
l0d); and rents (C 143/131/13). Peyforer: above n. 129; A Descriptive Catalogue of Ancient Deeds in the 
Public Record Office, 6 vols, (London, 1890-1915), iii, 160. 
147 N. B. Lewis, `An Early Fourteenth Century Contract for Military Service', BIHR, xx (1943-5), 111-18. 
148 Above n. 128 and chapter 3 n. 131; Bean, From Lord to Patron, 47-8. 
149 Indenture ('Private Indentures for Life Service', no. 15); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13); 1310 (PW, II, ii, 401); 
1314 (C 71/6, m. 5); 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1); 1319 (C 71/10, m. 5); 1322 (CPR, 1321-24,186). 
'50 Bean, From Lord to Patron, 143. 
151 Trivet, 330; C 67/8, m. 5d (1282); RG, iii, 296 (1295). Also, see W. E. Rhodes, `Edmund, earl of 
Lancaster', EHR, x (1895), 228; `Account of the Expenses of John of Brabant and Thomas and Henry of 
Lancaster, AD. 1292-3, ed. J. Burtt, Camden Miscellany II, Camden Society 1st ser., Iv (1853), xv, 10. 
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Edmund, later gave service with Thomas of Lancaster in Scotland in 1297,1298 and 
1301: he was probably a member of the Lancastrian familia as his father had been. '52 
John de Cam, the steward of Roger de Mortimer of Chirk, provides another example of 
a household retainer who gave regular military service on behalf of his lord. He can be 
traced either preparing for or serving in war with Mortimer on seven occasions between 
1294 and 1319.153 Other connections between lords and their regular followers are more 
difficult to pin down, and might have arisen from less tangible bonds of friendship or 
neighbourly association. J. R. Maddicott traced the connection between Robert Fitz 
Nigel and Thomas of Lancaster back to 1302 when he witnessed one of the earl's 
charters, 154 but a roll of household expenses of Thomas and Henry of Lancaster, dating 
from 1297 and recording payments for two saddles with the arms of Sir Robert Fitz 
Nigel, suggests that the connection went back still further. '55 The nature of the bond 
between these men is not clear. It was, at least, long-lasting, for Fitz Nigel later appears 
in Lancaster's retinue in Scotland in 1303,1306 and 1319, as well as at the first 
Dunstable tournament. '56 William de Scalebroke, who was with Ralph Pipard in Wales 
in 1295 and Scotland in 1298 and 1300, witnessed the granting of a manor by the latter 
to Hugh le Despenser in 1301.157 Meanwhile Ralph le Bygod, with Peter de Chavent in 
1297 and 1298, later accompanied him overseas on what might have been a diplomatic 
mission in the summer of 1301.158 Whether the ties between such men arose from 
within the household, through indentures, or by less formal bonds is now difficult to 
discern. Still, it is clear that soldiers and their lords did not confine their mutual 
associations to the sphere of war, and that their connections often lasted well beyond the 
duration of a campaign. 
From what has been said thus far it is evident that the ties between military 
leaders and their men in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were often of a 
durable nature. The analysis has been focussed, for the most part, on the well- 
documented campaigns that took place at the height of the wars of Edward I because it 
is only by carrying out the kind of in-depth analysis facilitated by such favourable 
record survival that meaningful conclusions can be reached about retinue stability. 
152 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3); 1298 (Gough, 179); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 5). 
153 Ancient Deeds, iii, 439; 1294 (RG, iii, 167); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 6); 1301 (E 101/9/23, m. 2); 1306 
(C 67/16, m. 8); 1310 (C 71/4, m. 13); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1); 1319 (C 71/10, m. 3). 
154 Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, 61, n. 5. 
iss C 47/3/28, m. 3. 
156 1303 (C 67/15, m. 13); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); 1309 (Tomkinson, `Retinues at Dunstable', 74); 1319 
(Maddicott, Thomas of Lancaster, 61, n. 5). 
157 C 67/10, m. 3; Gough, 220; PDS, 222; Ancient Deeds, ii, 163. 
158 E 101/6/37, m. l i; Gough, 168; CPR, 1292-1301,601. 
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Nevertheless, consideration of the service continuity for earlier and later campaigns may 
also tell us a great deal about retaining and recruitment practices. In this respect the 
Welsh war of 1282-3, the only early venture for the reign of Edward I for which horse 
inventories have survived, offers an ideal opportunity to compare the retinue continuity 
in the first and second halves of the reign. Did magnate retinues follow those of the king 
in revealing a high rate of turnover between the 1280s and the French and Scottish wars 
of the 1290s, or did the aristocracy display greater stability in retinue composition? Of 
the fifty lords in our sample nine, or around a fifth, also served as retinue leaders during 
the second Welsh war, but we lack the names of the two sergeants who were with 
Walter de Beauchamp. Taking the remaining eight fully-documented retinues which 
appear on the horse inventories for that year, four reveal evidence of personnel 
continuity with the later expeditions of the 1290s and 1300s. Three of the nineteen men 
with Ralph Basset of Drayton later served with him in Wales in 1294-5; one of these, 
Robert de Shelton, was also with him in Gascony the following year and in Scotland in 
1298.159 Two of the six soldiers with Peter de Chavent joined him on either the Flanders 
or Falkirk campaign some fifteen years later; 160 two of the nine soldiers with William de 
Leyburn also re-appear with him in the 1290s; 161 and Thomas de Bykenore was 
accompanied by his kinsman John in both 1282 and 1298.162 These figures may not 
seem particularly impressive by comparison with those given above, but it should be 
remembered (as little evidence survives relating to these retinues for the Welsh 
campaign of 1287) that over a decade separates the phases of war under analysis. Many 
of the men who had served in Wales might simply have died or retired during the 
intervening period. Furthermore, whilst the majority of the soldiers with our sample 
leaders in 1282 cannot be traced with them on later campaigns, individuals with the 
same surnames, probably their descendants, sometimes can. Thus, the William Caus 
with Hugh Pointz in Flanders in 1297 may be linked to the Richard Caus who was with 
him in 1282,163 and the Ralph de Pipe with Ralph Basset in 1282 to a Thomas de Pipe 
with his son twenty-four years later. 164 
So far, the issue of familial continuity within the retinues has been avoided 
because of the need to establish, in the first instance, the rates of re-service among 
159 John de Bodeham and John de Clinton: 1282 (C 47/2/7, m. 4); 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6). Robert de 
Shelton, ibid, 1296 (RG, iii, 324) and 1298 (Gough, 224). 
160 Peter Doleyns: C 47/2/7, m. 12; Gough, 168. Caned de Staney: C 47/2/7, m. 12; E 101/6/37, m. Ii. 
161 William de Iffeld: 1282 (C 47/2/5, m. 2); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1298 (Gough, 194). Peter de Ros: 
1282 (C 47/2/5, m. 2); 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 5d). 
162 C 47/2/6, m. 6; Gough, 162. 
163 E 101/6/19, m. 1; C 47/2/7, m. 1. 
164 C 47/2/5, m. 2; C 67/16, m. 5. 
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individual soldiers. Furthermore, family relations between men with the same surname, 
particularly those of sub-knightly rank, can rarely be proven beyond doubt. Yet, the 
family was one of the most important units of social organisation within medieval 
Europe. Therefore, even if familial continuity within the retinue does not lend itself to 
the same kind of statistical analysis as individual continuity, it is something which we 
must take into account and without which our impression of retinue stability would be 
severely distorted. Earlier, we saw how a minimum of 45 per cent of the men-at-arms in 
the retinues of our Falkirk leaders served with them on at least one other occasion 
between the first Welsh war and Bannockburn. When we factor in re-service within the 
same family the degree of stability becomes all the more impressive. Four of the 
soldiers in Ralph Pipard's company in 1298 who seem to have followed him to war on 
just that one occasion - Adam le Mareschal, Simon Barry, John de Scalebroke and 
George Giffard - shared their surnames with other men in the retinue at Falkirk who can 
be shown to have served with Pipard at least twice. 165 Five of the soldiers with Aymer 
de Valence in 1298 fall into a similar category. 166 The significance of such family links 
becomes more evident when we study the composition of magnate retinues over 
extended periods of time. Robert de Clifford's retinue reveals around twenty-two 
kinship groups: service within his comitiva rotated as family members came and went 
on a regular basis. 167 Whilst John de Harcla was with Clifford in Scotland in 1296, 
William de Harcla accompanied him to Falkirk and Andrew de Harcla in 1311.168 
Although none of these men seem to have served with Clifford more than once, the 
family was represented in his company on at least three occasions. In like manner, 
Andrew de Penreth was with Clifford in 1311, John de Penreth in 1303,1306,1307 and 
1310, and a third member of the family, Robert, in 1300.169 Clifford's retinue was by no 
means exceptional in this respect for John de Drokensford's company reveals around 
fifteen family groupings with rotating service in the comitiva, 
170 Thomas of Lancaster's 
165 Gough, 220-1. Ralph le Mareschal and William de Scalebroke in 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 3), and John 
Giffard and Robert Barry in 1300 (C 47/1/6, m. 3). 
166 William de Acton, Peter de Paris, Richard Pauncefot, Roger de Sakeville and Hugh le Taillour were 
with Valence at Falkirk only (Gough, 216-18), but a Walter de Acton and Gilbert de Paris were with him 
in 1297 (E 101/6/28, in. 2i), a Walter Pauncefot in 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13), a Richard de Sakeville in 1315 
(E 101/15/6, m. 1) and Thomas de Sakeville in 1301 and 1303 (E 101/9/24, m. l d; E 101/612/10, m. 1), 
and a Robert and William le Taillour in 1297 and 1301 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i; E 101/9/24, m. Id). 
167 The families of Hellebek, Multon, Redman, Penreth, Engleys, Harcla, Vepont, Monteny, Stirkeland, 
Lancaster, Kirkebride, Latimer, Rossegill, Louther, Sheffeld, Boys, Haustede, Leyburn, Joneby, 
Mauneby, Swyneburne and Ellesfeld. 
168 E 101/5/23, m. li; Gough, 197; C 71/4, m. 4. 
169 Andrew; E 101/14/15, m. 3. John: 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13); 1307 (E 
101/14/15, m. 9); 1310 (Rotuli Scotiae, i, 89). Robert; E 101/8/23, m. 5. 
170 The families of Chamberleyn, Flambard, Sauvage, Harenhull, Blakenham, Kendal, Molenders, 
Punchardon, Burghunt, Popham, Cormailles, Burnel, Gilbert, de la Hyde and Staney. 
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the same number, ' 7' and Aymer de Valence's a startling fifty-one. ' 72 There is no space 
to analyse all these connections here. Nonetheless, the figures speak volumes about the 
importance of kinship networks to the recruitment drives of leading magnates in these 
years. 
Family relations become increasingly relevant as we look towards Bannockburn 
and the years beyond. Several lords, such as Ralph Pipard (d. 1303), Hugh Bardolf 
(d. 1304) and Robert de Tony (d. 1309) predeceased that defeat; Edmund de Mauley and 
Robert de Clifford, on the other hand, were slain in the battle. Careful analysis of the 
retinues of the ten men in our sample who were still serving as leaders in 1314 gives the 
impression that many soldiers were recruited in that year who had not served with them 
in the past. Only eleven of the sixty men with the Despensers can be found with them in 
previous hosts, 173 and five of the twenty-seven with Henry de Beaumont. 174 Both 
Beaumont and two other men with low continuity rates, Edmund de Mauley and 
Bartholomew de Badlesmere, appear to have had far larger retinues with them at 
Bannockburn than in previous years, particularly in the case of the latter two. We must 
also take into account that neither of the Despensers had given military service for 
several years. These factors, together with the consideration that Bannockburn is a 
relatively poorly-documented campaign, means that we should not read too much into 
these figures. At least twenty of the men with Aymer de Valence at Bannockburn had 
ridden with him before, 175 and seven of the thirteen soldiers who took out protections 
with Robert de Clifford. 176 Therefore there is no reason to believe that the army in 1314 
was any less experienced than the hosts that had been raised at the height of the wars of 
17' Gacelyn, St. Maur, Legh, Swynnerton, Waldeshef, Dacre, Holland, Lughtburghe, Limesy, Botiller, 
Grandison, Metham, Segrave, St. Martin and Trussell. 
172 E. g. Reginald de Paveley appears in the retinue in 1301 and 1314 (see chapter 3, n. 238), and was 
proffered by Valence in 1322 (C 47/5/10, m. liii), Richard de Paveley was with him in 1315 (E 101/15/6, 
m. 1), and Walter de Paveley during the War of St. Sardos (CPR, 1321-24,427). 
173 Ralph de Cammoys: 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (Gough, 188); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1303 (C 
67/15, m. 14); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 11); 1307 (CDS, v, 445); 1308 (Rotuli Scotiae, i, 55). John de 
Ratingden: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 6); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (Gough, 187); 1303 (CVCR, 81); 1306 (C 
67/16, m. 5); 1307 (C 67/7, m. 1). John de Haudlo; see above n. 122. Walter Haket: 1297 (C 67/12, m. 
3d); 1298 (Gough, 187); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). John Russel: 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 1298 (Gough, 
187). John Joce: 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3d); 1298 (Gough, 188). Martin de 
Fishacre; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 9). Richard de Everley: 1298 (Gough, 188); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). Richard 
de Chastillon; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 8). Robert de Bologne; 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10). Nicholas de Alneto; 1306 
(C 67/16, m. 11). For their service in 1314; C 71/6, mm. 1-5. 
174 Richard le Breton; 1311 (C 71/5, m. 5). Henry de Percy; 1309 (CDS, v, 448). John de Eure: 1308 
(Rotuli Scotiae, i, 58); 1311 (C 71/4, m. 5). Roger de Haudlo: 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 
101/612/11, m. 1); 1308 (Rotuli Scotiae, i, 59). William Marmyon: 1308,1309 and 1310 (above n. 143). 
For their service in 1314; C 71/6, mm. 3,4. 
15 Eight, Maurice de Berkeley, Robert de Berkeley, Richard Wyriott, John de la Ryvere, John de 
Gacelyn, Thomas de Gurnay, William de Wauton and Roger de Ingepenne, had been with him at Falkirk: 
Gough, 216-18; C 67/13, m. 7. For 1314; C 71/6, mm. 1,3,5,8. 
176 Most of these, such as Richard de Huddleston (C 67/16, m. 8; C 71/6, m. 1) and Nicholas and Robert 
de Leyburn (C 67/16, m. 13; C 71/6, m. 1) had joined the retinue since 1306. 
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Edward I, although the more extended gaps between major campaigns under Edward II 
might have increased the number of first-timers a little. If we go back a few years to the 
more fully-documented army of 1310-11, we find that the degree of retinue stability was 
very similar to that for previous expeditions. 
Table 4.4: Retinue Continuity for Sample Leaders in Scotland, 1310-11 (1277-1314)* 
Leader Number of men with leader: % Times served with leader 
continuity other than in 1310 
In In 1310 (who also 1234567 
1310 served in other year) 
Badlesmere 1 0 0 - - - - --- 
Beaumont 13 3 23 1 1 1 - --- 
Botetourt 7 2 29 1 1 - - --- 
Clifford 47 24 51 11 5 4 2 1 1 
Fitz Payn 11 6 55 3 1 1 - -1- 
Lovel 2 2 100 - - - 1 -1- 
Mohaut 14 4 29 - 1 - 2 1-- 
R. Mortimer 9 6 66 1 - 2 2 1-- 
Welles 1 1 100 - - - - -1- 
Total 105 48 46 17 9 8 7 331 
* Table does not include men proffered by sample lords at the feudal muster 
Given that we lack a horse inventory for the army of 1310, it seems reasonable to 
assume that the continuity rates for that campaign were again around the 50 per cent 
mark, as with previous hosts. The sample for that year is smaller than one would like. 
Even so, it is interesting to note that a minimum of three of those with Henry de 
Beaumont, and five with Robert de Clifford, were also with their lords in 1314, 
suggesting that whilst many new men might have been recruited for Bannockburn, there 
was also a core of experienced campaigners within most of the retinues. '77 Three of 
those with Robert de Mohaut in 1310 had been with him at Falkirk; 178 and the same 
number had been associated with Roger de Mortimer of Chirk since the time of the 
Gascon campaign of 1294.179 The decision to use Bannockburn as a cut-off point means 
that the table does not account for many interesting bonds that lasted beyond 1314. No 
fewer than nine of the twenty-two men who had letters of protection with Henry de 
177 Beaumont: Breton, Eure and Marmyon, see above n. 174. Clifford: Nicholas and Robert de Leyburn 
(see preceding note), Thomas de Monteny (see above n. 122 and chapter 3 n. 159), John Mauleverer 
(CCW, 351; C 71/6, m. 1), and William de Penyngton (Rotuli Scotiae, i, 89; C 71/6, m. 1). 
178 Roger de Bilney, John de Bracebridge and Richard Strech (see above, table 4.1 and n. 114. ) 
179 John de Cam (see above n. 153), Hugh Godard (see chapter 3 n. 107 and n. 216) and John de Mortimer 
(RG, iii, 167; C 71/4, m. 13). 
-.. aid 
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Beaumont at the siege of Berwick in 1319 had fought with him at Bannockburn or 
earlier, including the father of the famous Northumbrian chronicler, Thomas Gray of 
Heton. ' 80 Gray junior, though writing several decades later, recalled the bond between 
his father and Beaumont and how the two men had squabbled at Bannockburn. This 
point is of particular interest given that comments by contemporaries on lord-follower 
relations are very rare. That the younger Gray remembered this earlier tie between his 
father and Beaumont says a great deal about the durability of traditions of service within 
genteel families. ' 81 We lack the names of the warriors who later accompanied 
Beaumont to Scotland during the early years of the reign of Edward III, including 
during his finest hour at Dupplin Moor in 1332.182 Nevertheless, at least fourteen of the 
men-at-arms who headed north of the border with the Despensers in 1322 had been 
connected to them since Bannockburn or earlier. 183 The same applies to a similar 
number who had previous links with the earl of Pembroke. ' 84 Therefore, the continued 
allegiance of a large group of soldiers to Beaumont beyond 1314 was by no means 
exceptional, nor should we expect it to have been given what has been said about 
retinue stability for many earlier English armies. 
Particularly striking is the way that a number of the bonds between men-at-arms 
and their lords continued or were revived among their descendants later in the 
fourteenth century. Five of the men in the company of Ralph Basset of Drayton in 
Scotland in 1333, John and Richard de Stafford, John de Sutton, and William and 
Richard de Whytacre, were probably related to Edmund de Stafford, Richard de Sutton 
and Richard de Whytacre who had earlier accompanied Basset senior to Wales and 
180 William de Bokminster; 1309 (CDS, v, 448). Robert le Breton; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Peter de 
Saltmarsh, John de Lymbury, Thomas de Gaveley, and Philip and Norman Darcy in 1314; C 71/6, m. 3. 
Thomas Gray; 1311 (C 71/5, m. 5). William le Mareschal: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 7); 1298 (Gough, 172); 
1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 2); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1); 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 1). For 1319; C 71/10, m. 4. 
181 Scalacronica, 75. 
182 For Beaumont's victory at Dupplin Moor, see J. Sumption, The Hundred Years War: Trial by Battle 
(London, 1990), 124-6. 
183 Ralph de Cammoys, Richard de Chastillon, Martin de Fishacre, John de Haudlo, John Joce and John 
de Ratingden; see above, n. 173. Ralph Basset: 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1301 (C 67/14, m. 5). Thomas 
Chaunterel; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Ralph de Gorges: 1304 (C 67/15, m. 2); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 12); 1309 
(Tomkinson, `Retinues at Dunstable', 76). Simon de Lyndeseye; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). Richard de Mascy; 
1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Robert de Stanegrave: 1294 (C 67/10, m. 5d); 1296 (E 101/5/23, m. li). Robert de 
Torkesey; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 3). Philip de Verley; 1310 (PW, II, ii, 402). For 1322: CPR, 1321-24,186-9; 
BL, Stowe MS 553, ff. 61 r-v. 
184 John de Hastings, John Darcy and Reginald de Paveley; see above n. 142, n. 149, n. 172. John la 
Zouche; 1315 (E 101/15/6, m. 1). Robert Bendyn and Ralph Bagot; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). William de 
Cleydon; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 12). John de Gacelyn: 1297 (E 101/6/28, m. 2i); 1298 (Gough, 217); 1311 (C 
71/5, m. 4); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). William Lovel and Richard de Muntchensy; 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). John 
Morice; 1310 (PW, II, ii, 401). John de Pabenham; 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13). Percival Symeon: 1306 (C 
67/16, m. 13); 1314 (C 71/6, m. 5). John de Stodley; 1298 (Gough, 217). John de Wolaston; 1311 (C 
71/5, m. 4). For 1322: CPR 1321-24,185-6; BL, Stowe MS 553. f. 56r; C 47/5/10, m. liii). 
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France during the 1280s and 1290s. '85 Similarly, the Richard Foliot with Thomas de 
Furnivall junior in the same year might have been linked to the Edmund Foliot who had 
fought in the retinue of Furnivall senior during the wars of Edward 1.186 Ralph de 
Cammoys served the Despensers on at least nine expeditions between 1297 and 1322, 
so it is interesting to find a John and Hugh de Cammoys in the retinue of a later Hugh le 
Despenser in northern France in 1340. John went on to ride alongside the same lord in 
Brittany shortly afterwards. 187 Some of the most impressive instances of continuity can 
be found among the earls and dukes of Lancaster. At least thirty of the men-at-arms who 
later campaigned under Henry of Grosmont during the years of greatest success in the 
Hundred Years War were members of families whose forebears had been followers of 
the duke's father and uncle. '88 The William Trussell who accompanied Thomas of 
Lancaster to Scotland in 1306 and who was proffered by him at the feudal muster four 
years later may or may not have been the man of that name who can be found in Henry 
of Grosmont's retinue in 1335,1341 and 1345, although that seems very unlikely. There 
was also a Theobald Trussell who was with the king's lieutenant on eight campaigns 
between 1334, when he served as an esquire in Scotland, and the Reims expedition of 
1359-60.189 This is without including the numerous members of the St. Maur, Twyford, 
Vernoun and Zouche families who served with more than one member of the Lancaster 
dynasty at one time or another during the fourteenth century. Evidently, the loyalties of 
men to their lords often transcended the coming and going of kings as well as the 
stresses of civil war and political turmoil, and provided an element of stability that no 
doubt contributed to the military successes of these years. 
185 Edmund de Stafford in 1294-5 (C 67/10, m. 6); Richard de Sutton in 1282 (C 47/2/7, in. 5); Richard de 
Whytacre in 1287 (CPR, 1281-92,274). For Basset junior's retinue in 1333, see C 71/13, in. 31. 
186 Richard Foliot (C 71/13, m. 28); Edmund Foliot (see chapter 3 n. 216 for 1296,1298 and 1300). 
187 Ralph de Cammoys (above, n. 173), Hugh and John in 1340 (C 76/15, m. 20), and John in Brittany (C 
61/54, in. 30). On the elder Cammoys, see N. Fryde, The Tyranny and Fall of Edward 11 1321-1326 
(Cambridge, 1979), 47-8,183. 
188 Walter de Bonyngton, Henry Cliff, Ralph and William de Ferrers, Richard de Havering, John de 
Holland, William de Lughtburghe, Peter de Melbourne, Thomas de Metham, Richard and Robert de 
Shelton, Robert and William de St. Maur, Theobald, Thomas and William de Trussell, John de Twyford 
senior, John de Twyford junior, Ralph and Robert de Twyford, Edmund, Robert and Thomas de Ufford, 
John and Geoffrey Vernoun, and John, Richard and three men named William la Zouche. 
189 For the man of that name who was associated with Thomas of Lancaster, see C 67/16, m. 4 and 
PW, II, 
ii, 406, and for the later service with Henry of Grosmont: 1335 (C 71/15, m. 27); 1341 
(C 71/21, m. 5); 
1345-6 (E 101/25/9, m. 3). Theobald was with Grosmont in 1334 (E 101/15/12); 1338-9 (The Wardrobe 
Book of William de Norwell, 12 July 1338 to 27 May 1340, ed. M. Lyon, B. Lyon, 
H. S. Lucas and J. de 
Sturler [Brussels, 1983], 312); 1342-3 (C 76/17, m. 22); 1345-6 (E 101/25/9, m. 3); 1347 (Crecy and 
Calais, ed. G. Wrottesley [London, 1898], 131); 1348 (C 76/26, m. 
7); 1356-8 (C 76/34, mm. 8,14,15); 
1359-60 (C 76/38, m. 16; C 76/40, m. 11). 
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LOYAL SERVICE, SHIFTING ALLEGIANCES 
From the perspectives of the lords in our sample, there appears to have been greater 
stability in retinue composition within the armies of Edward I and Edward II than has 
generally been perceived. Retinue leaders raising companies for war were able to rely 
upon well-defined recruitment pools consisting of soldiers who were familiar to them 
from previous campaigns, or were to become so in the future. To obtain a deeper 
understanding of the service networks within late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century 
England it is now necessary to alter our viewpoint, and to examine in more detail the 
allegiances of the gentry who staffed these retinues. In the previous chapter we saw how 
many of the men-at-arms who fought at Falkirk, both knights and sergeants, had careers 
spanning twenty years or more. To fully appreciate the nature of the personal ties that 
brought so many men into the king's armies, however, we must attempt to analyse the 
military service connections of the gentry en masse. This inevitably means interpreting 
hundreds of career profiles. To summarise the military lordship bonds of all the men-at- 
arms who went to war between the first Welsh war and Bannockburn lies beyond the 
scope of this study. Nevertheless, our fifty sample retinues at Falkirk provide ample 
opportunity to reconstruct a proportion of these ties, providing as they do the names of 
647 mounted soldiers. Not all of these individuals can be traced with absolute certainty; 
there were also many whose military careers appear to have been fairly short-lived. Yet 
overall, this group provides us with a sufficiently large number of soldiers who were 
regularly active during the wars in Wales, France and Scotland to enable us to reach 
meaningful conclusions relating to a number of important questions. How many of these 
men, for instance, remained with the same lords throughout their military careers? What 
proportion seems to have changed their allegiance on a regular basis? And in those 
instances when soldiers do appear to have changed their lords for others, what factors, 
now often difficult to discern, might have influenced their decisions? 
Since the publication of K. B. McFarlane's seminal studies on `bastard 
feudalism' and the late-medieval nobility, all discussions about noble and genteel 
military service have been coloured by his conclusions. His assessment of the gentry 
during the Wars of the Roses as men who `turned their coats as often and with the same 
chequered success as their betters', and his belief that the fourteenth-century soldier 
`seemed more anxious to see service than to care whether it was always under the same 
banner', have left an indelible imprint on subsequent historiography. 
190 Nor was he 
190 K. B. McFarlane, `The Wars of the Roses', England in the Fifteenth Century: Collected Essays 
(London, 1981), 248; idem, `Bastard Feudalism', 176. 
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alone in expressing such views. Helen Cam was of the opinion that the aristocracy of 
the later Middle Ages were an altogether less faithful and dependable group than their 
forebears during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. In her eyes, the `parasitic 
institution' of `bastard feudalism' was `far removed ... 
from the atmosphere of 
responsibility, loyalty and faith which had characterised the relationship of lord and 
vassal in the earlier Middle Ages'. 191 Although written primarily about the late 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries when the system of contracting for military service 
had taken deeper root within English society, the views of McFarlane and Cam have 
been widely accepted and applied to earlier periods. `The evidence', a fairly recent 
summary of research on retinue personnel in medieval English armies has indicated, 
`suggests that there was a floating population of men willing to take service with 
whoever offered them the best terms'. 192 Despite certain elements of stability and 
continuity, `the society of late medieval England was one in which loyalty to a lord, 
even if nurtured by generations of family tradition, was subject to erosion'. 193 There can 
be no denying that such statements contain a large element of truth. The faithlessness 
detected by modem historians was often only too evident to contemporaries: one song 
on the reign of Edward II depicted the knights of that era as debased and lamentably 
arrayed, and the squires as deceitful men who could not keep to their words. ' 94 When 
we also consider the well-documented and widely-condemned betrayals by their 
retainers of the earl of Gloucester at Bannockburn and Thomas of Lancaster at 
Boroughbridge, it is evident that not all soldiers active under the first two Edwards were 
unreservedly devoted to their lords. 195 Yet, whilst men-at-arms often did move from one 
retinue to another, and sometimes, in difficult circumstances, abandoned their lords to 
their miserable fates, it is not quite so clear whether such actions were all that common, 
or motivated purely by selfish interests. 
Rather than moralise about a body of men whose actions, let alone motives, can 
be notoriously difficult to reconstruct, it may be more appropriate to accept that some 
movement within the military community was inevitable. Personal relationships 
changed then, just as they do today, and it would be strange indeed if during the course 
of several decades of military service large numbers of men-at-arms did not, at one 
191 H. M. Cam, `The Decline and Fall of English Feudalism', History, xxv (1940), 225. 
192 Prestwich, `Miles in Armis Strenuus', 217. 
193 Bean, From Lord to Patron, 188. 
194 Thomas Wright's Political Songs, 335-6. 
195 See chapter 1 n. 28; Thomas Wright's Political Songs, 270-1. For further comment on lordship bonds 
and the rebellion of 1322, see O. de Ville, `Jocelyn Deyville: Brigand, Or Man of his Time? ', Northern 
History, xxxv (1999), 45; C. Valente, The Theory and Practice of Revolt in Medieval England 
(Aldershot, 
2003), 149-53. 
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point or another, ride within the retinue of more than one lord. Furthermore, it would 
seem (though the debate continues to rage) that in most parts of England for most of the 
time, the gentry constituted an independent body of men, free from the coercive 
influence of the leading nobles and barons. As Colin Richmond has rather amusingly 
put it, `men were not Pavlovian dogs, jumping at the chance of a fee, a rent charge, a 
stewardship here, a parkership there. No more were lords puppet masters manipulating 
their marionette retainers to dominate the provinces or pack parliaments'. 196 In part, the 
freedom of action of the gentry was guaranteed by the inability of the nobility to retain 
all members of their social group. 197 One needs only to glance at the long lists of 
`independent' protections that were enrolled before campaigns, or the large number of 
men summoned to a muster in 1322 who had not already been organised into retinues, 
to appreciate that the image of a floating population of men-at-arms is not unfounded. 198 
By the same token, it would be inaccurate to see in every instance of a change of retinue 
evidence of instability and disloyalty. `Disloyalty' is a loaded term that gives a 
moralistic dimension to the study of history that can seldom be supported by evidence 
from the sources. In many respects it would be more suitable to regard such changes as 
evidence of fluidity rather than instability. Certainly, there were many instances in 
which joint raids or commands made the transfer of personnel and sharing of retainers a 
practical necessity; and it would be wrong to presume that men who changed lords or 
served within a different company always did so without the consent, or good will, of 
their usual retinue leader. Edward II was happy to share his retainers and place them at 
the service of his favourite and possible brother-in-arms, Piers Gaveston. 199 Lords 
sometimes even encouraged their household retainers to have connections with other 
men: Thomas of Lancaster's accounts for 1318-19 record robes for Robert de Holland 
in the liveries of Hugh de Audley and Bartholomew de Badlesmere. 20° Similarly, the 
indenture of 1297 between the earl of Norfolk and John de Segrave allows the latter to 
serve in other companies if the earl was not on campaign. 201 
196 C. Richmond, `After McFarlane', History, lxviii (1983), 57. 
197 For a slightly later period, see S. Payling, Political Society in Lancastrian England: The Greater 
Gentry ofNottinghamshire (Oxford, 1991), 105; C. Carpenter, `Gentry and Community', 360. 
198 For the 1322 returns; PW, II, ii, 587-95. 
199 Hamilton, Piers Gaveston, 102,167 n. 100. I have identified ten men with Gaveston in 1306 or 1310 
who were also members of Edward's household or joined it after Gaveston's death, namely Edmund 
Bacon, John Howard, John de Charlton, John de la Beche, Robert de Sapy, Humphrey de Littlebury, 
Thomas de Chaucombe, Warin de Lisle, John Knokyn and Robert de Kendal. With Gaveston: E 101/13/7, 
m. 1; Rotuli Scotiae, i, 89; C 71/4, mm. 4-13. Household service: E 101/369/11, f. 107r; BL, Cotton Nero 
C VIII, if. 36r, 42r, 90v-92r; E 101/376/7, f. 54v. On the relationship between Gaveston and Edward, see 
P. Chaplais, Piers Gaveston: Edward II's Adoptive Brother (Oxford, 1994), 20-22. 
200 Maddicott, `Thomas of Lancaster and Sir Robert Holland', 465. 
201 Hicks, Bastard Feudalism, 88. 
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As Christine Carpenter has pointed out, `impressionistic surveys confined to a 
small number of the gentry are not enough' when studying the personal networks, 
military or otherwise, of the active men of this age. Our sample of 647 soldiers enables 
us to push beyond such limits, and to conduct an analysis that is conducive to a study 
`both comprehensive and systematic'. 202 In an attempt to provide as subtle and nuanced 
a perspective of the military bonds of these individuals as possible, the career profiles of 
each soldier have been placed into one of several categories. At either extreme are those 
who can be shown to have either remained in the service of the same lord throughout 
their military careers or to have changed allegiance at some stage or other, often on a 
regular basis and for no obvious reason. Between these two extremes is a third group 
consisting of individuals who did serve in the retinue of more than one company 
commander, but whose change of unit can be explained by one of a variety of factors, 
such as the death of their lord; service with another man from the same family or region; 
or the absence of their usual leader from a campaign. A few others took out letters of 
protection or attorney with the campaign captains and were therefore not necessarily 
changing retinues. Dividing the profiles of hundreds of men into these categories is by 
no means an easy exercise, yet the resulting data is likely to provide a more accurate 
insight into the networks of these men than a simple division into those who appear to 
have remained `loyal' and those who did not. 
Table 4.5: Lordship Allegiances of Sample Knights and Sergeants (1277-1314) 
Knights Sergeants 
Served one lord only 37 311 
Changed lord according to: 
Regional factors 5 28 
Familial factors 6 8 
Death of leader 12 23 
Non-service of leader 6 13 
As part of sub-retinue 3 22 
Combination of above 6 6 
Other explanation 3 2 
Change of lord unexplained 35 84 
Total 113 497 
202 C. Carpenter, `Gentry and Community', 369. 
-. je 
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Difficulties of identification mean that it has been necessary to exclude thirty-seven of 
the sergeants in our sample from the above table. Also, many individuals can be traced 
on campaign within the service of a lord on only one occasion: five of the knights, and 
193 of the sergeants, fall into this category. This means that the number of men who 
seem to have served with only one lord throughout their military careers was not quite 
as impressive as would appear from the table. Nevertheless, if we exclude these soldiers 
from our calculations it remains the case that thirty-two of the 108 knights who served 
within a magnate retinue on more than one expedition, or 30 per cent, and 118 of the 
equivalent 304 sergeants (39 per cent), fought under one lord only. Thus, around a third 
of the men-at-arms who went to war in 1298 would appear to have remained under the 
banner of the same retinue leader in all other hosts in which they served during their 
careers. This figure might be lower if the records at our disposal were more complete. 
Still, it would seem that the proportion of men-at-arms who had no desire, or need, to 
change their allegiance was far from negligible. A considerable number of these men, 
particularly the sergeants, can be traced in the service records in the years up to and 
including Bannockburn on just two or three occasions. However, there were also some 
who stayed with the same lord on four, five or more campaigns. Such were the knights 
Hugh Godard, who prepared for war with Roger de Mortimer of Chirk on six occasions 
between 1294 and 13 101203 and Robert de Dutton and Thomas de Cirencester, who 
followed their respective lords, John de Benstede and Hugh de Courtenay, to war four 
times. 204 Even among the sergeants, there were those who gave regular bouts of service 
without apparently leaving the confines of the one retinue. Alan de Sumborn and Hamo 
Bygod each served in four different hosts with Alan Plukenet senior or junior. 205 Robert 
de Suthwold was with Thomas de Verdon an equal number of times, 206 and John de 
Cary and Geoffrey de Harden are listed in the company of Robert Fitz Payn on seven 
and five campaigns respectively. 207 To some extent, individuals such as these were the 
exception that proves the rule, but the important stability that they provided to magnate 
war retinues probably compensated for their modest numbers. 
It would be a mistake to draw too sharp a distinction between these `stable' 
elements within Edwardian armies and other individuals who served several lords in 
203 Above n. 179. He took out a protection `independently' in 1314. 
204 Dutton: 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 2iii); 1298 (Gough, 177); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2); 1303 (E 101/612/11, 
m. 3). Cirencester: 1296 (E 10 1/5/23, m. lii); 1298 (Gough, 208); 1300 (Aspilogia III, i, 454); 1304 (PDS, 
272). 
205 E 101 /5/23, m. I ii; E 101 /6/37, m. 1 i; Gough, 190; C 67/14, m. 11; PDS, 218; E 101 /9/24, m. 1 d. 
206 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 6i); 1298 (Gough, 173); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 1). 
207 Above n. 120. 
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different hosts. In truth, the `stable' element was probably less stable, and the `unstable' 
element more stable, than would seem to have been the case through our distorted lens. 
Sometimes a man might serve a lord for over a decade before suddenly turning against 
him for reasons that are now difficult to discern. Members of the Berkeley family went 
to war with Aymer de Valence on numerous occasions, including at Falkirk and 
Bannockburn, before destroying his lands at Painswick in 1318.208 Moreover, we should 
not forget that Thomas of Lancaster had been on amicable terms with his cousin Edward 
of Caernarfon for a number of years prior to becoming his irreconcilable opponent for 
reasons which continue to task historians. 209 At the other extreme, many of the soldiers 
in the table who have been placed into the category `changes unexplained' displayed a 
great deal of continuity in their service patterns. Thomas de Coudray can be found in 
three different lordship groups between 1297 and 1314, but he gave repeated service in 
each. He was with Hugh le Despenser, or his sub-leader John ap Adam, in 1297,1298 
and 1307; John de St. John in 1294,1299,1300 and 1301; and either Ralph de 
Monthermer or Gilbert de Clare in 1303,1306 and 1314.210 From one perspective he 
may appear to have been one of K. B. McFarlane's prototype freelances, `going abroad 
in the "comitiva" of now this commander and now that'. 211 Alternatively, if we think of 
his military service in terms of a network of relations, then it is clear that he operated 
within well-defined lordship parameters. Nor was his example singular. Robert Fitz 
Nigel served within three retinues, those of Richard Fitz John, Hugh de Vere and 
Thomas of Lancaster, on more than one campaign; 212 a sergeant named William de 
Cotun fought under the northern lords Edmund de Mauley and Andrew de Harcla on 
two occasions each. 213 There were also knights and sergeants who changed lords only 
once or twice but who accompanied one of their leaders on numerous expeditions. 
Henry de Glastingbury has been placed in this `unstable' group because he joined the 
retinue of John de Mohun in 1303. He was also with one or other of the Lancaster 
brothers, or their father, in four other hosts, and with Thomas of Lancaster's tenant, 
Payn de Tibetot, in 1306.214 Thus whilst satisfying a natural desire for demarcation 
208 M. Prestwich, The Three Edwards: War and State in England 1272-1377 (London, 1980), 145. 
209 Cf. A. King, `Thomas of Lancaster's First Quarrel with Edward IF, Fourteenth Century England III, 
ed. W. M. Ormrod (Woodbridge, 2004), 31-45. 
210 For his service record, see chapter 1 n. 133. 
'" McFarlane, `Bastard Feudalism', 176. 
212 For his service with Lancaster, see above n. 156, plus 1282 and 1287 with Fitz John (C 
67/8, m. 8; 
CPR 1281-92,272), and 1300 and 1301 with Vere (C 67/14, mm. 1,12). 
213 Mauley: Gough, 233; BL, Add. MS 7966a, f. 75v. Harcla: E 10 1/14/15, mm. 4,5. 
214 With the Lancasters in 1295 (C 67/10, m. 3); 1297 (C 67/12, m. 3); 1298 (Gough, 179); 1300 (C 
67/14, m. 10). Also, see C 67/15, m. 8; E 101/13/7, m. 1. For Tibetot's links with Lancaster; IPM, v, no. 
519. 
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between `loyal' soldiers and those who changed their allegiances, neither the perception 
of such a dichotomy, nor its reflection in the above table, tells the full story of the ties 
that bound within the military community. Simultaneously stable and fluid would be the 
best description of most soldiers' career patterns for, within the framework of 
recruitment networks, these terms were not irreconcilable. 
Bearing this in mind, it is the third group in our table, representing the 
individuals who changed their allegiances but who did so due to altered circumstances, 
or within the parameters of identifiable recruitment networks, that best reflects the 
experiences of the `average' soldier in early Edwardian armies. It is also this group that, 
by taking into account alterations in the composition of the military community through 
deaths and non-service, most accurately conforms to the diachronic approach according 
to which all forms of network analysis should ideally operate. 215 It may be a truism to 
state that personal relationships change naturally with the passage of time, but it is an 
important point that must be reiterated. Work by David Crouch on the tenants and 
retainers of the twelfth century earls of Warwick, 216 and by David Green and Simon 
Walker on the affinities of the Black Prince and his younger brother John of Gaunt 
respectively, 217 have each highlighted the way in which generational changes and 
distances between campaigns served to undermine personal bonds which, viewed from a 
short-term perspective, often proved stable and strong. We will shortly have cause to 
look at the impact of deaths and non-service on the recruitment networks of the military 
community in greater detail. As we have already seen, it was perfectly possible for men 
to join the companies of other military leaders whilst their usual lords were still alive 
without this in any way reflecting disloyalty. One of the most obvious channels through 
which transference from one lord to another might take place was the lordship family. 
Two of the knights and three of the sergeants in Thomas of Lancaster's retinue in 1298 
can also be traced serving on other occasions with his younger brother Henry: not all of 
these have been included in the `familial' section of the table due to other connections 
in different years. 218 Another fraternal tie that was exploited to the full for the purposes 
of military recruitment was that between the household steward, Walter de Beauchamp, 
215 Network Analysis: Studies in Human Interaction, ed. J. Boissevain and J. C. Mitchell (The Hague, 
1973), xi. 
216 D. Crouch, `The Local Influence of the earls of Warwick, 1088-1242: A Study in Decline and 
Resourcefulness', Midland History, xxi (1996), 11-12. 
217 Green, `Politics and Service with Edward the Black Prince', 59; Walker, The Lancastrian Affinity, 50. 
218 Knights: Henry de Glastingbury (above, n. 214); Nicholas de St. Maur (Gough, 179 et alia; C 67/7, m. 
3). Sergeants: William de Lughtburghe (Gough, 180; C 67/16, m. 6); Adam de Skelton (see his service for 
1298,1300,1303 and 1306 in chapter 3 n. 240); Roger de Bray (C 67/12, m. 3; Gough, 181; C 67/14, m. 
10; C 67/14, m. 3; C 67/16, m. 10). 
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and his older brother, William, earl of Warwick. Although only two of the men in 
Walter de Beauchamp's company at Falkirk, the knight William le Blount and his 
probable relation Walter, also appear to have accompanied the earl to war, 219 analysis of 
the affinities of the two brothers for all campaigns shows no fewer than ten families or 
individuals who had allegiances to both siblings. 220 
If fraternal and other familial bonds provided one connecting thread along which 
retainers and military followers might manoeuvre, it was not the only one. Membership 
of a regional network of soldiers might enable men-at-arms to shift between lords who 
had close neighbourly associations with one another whilst remaining part of a well- 
established military pool. Although, as we have seen, the idea of `county communities' 
is fraught with conceptual problems and interpretative difficulties, there is no doubt that 
men of the same locality, county or region often operated in close proximity to one 
another when dealing with local issues. 221 Furthermore, the existence of regional 
networks was sometimes reflected in the military summons lists issued by the Crown, 
which in some years, including 1298, were drawn up partly on a county-by-county 
basis. 222 In other instances, men of the same locality might serve together in raids 
against the Scots or in defence of the sea coast from enemy invasion. Therefore, for a 
variety of reasons, military leaders from the same region or locality were far more likely 
to share their soldiers with one another than were retinue leaders whose lands lay far 
apart. Table 4.5 shows that there were around five knights and twenty-eight sergeants in 
our sample whose change of retinue can be explained by such regional factors. Richard 
de Kirkebride found service with two fellow north-westerners, Robert de Clifford and 
John de Lancaster, in separate years, 223 and his fellow knight Richard Mauleverer was 
with the northern landholders John de Craystok and William de Cantilupe in 1294 and 
1298 respectively. 224 In like manner, a Simon de Blakeshale was in the company of 
William de Ryther at Falkirk and of Ryther's fellow Yorkshireman Robert de Mauley in 
225 Scotland in 1306. The interconnection of the landholding families of Yorkshire is 
219 William: 1294-5 and 1297 with the earl (C 67/10, m. 5; E 101/6/37, m. 6i), and 1298 with the steward 
(Gough, 183). Walter: 1294-5 with the earl (C 67/10, m. 5), and 1297 and 1298 with Walter de 
Beauchamp and his son (E 101/6/37, m. lii; Gough, 184). 
220 Astley, Blount, Brompton, Cheney, Fitz Waryn, Harpur, Heton, Saltmarsh, Sapy and St. Mareys. 
221 Cf. M. J. Bennett, `A County Community: Social Cohesion amongst the Cheshire Gentry, 1400-1425', 
Northern History, viii (1973), 43. 
222 PW, i, 311-2. 
223 Gough, 196; E 101/612/15, m. I d. 
224 RG, iii, 157; Gough, 177. 
225 Gough, 226; E 101/13/16, f. 20v. 
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highlighted by the proximity of their family shields in the nave of York Minster. 226 
Indeed, the presence of a regional recruitment pool in that county has already been 
demonstrated for a slightly later period in Andrew Ayton's study of the retinue of 
Thomas Ughtred, a lord of the East Riding who was Edward III's marshal at Crecy. 227 
Northern England was by no means unique in this respect, however: many of the 
sergeants at Falkirk alternated between service with different lords of the south-east, or 
south-west. Robert de Echingham served no fewer than four men with landed interests 
in the south-east in the years leading up to and including Bannockburn, namely his 
brother William, William de Leyburn, the earl of Gloucester and Bartholomew de 
Badlesmere; 228 and Edmund de St. Leger had links to three Kentish lords, William de 
Leyburn, Stephen de Burgherssh and the earl of Gloucester. 229 The presence of such 
regional networks shows that changes of retinue were not necessarily indicative of 
instability. Soldiers might move between lords without undermining the cohesion of 
royal hosts. 
The largest retinues were usually composed of much smaller units of men-at- 
arms. Although the more unwieldy companies might see soldiers come and go on a 
regular basis, small groups of two or three men-at-arms would stick together, 
constituting sub-retinues within these larger wholes. One of Robert Fitz Payn's knights 
at Falkirk, Ingelram de Berenger, and two of his sergeants had been to Flanders during 
the preceding year with John de Berewyk. It is almost certain that the sergeants, 
Michael Criketot and Frary de Ameney, were associates of Berenger rather than either 
of the main retinue leaders. 230 As such, the sergeants were not changing retinues but 
remaining within the same unit on both occasions, as were the sergeants who joined 
Nicholas de St. Maur in Fitz Payn's retinue in 1297 but then followed him into the 
service of Thomas of Lancaster at Falkirk . 
231 Horizontal bonds between soldiers would 
continue to be activated for military purposes when vertical bonds to a lord had, for 
whatever reason, long since dissolved, or when the lord with whom they normally 
served was not present. The knight Edmund Foliot led the sergeant Edmund de Misne to 
226 S. Brown, `Our Magnificent Fabrick'. York Minster. An Architectural History c. 1220-1500, English 
Heritage publication (Swindon, 2003), 129, appendix 2. 
227 Ayton, `Sir Thomas Ughtred', 124-5. 
228 For his service with Leyburn in 1297 and Gloucester and Badlesmere in 1314, see chapter 1 n. 166. He 
was with his brother in 1298 (Gough, 213). The other lords whom he served, the Despensers, had links to 
the earl of Gloucester through the marriage of Despenser junior to the young earl's sister, Eleanor, and 
held Swanscombe manor in Kent: 1303 (C 67/15, m. 9); 1306 (C 67/16, m. 10); CPR, 1301-07,443; 
Aspilogia III, ii, 140-1. 
229 With Leyburn in 1297 (E 101/6/37, m. 4), 1298 (Gough, 194), and 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 4), 
Burgherssh in 1306 (C 67/16, m. 6), and the earl in 1314 (C 81/1727, m. 11). 
230 C 67/12, m. 1; E 101/6/28, mm. 2i-2ii; Gough, 171. 
231 E 101/6/19, m. 1; Gough, 179-80. The sergeants were Warin de St. Maur and Robert de Strode. 
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Scotland in 1302 when their usual lord, Thomas de Furnivall, seems not to have 
served. 232 In some instances lords lost the service of a group of men because they did 
not join a particular campaign. The earl of Norfolk's aversion to service in Flanders in 
1297 is well known, but his decision not to go did not stop at least thirteen of the men 
who had been associated with him in previous years from participating without him. 
These men joined the retinues of other lords; in many cases, on a permanent basis. Most 
notably, all three knightly members of the Berkeley family who were active at this time, 
Thomas and his sons Thomas junior and Maurice - at least two of whom were with 
Bygod in Wales during 1294-5 - began their association with Aymer de Valence in that 
year. 233 This constituted a major drain on the earl's military resources, although it may 
be that his growing illness in the years that followed would have prevented him from 
retaining these men for much longer in any case. In other instances, it would seem that 
when a lord did not take part in a campaign few of his men did either. Only four of 
Valence's large retinue can be found in Scotland in 1310 when he was busy with his 
duties as an Ordainer: two with the earl of Gloucester. 234 And in 1314, neither the earl 
of Lancaster nor his political supporters who stayed at home with him appear to have 
haemorrhaged too many of their followers. The few who did go to Scotland without 
them probably did so with their lords' consent. 235 
The absence of a lord on a short-term basis inevitably caused far less disruption 
than his death. Whilst those who journeyed to Scotland in the absence of the earl of 
Lancaster in 1310, or at Bannockburn, might have returned to his allegiance at the siege 
of Berwick or during the civil war of 1322, the retainers of a lord who had died did not 
have that option. Sometimes they chose to remain within the service of the same family, 
but there was no guarantee that their relationships with the father would extend to the 
son. Even if they did, service with an older, more seasoned campaigner might have 
appealed more than starting afresh with a youth who had little or no previous experience 
of was. For all of these reasons, as well as because not all lords had male successors 
232 Gough, 211; C 67/15, m. 15. 
233 C 47/2/10, m. 8; E 101/6/28, m. 2i. The other ten were John ap Adam (Bygod 1277, CPR, 1272-81, 
217,1287, CPR 1281-92,273,1294, C 67/10, m. 7,1296, CCW, 71; 1297, C 67/12, m. 9d); Ralph le 
Bygod (Bygod 1282, C 67/8, m. 7; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. li); William de Boyton (Bygod, 1294, C 67/10, 
m. 6,1296, C 67/11, m. 2; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. 6i); Richard le Keu (Bygod 1287, CPR, 1281-92,274; 
1297, C 67/12, m. 3d); John de Knoville (Bygod 1294, C 67/10, m. 6; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. 4); Hugh 
Pointz (Bygod 1294, C 47/2/10, m. 8,1296, C 67/11, m. 6; 1297, BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 69r); Nicholas 
Pointz (ibid); Thomas de Scales (Bygod 1296, C 67/11, m. 4: 1297, E 101/6/19, m. 2); John de Sotebroke 
(Bygod 1287, CPR, 1281-92,273,1294 C 67/10, m. 7; 1297, E 101/6/37, m. Iii); Nicholas de Stotevillle 
(Bygod 1283, SC 1/9, no. 83; 1297, C 67/12, m. 9d). For information on some of these men and their 
relations with the earl of Norfolk, see M. Morris, The Bigod Earls of Norfolk in the Thirteenth Century 
(Woodbridge, 2005), 138-53. 
234 John Darcy, Gilbert Pecche, Edmund de Gacelyn and Thomas de Sakeville; C 71/4, mm. 5,10,11. 
235 Lanercost, 224. 
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who were of an age to lead men to war, retainers whose lords had died sometimes had to 
seek elsewhere for direction on future campaigns. This applied to twelve of the knights 
and twenty-three of the sergeants in our sample, and provides one of the most striking 
instances in which men-at-arms changed their allegiance simply because they had little 
or no choice in the matter. When the Marcher lord Roger de Mortimer died during the 
course of the Welsh war of 1282, there were reports of disturbances and unrest among 
his tenants. 236 In a society that depended so much for its stability on the personal 
connections of landed society, it is not surprising that the death of a lord could lead to 
the erosion of his retinue and to subtle shifts in the recruitment networks of the regions 
in which he had operated. Walter de Beauchamp's death in 1303 saw his men move in 
several directions. Some stability was maintained by the fact that two of his former 
soldiers, the knight Simon le Chamberleyn and the sergeant Geoffrey Fitz Waryn, later 
served under Aymer de Valence, 237 but others among his former followers joined the 
companies of different lords. Stephen de la More of Gloucestershire naturally gravitated 
towards the leading magnate of that region, Gilbert de Clare, with whom he served on 
the 1310 campaign. 238 The steward's younger son, William, associated himself with 
another leading figure of the south-west, Robert Fitz Payn. 239 In most cases, soldiers 
who were released from their former allegiances by the death of their lords ended up 
either in the company of other lords from the same region or members of the same 
family. Following Nicholas de Audley's death in 1299, one of his sergeants, Ralph le 
240 Botiller, went on to serve at Bannockburn with the former's younger brother, Hugh. 
Richard de Cleobury, on the other hand, attached himself to Audley's fellow Marcher 
lord Roger de Mortimer of Wigmore. 241 Walter de Hormede was with John Tregoz at 
Falkirk but later appears with the earl of Hereford following Tregoz's death in 1300; 242 
and in 1310, Nicholas Pointz found service with his tenurial lord, the earl of Gloucester, 
a couple of years after his father, Hugh, had passed away. 243 
As old recruitment hubs died out, new ones arose to take their place. Such `new' 
men were naturally keen to tap into as many pre-existing networks as they possibly 
could. The overwhelming majority of newly-risen lords were the heirs of long- 
established aristocratic lines: there were far fewer parvenus rising meteorically from 
236 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 131. 
237 Chamberleyn in 1314 (C 71/6, m. 1); Fitz Waryn in 1306 (C 67/16, m. 13). 
238 C 71/4, m. 10. 
239 C 47/5/7, m. 1; C 71/4, m. 13. 
240C71/6, m. 1. 
241 C 67/16, m. 11. 
242 Gough, 192; CDS, v, 448. 
243C71/4, m. 10. 
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obscurity to the top during the Welsh and early Scottish wars than there were to be 
during the French war of Edward III. One man who did rise from membership of a 
minor genteel family to become a leading member of the military community was the 
Cumbrian lord Andrew de Harcla, whose family prior to the early years of the reign of 
Edward II had led a fairly quiet existence. We are fortunate that for the years 1313-14 
we have complete inventories listing the names of the men-at-arms who were with 
Harcla on the Scottish March. These make it clear that he called upon a wide range of 
service connections with other prominent lords from Cumberland, Northumberland, 
Westmorland and southern Scotland in order to create his retinue. 244 Of the men whom 
it has been possible to identify on other campaigns, five had previous military 
experience in the retinue of the dominant lord of the region, Robert de Clifford. 245 
Some, such as Patrick de Curwen and Adam de Skelton, had fought alongside other 
members of the north-western gentry, like John de Lancaster and Gilbert de Bromley. 246 
Others, such as Thomas de Torthorald and David le Mareschal, were drawn from across 
the border, and Adam de Kirkby and William de Sutton were probably the same 
individuals as the men of those names who had accompanied William de Cantilupe to 
Scotland before his death in 1308.247 Therefore, Harcla did not need to create a new 
retinue from scratch, but simply to tap into the service networks that already existed 
within that highly-militarised area of the British Isles. 248 The same also applies to the 
rising lords within our sample who began their military service in 1296 or later. Both 
Thomas of Lancaster and Aymer de Valence inherited the affinities of their fathers: 
thirteen of the men with Lancaster at Falkirk had served with his father Edmund, 249 and 
three of the knights with Valence were former associates of William de Valence from 
the Welsh wars. 250 Furthermore, two of the men with William le Brun in 1298 had 
previously been to Gascony under his fellow Hampshire lord John de St. John, three 
years before Brun first appears to have seen service as a retinue leader in his own 
ri ght. 251 Others who began to serve as company leaders after 1296 and who tapped into 
244 E 101/14/15, mm. 2,4,5. 
245 Robert de Bampton, John de Harcla, John de Lancaster, Roger de Lancaster and Richard le Latimer. 
246 C 67/13, m. 6d; E 101/612/15, m. ld; E 101/14/15. m. 3. 
247 E 101/8/23, m. 2; E 101/9/24, m. 3; E 101/612/11, m. 5. 
248 For a similar phenomenon among the new lords of southern Scotland during the 1330s and 1340s, see 
M. H. Brown, `The Development of Scottish Border Lordship, 1332-58', BIHR, lxx (1997), 7-9. 
249 William Wyther, Reginald de St. Martin, Alan de Waldeshef, Henry de Glastingbury, Nicholas de St. 
Maur, William le Lung, Jordan Label, Adam de Skelton, Robert de Strode, Richard de Waldeshef, Roger 
de Bray, Walter de Baa and William de Bonyngton. 
250 John de Columbers, Nicholas de Carru and John de la Ryvere. The Gacelyn family also had links with 
both the father and son; H. Ridgeway, `William de Valence and his Familiares, 1247-72', BIHR, 1xv 
(1992), 244. 
251 John de Roches and William de Draycote: RG, iii, 127. 
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existing regional networks include Richard Lovel and Hugh de Courtenay. 252 By the 
onset of the Scottish wars, most retinue leaders could employ at least a few soldiers with 
several years of military experience behind them, even if it had not been obtained with 
them. 
Far from consisting of a shifting mass of men who changed retinues at will from 
one campaign to the next or, at the other extreme, a monopoly of `loyal' soldiers who 
stayed with the same lords throughout their careers, the military community was 
therefore characterised, as one would expect, by something in between those two 
extremes. That there was a large degree of mobility and fluidity should come as no 
surprise given the independence that most members of the gentry enjoyed in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. However, the movements that did take place usually 
involved subtle shifts within the well-established frameworks of familial or regional 
networks, or were necessitated by changes within the composition of the arms-bearing 
elite. Only rarely do soldiers who went to war under Edward I and Edward II appear to 
have displayed no continuity in their choice of lords and retinues. Such individuals did 
exist but, just like those who stayed with one lord for six or seven campaigns without 
ever entering the service of another man, they were the exception rather than the rule. 
For most knights and sergeants, it made sense to stay with soldiers whom they knew 
personally and had campaigned with in the past. Their links to other lords and members 
of the gentry meant that, more often than not, any movement that they did make 
involved no loss of face with their previous lords. To view such fluidity as indicative of 
declining standards or confused loyalties among the gentry and nobility would therefore 
be to read far more into the evidence than is really there. 
252 William de Punchardon had fought under Hugh de Courtenay senior in 1282 and 1287 prior to the 
latter's death in 1292 (C 67/8, in. 8d; CPR, 1281-92,275), and went on to be one of Lovel's most regular 
followers. Robert Beaupel was with William Martin in 1295 and Robert Fitz Payn in 1296 before serving 
with the younger Courtenay in 1298; see chapter 3 n. 193. 
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5 
`Feudal' Service and the Pre-Contract Army 
A detailed understanding of the military service given by the English gentry and 
nobility during the wars of Edward I and his son, including their frequency of service, 
connections to other members of the military community, and the methods by which 
they were recruited, can add a great deal to our understanding of the armies of the 
period. If, as is commonly perceived, Edward I inherited a far from glorious military 
legacy from his father, then by the end of his reign he would appear to have moulded a 
well-trained military elite, hardened by years of regular campaigning and strengthened 
by a sense of group solidarity that was reflected in the wide dissemination of new and 
more complex coats of arms. Bannockburn might have brought any progress that had 
been made during the previous four decades to a momentary halt, but it could not 
reverse the process. By the 1340s, Edward III was demonstrating to the French what the 
Welsh and Scots already knew: that English armies had come a long way since the days 
of Lewes and Evesham. The previous chapters have highlighted some of the factors that 
contributed to this transformation through a study of the careers and activities of the 
mounted soldiers who fought in these hosts. Years of military experience in a variety of 
theatres of war, and recruitment ties that were grounded within local communities, no 
doubt added to the stability and effectiveness of the armies that Edward I and Edward II 
led on campaign. The strong military records of captains like Aymer de Valence and 
Reginald de Grey meant that the Crown was able to draw upon a ready supply of 
apparently able commanders, whilst the whole edifice was underpinned, as we have 
seen, by a monarchy that was eager to maximise the martial potential of its subjects, 
both in number and quality. One question that remains to be answered is how such 
progress was possible, if indeed we accept that advances were made, at a time when the 
structure of English armies looks, at least superficially, very much the same as it had 
throughout the major part of the Middle Ages. Could English field forces ever have 
fulfilled their potential so long as `feudal' summonses continued to be issued and 
soldiers were raised through the calling out of the servicium debitum, as had been the 
case since the Norman Conquest? Was not the feudal host a remnant of a bygone age, 
and the dogged persistence with which both Edward I and his son continued to raise it 
one of the main bars to military success? Indeed, could it not be argued that any 
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advantages gained through factors such as collective experience, well-tried recruitment 
practices and familiarity among soldiers who fought together on campaign were 
undermined by more fundamental flaws relating to the way that the armies were 
organised in the field? 
Feudal service has, of course, had a very bad press among historians. The 
received wisdom is that it had very little to contribute to medieval warfare, whether in 
the late eleventh or early fourteenth century. J. E. Morris, who was certainly aware of the 
progress made in the conduct of war under Edward I, believed that the latter had tried to 
abandon traditional feudal service completely, and that he attempted to `substitute paid 
for feudal service.. . just because the formal feudal service was unsatisfactory'. 
' Other 
historians in the decades following Morris' pioneering work followed him by focussing 
on the transformation from feudal to paid service which, it appeared, had undergone 
considerable acceleration under the guidance of Edward I. Bryce Lyon, whose work on 
fiefes-rentes seemed to provide evidence for a missing link between these two phases in 
military history, affirmed that feudalism was `no longer... equal to supplying the forces 
needed for the more extensive, frequent, and distant campaigns of Edward I'. 2 K. B. 
McFarlane was also of the opinion, which by then had acquired the status of orthodoxy, 
that the days of the old fee-based method of raising armies were numbered `when the 
need was felt for an army more efficient and more durable than the feudal host'. 3 The 
simplicity of such explanations, and the conviction with which they were expressed by 
these eminent scholars, might have sealed the argument were it not for a number of 
awkward facts that did not comply with this theory of gradual decay. Work by F. M. 
Powicke, J. O Prestwich and Marjorie Chibnall has demonstrated that armies of the 
eleventh, twelfth and early thirteenth centuries were already staffed by a combination of 
paid and `feudal' soldiers, much as was the case under Edward I. 4 As such, the feudal 
host had never formed the sole prop upon which the kings of England had based their 
military strength. Furthermore, far from abandoning the servicium debitum and 
attempting to replace it with wholly paid armies, both Michael Powicke and, more 
recently, Michael Prestwich have shown that Edward I and his son continued to call out 
1 Morris, Welsh Wars, 36. 
2 B. D. Lyon, `The Feudal Antecedent of the Indenture System', Speculum, xxix (1954), 504; idem, From 
Fief to Indenture: The Transition from Feudal to Non-Feudal Contract in Western Europe (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1957), 198-232. 
3 McFarlane, `Bastard Feudalism', 162. 
4 F. M. Powicke, The Loss of Normandy (1189-1204): Studies in the History of the Angevin Empire 
(Manchester, 1913), 322-3; J. O. Prestwich, `War and Finance in the Anglo-Norman State', TRHS, 5th ser., 
iv (1954), 42-3; M. Chibnall, `Mercenaries and the Familia Regis under Henry I', History, new ser., lxii 
(1977), 15-23. 
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the feudal host on a regular basis. Indeed, Powicke has asserted that `the army of 
Edward I achieved a balance between contractual, feudal, and communal troops which 
5 exceeded anything achieved before or after'. Whilst the replacement of soldiers raised 
by means of the feudal summons with mounted forces levied through contracts is still 
generally perceived to have been desirable, even by those historians who have proved 
that the feudal host was far from dead and buried in the first quarter of the fourteenth 
century, 6 it can clearly no longer be maintained that Edward I sought to abandon feudal 
service for wholly paid armies. 
Why, then, was feudal service retained by this allegedly modernising king? 
Moreover, how did it affect the way that the aristocracy discharged their military 
obligations, if at all? These are difficult questions that cannot satisfactorily be answered 
without close scrutiny of the military careers of the men who fought in response to the 
feudal summonses. First, however, we must consider the subject of feudal service in its 
wider setting, including what the king hoped to gain from it and how such service was 
controlled and enforced by the Crown. Something that can be easily forgotten when one 
considers the role of the feudal host is that Edward's formative military experiences 
were gained during the civil wars of his father's reign. During those wars the feudal 
levy had been called on repeatedly to deal with the king's internal enemies, including 
before the siege of Northampton in 1264 and in order to confront the rebels who were 
holding out at Kenilworth two years later. 7 Indeed, it was said that Henry III could 
memorise and recite the names of 250 of the tenancies-in-chief within the realm. 8 
Edward would therefore have been well acquainted with the uses to which this form of 
military obligation could be put. On coming to the throne, he issued feudal summonses 
for the majority of his campaigns, not only for the Welsh wars of 1277 and 1282-3 and 
the Scottish campaigns of 1300,1303 and 1306, but also for a continental campaign in 
1294.9 His son, in turn, raised the feudal levy for most of the armies that he marched 
north of the border, in 1310,1314 and 1322, as well as for abortive campaigns such as 
5 Powicke, Military Obligation, 97; M. Prestwich, `Cavalry Service in Early Fourteenth Century 
England', War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, ed. J. 
Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 148. 
6 For some of the problems associated with feudal service, see Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 80- 
7 Documents of the Baronial Movement, 181-3; Royal and Other Historical Letters Illustrative of the 
Reign of Henry III, ed. W. W. Shirley, 2 vols (London, 1862-6), ii, 300-2; Ann. Dunstaple, 229; Ann. 
Waverley, 370. 
8 Critchley, `Summonses to Military Service', 80. 
9 Cf. H. M. Chew, The English Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief and Knight Service, especially in the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries (London, 1932), 71. 
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that of 1309.10 It was one thing to issue such summonses but quite another to form an 
effective fighting force from the resulting troops, and opinions of the practical value of 
such feudal levies in the field have been universally unfavourable. l' Yet, it should not 
be forgotten that at a time when cavalry forces usually numbered between 2,000 and 
2,500 men, the numbers raised through the traditional feudal summons, even at the most 
conservative estimate, might constitute a quarter of the whole. 12 In 1310, when the total 
cavalry strength probably fell short of 2,000 men, the 500 or so mounted soldiers who 
proffered their service at the feudal muster constituted an even greater proportion of the 
army. 13 Despite the emphasis that has always been placed on the fact that feudal forces 
were only obliged to serve for forty days, this form of military obligation was actually 
very flexible and adaptable. Service owed by tenants-in-chief might be directed towards 
the regions in which they had the most immediate interest, 14 whilst the shortage in 
warhorses was partly overcome by encouraging some men to provide mounts for their 
service rather than soldiers. 15 The kinds of force raised by feudal summons might vary. 
In 1322, two tenants-in-chief proffered hobelars, whereas archer service was widely 
employed in Scotland as a way of dealing with the English cavalry. 16 Finally, on 
campaigns such as that of 1282-3 when several armies were raised in different parts of 
the country, those performing feudal service could in turn muster in the places where 
they were most needed, or where they were already engaged. 17 There is no substance to 
the view that the feudal host was an encumbrance that had a negative impact on field 
operations. 
As an explanation for the continued use of the feudal summons, the value of 
feudal service in the field has tended to be overlooked in favour of explanations 
focussing on the political and financial benefits that accrued from it to the Crown. 18 
However, as we shall see in more detail later in this chapter, there is little reason to 
regard feudal service any differently from many other forms of recruitment and 
10 Powicke, Military Obligation, 162, note A. 
11 E. g. F. M. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, 1216-1307,2nd edition (Oxford, 1962), 543; Critchley, 
`Military Organisation in England', 230; Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 71. 
12 M. Prestwich, `Money and Mercenaries in English Medieval Armies', England and Germany in the 
High Middle Ages, ed. A. Haverkamp and H. Vollrath (Oxford, 1996), 133. 
13 Cf. D. Simpkin, `The English Army and the Scottish Campaign of 1310-11', England and Scotland in 
the Fourteenth Century: New Perspectives, ed. A. King and M. Penman (Woodbridge, forthcoming). 
14 E. g. Cal. Ch. Rolls, ii, 7, relating to service owed by Roger de Mortimer. 
15 CVCR, 185. 
16 C 47/5/10, mm. liii, 2; The Acts of Robert I, King of Scots 1306-1329, ed. A. A. M. Duncan, Regesta 
Regum Scottorum, v (Edinburgh, 1988), 50. Also, see A. Grant, `Service and Tenure in Late Medieval 
Scotland, 1314-1475', Concepts and Patterns of Service in the Later Middle Ages, ed. A. Curry and E. 
Matthew, The Fifteenth Century I (Woodbridge, 2000), 149-52. 
17 CVCR, 253-4. 
18 E. g. Prestwich, `Cavalry Service', 151-2. 
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obligation. Stephen Morillo has defined feudal service under the Anglo-Norman kings 
as `a system of maintaining a reserve of trained manpower', and that is precisely what it 
was. 19 If it had been a hindrance in the field, the Crown could simply have requested its 
tenants-in-chief to pay fines rather than send corporal service. Many did pay, but in 
some years, as Helena Chew has shown, the monarchy deliberately sought to reduce the 
numbers who commuted for their service. 20 Given the great need that both Edward I and 
his son had for efficient fighting forces, it is unlikely that they would have persevered 
with the servicium debitum unless it had already proven its worth on numerous 
occasions. Edward I certainly took the obligations of his tenants-in-chief to provide 
corporal service very seriously, pardoning his nephew Thomas of Lancaster in 1306 
only after it had been noted that despite serving with a fitting company, he had failed to 
acknowledge his full quota at the feudal muster. 21 Even as late as the opening year of 
the reign of Edward III and the Weardale campaign, which witnessed the final feudal 
summons for over half a century, permission to make fine was limited to those who did 
not hold a whole knight's fee, ecclesiastics, and women in an attempt to obtain as much 
corporal service from the male lay tenants-in-chief as possible. 22 Chew, whose detailed 
study of the feudal service of the ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief remains the seminal 
work on this subject, was in no doubt as to the Crown's long-term interest in the field 
service of its feudal forces. 23 This is not to say that the financial advantages reaped 
through the feudal summons were not also important, or that the Crown did not follow 
up its rights in this respect as zealously as it did its rights to corporal service. The 
rigorous searches of the financial repositories of the tenants-in-chief ahead of the 
Gascony campaign in 1294, recorded with much disgust by one chronicler, testifies to 
that. 24 Nevertheless, when Edward I obtained scutage he sometimes used it to reward 
those who had served in his armies; and, as Michael Prestwich has noted, the time taken 
by the Crown to collect the money due to it from feudal service suggests that financial 
gain cannot always have been uppermost in its mind. 25 When the earl Warenne died in 
1304 it was found that he still had debts relating to the scutage for the armies of 1277 
and 1282-3, debts that were subsequently cancelled. 26 By the time that the archbishop of 
19 Morillo, Warfare under the Anglo-Norman Kings, 6. 
20 Chew, Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief, 54, n. 1. 
21 CPR, 1301-07,469. 
22 N. B. Lewis, `The Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 5 April 1327', Essays in Medieval History 
Presented to Bertie Wilkinson, ed. T. A. Sandquist and M. R. Powicke (Toronto, 1969), 240. 
23 Chew, Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief, 54. 
24 Bury St. Edmunds, 121-2. 
7`5 E. g. CCR, 1279-88,381; Prestwich, `Cavalry Service', 151. 
26 Ancient Petitions Relating to Wales, 303. 
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York was acquitted of scutage for the same campaigns in 1311, any interest that the 
Crown had in obtaining the money had probably long since lapsed. 27 There seems little 
reason to doubt, therefore, that feudal summonses continued to be issued primarily for 
the additional manpower supplies that they could yield during wartime. 
There were problems with the feudal system, if as such we may describe it, and 
it was far from perfect. Besides the well-documented eccentricities of the military duties 
that many tenants-in-chief owed to the Crown, particularly those who held by serjeanty 
tenure and who might be requested to serve with items such as a horse worth five 
shillings, or a pin and a sack, 28 there were also the more serious difficulties of knowing 
how many fees were owed to the king and the problems that the Crown faced in 
enforcement. Confusion early in the reign as to whether service was to be owed 
according to the old assessments or the `new' quotas that had been established under 
Henry II was expressed on several occasions. As late as 1302, the king was ordering the 
rolls to be searched to assess whether the abbot of Abingdon was liable for thirty fees or 
just three. 29 This grey area might have arisen in part from the Crown's attempts to levy 
scutage on the old fees. 30 Concern was expressed late in the reign of Edward II about 
the Crown's inability to discern precisely how much service was owed to it. 31 
Furthermore, the proffer rolls reveal many instances in which tenants-in-chief declared 
uncertainty as to whether or not they had performed the correct amount of service. 32 
What is beyond doubt is that despite such problems, the Crown was still keen to utilise 
the feudal system late in the thirteenth century: where ambiguity prevailed, it was 
determined to assert its rights. The search of the charters of Meaux abbey during the 
reign of Edward I to ascertain whether that ecclesiastical house owed feudal service or 
not, 33 and the claim by Thomas Lercedekne of Cornwall that his lands had been taken 
into the king's hand despite the fact that neither he nor his family had ever owed such 
obligations, 34 suggest that the Crown was eager to maintain and even extend its right to 
this traditional form of recruitment. Edward I appears to have attempted to introduce a 
new kind of feudal obligation north of the border during the opening decade of the 
fourteenth century, requiring the Englishmen who had been granted lands in Scotland to 
27 CCR, 1307-13,313. 
28 CFR, i, 523. C£ E. G. Kimball, Serfeanty Tenure in Medieval England (London, 1936), 70-1. 
29 CCR, 1296-1302,562-3. 
30 H. M. Chew, `Scutage under Edward I', EHR, xxxvii (1922), 323. 
31 The Red Book of the Exchequer, ed. H. Hall, 3 parts, Rolls Ser., xcix (London, 1896), iii, 960-3. 
32 E. g. PW, i, 198. 
z; Melsa, ii, 210. 
34 Parl. Roll., ii, 479-80. 
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provide men-at-arms for garrison service there. 35 Furthermore, the chronicler Peter de 
Langtoft maintained that had Edward introduced a form of feudal service into Wales, he 
might have been able to subdue that country with less difficulty. 36 Even if the king did 
not reinvigorate such service within the conquered lands, his leading henchmen 
certainly did: R. R. Davies has drawn attention to the extensive process of colonisation 
that was carried out within the Welsh territories in the years following the conquest. 37 
Feudal service was evidently still very much alive in the minds of contemporaries and 
was far from being obsolete. As one of many different forms of land-based military 
obligation it was a principal method by which Edward I and his son sought to raise their 
armies. For this reason it deserves to be considered afresh by historians. The remainder 
of this chapter will focus on the cavalrymen who performed this form of service, their 
identities and career patterns, as well as the way in which they were organised in the 
field alongside those raised by other forms of obligation. 
WHO WAS THE `FEUDAL' SOLDIER? 
One of the main drawbacks with previous studies on the feudal army is that relatively 
little attempt has been made to look at the issue of feudal service, as with other forms of 
military obligation, from the perspectives of the soldiers themselves. Fundamental 
questions relating to the identities of these men, their relationship to the tenants-in-chief 
who proffered them at the feudal musters, and their military service patterns in a more 
general sense, have not been considered in sufficient detail. An obvious reason for this 
is that, prior to the reign of Edward I, the detailed military sources on which such 
studies must be based do not exist in sufficient quantity or depth. Furthermore, whilst 
such records have survived for the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, 
relatively little interest has been shown in the workings of the feudal host at that stage 
because of the common perception that it was in a state of terminal decline. 38 Yet, 
although the view that the corporal service of soldiers raised by means of the feudal 
levy was of some value to the Crown even as late as the 1320s may not receive 
universal acceptance, it remains the case that any study of the military activities of the 
English aristocracy under the first two Edwards would be incomplete without 
consideration of these men and their activities. Seven feudal armies were raised between 
35 Prestwich, `Colonial Scotland', 9; E 101/10/5, m. 5. 
36 Langtoft, 283-4. 
37 R. R. Davies, `Colonial Wales', Past and Present, lxv (1974), 5-6. 
38 The main exceptions being the works of Chew and Prestwich. 
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the accession of Edward I and Bannockburn, including the host of 1314 for which the 
proffer roll has been lost. Marshals' registers of varying degrees of completeness have 
survived for the armies of 1277,1282,1300,1303,1306 and 1310. The names of 
around 2,000 individual proffered cavalrymen of all ranks can be traced on these rolls, 
suggesting that around one in four men-at-arms gave feudal service at some point in 
their careers. 39 A number of questions arise from the extant data. To what extent did 
these feudal soldiers constitute a continuation of the wider military community, or were 
their service patterns fundamentally different from those of men-at-arms who served 
gratuitously or for pay? Were the same individuals proffered on several occasions, or 
did these men alternate between different forms of military service, sometimes serving 
in response to the feudal summonses, while on other campaigns for Crown wages? Why 
were these men chosen to discharge feudal service, and what proportion had previous 
campaigning links to the men who proffered them? Are we, indeed, dealing with 
obscure men who are difficult to trace? What is clear is that a true estimation of the 
strengths and weaknesses of the feudal element in Edwardian armies cannot be formed 
without a better knowledge of the men who comprised it, and that a prosopographical 
analysis of these `feudal' soldiers is long overdue. 
Before one can begin to delve deeper into the activities of these `feudal' soldiers, 
it is necessary to assess the completeness of the sources that are available. It would be a 
mistake to take the formal strengths recorded on the marshals' registers, or proffer rolls, 
at their face value, as it is clear that on many campaigns feudal service was performed 
without being enrolled, and that quite a few of the rolls are incomplete. 40 At first glance, 
the methods by which feudal service was recorded seem clear. The marshal and 
constable would note down the names of the tenants-in-chief, along with the sizes of 
their quotas and the names of the men who were being proffered. Once the campaign 
was over, the rolls were sent into the chancery and exchequer. 41 Usually, the king would 
request to see the rolls at some subsequent stage so as to ascertain who had done their 
service. 42 In truth, however, the picture was often more complicated than that. When 
several armies were serving simultaneously in different areas of war, the responsibility 
for recording the performance of feudal service might fall, as we have seen, on a 
number of regional army captains. A letter from Robert de Chandos to the chancellor 43 
39 See chapter 3,85, for the size of the military pool as a whole. 
40 Morris, Welsh Wars, 65; Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 79-80. 
41 The proffer rolls can be found at: 1277 (PW, i, 197-213); 1282 (ibid, 228-243); 1300 (PDS, 209-231); 
1303 (E 101/612/10; E 101/612/29); 1306 (C 47/5/7); 1310 (PW, II, ii, 401-8); 1322 (C 47/5/10). 
42 E. g. CCR, 1272-79,484. 
43 E. g. CDS, ii, no. 1397; CCR, 1307-13,12. 
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(c. 1285) showed incidentally that his service in 1282 had been recorded on the rolls of 
Roger de Mortimer senior, the captain at Montgomery, as well as with the earl 
Marshal. 44 Sometimes the constable or captain would provide written confirmation in 
the form of certificates to verify that feudal service had been performed, as was the case 
with that discharged by Eleanor de Parles in 1322.45 Although her quota was also 
recorded on the proffer roll in that year, there were other instances in which such 
certificates or indentures were the only proof that obligations had been met. The scutage 
and related rolls are replete with references to indentures delivered in to chancery 
recording feudal service, 46 as well as with instances when it was simply stated that a 
(often the chancellor or a campaign captain) testified that b had performed his service. 47 
Whether this involved oral or, as seems more likely, written testimony, is unclear; but it 
is certain that the proffer rolls were only one way in which feudal service might be 
recorded, and that we should not assume that these rolls are complete. Roger de 
Somerville relied on letters of Prince Edward to show that he had performed his service 
in 1306.48 Even the king might be called on to testify in the absence of other records: 
Edward I recalled that William de Breouse had met his obligations in 1303 despite the 
fact that his name was not recorded on the marshal's register for that year. 49 
Fortunately, it is possible to ascertain just how complete the proffer rolls are by 
drawing not only on the information contained within the said rolls, but also on the 
scutage rolls and those recording fines made in lieu of corporal service. The numerous 
petitions sent to the king by tenants-in-chief (particularly for the Welsh campaign of 
1282 and the Scottish expedition of 1306) protesting that they were being charged with 
scutage even though they had performed their service, indicates that there were a 
number of flaws in the recording process. 50 But the scale of these problems, and how 
much they have led to an underestimation of the strengths of the feudal forces that were 
raised, remains to be worked out. Firstly, only a portion of the men summoned to bring 
their due service in any given year can be traced on the rolls, whilst large numbers who 
had not been summoned in person made proffers. Table 5.1 provides data for all six 
campaigns for which proffer rolls have survived between 1272 and 1314. It shows what 
proportion of the male lay tenants-in-chief who were summoned individually proffered 
44 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 114. 
45 BL, Add. Charter 21506; C 47/5/10, m. 1 iii. 
46 E. g. CVCR (supplementary close rolls), 108 (Henry de Grey), 109 (Payn de Tibetot), et al. 
47 Ibid, (scutage rolls) 365-73. 
48 Parl. Roll., ii, 386. 
49 CCW, 253. 
50 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 132-3; Parl. Roll., ii, 386-8. 
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their service or made fines, as well as how many men in each of the said years gave 
service despite not having been summoned. 
Table 5.1: Nos. of Male Lay Tenants-in-Chief who Proffered Feudal Serviced 
1277 1282 1300 1303 1306 1310 
No. summoned in person 179 165 107 100 81 138 
Made proffers (on roll) 88 42 41 23 14 53 
Paid fine 11 15 2 4 13 3 
Not summoned in person 
Made proffers (on roll) 144 77 117 83 36 80 
Paid fine 39 42 3 14 22 0 
These figures demonstrate that there was no precise correlation between the men who 
were individually summoned to bring their due service and the tenants-in-chief who 
were enrolled on the registers with their contingents. Particularly striking is the large 
number of landholders in each of the said years who proffered their service despite not 
having been summoned in person. Presumably they were responding to the sheriffs' 
summonses, but precisely how the Crown was able to enforce the service of these men, 
and why some responded to the summonses but others did not, is less clear. 52 If feudal 
service was unpopular, it seems remarkable that so many individuals should have been 
willing to perform service without being directly ordered to do so by the king. On the 
other hand, of the lay tenants-in-chief who received a personal summons, it is frequently 
the case that only a quarter to a half appear on the proffer rolls as having met their 
obligations. Here we must return to the thorny problem of the incompleteness of the 
records, for it is evident that not all tenants-in-chief who performed their feudal service 
appear on the marshals' rolls. Consequently, we lack the names of many tens of soldiers 
who were sent to war on behalf of these individuals. An examination of the scutage rolls 
for these armies, which show the names of men who had performed their feudal service 
and were entitled to collect scutage from their under-tenants, reveals many tenants-in- 
chief who had sent their quotas to the musters but whose names do not appear on the 
51 Cf. For the summonses, see: PW, i, 193-5,225-6,327-8,366-7,377; PW, II, ii, 394-6. For the fines: 
CFR, i, 85-7; E 370/1/13, mm. 1-6,11. Many fines for the 1277 and 1282 campaigns can also be found on 
the proffer rolls for those years, as can a couple on the roll for 1300. The figure given for the men 
summoned who made proffers in 1310 is a little higher than that given by M. R. Powicke. Cf. Powicke, 
`Edward II and Military Obligation', Speculum, xxxi (1956), 117. 
52 Also, see Critchley, `Summonses to Military Service', 85. 
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registers. The following table reveals the extent of this practice and demonstrates just 
how incomplete the proffer rolls are. 
Table 5.2: Tenants-in-Chief who Proffered Service but are not on the Marshals' Rolls53 
1277 1282 1300 1303 1306 1310 
Summoned individually 
Not summoned individually 
n/d 
n/d 
32 
37 
14 
25 
29 
37 
14 
57 
21 
4 
Total n/d 69 39 66 71 25 
Besides forcing us to modify our figures in table 5.1, showing that more of those who 
were summoned individually performed their service than would appear to have been 
the case at first glance, the above table demonstrates how incomplete are the proffer 
rolls that have come down to us. Although the scutage rolls provide the names of the 
tenants-in-chief who fulfilled their feudal obligations, they do not stipulate the names of 
the men-at-arms who they proffered. Nevertheless, it is evident that the number of 
knights and sergeants who had their names enrolled on the marshals' registers cannot be 
taken as the sum total of those performing feudal service. Indeed, we need to revise our 
figures relating to the strengths of feudal hosts, and their proportional contribution to 
English armies during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, by some margin. 
Evidently, feudal service was not quite as outdated as it is often portrayed. 
It is clear that any prosopographical analysis of the men who performed feudal 
service during this period must necessarily be incomplete. This should be borne in mind 
throughout the following analysis. Before we look in more detail at the knights and 
sergeants who were proffered at feudal musters, it may first prove useful to examine the 
service records of the tenants-in-chief themselves. 54 In his work on the feudal forces of 
an earlier period, J. H. Round described the tenants-in-chief of eleventh and twelfth 
century England as the middlemen of the feudal system. 55 This continued to be the case 
through to the fourteenth century. A total of some 237, or 203 if we discount females 
and ecclesiastics, appear on the marshals' registers as proffering corporal service on 
more than one expedition between 1277 and 1310: 127 of the male lay tenants-in-chief 
proffered their service twice; fifty, on three occasions; twenty, four times; four, on five 
53 For service not on the proffer rolls, see CVCR (supplementary close rolls and scutage rolls), passim. 
sa For a detailed prosopographical analysis of the service performed by the baronial tenants-in-chief 
between 1210 and 1322, see I. J. Sanders, Feudal Military Service in England: A Study of the 
Constitutional and Military Powers of the Barones in Medieval England (Oxford, 1956), 136-60. 
55 J. H. Round, Feudal England: Historical Studies on the Xlth and XIIth Centuries (London, 1895), 248. 
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occasions; and just two in all six years. 56 An additional 252 male lay tenants-in-chief 
proffered their service during these years on only one occasion, but around 130 of these 
can be tentatively linked to family members who appear in that capacity on the proffer 
rolls in other years. 57 The majority of those named as tenants-in-chief on just one 
occasion can be traced in either 1277 or 1310, the years that form the parameters of our 
analysis. Continuity rates would be higher if we included those who are said to have 
performed their service on the scutage and related rolls. Many tenants-in-chief, 
particularly in 1277 and 1282, gave feudal service in person. Forty-three did so on more 
than one campaign, and one individual, Thomas de Scales, proffered himself at the 
feudal muster on four occasions between 1300 and 1310.58 Most, however, preferred to 
discharge their service through substitutes, particularly during the Scottish wars. Even 
so, it is evident that the majority of the tenants-in-chief were present on the king's 
expeditions in person. The military service records for the well-documented campaign 
of 1300 show that at least seventy-five of the 107 male lay tenants-in-chief who 
received an individual summons were in the army in Scotland in that year, the majority 
as retinue leaders. For the expedition of three years later, seventy-eight of the hundred 
individuals summoned can be traced in the same way. 
As for the knights and servientes who made up the quotas of these tenants-in- 
chief, the greater part, not surprisingly, appear in their feudal contingents on no more 
than one occasion. An inquest into the lands of Henry de la Pomeray in Devon in 1293 
revealed that some fifty tenants held land from him by military service in just one 
estate. 59 The pool from which tenants-in-chief could draw the men to discharge their 
feudal service was therefore very large. Despite this, there was some continuity, and at 
least eight of the knights and thirteen of the sergeants who were proffered at the feudal 
muster in Wales in 1277 were employed by the same tenants-in-chief five years later. 
Many of the ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief, in particular, repeatedly drew on the same 
soldiers to discharge their feudal service. The abbot of St. Albans, for example, used 
one of the knights and three of the sergeants whom he proffered in the first Welsh war 
to represent him at the feudal muster in 1282.60 It was not only ecclesiastics who 
56 Cf. Prestwich, `Cavalry Service', 149. 
57 Oliver de Dynaunt, for example, appears only in 1277 but his son Joyce later acknowledged his 
family's service in 1300 following Oliver's death: PW, i, 203; PDS, 212. 
58 1300 (PDS, 216); 1303 (E 101/612/29, m. 1); 1306 (C 47/5/7, m. 1); 1310 (PW, II, ii, 407). 
59 Liber Feodorum. The Book of Fees commonly called Testa de Nevill, 3 vols (London, 1920-3 1), ii, 
1316-9. 
60 The knight Stephen de Cheynduit (although the Cheynduit junior who served in 1282 might have been 
the son of the knight of that name who fought for the abbot in 1277), and the sergeants 
John de Linlegh, 
John le Mareschal and John de Russepot: PW, i, 198,228. 
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repeatedly drew on the same individuals to perform their feudal service: between 1277 
and 1310, at least forty male lay tenants-in-chief enlisted men-at-arms whom they had 
employed to discharge their obligations in the past. The knights Ralph de Trehampton 
and William le Vavasur can be found in the feudal quotas of the earl of Lincoln in both 
of the first two Welsh wars. 61 In like manner, the Doddingseles family sent or led the 
sergeants Clement de la More and John de Wygenhale to more than one muster: the 
former in 1300 and 1303, the latter in those years as well as 1310.62 Even when a soldier 
was not re-employed in this way, members of the same family might be. An attempt by 
the abbot of Ramsey in 1294 to force William de Haningfeld to give feudal service on 
his behalf in the way that his ancestors had done demonstrates that tenants-in-chief were 
keen to maintain these links over succeeding generations. 63 In such instances, the 
proffered men tended to be related to the tenants-in-chief, but not always. Whilst a 
Simon de Coleford can be found in the company proffered by Hugh de Courtenay in 
1300, an Alexander de Coleford performed the service for him six years later. 64 Two 
members of the Bakepuz family, John and Reginald, were brought into the army as part 
of Nicholas de Meppershall's contingent in separate years. 65 As noted already, the 
majority of feudal quotas recorded on the proffer rolls do not reveal such continuity. In 
fact, most tenants-in-chief appear to have relied upon the services of different 
individuals on each occasion that they were summoned by the king. 
This does not tell the whole story of the connections between tenants-in-chief 
and those who they proffered, nor does it reveal whether the knights and sergeants who 
gave feudal service also gave different forms of military service on other occasions. 
This last point is particularly important when attempting to discern the extent to which 
`feudal' soldiers were an extension of the normal military community. What is evident, 
from a prosopographical analysis of the knights and sergeants who performed feudal 
service between 1277 and 1310, is that these men were not, for the most part, untrained 
and untested soldiers who were drawn into the army for forty days and then never seen 
again. On the contrary, they were ordinary members of the military elite who sometimes 
happened to perform feudal service but who on many other occasions served for Crown 
wages, or gratuitously. Distinctions between `feudal' and other types of mounted soldier 
61 PW, i, 199,229. 
62 PDS, 216; E 101/612/29, m. 1; PW, II, ii, 403. 
63 Select Pleas in Manorial and Other Seignorial Courts, i, 78. 
64 PDS, 225; C 47/5/7, m. 1. 
65 PW, i, 204,234. 
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therefore have little merit. 66 Whilst many of the sergeants proffered in 1277 and 1310 
do appear to have been obscure men who are difficult to trace in the military records in 
other years, an analysis of those who gave feudal service in the middle of our period 
shows that this was by no means universally the case. Of the forty or so knights 
proffered at the feudal muster in 1300, no fewer than thirty-five can be traced in armies 
on other campaigns in non-feudal capacities. There is insufficient space to discuss all of 
the individual cases here, but the example of Robert Peverel may be taken as 
representative. He had letters of protection with the king for service in non-feudal 
armies north of the border in 1296,1298 and 1299, and also fought as a retinue leader in 
Flanders in 1297, prior to being proffered by Walter de Langton at the feudal muster in 
1300.67 Despite the great difficulties involved in tracing the service records of the 
sergeants who fought in these armies, around a half of those who were proffered in 
1300 can be found on campaigns in non-feudal capacities in other years. Geoffrey de 
Briggeford fought for pay in Scotland under Eustace de Hacche in 1298 and 1301. In 
between, in 1300, he gave a spell of feudal service on behalf of Edmund Deyncurt. 68 An 
analysis of the sergeants who registered their names with the marshal in other years 
reveals similar trends. Men-at-arms who gave feudal service were sometimes, in fact, 
among the most exalted warriors of their day. Giles de Argentein fought as a sergeant in 
the feudal levy of 1300 and as a knight for Piers Gaveston in Scotland in 1310.69 
Furthermore, at least ten of the knights proffered in 1277 had taken part in the Lord 
Edward's crusade to the Holy Land a few years previously. 70 
That `feudal' soldiers sometimes served for Crown wages and, as J. E. Morris 
noted in his study of the Welsh wars of Edward I, entered pay once their feudal service 
had been discharged, may not be particularly surprising. 7' Indeed, it has been 
recognised for a long time. Yet the obvious point arising from this, that the feudal host 
can hardly have been less competently manned than armies that were raised through 
other means if the soldiers in both kinds of army were the same, seems to have been 
overlooked. Furthermore. although tenants-in-chief might not have used the same men 
66 For a similar view relating to an earlier period, see S. D. B. Brown, 'Military Service and Monetary 
Reward in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries', History, lxxiv (1989), 22,34. 
67 1296 (C 67/11, m. 4): Flanders 1297 (C 67/12. m. 3d); 1298 (C 67/13. m. 7): 1299 (C 67/14. m. 15): 
1300 (PDS, 210). 
68 1298 (Gough, 192): 1300 (PDS, -' 15): 1301 (E 101 '924, m. 3). He also served for pay in the retinue of 
Hacche's sub-leader William de Hardreshull in Flanders in 1297; BL, Add. MS 7965, f. 73v. 
69PDS, 212: P11'. Il, ii, 403. 
70 Ralph de Wodeburg, Thomas Lercedekne, Peter de Chalons, John de Gurna\ 
, 
William de Wodeburg. 
Thomas Boter. Thomas du Pvn. Walter de Cambhou, Robert Martin and Ralph de Cotun. Lloyd. English 
Socieh" and the Crusade. appendix 4. 
'' Morris, 11'elsh 11'cnýs. 132. 
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repeatedly to discharge their feudal obligations, many of the soldiers who were 
proffered at the feudal musters did have service connections with them in different 
capacities in other years. Sixteen of some forty knights proffered in 1300, and twelve 
out of thirty-four in 1310 (not including tenants-in-chief who performed the service in 
person) had additional military ties to the men who they represented. There were many 
similar bonds, in other years, between the tenants-in-chief and the men whom they 
proffered. Again, some examples will have to suffice to illustrate this point. The knight 
Thomas de Wokyndon was proffered by Henry de Grey in 1303. He had letters of 
protection enrolled in Grey's service not only in that year, but also in 1298,1300 and 
1306.72 Thomas Paynel, who gave feudal service for John de St. John in 1282, can also 
be found in his retinue, or that of his son, in Gascony in 1294, and in Scotland in 1299, 
1300,1301,1303 and 1306.73 In 1310, John Darcy and Simon de Cokefeld were 
proffered by Aymer de Valence and Payn de Tibetot respectively: both had joined the 
retinues of those lords on previous expeditions. 74 Meanwhile, all four knights sent by 
Thomas of Lancaster had been with him either in 1306 or at the Dunstable tournament 
of 1309.75 In other instances, the connections between tenants-in-chief and their feudal 
soldiers are less immediately obvious. Richard de Mascy gave feudal service on behalf 
of Ralph de Cammoys in 1310. Four years later he can be found in the retinue of 
Cammoys' lord, Hugh le Despenser, at Bannockburn. 76 Likewise, two of the sergeants 
proffered by Richard de la Ryvere and John de Columbers on the Caerlaverock 
campaign had fought alongside both men in the retinue of Aymer de Valence at Falkirk 
two years previously. 77 Evidently, the service patterns of `feudal' soldiers did not differ 
from those of other soldiers within Edwardian armies. Indeed, it is doubtful whether 
armies that contained feudal elements looked any different from other armies of the age 
once they had been put into the field, something that we will now have cause to look at 
in greater detail. 
72 1298 (C 67/13, m. 6d); 1300 (C 67/14, m. 10); 1303 (E 101/612/10, m. 1; C 67/15, m. 14); 1306 (C 
67/16, m. 13). 
73 1282 (PW, i, 231; E 101/4/1, m. 10); 1294 (RG, iii, 167); 1299-1300 (E 101/8/26, m. 1); 1301 (C 67/14, 
m. 4); 1303 (C 67/15, m. 7d); 1306 (E 101/612/15, m. 1); temp. Edward II (E 101/17/32). 
74 Darcy; see chapter 4 n. 149. Cokefeld: 1303 (E 101/612/11, m. 2d); 1306 (E 101/13/7, m. 1). Also, see 
PW, II, ii, 401,405. 
75 Peter de Limesey and William Trussell junior in 1306 (C 67/16, mm. 9,4d) and Roger de Swynnerton 
and John de Twyford in 1309 (Tomkinson, `Retinues at Dunstable', 74-5); PW, II, ii, 406. 
76 PW, II, ii, 403; C 71/6, m. 3. 
" Roger de Weston (proffered by Columbers) and Roger de Sakeville (proffered by de la Ryvere): PDS, 
222,230; Gough, 216-18. 
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STRUCTURE AND ORGANISATION: AN INTRICATE FUSION OF ELEMENTS 
In any study of medieval armies, the most important question is also invariably the most 
difficult to answer: how were these hosts organised in the field? This question takes on 
added complexity prior to the reign of Edward III, that is in the era of the pre-contract 
armies, for the forces of Edward I and his son, like those of their predecessors, were 
composed of diverse elements. During the middle third of the fourteenth century, 
important innovations were made in the way that royal hosts were recruited and 
organised. Foremost amongst these were the universal use of Crown pay and the gradual 
employment of mixed retinues. The improved performance of English armies during the 
early stages of the Hundred Years War has been attributed to the development of these 
apparently simple and efficient methods of raising soldiers. 78 In contrast, the armies of 
the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were, superficially at least, more 
difficult to manage. Mounted men-at-arms were gathered in a variety of ways: some 
were paid by the king, others served gratuitously, whilst still more, as we have seen, 
served in fulfilment of their feudal obligations. In effect, `there is no simple way of 
describing the cavalry forces in the armies of Edward I's reign: they cannot with justice 
be termed either mercenary, feudal or contractual'. 79 If characterising these pre-contract 
armies and understanding how they functioned in the field is difficult, historians have 
nevertheless shown little restraint when assessing their flaws and shortcomings. In 
particular, the feudal part of these hosts has been the focus of much criticism. For J. E. 
Morris, `the paid squadrons under professional captains... were more effective than the 
incoherent units of a feudal host'; 80 and F. M. Powicke was of the opinion that feudal 
forces could never be of use for anything more than mere `martial demonstrations'. 8' 
The perceived lack of usefulness of the feudal host has even led one historian to suggest 
`that English feudalism was in its origins as much a fiscal as a military institution'. 82 
Little attempt has been made to modify or oppose such views, and the received wisdom 
is that the rise of the contract army was an inevitable consequence of the inadequacies 
of the feudal host. 
Few would deny that the contract armies of Edward III and his successors 
performed better than did the hosts raised by his father and grandfather. Edward I might 
have won at Falkirk, but it is doubtful whether he could have done so at Crecy. It also 
seems that these contract armies were easier to manage and control than the fluctuating 
78 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, chapter 1; idem, `English Armies in the Fourteenth Century'. 
79 Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, 91. 
80 Morris, Welsh Wars, 68. 
81 Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, 543. 
82 J. M. W. Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism, 1215-1540 (Manchester, 1968), 5. 
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forces put into the field by the first two Edwards. However, whilst the beneficial impact 
of the use of contracts and the rise of wholly paid armies is irrefutable, the suggestion 
that the feudal hosts within the armies of Edward I and Edward II were incompetent and 
ineffective is less clear-cut. Not only is it doubtful that the English government would 
have persisted with the feudal summons for over two-and-a-half centuries if the forces 
raised in this way were not of some value; it also seems unlikely that a society organised 
for war would be unable to manage and arrange its field forces effectively, however 
they were raised. 83 The problem is that evidence relating to the way that these armies 
were organised in the field is conspicuously lacking. 84 Monastic chroniclers either were 
unaware of the more intricate matters of military organisation, or deemed them too 
commonplace to be worth recording. And the soldier-chronicler Sir Thomas Gray also 
has little to say about military organisation during the Scottish wars in which his father 
played so honourable a part, whereas by the time of his own martial career the feudal 
host was effectively a relic of the past. What does seem clear is that some reorganisation 
usually took place at the muster under the supervision of the king (if he was present), 
marshal and constable, a process that comes more fully into focus for later armies. 
85 
Before the main army set out from Chester in 1282, Edward ensured that his men were 
kept in good order with barded mounts. 86 Furthermore, an interesting account in The 
Annals of the Reign of King Edward the First shows that some intricate organisation 
took place when the army arrived at Carlisle in 1300.87 For their part, the feudal 
contingents were reviewed and monitored with particular care. Some of the men-at-arms 
who arrived at the muster in 1322 were described on the marshal's register as `well- 
armed', 88 and the equipment of individuals serving according to serjeanty tenure was 
recorded in minute detail. 89 One thing that can be said with certainty is that, in general, 
`feudal' soldiers were just as well equipped and armed as other soldiers within the 
armies. 
83 The inherent implausibility of the `feudal hosts' of this period being poorly organised is further 
suggested by the use of similar methods of raising armies in other countries. Cf. J. S. Critchley, Feudalism 
(London, 1978), 24-9; P. Engel, The Realm of St Stephen: A History of Medieval Hungary, 895-1526 
(London, 2001), 104-5; B. Arnold, German Knighthood, 1050-1300 (Oxford, 1985), 116,124; A. Ayton, 
`From Muhi to Mohacs - Armies and Combatants in Later Medieval 
European Transcultural Wars', 
Transcultural Wars from the Middle Ages to the 21 t Century, ed. H-H. Kortüm (Berlin, 2006), 229-32. 
84 For the longevity of this source problem, see F. M. Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism, 
1066-1166 (Oxford, 1932), 177. 
85 Cf. A. L. Brown, `The English Campaign in Scotland, 1400', British Government and Administration: 
Studies Presented to S. B. Chrimes, ed. H. Hearder and H. R. Loyn (Cardiff, 1974), 45. 
86 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 201-2. 
87 Chronica et Annales, 439. 
88 C 47/5/10, m. 2. 
89 As with the sergeant Adam le Brun in 1300; PDS, 211. 
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Unfortunately, despite the appealing simplicity of this image, of soldiers (both 
`feudal' and non-feudal alike) who arrived at the muster before being integrated into the 
army as the constable and marshal saw fit, 90 the reality is likely to have been more 
complex than that. For one thing, whilst the muster might have been the ideal place to 
group the retinues of various sizes into larger units and battles, it is unlikely that the 
internal structure of the retinues was interfered with at that point. Much of the necessary 
organisation took place before the muster convened. Secondly, it must be remembered 
that in many years there was no single muster and that men and units arrived and 
departed from the army at different times. `A medieval army', as F. M. Powicke once 
noted, `was a fluctuating thing'. 91 Finally, few accounts that have survived relating to 
the mustering process tell us in sufficient detail exactly what was happening there. The 
exceptions are few, but useful, and will be discussed in due course. In sum, if we wish 
to know how these armies were organised in the field, and how the so-called feudal 
contingents were arranged alongside those serving for pay or gratuitously, we cannot 
rely solely on odd snippets in chronicles or monastic registers. Instead, we must draw on 
as wide a range of sources as possible. Fortunately, the Crown records, and in particular 
the proffer rolls, shed some light on this process. Sometimes it would appear that the 
king or the army's commanding officer might have some say as to how and where the 
feudal contingents performed their service. At the macrocosmic level, the king might 
order individuals to proffer their feudal service in one regional army or another. During 
the first Welsh war, Edward commanded Geoffrey and Ralph de Gacelyn to perform 
their feudal service in west Wales under William de Valence. This order would have 
come quite naturally as the Gacelyn family were associates of that captain. 92 Five years 
later, there is evidence that some leading Marcher lords were stationed at Ellesmere and 
Montgomery at the king's behest. 93 Roger de Somerville offered his service to the 
Prince of Wales in 1306 because he had been knighted by him during the spring, so 
Edward sent him to perform it under Henry de Percy who was captain of one of the 
small armies north of the border. 94 The ways in which such service was discharged 
therefore varied from case to case. 
The way in which feudal contingents could be distributed throughout several 
regional armies shows that they, and the feudal hosts in general, were perfectly flexible 
and adaptable. In this respect the feudal units were no different from those serving for 
90 Cf. Powicke, Military Obligation, 34. 
91 Powicke, The Thirteenth Century, 411. 
92 CPR, 12 72-81,212. 
93 Ancient Correspondence Concerning Wales, 77-8; PW, i, 234. 
94 CDS, iii, no. 52. 
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pay or gratuitously. When we begin to look at the organisation of the feudal contingents 
at a lower level, that is, among the retinues that comprised the armies, the situation 
becomes still more intriguing. What does seem clear is that the feudal contingents were 
not serving in a separate all-feudal brigade. 95 The king did not concern himself too 
much with the internal organisation of the army retinues. Still, one entry on the close 
rolls relating to the army of 1306, in which it is stated that John Fitz Reginald had his 
feudal service in Hugh le Despenser's company by the king's orders, suggests that he 
could do so if he wished. 96 More importantly, this entry demonstrates that `feudal' 
soldiers could be and were integrated into the retinues. In fact, numerous entries on the 
proffer rolls of 1277 and 1282 suggest that it was normal for the feudal contingents to 
be organised in this way. Baldwin Wake and Matthew de Lovayn requested in 1277, for 
example, that they be allowed to perform their feudal service `in ii quarentena' because 
they belonged to a magnate `familia'. 97 The precise meaning of such entries, and what 
they tell us about how these men performed their feudal service, is a little unclear. Yet, 
sometimes the testimony of the proffer rolls is less ambiguous. In 1282, Robert de 
Sevans gave his forty days' service in the company of John le Mareschal and John de 
Vaux in the comitiva of the earl Marshal. 98 A generation later in 1306, we find both 
Thomas de Scales and William le Mareschal, tenants-in-chief who were performing 
their service in person, fighting within the company of Hugh de Vere. 99 Such evidence 
can be supplemented by miscellaneous entries in other sources. In 1313 it was found 
that Ralph Fitz William had performed his service of three knights' fees in the army of 
1306 because he had been present in that year with ten men-at-arms. 100 This implies that 
his `feudal' soldiers were integrated with the other men in his retinue who were present 
in response to other forms of obligation. 
Such combinations of `feudal' and non-feudal soldiers within the retinues 
highlight the danger of drawing simplistic distinctions between feudal hosts and paid 
armies, or of juxtaposing feudal hosts with later professional or national forces. 1°' One 
of the reasons why quasi-feudal armies are believed to have been structurally defective 
is because the feudal contingents, so the theory goes, were not normally combined with 
9s Cf. Prestwich, `Cavalry Service', 150-1; idem, Edward I, 485; idem, Armies and Warfare, 73. 
96 CCR, 1302-07,490. 
97 PW, i, 200,204; M. Altschul, A Baronial Family in Medieval England: The Clares, 1217-1314 
(Baltimore, 1965), 138-9. 
98 PW, i, 232,233. 
99 C 47/5/7, m. 1. 
ioo CCR, 1313-18,17. 
to' Cf. S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Communities in Western Europe, 900-1300,2nd edition (Oxford, 
1997), 253-4. 
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those serving gratuitously or for pay. But just why this was not possible, and how these 
`feudal' soldiers performed their service if they were not integrated into the paid and 
other retinues, has never been fully explained. 102 Morris believed that the size of the 
retinues varied according to whether feudal or paid service was being given. If a leader 
were serving for pay, then performed his feudal service for forty days before entering 
pay again, he `possibly [had] larger troops out during the obligatory period than either 
before or after'. 103 Here Morris was evidently aware that at some stages in the Welsh 
wars and under particular circumstances it was necessary for `feudal' and paid soldiers 
to fight alongside one another within the same retinues. Yet he did not draw the logical 
conclusion from this, possibly because of a due sense of caution, that such integration 
might well have been a normal state of affairs. Consequently, the impression of `feudal' 
soldiers as men who were somehow separate and different from other men-at-arms 
within the armies has been repeated in the historiography. 104 Nevertheless, Morris' 
observation raises an obvious question. If `feudal' and non-feudal soldiers could be 
combined on some occasions, then why not on others? Fortunately, the survival in 1300 
of two occasional armorials, the Caerlaverock Roll and the Galloway Roll, allows us to 
look at this problem in more detail. On 2 July in that year, the Gloucestershire knight 
Thomas de Berkeley proffered three knights at the feudal muster: the brothers Edmund 
and John Basset, along with Thomas de Gurnay. '°5 In one of the short apparently eye- 
witness accounts towards the end of the Caerlaverock poem, which recalls the events of 
15 July, the herald notes that the Basset brothers were present alongside the Berkeley 
brothers, Maurice and Thomas, during the siege. 106 On the Galloway Roll, recording an 
encounter that took place between the English and Scots at the river Cree on 8 August, 
the Basset brothers are again arranged within the Berkeley retinue, as is the third 
`feudal' knight, Thomas de Gurnay. The Berkeley brothers were not giving feudal 
service and appear, along with William de Wauton and another unidentified knight who 
is listed in the retinue on the Galloway Roll, to have been serving without Crown pay. 
107 
Evidently, the three `feudal' knights performing their obligatory service did so 
alongside the Berkeleys' non-feudal men-at-arms (including the sergeants who are not 
102 R. F. Walker's work on the Welsh wars of Henry III contains much information on the feudal levies but 
the sources do not really allow for close analysis of the relationships between such men and those serving 
according to other forms of obligation; Walker, `The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 178-9,182,277-8,542-3. 
103 Morris, Welsh Wars, 75. 
1°4 E. g. G. W. S. Barrow, Feudal Britain: The Completion of the Medieval Kingdoms 1066-1314 
(London, 
1956), 362-6; A. Nusbacher, The Battle of Bannockburn 1314 (Stroud, 2000), 54. 
105 PDS, 221. 
106 Aspilogia III, 1,443. 
107 Ibid, 468. 
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listed on the rolls but who must have been present) and did not perform their service 
elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, the Caerlaverock Roll, which records events that took place 
during the forty days of feudal service, is of limited value in this respect as few men 
below the rank of banneret are listed on the armorial. The Galloway Roll, on the other 
hand, records the names of many knights bachelor organised into retinues. This enables 
us to trace other instances of `feudal' soldiers who served within the magnate 
companies alongside paid and other cavalrymen. John de Hulles was proffered at the 
feudal muster by the tenant-in-chief and campaign leader Hugh de Vere on 29 June 
1300. Interestingly, not only was a letter of protection enrolled for him within Vere's 
company on 13 June, but he also appears on the Galloway Roll four places after Vere 
and alongside his other, non-feudal retainers: Alphonse de Vere, Robert Fitz Nigel and 
Arnold de Monteny. 108 In like manner, the knight John de Grendon was proffered by his 
former retinue leader Edmund, baron Stafford on 28 June before having a protection 
enrolled in Robert de la Warde's company on 2 July. He appears on the armorial three 
places after de la Warde, again alongside the latter's other, non-feudal followers. ' 09 
These men appear on the Galloway Roll shortly after their periods of feudal service 
were due to expire. This proves that they did not depart from the army as soon as their 
feudal service was over. It also seems unlikely that they would have appeared within the 
retinues just a few days after completing their feudal service had they not been there all 
along: restructuring at that stage would only have created confusion, particularly as not 
all men-at-arms began their obligatory service on the same date. Fortunately, there are 
some men on the Galloway Roll whose periods of feudal service began later in the 
summer. These individuals should therefore have been performing their feudal service 
on 8 August at the time of the events that the Galloway Roll commemorates. In mid- 
July, the household banneret and one of Edward's most trusted military associates, 
William de Leyburn, proffered two knights in his capacity as a tenant-in-chief: Fulk 
Peyforer and Henry de Leyburn. Had these men been serving in a separate feudal 
brigade then one would not expect them to appear under Leyburn on the armorial. 
However, both men can be traced on the roll just a few entries down from him along 
with his other bachelors: Simon de Leyburn, William de Creye and John de 
Champayne. ll° To complicate matters still further, on 8 July, just a few days before 
their feudal service was due to begin, these two `feudal' knights also appear, within 
108 PDS, 216; C 67/14, m. 12; Aspilogia III, i, 456. 
109 PDS, 213; C 67/14, m. 10; Aspilogia III, i, 465-6. 
1 10 PDS, 228; Aspilogia III, i, 463. 
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Leyburn's retinue, on the household horse inventory for the expedition. "' This is 
peculiar as the inventory records only the part of the army that was in receipt of Crown 
wages. The integration of the feudal contingents within Edwardian armies was, 
therefore, a complex business that requires more detailed investigation. 
For the purposes of such an analysis it is not enough to rely on the testimony of 
the rolls of arms alone. All the evidence shows that the armies of Edward I and Edward 
II were complex structures, and it is therefore necessary to look at the problem of the 
organisation of the feudal contingents from as broad a perspective as possible. 
Furthermore, although the Galloway Roll is a more inclusive armorial than any of its 
predecessors among the occasional rolls, it does not name any men of sub-knightly 
status. This is a major problem as by the time of the Scottish wars around 90 per cent of 
the feudal levies consisted of servientes rather than knights. The only way to investigate 
this matter in detail, therefore, is to carry out a wide-ranging prosopographical analysis; 
that is, to compare the information contained in the proffer rolls with the other military 
records of this period: the letters of protection and attorney, horse inventories, wardrobe 
books and pay rolls. The best place to begin is with the lay tenants-in-chief as many of 
these men not only made proffers at the feudal musters but also went on to serve as 
retinue leaders within the armies. In this light, it is possible to reflect on how many of 
the men proffered by these serving tenants-in-chief also appear in their military retinues. 
In all years for which the feudal summons was issued, it is possible to find some overlap 
between the men named in the feudal contingents of the tenants-in-chief and the men-at- 
arms who fought alongside them. Four of the eight men proffered by the earl of Lincoln 
on the Welsh campaign of 1277 - Aymer de Bruycurt, Ralph de Trehampton, William le 
Vavasur and Robert de Kirketon - also took out letters of protection with him in that 
year. 1 12 All, with the possible exception of Kirketon, had been in Lincoln's retinue since 
the earliest operations of the war during the previous winter, when he had led six 
knights and twenty-three sergeants in his paid retinue as captain on the March. ' 13 It 
seems unlikely that these men would have left the earl's retinue, in which they had been 
serving for several months, during their forty days of feudal service. In 1303, all four of 
the men proffered by Richard Lovel on 2 June had had their horses appraised in his 
retinue on 18 May, meaning that they were giving paid service under him before 
beginning their obligatory spell. It also suggests that they were probably with Lovel 
'" E 10 1/8/23, m. 4; Liber Quotidianus, 195. 
112 PW, i, 199; CPR, 1272-81,189,190,221. 
113 See the dates of the protections in the previous footnote; E 101/3/12. 
201 
during their six weeks of feudal service. 114 This is all the more likely given that three of 
these sergeants (Hugh de Sturgeun, Michael de Wemmes and Elias de la Forde) had 
followed Lovel to Scotland in previous years, the last having been proffered by him at 
the feudal muster in 1300.115 What these and many other similar examples illustrate is 
that more often than not, when a tenant-in-chief who made a proffer also served as a 
retinue leader, his `feudal' soldiers served alongside his non-feudal men-at-arms within 
the wider comitiva. 116 
Alternatively, `feudal' soldiers sometimes performed their service not with the 
men who had proffered them, but in the retinues of other campaign leaders. They might 
even follow the lay tenants-in-chief into those retinues. ' 17 In some instances, there was 
no choice but for men-at-arms to serve with a lord other than the man who had proffered 
them as the landholders who discharged their obligations were either too old to give 
service in person, or did not take part in the campaigns for political reasons. ' 18 In 1310 
and 1314, political unrest and opposition to Edward II among the magnates meant that 
some of the earls and leading barons did not take part in the campaigns in person, even 
though they did make proffers. ' 19 No records survive for the feudal contingents that 
served on the Bannockburn campaign. Still, it is interesting to note that a certain John 
Darcy had a letter of protection in 1310 for service with the earl of Gloucester, and that 
a knight of that name had been proffered at the muster on behalf of the earl of Pembroke 
who was back in London carrying out his duties as an Ordainer. 120 The possibility that 
Pembroke's feudal contingent was with Gloucester in that year is strengthened not only 
by the fact that the earls were men of the same rank, making any such agreement 
acceptable to both parties, but also by the presence of a Nicholas de Reseby in 
Gloucester's retinue, a sergeant named Walter de `Rysebegh', possibly a relative, 
having been proffered by Valence. 121 Gilbert Pecche, who had been to Scotland with 
Aymer de Valence in 1301 and 1306, was also with the earl of Gloucester in 1310.122 
That agreements between lay tenants-in-chief and the campaign leaders were not 
uncommon is suggested by many similar prosopographical links grounded in local and 
14 E 101/612/29, m. 2; E 101/612/11, m. 1. 
115 Sturgeun: 1298 (Gough, 179); 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 7d); 1301 (E 101/9/24, m. 2). Wemmes; 1301 (E 
101/9/24, m. 2). Forde; 1300 (E 101/8/23, m. 7d; PDS, 220). 
16 In such instances the `feudal' soldiers would have been treated no differently from the other men in the 
retinues, receiving the same pay and benefits, such as horse compensation, from their retinue leaders; 
Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 88-9. 
117 Powicke, `Edward II and Military Obligation', 118. 
118 Cf. A. L. Poole, Obligations of Society in the XII and XIII Centuries (Oxford, 1946), 39. 
119 Vita Edwardi Secundi, 21-3,86-9; Lanercost, 224; Flores Historiarum, iii, 338. 
120 C 71/4, m. 10; PW, II, ii, 401. 
121 C 71/4, m. 13; PW, II, ii, 401. 
122 For his service with Valence: E 101/9/24, m. ld; E 101/13/16, f. 5v. For 1310: C 71/4, m. 10. 
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regional familiarity. Two of the men-at-arms proffered by Edmund earl of Cornwall in 
1277 had letters of protection earlier that year for service in the company of the south- 
western lord, Oliver de Dynaunt. 123 In 1300, the two sergeants proffered by Nicholas de 
Kiryel of Kent, Peter Pycard and Edmund de St. Leger, had their horses appraised under 
another landholder from that county: William de Leyburn. 124 Kiryel made his proffer 
immediately after Leyburn and had previously served in his company on the Flanders 
campaign of 1297-8.125 On other occasions, the retinue leaders were related to the 
tenants-in-chief by whom the men had been proffered. In 1303, a Roger de Wellesford 
registered his service on behalf of Cecily de Beauchamp, just a couple of weeks after 
having his horse appraised with her son, Robert. 126 Furthermore, the Warin Martin who 
was proffered by the countess of Pembroke on the same campaign can later be found 
receiving compensation for horse losses within the retinue of Aymer de Valence. 127 
What these links prove is that `feudal' soldiers operated within the same networks of 
regional and familial relations as did other men-at-arms, and that their service bonds 
were essentially the same as theirs. 
On most campaigns it would appear that around a half of the retinue leaders 
within the armies were not serving for Crown pay, but had chosen, instead, to pay their 
men-at-arms directly from their own resources. In such instances, the campaign pay 
accounts tell us little about the integration of the feudal contingents within the retinues. 
It is also far from clear how reliable and precise the pay rolls actually are: careful 
scrutiny of the vadia guerre accounts of a slightly later period has shown that royal 
clerks were more interested in making their accounts add up than in reflecting the 
practical reality of what was happening in the field. 128 Nevertheless, in a few instances, 
the pay accounts can be of some value for our investigation. The pay entry for William 
de Cantilupe for the Caerlaverock campaign states that he had three knights and eight 
sergeants in his retinue between 3 July and 31 August; and that the pay of one of his 
sergeants had been stopped for eight days because he owed the service of the tenth part 
of one knights' fee. This sergeant, William de Sutton, was proffered by Cantilupe at the 
feudal muster on 3 July. Intriguingly, Sutton is also listed among his lord's paid men-at- 
arms on the horse inventory on the same date, even though he should have been 
123 PW, i, 198; CPR, 1272-81,189. For evidence of the familiarity of the earl with the Dynaunt family, 
see Ministers' Accounts of the Earldom of Cornwall, 1296-1297, ed. L. M. Midgley, 2 vols, 
Camden 
Society P ser., 1xvi, lxviii (1942-5), ii, 231. 
'24 PDS, 228; E 101/8/23, m. 4. 
125 E 101 /6/3 7, m. 4. 
126 E 101/612/29, m. 1; E 101/612/11, m. 1. Also, see CCR, 1296-1302,567. 
127 E 101/612/10, m. 1; BL, Add. MS 8835, f. 46v; PDS, 269. 
128 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 138-55. 
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beginning his period of feudal service at that time. His inclusion in Cantilupe's pay 
account, as well as among his soldiers on the horse inventory, strongly suggests that he 
performed his feudal service within his lord's paid retinue. 129 On the other hand, the 
men who gave their feudal service in west Wales under William de Valence in 1282 
simply disappeared from the pay records for forty days between 2 August and 10 
September. 1 30 In addition to the evidence provided by the pay accounts, it is sometimes 
possible to trace instances in which `feudal' soldiers followed the lords who had 
proffered them into the retinues of other men. On 14 July 1300, Andrew Luterel and 
Roger de Arundel, among others, were proffered at the feudal muster by John de 
Mohun. Just ten days previously, both men, along with Mohun, had had letters of 
protection enrolled in the company of the earl of Warwick. 131 In a similar instance in 
1310, the serviens Raymond Harang took out a letter of protection with the earl of 
Gloucester within three weeks of being proffered at the feudal muster by Nicholas 
Pointz. He would appear to have given his feudal service within Pointz' sub-retinue on 
the Scottish campaign of that year, as Pointz also received a protection with Gilbert de 
Clare during the autumn. 132 Such examples could be multiplied and, along with the 
evidence of the pay rolls, enhance our understanding of how the `feudal' soldiers were 
woven into the army structures. 
It is not surprising to find that `feudal' soldiers who had been proffered by male 
lay tenants-in-chief were integrated into the armies in much the same way as those who 
were serving for pay or gratuitously. After all, these men would often have been 
relatives, neighbours, friends or tenants of the lords for whom they performed their 
obligatory service. Furthermore, as we have seen, it was common for `feudal' knights 
and sergeants to have had service links to the men who proffered them in non-feudal 
capacities on other campaigns. With the notable exception of the bishop of Durham, 
however, this cannot have been the case with the ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief. These 
men and women were not warriors accustomed to the intricacies of military organisation 
and recruitment, but simply landholders who by virtue of the estates that they held in 
chief of the king were obliged to provide a quota of men-at-arms for forty days of 
military service whenever a summons was issued. How, then, were the men named 
within the feudal contingents of these ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief organised within 
the armies? Here, the evidence of the monastic chronicles and registers may provide 
129 Simpkin, `The English Army and the Scottish Campaign of 1310-11' (forthcoming). 
130 R. F. Walker, `William de Valence and the Army of West Wales, 1282-1283', WHR, xviii (1997), 415. 
131 PDS, 227; C 67/14, m. 9. 
132 C 71/4, m. 10; PW, II, ii, 403. 
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some clues. The most familiar accounts are those composed at that most renowned 
house of historical writing, the abbey of St. Albans. Matthew Paris' well-known passage 
relating to the army in Wales in 1257 shows (although Paris' lack of proximity to events 
must be remembered) that the knights and sergeants proffered by the abbot in that year 
were distributed by the marshal and constable among the retinues at the muster, the 
former being separated from the latter. '33 In 1277, in contrast, it would appear that the 
men proffered by the abbey stayed together during their service. Other than the fact that 
the contingent was well-armed and served for eight weeks, some of this service being 
for pay, the account for that year tells us nothing of how the contingent was organised 
within the host. '34 Similarly frustrating are the accounts preserved in the register of the 
abbey of Malmesbury. 135 Nevertheless, there is evidence to suggest that `feudal' 
soldiers who were proffered by ecclesiastics, like those sent by their lay counterparts, 
were organised within the retinues. One of the knight's fees owed by the abbot of St. 
Albans for the army of 1303 was held by the household yeoman, William de Montacute. 
In compliance with the king's wishes, it was agreed that Montacute would do his 
service to the king in that year, presumably in the household division, and that the abbot 
would be allowed the service of that fee. ' 36 If the king sometimes arranged for soldiers 
proffered by ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief to serve within his own retinue, it is probable 
that lesser retinue leaders were also involved in similar agreements. 
What might well have happened, therefore, is that when an ecclesiastical tenant- 
in-chief had well-established landholding or personal connections with a local military 
leader, some agreement might be reached between the two men by which his quota 
could be discharged. In other cases, when such agreements were not possible prior to 
the muster, or when such relationships did not exist, it might be left to the marshal and 
constable to distribute the ecclesiastical quotas at the muster; as in the case recorded by 
Paris in 1257. It was quite common for ecclesiastics to contract with military leaders for 
the fulfilment of their military obligation before the start of a campaign. Indeed, in the 
few instances where contracts have survived, it is relatively easy to trace the integration 
of these quotas within the retinues. The archbishop of York, William Wykewane, paid a 
hundred pounds to John de Eyville in 1282 to discharge his feudal service in Wales. 
'37 
133 Chronica Majora, vi, 374. 
134 Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani, a Thoma Walsingham, Regnante Ricardo Secundo, ejusdem 
Ecclesiae Praecentore, compilata, ed. H. T. Riley, 3 vols, Rolls Ser., xxviii 4 (London, 1867-9), i, 435. 
135 Registrum Malmesburiense: The Register of Malmesbury Abbey, ed. J. S. Brewer, 2 voll, Rolls Ser., 
lxxii (London, 1879-80), ii, 404-5. 
136 CCR, 1302-07,32. 
137 The Register of William Wickwane, Lord Archbishop of York 1279-1285, ed. W. Brown, Surtees 
Society, cxiv (1907), no. 839. 
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Eyville was included in the archbishop's quota and was clearly leading the other five 
men who were proffered: they can be found in his retinue on the horse inventory, or 
with protections, just two weeks prior to the muster alongside other, non-feudal 
soldiers. 138 In this instance, the relationship between the Eyville family and the 
archbishops appears to have been firmly established, as a Gocelyn de Eyville later 
appears as a yeoman of another archbishop, Thomas de Corbrigg, in 1301.139 A third 
archbishop of York, William de Grenefeld, later contracted with the local north 
Yorkshire knight, Thomas de Coleville, for the fulfilment of his feudal service in 1310. 
There is evidence to suggest that Coleville led the archbishop's feudal contingent into 
the retinues in that year. 140 It was not only the archbishops of York, however, who 
employed retinue leaders for this purpose: in 1300, the bishop of Hereford contracted 
with a local knight, William de Grandison, for his feudal service. 141 Significantly, the 
knight in the bishop's proffered contingent, Thomas de Bermingham, appears under 
Grandison on the Galloway Roll shortly before entering pay in his retinue. This 
demonstrates that he was riding within the comitiva alongside Grandison's other men 
during his spell of feudal service. '42 It seems likely that these `feudal' soldiers were 
associates of Grandison rather than of the bishop, as Bermingham was also with 
Grandison in Scotland in 1301 and 1304. Furthermore, two of the sergeants proffered by 
the bishop in 1300, John de Dun and Walter de Cadington, were likewise with 
Grandison in Scotland the following year. 143 Sometimes the wording of these 
agreements makes it clear that the service was to be performed within the retinues. A 
chancery warrant relating to a planned Scottish campaign of Edward II in 1318 shows 
that the household steward William de Montacute had contracted with the abbot and 
convent of Abingdon to take their feudal service north in his company. 144 In such 
instances, the records leave little doubt as to the way in which the `feudal' soldiers 
discharged their service during the forty days. 
138 PW, i, 228; C 47/2/7, mm. 8-9; C 67/8, m. 5. This contract has been mentioned before but without 
reference to the horse lists and other military service records for that year; Chew, Ecclesiastical Tenants- 
in-Chief, 156, n. 2; Lewis, `The Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 5 April 1327', 243, n. 27. 
139 The Register of Thomas of Corbridge, Lord Archbishop of York, 1300-1304, ed. W. Brown with 
introduction by A. Hamilton Thompson, 2 vols, Surtees Society, cxxxviii, cxli, (1925-8), ii, no. 949. 
140 The Register of William Greenfield, Lord Archbishop of York 1306-1315, ed. W. Brown and A. 
Hamilton Thompson, 5 vols, Surtees Society, cxlv-cliii, (1931-40), iv, no. 2312; Simpkin, `The English 
Army and the Scottish Campaign of 1310-11' (forthcoming). 
14' Registrum Ricardi de Swinfield, Episcopi Herefordensis, A. D. MCCLXII-MCCCXVII, ed. W. W. 
Capes, Canterbury and York Society, vi (1909), 375-6; PDS, 214. 
142 Aspilogia III, i, 455; Liber Quotidianus, 199. 
143 E 101/9/23, m. 2; PDS, 270. 
144 CCW, 493. 
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The number of contracts that have survived account for only a small portion of 
the total feudal service discharged by ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief during the wars of 
Edward I and his son. Nonetheless, it is possible to augment such documents with 
evidence of other connections between ecclesiastics and military leaders, drawn from a 
wider prosopographical analysis. Although only a small number of contracts have come 
down to us, it is clear that many more were drawn up at the time, or that oral agreements 
were made between the two parties. In 1282, the abbot of Winchcombe sent a unit of 
one knight and two sergeants to perform his service of two knights' fees and these men - 
Theobald de Neville, William de Bermingham and James de Eley - duly registered their 
service on behalf of the abbot on 2 August. 145 All three (Neville, Bermingham and a 
James de `Astlegh') also appear on the main horse inventory in the retinue of Nicholas 
de Segrave alongside ten other men: the names of Bermingham and Astlegh are crossed 
through. 146 Although the entry on the inventory is undated, the pay roll shows that 
Segrave and his men entered the king's pay on 9 June. 147 The likelihood is that he had 
contracted with the abbot and that these men stayed in his retinue during their forty days 
of feudal service. For the same campaign, no fewer than six of the sixteen men 
proffered by the bishop of Durham can be traced on the inventory in the retinue of the 
Yorkshire banneret William le Latimer. All six appear on a separate membrane that was 
stitched into the middle of Latimer's retinue and which contained the names of a further 
seven men. 148 For the expedition that resulted in the siege of Caerlaverock eighteen 
years later, three of the men-at-arms proffered by the bishop of Salisbury on 2 July had 
obtained letters of protection in the retinue of John de Ferrers on 28 June, just a few 
days prior to the muster. 149 Some kind of agreement must have been reached between 
Ferrers and the bishop during the days and weeks that preceded the campaign. To give 
one more of many similar examples, the sergeant Stephen de Bannebury was proffered 
by the abbot of St. Augustine's of Canterbury in 1300 and 1303, and in both years he 
appears in the retinue of the Kentish lord Roger le Sauvage within the wider comitiva of 
John de Drokensford. 150 This particular case provides yet more evidence of local 
recruitment networks in action. 
So far we have looked at the way that the feudal contingents, both of lay and 
ecclesiastical tenants-in-chief, were woven into the retinues within royal armies. The 
145 PW, i, 228. 
146 C 47/2/7, m. 8. 
147 E 101/4/1, m. 2. 
148 PW, i, 228; C 47/2/7, mm. 4,6. 
149 PDS, 221; C 67/14, m. 11. 
150 1300 (PDS, 210; E 101/8/23, m. 7); 1303 (E 101/612/29, m. 1; E 101/612/11, m. 5). 
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main point arising from this investigation is that, fundamentally, `feudal' soldiers were 
no different from other men-at-arms within the armies: they were flexible and might 
take part in royal campaigns in a number of different ways. During times of war, men 
were needed not only to serve in the main field armies, but also in the garrisons in 
occupied territories. As such, it should not occasion surprise to find that `feudal' 
soldiers, like other men-at-arms, sometimes discharged their service within these 
garrisons. Helena Chew noted how the bishop of Hereford's contingent in 1282 was 
sent to serve under Roger de Mortimer at Builth. l51 This was not an isolated incident; in 
fact, there was clearly quite a long tradition of this practice as `feudal' soldiers had been 
sent to serve in the garrisons of the March during the Welsh wars of Henry 111. ' 52 This 
practice probably varied from campaign to campaign depending on the exigencies of the 
moment, but in 1282, at least, the proffer roll contains several references to men who 
performed their service in the castles of the March, including William le Botiller of 
Wem and Hugh de Wlonkeslowe at their local fort of Shrewsbury. ' 53 One interesting 
example relating to the Scottish campaign of Edward II in 1310-11 suggests that the 
feudal contingents might sometimes have performed their service together in the 
garrisons en bloc, under the command of one of the leading men in their group. On 10 
September, John de Grey proffered two knights and nine servientes at the feudal muster 
at Tweedmouth in fulfilment of his feudal obligations. ' 54 In July the following year, as 
this campaign was stuttering to a close, one of these knights, Edmund de Hastings, 
could be found in command of six of Grey's sergeants in the garrison of Dundee. ' 55 
Evidently, Grey had contracted with Hastings for his feudal service. In fact, Hastings 
was probably leading these men-at-arms in the Scottish garrisons from the beginning of 
the campaign the previous autumn: he had received a prest on 11 November 1310 for 
service in the garrison at Perth with twelve men-at-arms, under the command of Henry 
de Beaumont. 156 A sergeant named Alexander de Vaux, who was proffered by John de 
Noers at the muster on 10 September 1310 immediately after Grey's unit had registered 
their names with the marshal, also appears under Hastings in the garrison at Dundee the 
following summer. 157 It seems likely that feudal soldiers were sometimes grouped 
together during the mustering process. Indeed, the order in which soldiers were 
151 Chew, Ecclesiastical Tenants-in-Chief, 94. 
152 Walker, `The Anglo-Welsh Wars', 277-8. 
153 PW, i, 233. 
154 PW, II, ii, 402. 
155 CDS, iii, 430. 
'56 BL, Cotton Nero C VIII, f. 43v. 
157 PW9 II, ii, 402; CDS, iii, 430. 
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registered on the proffer rolls may provide clues as to the ways in which they performed 
their service. 
Many other interesting phenomena arise from a detailed study of the proffer rolls 
and a prosopographical analysis of the soldiers who performed feudal service. On some 
campaigns, one finds examples of tenants-in-chief who not only made proffers, but who 
also appear in the feudal contingents of other tenants-in-chief. One such man was 
Ingelram de Berenger, who gave service on behalf of the abbess of Wilton in 1300 two 
days before fulfilling his own obligations. 158 Alternatively, the same group of men-at- 
arms sometimes discharged the service of more than one tenant-in-chief. In 1282, three 
of the sergeants proffered at the feudal muster by John de la Mare also served in the 
contingent of the abbot of Malmesbury: some kind of compromise had probably been 
reached between the two men. ' 59 One thing that is clear is that `feudal' soldiers should 
not be bracketed as particular types of soldier who were somehow different from other 
men-at-arms. As we saw earlier in this chapter, `feudal' soldiers might alternate 
between gratuitous, paid and feudal service, whilst a few of the sergeants who were 
proffered at the muster in 1300 appear to have had links to the county levies in that 
year. 160 More particularly, there is little reason to believe that `feudal' soldiers and the 
raising of the feudal levy had a detrimental impact on the way that these armies 
operated in the field. Even if `feudal' soldiers were only obliged to join the armies for 
forty days, that was forty days for which the Crown did not need to pay them and could 
save on its resources. After that, if it wished, it was simple enough for the Crown to take 
the `feudal' soldiers over into pay, or for these men to carry on as many others did 
without receiving such wages. Finally, so far as the structures of these armies are 
concerned, it is difficult to see how the feudal contingents could have undermined the 
performance of English armies. Certainly, it would seem that hosts raised partly through 
the traditional feudal summons would have looked very much the same as armies that 
were not. It would have made no sense for the king to arrange his host any differently in 
1300 or 1303, when feudal levies were called on, than he had at Falkirk when no feudal 
summons was issued. The evidence gathered here, showing that `feudal' soldiers were 
integrated within retinues that included men serving for pay and gratuitously, 
demonstrates that there would have been no need for him to have done so. To 
158 PDS, 216,221. 
159 PW, i, 228,231. 
160 Men by the names of Philip Burnel, Roger de Swerkeston, Robert de Mandeville, Thomas de Norton 
and Roger de Watford are listed in the pay accounts as "de diversis comitatibus" in the summer of 1300 
and appear on the proffer roll in that year: PDS, 212,217,220,224,228; Liber Quotidianus, 
224,233- 
234. 
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summarise, distinctions between paid, `feudal' and gratuitous soldiers simply distort a 
less complex reality in which soldiers were soldiers and armies were armies, however 
we choose to label them. The real key to the organisation of these hosts was not the 
methods by which soldiers were or were not paid, but how they were recruited at ground 
level. 
THE END OF AN ERA 
In recent years, the theory that the reign of Edward I witnessed fundamental changes in 
the way that English armies were recruited and organised in the field has been 
superseded by a new consensus emphasising continuity with previous reigns. Far from 
1272 constituting a break with the past, the armies of Edward I (and indeed those of his 
son) differed little in fundamentals from those put into the field by John and Henry 
III 161 `In terms of tactics and organization, the historian searches in vain for a "military 
revolution" in this period. Instead we detect developments more fragmented and 
subtle'. 162 The progress made under Edward I had less to do with advances in battlefield 
tactics or in the way that armies were structured, than with the sheer size of the forces 
that he was able to raise for his campaigns in Wales and Scotland. 163 Particularly large 
armies were gathered for the Welsh wars of 1282-3 and 1294-5,164 whilst as we have 
seen, an estimated 30,000 men took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298. Warfare on 
this scale was made possible by fundamental improvements in the way that the 
campaigns were managed and administered and, in particular, by the system of war 
finance that was supervised by the wardrobe clerks. The conquest of Wales owed more 
to the increased capacity of the English state to pay for those wars, partly through the 
exploitation of a system of credit finance, than to any drastic alterations in weaponry, 
strategy, tactics or armour. 165 One of the factors that gave this period its unity and which 
was brought to an end by the English defeat at Bannockburn in 1314, an event now 
regarded as the true watershed in the warfare of the period, was the important role 
161 For John, see A. R. Fisher, `The Organisation of War in England under John, 1199-1216', University of 
Hull D. Phil. thesis, 1997,81-2. 
162 N. Housley, `European Warfare, c. 1200-1320', Medieval Warfare: A History, ed. M. Keen (Oxford, 
1999), 114. 
163 On the lack of tactical progress, see M. Prestwich, `England and Scotland during the 
Wars of 
Independence', England and her Neighbours, 1066-1453: Essays in Honour of Pierre Chaplais, ed. M. 
Jones and M. Vale (London, 1989), 189. 
164 Prestwich, Plantagenet England, 163. 
165 Cf. Prestwich, War, Politics and Finance, chapters 7-9, but also W. M. Ormrod, `State-Building and 
State Finance in the Reign of Edward I', England in the Thirteenth Century, ed. W. M. Ormrod (Stamford, 
1991), 15-35, for a more sceptical discussion. 
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played by heavy cavalry. 166 Whether or not `cavalry was the essential feature of a 
medieval army', as R. H. C. Davis put it, 167 there can be no doubt that the genteel ranks 
fought on horseback throughout most of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, 
including at the pitched battles of Lewes, Evesham, Falkirk and Bannockburn. Sir 
Thomas Gray's account of the debacle in 1314, when the army leaders `mounted on 
horseback in great consternation, for they were not at all used to dismounting to fight on 
foot', must remain definitive on this point. 168 In this respect, the hosts of Henry III, 
Edward I and Edward II were distinct from royal armies of earlier and later periods in 
which the aristocracy were regularly required to dismount to fight on foot. There are 
therefore strong grounds for regarding Bannockburn as the end of an era for English 
warfare in the Middle Ages, one that reached its apogee under Edward I. 
That Edward I and Edward II were conservative in the methods that they used to 
recruit soldiers and organise them in the field is supported by their repeated resort to the 
feudal host for most of their campaigns. Both kings did make important innovations, 
such as their attempts to create a new form of military obligation based on the landed 
wealth of the subject, but there is little evidence to suggest that this was ever intended to 
replace the traditional servicium debitum. The claim by the magnates at the York 
parliament in 1300 that they did not owe feudal service in Scotland, and the successful 
bid by the king to refute those claims by appeal to the chronicles, shows that it was the 
king, not the aristocracy, who wished to maintain that method of recruitment. ' 69 As we 
have seen, such conservatism does not appear to have had a detrimental impact on the 
way that English armies were recruited and structured. It must remain extremely 
doubtful as to whether soldiers such as Robert del Escheker, who campaigned under 
John de Engayne in the non-feudal army in Flanders in 1297 before giving feudal 
service in the same lord's retinue in 1300, carried out their military service any 
differently when they gave feudal service from when they did not. 170 Of course, the way 
that soldiers appear to have been recruited and organised in the Crown records may not 
always reflect the way that they fought on campaign. Anne Curry's cautionary note, that 
166 For the impact of Bannockburn, see Verbruggen, The Art of Warfare, 72; Ayton, Knights and 
Warhorses, 18. 
167 R. H. C. Davis, The Medieval Warhorse: Origin, Development and Redevelopment (London, 1989), 11. 
For more nuanced views on infantry and cavalry forces, see J. Gillingham, `Richard I and the Science of 
War in the Middle Ages', War and Government in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honour of J. O. Prestwich, 
ed. J. Gillingham and J. C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 91; S. Morillo, `Milites, Knights and Samurai: 
Military Terminology, Comparative History, and the Problem of Translation', The Normans and their 
Adversaries at War: Essays in Memory of C. Warren Hollister, ed. R. P. Abels and B. S. Bachrach 
(Woodbridge, 2001), 167-84. 
168 Scalacronica, 75. 
169 Bury St. Edmunds, 156. 
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`organisation for war is not necessarily the same as organisation in war', serves as a 
useful warning in this respect. 171 However, given the absence of more conclusive 
evidence, the service records remain our best bet if we wish to reconstruct the wad- that 
medieval armies functioned when in formation and fought in the field. So far as feudal 
service is concerned, a prosopographical analysis of the administrative records can tell 
us much more about how these units were organised and integrated into the armies than 
any other methodological approach. We will never know for certain whether William de 
St. John, who received a letter of protection with Robert Fitz Nigel in April 1303 before 
being proffered by Hugh de Vere in June, gave his feudal service in Fitz Nigel's retinue 
in that year or not. That he did so is likely given that he had served alongside Fitz Nigel 
within Vere's retinue in the past. ' 72 The least that we can say is that that scenario is 
highly probable. It is far more profitable to attempt to reconstruct English armies in this 
way than to rely on brief and vague descriptions in the chronicles, or on rare fragments 
that may give some direct insight into military organisation but which in isolation can 
ultimately tell us little. The records for military service yield a great deal about 
medieval armies that would otherwise inevitably be obscured. 
For all that the quasi-feudal army might have functioned effectively under 
Edward I and Edward II, it was ultimately abandoned, despite a brief revival under 
Richard II, following the Weardale campaign of 1327.173 If the armies raised partly by 
means of the feudal summons were structured and organised in the same way as those 
that were not, then why the need for change? Although some armies for which a feudal 
summons were issued, such as that of 1314, failed to obtain the desired results, others, 
such as those gathered in 1282 and 1303, were successful. Furthermore, many armies 
that were raised later in the century under the unpopular leadership of Richard II were 
as ineffective as those raised by Edward 11.174 This suggests that military success and 
failure often had more to do with leadership than with whether the armies were feudal 
or paid. Explanations of the decline of feudal service must, therefore, take other factors 
into account. Perhaps the most convincing explanation is also the simplest: that feudal 
service became surplus to requirements once the focus of royal campaigns had shifted to 
"1 A. Curry, `Medieval Warfare. England and her Continental Neighbours, Eleventh to the Fourteenth 
Centuries', Journal of Medieval History, xxiv (1998), 95. 
172 1303 (C 67 15, m. 13. E 101 612 29, m. 2); 1300 (C 67/14. m. 12): 1301 (C 67/14, m. 4). 
173 For the summons of 1385, see N. B. Lewis, 'The Last Medieval Summons of the English Feudal Lev\. 
13 June 1385'. EHR, lxxiii (1958), 1-26; J. J. N. Palmer, The Last Summons of the Feudal Army in 
England (1385)', EHR, lxxxiii (1968), 771-75. and N. B. Lewis, `The Feudal Summons of 1385', EHR. c 
(1985). 729-43. On 1327, see A. E. Prince, `The Importance of the Campaign of 1327', EHR, 1 (1935). 
'99-302, which shows that innovation and feudal service were not irreconcilable. 
114 Powicke, Afilitan Obligation, 166. 
212 
the continent. During the twelfth century, attempts to enforce feudal service for overseas 
campaigns were unpopular: both Henry I and Henry II relied on non-feudal soldiers for 
their continental campaigns after Tinchebray. 175 The same problem - how to encourage 
an aristocracy that had previously been unwilling to serve overseas to follow him to 
France - probably gave Edward III and his advisors recourse to a similar rethink during 
the 1330s and `40s. Certainly, A. E. Prince was of the opinion that the requirements of 
overseas campaigns `dealt the coup de grace to the feudal method of enlistment'. 176 
Once armies raised by indenture had proven their worth, there would have been no need 
to return to an older system which, though perfectly adequate at the time, had now been 
replaced by a better one. Whatever the reason for this transformation, it is important to 
stress that there were many points of continuity across the dividing line of 
Bannockburn, the impact of which only began to be fully worked out once Edward II 
had been forcibly removed from the throne. l" J. E. Morris noted that `with all its faults 
the feudal system lent itself to the new [paid] one'. 178 The contracts that were so 
essential a feature of the system that replaced feudalism had already, as we have seen, 
been employed for the provision of feudal service prior to its demise. 179 Finally, it is 
interesting to find that the forty-day period, usually associated with feudal service, was 
still being envisaged as a unit of account for paid service prior to the proposed 
180 continental campaign in 1341. 
The most important aspect of continuity between the quasi-feudal armies of 
Edward I and Edward II and the later hosts of Edward III lay in the way in which the 
retinues were composed. As Philippe Contamine has observed, during the age of wholly 
paid armies soldiers `came to the assembly point in family, feudal or regional groups 
and continued to fight in the service of their rightful sovereign. . . 
but under the orders of 
their immediate natural lords. In other words, they left home together in their customary 
social formations'. 181 The transition from feudal to paid service, a lengthy and gradual 
process which was never inevitable, did not suddenly transform the English aristocracy 
from occasional campaigners into full-time professionals or mercenaries. The nature of 
the obligation had altered, but the tightly-knit social bonds between the men in the 
175 S. Painter, Studies in the History of the English Feudal Barony (Baltimore, Maryland, 1943), 32-3; 
C. W. Hollister, The Military Organization of Norman England (Oxford, 1965), 123-4. 
176 A. E. Prince, `The Payment of Army Wages in Edward III's Reign', Speculum, xix (1944), 152. 
177 On the attempts at innovation made by Edward II in response to Bannockburn, see Powicke, Military 
Obligation, chapter 8. 
178 Morris, Welsh Wars, 70. 
179 Lewis, `The Summons of the English Feudal Levy, 5 April 1327', 242. 
180 M. Prestwich, `English Armies in the Early Stages of the Hundred Years War: A Scheme in 1341', 
BIHR, lvi (1983), 102,107. 
181 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, 99. 
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retinues for the most part remained the same. Even as late as the duke of York's 
expedition of 1441, an English lord's retinue normally comprised `his own family, his 
household, tenants, neighbours and well-wishers'. 182 Whether men like Edmund de 
Wasteneys and Roger de Swynnerton, who gave feudal service in Edward II's army of 
1310 and later went on to fight at Halidon Hill, would have noticed any major changes 
in military service during the course of their careers, other than the important fact that 
they were now being required to fight on foot, is difficult to discern. 183 It may be that 
the changes in the way that English armies were recruited and organised under Edward 
III had a more profound effect on the yeomanry than on the ranks of the gentry. 
Whatever the truth of this, it would be wrong to regard the reforms of Edward III as a 
necessary consequence of the inadequacies of the feudal system. War was a major 
preoccupation of the Crown and aristocracy in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth 
centuries. We should therefore assume that they knew how to conduct it, irrespective of 
the types of military obligation employed. 
182 A. Marshall, `The Role of English War Captains in England and Normandy, 1436-1461', The 
University of Wales: University College, Swansea, M. A. thesis (1974), 100. 
183 Wasteneys: PW, II, ii, 403; C 71/13, m. 31. Swynnerton: PW, II, ii, 406; Rotuli Scotiae, i, 253. 
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Conclusion 
This study has focussed primarily on three main areas of enquiry: the Edwardian 
soldier; the retinues that he led to war or in which he served; and the armies at large. 
Upon completion, it is appropriate to reflect upon each of these units of investigation 
and what they can tell us about the military activities of the aristocracy during the wars 
of Edward I and Edward II. One thing that can be said with certainty is that most genteel 
families had representatives who fought in the king's wars at least some of the time. No 
fewer than 80 per cent of the knights listed on the Lord Marshal's Roll (405 out of 499 
individuals) and the Parliamentary Roll of Arms (714 out of 854 knights bachelor) can 
be traced in the military records between the first Welsh war and the battle of 
Bannockburn. These figures give a numerical dimension to notions of aristocratic 
militarization and demonstrate the close connection that existed between martial display 
and martial reality during these years. That the demands of warfare made the greatest 
call on the financial and energy reserves of the landholding elite should not occasion 
surprise, but perhaps more striking is the extent of this commitment and the vast 
numbers of men involved. It has traditionally been assumed that the wars of Edward I 
and his successors affected but a particular section of the landholding community and 
that most members of the gentry went about their business as usual in the years that the 
king's armies set out. A. L. Brown has surmised that during the later Middle Ages, `the 
values of the upper ranks of society were certainly chivalrous and military, but it was a 
somewhat artificial chivalry, and enthusiasm for war had to be cultivated by the king. 
Among the gentry in particular there were many men who were not bellicose, and the 
same was true of the lesser people in the community'. ' However, the repeated and 
frequent service given by the knights who fought at Falkirk, together with the large 
proportion of bachelors named on the PRA who had accompanied the king and his 
household to war at some point in their lives, indicates that the wars of Edward I and his 
son affected a much broader cross section of English landholding society than has 
generally been perceived. 
The average genteel soldier who fought in the king's hosts remains something of 
an abstraction: no amount of work in the archives can ever fully restore a perfect image 
of the Edwardian combatant. `Record', J. C. Holt once remarked, `gives us for each man 
I A. L. Brown, The Governance of Late Medieval England 12 72-1461 (London, 1989), 88. 
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a skeleton biography, ,2 yet among historians there must always be a lingering regret that 
the bare bones can never be more than partly fleshed out. In attempting to reconstruct 
the military activities of the aristocracy on a national scale over a period spanning forty 
years and more, it has been difficult to make anything more than the most fleeting of 
acquaintances with the dramatis personae named in this study. Nevertheless, by 
carrying out a large-scale prosopographical analysis, it has been possible to reach some 
conclusions which more than compensate for the inevitable loss of detail in places. Only 
by casting the interpretive net beyond the county or region can one provide universal 
answers to the kind of questions that have been framed here - such as how frequently 
Edwardian men-at-arms gave military service, and how they combined such duties with 
their responsibilities in the shires. In contrast to many of the landholders who took part 
in Edward I's initial expedition as king in 1277 and who `must', according to J. E. 
Morris, `have been utterly without experience', 3 the vast majority of those who fought 
at Bannockburn would have been well acquainted with the rigours of warfare. Among 
the older men who took part in the Falkirk campaign of 1298, the greater part had seen 
active service either in Wales or France. Of the younger generation, meanwhile, there 
were few who did not go on to become regular campaigners on the almost annual 
expeditions that were launched north of the border. The wars in Scotland have fittingly 
been described as a `proving ground' for the aristocracy. 4 Between 1272 and 1314, the 
English gentry and nobility learned a great deal about the sacrifices and hardships that 
came with regular campaigning in the king's armies. When the time arrived during the 
reign of Edward III to transfer that knowledge to France, they were consequently well 
prepared for all eventualities. 
By focussing on the backgrounds and experiences of individual soldiers, it has 
been possible to trace the armies that were raised during these years back to the regions 
and localities from which they arose. Each man-at-arms was but a single link in an 
intricate web of relationships that spanned the realm. Through an investigation of these 
personal connections, one can at least begin to reconstruct the main characteristics of 
the armies at large. In the Middle Ages, `mounted warriors were obtained, trained and 
retained, not by central governments raising cavalry regiments from public funds as in 
the modern period, but by lordship and vassalage and by the integrating and overlapping 
2 Holt, The Northerners, 18. 
3 Moms, Welsh Wars, 127. 
4 Prestwich, The Three Edwards, chapter 2. 
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institutions of the household and the fiefs Consequently, the retinue holds the key to a 
comprehensive and systematic study of military organisation under the first two 
Edwards. The traditional view is that the companies that were led to war in this period 
lacked stability in membership. However, the findings made here suggest that the 
evidence on this subject needs to be reassessed. Whilst soldiers did serve under different 
lords and change their allegiances on a fairly regular basis, there was also a measure of 
continuity in the bonds between lords and their men that should not be overlooked. 
What mattered was not that each lord led the same troop of men on every campaign, but 
that a sufficiently large group should stick together so as to contribute substantially 
towards the esprit de corps of the retinue. In this context, it is worth bearing in mind 
John Keegan's words, `that ordinary soldiers do not think of themselves, in life and 
death situations, as subordinate members of whatever formal military organization it is 
to which authority has assigned them, but as equals within a very tiny group - perhaps 
no more than six or seven men'. 6 Although written primarily with modern armies in 
mind, the importance of `primary groups' to medieval forces has also received some 
attention in recent years, and may assist in overcoming many of the widely-held 
prejudices against pre-modern hosts. 7 
When viewed in isolation, these points about aristocratic militarization and 
retinue stability may appear to be of secondary importance by comparison with subjects 
that have tended to receive more attention, such as logistics, war finance and, in more 
recent years, developments in strategy and tactics. 8 Nevertheless, understanding how 
these armies were recruited can possibly contribute more than any of the above to our 
understanding of the way that Edwardian hosts functioned and performed when on 
campaign. We have often been told of how cavalrymen during the high Middle Ages 
were individuals who found it difficult to conform to the mentality or the discipline of 
the group. For Nigel Saul, chivalry was an individualistic cult, and `what mattered' most 
in this age were therefore `the brave deeds of brave men'. 
9 Even so, individual valour 
and bravery were not necessarily irreconcilable with the `small group' ethos. The 
retinue, which was without doubt the fundamental and most important unit of military 
recruitment and organisation in the armies of Edward I and Edward II, was the perfect 
5 R. A. Brown, `The Status of the Norman Knight', Anglo-Norman Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon 
and Anglo-Norman Military Organization and Warfare (Woodbridge, 
1992), 138. 
6 J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, 1976), 53. 
7 Ayton, `The English Army at Crecy', 229. 
8 For grand strategy in fourteenth-century armies, see 
C. J. Rogers, War Cruel and Sharp: English 
Strategy under Edward III, 132 7-1360 (Woodbridge, 
2000). 
9 N. Saul, ed. Age of Chivalry: Art and Society in Late 
Medieval England (London, 1992), 7. 
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medium through which the requirements of group discipline and individual honour 
could simultaneously be channelled. After all, what good are deeds of bravery and 
courage if one has no colleagues, family members and friends to witness them? We can 
assume that it was, in fact, the competitiveness of the small group and the experience of 
campaigning together that drove Edwardian men-at-arms towards great feats of arms, as 
well as knowing that performance in the field would influence the way that they would 
be perceived by their peers when they returned to their manors during peacetime. This, 
rather than any isolated notion of daredevil valour, was what drove the medieval 
aristocrat to excel in war. Such an interpretation is given further credence by the many 
heraldic connections between men-at-arms who fought together on campaign, for was 
this not the ultimate symptom of a `small-group' mentality? Soldiers of this era had 
numerous ties to lords, friends, kinsmen and neighbours. Whilst such overlapping 
commitments inevitably introduced a degree of fluidity into their social and military 
relationships, the dissemination of arms among such men demonstrates that group 
identities, however fleeting, were as central to the chivalrous ethos as more selfish 
concerns. 
That there was some stability in the composition of the hosts gathered in the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, both among the soldiers who served and in the 
units in which they fought, enables us to assess the likely effectiveness of these armies 
with greater precision. Had the structure and composition of these retinues changed 
almost completely from one campaign to the next then it is unlikely that they could have 
functioned at all smoothly in the heat of battle. However, this was evidently not the 
case, and if around 40 or 50 per cent of the men in a lord's retinue had served with him 
on at least one other occasion at some point in the past, as happened in most instances, 
then it is probable that these armies, when led by wise and respected commanders, were 
perfectly efficient and competent by the far from negligible standards of their time. 
Further credence is given to this positive assessment by the evidence relating to the 
structure and organisation of the feudal army which, despite receiving a great deal of 
attention (and comments of varying degrees of negativity) from numerous historians, 
has never previously been studied from the perspectives of the soldiers concerned. In 
the light of the research carried out here, not only is it clear that the armies of the first 
two Edwards, whether of the feudal or non-feudal variety, relied for their quality on the 
networks of relations between men-at-arms within the retinues, just as with the later 
hosts of Edward III, but there is also reason to believe that the transition from the 
`quasi-feudal' armies of the reigns of Edward I and his predecessors to the wholly paid 
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hosts of the 1330s onwards constituted less a revolutionary rupture than a natural 
progression in military organisation. Whilst there is no doubt that `the English army 
underwent important organizational, structural, and administrative changes in the 
decades between Bannockburn and the opening of the Hundred Years War', it may be 
that such reforms simply involved tinkering with pre-existing systems of recruitment 
and organisation. 10 Certainly, the rapidity with which these new procedures were put 
into effect during the 1330s and 1340s suggests that they cannot have been completely 
alien to the older generation of soldiers. 
Ultimately, it may be some time before the picture of the military activities of 
the thirteenth- and fourteenth-century aristocracy can be restored in its entirety. The 
need to know more about the men who served within Edwardian armies so as better to 
understand the impact of war on the societies from which these armies arose has already 
been noted by Andrew Ayton. ll Although this study has endeavoured to make a 
contribution towards that end, much additional work remains to be done. For example, 
the motives that led members of the gentry to serve in the armies of the first two 
Edwards. This is a particularly interesting area of study given that the wars of the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries are generally held to have been far less 
lucrative for the soldiers who took part in them than those of a later period. The 
experience of Gilbert Pecche, who had to wait until a lay subsidy was levied in Kent in 
1302 before his wage arrears could be met for service in Gascony in the 1290s, provides 
just one of many examples of men who were left out of pocket because of their 
commitment to the king's cause. 12 There is also much scope for work on the 
contribution of non-English soldiers to the Edwardian war effort, for men-at-arms from 
Gascony, Wales, Scotland and Ireland all played a significant part in the armies of 
Edward I and his son, one that has not sufficiently been recognised in this study. 
Despite these obvious lacunae, there are strong grounds for optimism given what has 
already been achieved. English armies of the Hundred Years War and the men-at-arms 
who fought in them are now, owing to the work of Ayton, Anne Curry and others, much 
better understood than they were just a couple of decades ago. If this study 
has 
demonstrated the benefits of applying the same methodological approach to the armies 
of a slightly earlier period then it will have achieved one of its main objectives. 
lo C. J. Rogers, "`As if a New Sun had Arisen": England's Fourteenth-Century RMA', The Dynamics of 
Military Revolution 1300-2050, ed. M. Knox and W. Murray (Cambridge, 2001), 23. 
11 Ayton, Knights and Warhorses, 2. 
12 E 179/237/52, mm. 1,2. 
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Appendix: Personnel continuity for 50 sample retinues 
on the Falkirk campaign of 1298 (1277-1314)' 
Leader Number of men with % Times served with leader 
leader: continuity other than in 1298: 
In 1298 In 1298 (who 1234567 
also served in 
other year) 
Audley 15 2 13 1 1 - - --- 
Badlesmere 4 1 25 - 1 - - --- 
Bardolf 14 6 43 2 2 1 1 - -- 
Basset 11 3 27 2 - 1 - --- 
J. Beauchamp 11 7 64 4 1 2 - --- 
W. Beauchamp 25 16 64 6 2 2 4 2-- 
Beaumont 5 4 80 - 1 1 2 - -- 
Benstede 14 9 64 2 5 2 - --- 
Botetourt 16 11 69 7 2 1 - 1-- 
Brun 8 7 88 3 4 - - --- 
Bykenore 3 2 66 1 - - - 1-- 
Cantilupe 11 2 18 1 - 1 - --- 
Charles 4 4 100 2 2 - - --- 
Chavent 16 12 75 7 3 1 - 1-- 
Clifford 34 18 53 5 7 1 2 111 
Courtenay 11 5 45 2 1 2 - --- 
Despenser 49 18 37 6 3 5 - 112 
Drokensford 25 14 56 4 4 5 1 --- 
Echingham 5 3 60 3 - - - --- 
Fitz Payn 19 8 42 3 2 1 1 - 1- 
Fitz Reginald 4 0 0 - - - - --- 
Fitz Waryn 5 3 60 3 - - - --- 
Furnivall 10 3 30 2 1 - - --- 
Grandison 9 1 11 - 1 - - --- 
Hacche 12 8 66 3 2 3 - --- 
Haustede 3 2 66 1 - 1 - --- 
Havering 25 2 8 2 - - - --- 
Kyngeston 3 0 0 - - - - --- 
Lancaster 45 14 31 7 3 4 - --- 
Leyburn 15 9 60 2 2 1 1 3 -- 
Lovel 5 2 40 - - 1 - -1- 
Malemains 3 2 66 2 - - - --- 
Mauley 4 1 25 1 - - - --- 
Meynill 7 2 29 1 - 1 - --- 
Mohaut 15 8 53 - 3 1 3 1 -- 
Montacute 9 1 11 1 - - - --- 
H. Mortimer 9 0 0 - - - - --- 
R. Mortimer 20 11 55 3 4 1 1 1 1- 
Pichard 2 0 0 - - - - --- 
Pipard 20 5 25 4 1 - - --- 
Plukenet 4 4 100 - 1 3 - --- 
220 
Pointz 5 4 80 - 2 2---- 
Ryther 8 1 13 1 - ----- 
Scales 7 3 43 - - -12-- 
Tony 17 10 59 5 4 1---- 
Tregoz 12 1 8 1 - ----- 
Tuchet 4 3 75 1 1 1-- -- 
Valence 49 27 55 16 6 12-2- 
Verdon 2 2 100 1 - 1---- 
Welles 14 8 57 2 4 1-1 -- 
Total 647 289 45 120 76 49 19 15 73 
' The full names of the 50 leaders in the sample are as follows: Nicholas de Audley, Bartholomew de 
Badlesmere, Hugh Bardolf, Ralph Basset of Drayton, John de Beauchamp of Somerset, Walter de 
Beauchamp, Henry de Beaumont, John de Benstede, Thomas de Bykenore, John Botetourt, William le 
Brun, William de Cantilupe, Edward Charles, Peter/John de Chavent, Robert de Clifford, Hugh de 
Courtenay, Hugh le Despenser senior/junior, John de Drokensford, William de Echingham, Robert Fitz 
Payn, John Fitz Reginald, Fulk Fitz Waryn, Thomas de Furnivall, William de Grandison, Eustace de 
Hacche, Robert de Haustede senior/junior, John de Havering, John de Kyngeston, Thomas of Lancaster, 
William de Leyburn, Richard Lovel, Nicholas de Malemains, Edmund de Mauley, Nicholas de Meynill 
senior/junior, Robert de Mohaut, Simon de Montacute, Hugh de Mortimer, Roger de Mortimer of Chirk, 
Miles Pichard, Ralph Pipard, Alan Plukenet senior/junior, Hugh Pointz, William de Ryther, Robert de 
Scales, Robert de Tony, John Tregoz, William Tuchet, Aymer de Valence, Thomas de Verdon and Adam 
de Welles. 
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